


S 310B



Total Army Training System Courseware

COMBAT OPERATIONS

36
CREDIT HOURS

CENTER FOR ARMY TACTICS (CTAC)

U. S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS

S 310B/8

SUBCOURSE

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PREFACE

“The art of war has no traffic with rules, for the infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce the same situation twice. Mission, terrain, weather, dispositions, armament, morale, supply, and comparative strength are variables whose mutations always combine to form a new tactical pattern. Thus, in battle, each situation is unique and must be solved on its own merits.”

“It follows, then, that the leader who would become a competent tactician must first close his mind to the formulae that well-meaning people offer in the name of victory, To master his difficult art he must learn to cut to the heart of a situation, recognize its decisive elements and base his course of action on these. The ability to do this is not God-given, nor can it be acquired overnight; it is a process of years. He must realize that training in solving problems of all types, long practice in making clear, unequivocal decisions, the habit of concentrating on the question at hand, and an elasticity of mind, are indispensable requisites for the successful practice of the art of war.”

“The leader who frantically strives to remember what someone else did in some slightly similar situation has already set his feet on a well-traveled road to ruin.”

Colonel George C. Marshall, *Infantry in Battle*, 1939

S310B, Combat Operations, exposes the professional soldier to the tools he needs to plan and conduct warfare.

This course is the initial attempt at aligning the tactics instruction for the United States Army Nonresident Command and General Staff Officers Course with the Resident Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) under the Total Army School System (TASS). This course replicates the resident course C310, Combat Operations.

S310B provides you a detailed study and application of the tactical decisionmaking process (TDMP) using a heavy maneuver brigade as the learning model. The skills and knowledge you acquire in S310B will be the basis for corps and division operations in later tactics courses.

NOTE: The words “he” or “his”, when used in this publication, represent both the masculine and feminine genders unless otherwise specifically stated.

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COMBAT OPERATIONS

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COMBAT OPERATIONS**REFERENCES**

The following references were used in the development of this subcourse. You will not receive all of these references with your courseware; they are not necessary for you to successfully complete the subcourse. This list is provided so that you will know what references to consult should you want additional information in a particular subject area.

| | |
|------------|--|
| FM 5-100 | <i>Engineer Combat Operations, Nov 88</i> |
| FM 6-20 | <i>Fire Support in the Airland Battle, May 88</i> |
| FM 6-20-10 | <i>Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process, May 96</i> |
| FM 6-20-30 | <i>Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support For Corps and Division Operations, Oct 89</i> |
| FM 6-20-40 | <i>Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy), Jan 90</i> |
| FM 17-95 | <i>Cavalry Operations, Sep 91</i> |
| FM 34-1 | <i>Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) Operations, Sep 94</i> |
| FM 34-2 | <i>Collection Management and Synchronization Planning, Mar 94</i> |
| FM 34-2-1 | <i>Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance, Jun 91</i> |
| FM 34-8 | <i>Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence, Sep 92</i> |
| FM 34-10 | <i>Division Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, Nov 86</i> |
| FM 34-10-2 | <i>Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW Equipment Handbook, Jul 93</i> |
| FM 34-80 | <i>Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, Apr 86</i> |
| FM 34-130 | <i>Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, Jul 94</i> |
| FM 63-2 | <i>Division Support Command, Armored, Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Divisions, May 91</i> |
| FM 63-3 | <i>Corps Support Command, Sep 93</i> |
| FM 63-20 | <i>Forward Support Battalion, Feb 90</i> |
| FM 63-21 | <i>Main Support Battalion, Aug 90</i> |

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| FM 71-2 | <i>The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force</i> , Sep 88 w/C1 dtd 17 Aug 94 |
| FM 71-3 | <i>The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade</i> , Jan 96 |
| FM 71-100 | <i>Division Operations</i> , Aug 96 |
| FM 90-2 | <i>Battlefield Deception</i> , Oct 88 |
| FM 90-20 | <i>J-Fire: Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower</i> , Feb 94 |
| FM 90-21 | <i>JAAT: Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operations</i> , Oct 91 |
| FM 100-5 | <i>Operations</i> , Jun 93 |
| FM 100-9 | <i>Reconstitution</i> , Jan 92 |
| FM 100-15 | <i>Corps Operations</i> , Oct 96 |
| FM 100-103-1 | <i>ICAC²: Multiservice Procedures for Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control</i> , Oct 94 |
| FM 100-103-2 | <i>TAGS: Multiservice Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System</i> , Oct 94 |
| FM 101-5 | <i>Command and Control for Commanders and Staff</i> , Jul 93 (Final Draft) |
| FM 101-5-1 | <i>Operational Terms and Symbols</i> , Oct 85 |
| ST 22-2 | <i>Writing and Speaking Skills for Senior Leaders</i> , Apr 91 |
| ST 63-1 | <i>Division and Corps Logistics</i> , Jul 96 |
| ST 100-3 | <i>CGSC Battle Book</i> , Apr 96 |
| ST 100-7 | <i>OPFOR Battle Book</i> , Apr 96 |
| ST 101-5 | <i>The Tactical Decisionmaking Process</i> , Feb 96 |
| ST 101-6 | <i>G1/G4 Battle Book</i> , Jul 96 |

COMBAT OPERATIONS

Advance Sheet

SCOPE

S310B will provide you with information on how commanders and their staffs plan and conduct combat operations at the tactical level of war. The three lessons in S310B will analyze how brigades fight and sustain themselves on the battlefield.

Lesson 1. Overview of the Tactical Decisionmaking Process

Lesson 2. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

Lesson 3. The Tactical Decisionmaking Process,

Lesson 4. Subcourse Examination

TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVES

TLOs A and B are prerequisite learning objectives that are based on M310A curriculum. You must have a firm grasp of these to achieve the standards outlined in TLO C. Each TLO has several enabling learning objectives (ELOs) that support achievement of one or more aspects of the performance standard for the associated TLO. ELOs are described on the advance sheet of the lesson in which they are accomplished.

A. TASK: Explain United States Army operations doctrine.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement, out of class, and a case study or situation,

STANDARD: The explanation must-

- Address the interrelationship of the three levels of modern warfare; address the interrelationship of the components of combat power; relate the principles of war and the tenets of Army operations; relate the battlefield framework and the battlefield operating systems; address the concepts of mission orders and nesting; and address the general doctrine for offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations IAW FM 71-100, FM 100-5, FM 100-15, and selected readings.
- Address how Air Force support is synchronized with Army ground operations IAW FM 100-103-2.
- Address the tactical logistics functions that support tactical- and operational-level offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations IAW FM 100-5.
- Relate how corps, divisions, and brigades conduct and sustain combat operations IAW FM 71-100, FM 100-15, ST 63-1, and ST 100-3.

LEVEL: Comprehension

PJE Phase I Objective Numbers: 1a, 1b, 2a, 3e, 5b, and 5c.

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B. TASK: Explain the structure and missions of logistics organizations at the tactical level of war.

CONDITION: With references, out of class, given a situation and a written requirement

STANDARD: The explanation must-

- Identify those company-sized units that exist in the heavy division support command.
- Identify those units that normally operate in the corps support group (forward) that is in support of a divisional sector.
- Differentiate between the composition and missions of the corps support group (forward) and the corps support group (rear).
- Determine the capability of combat service support units at the tactical level of war.
- Be IAW FM 100-5, ST 63-1, and ST 101-6.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE Phase I Objective Numbers: 1a and 1e.

C. TASK: Explain combined arms operations at the tactical level of war.

CONDITION: Acting as a staff officer, given the higher headquarters plans and higher commanders' intents; appropriate references; data bases for terrain and weather; friendly and enemy statuses, locations, and movements; and a written requirement, out of class.

STANDARD: The explanation must-

- Offer a solution that is feasible with respect to the mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and time (METT-T).
- Employ and array forces, and synchronize combat power within the battlefield framework IAW FM 71-3, ST 101-5, FM 34-130, FM 6-20-10, and the S310B Advance Book.
- Integrate the actions of direct and general support units, management centers, and command and control headquarters responsible for the execution of the tactical logistics functions IAW FM 100-5, ST 63-1, and ST 101-6.
- Be developed IAW the procedures described in ST 101-5
- Employ conventional military terminology and symbology outlined in FM 101-5-1 and ST 100-3.
- Be communicated effectively IAW the writing and briefing techniques described ST 101-5.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE Phase I Objective Number: 1a.

EVALUATION

1. GENERAL

CGSC Circular 351-3, CGSC's NonResident Catalog, provides guidelines for the evaluation of student academic performance. There is no intent here to repeat CGSC directives described in the reference, but only to specify how this subcourse implements those policies.

2. GRADES

a. General. You will receive one letter grade from the Directorate of NonResident Studies (NRS) that will summarize how well you accomplished the subcourse goal.

b. Grades. Final grades are awarded according to the following point scale.

| <i>Points</i> | <i>Grade</i> | <i>Description</i> |
|---------------|--------------|---|
| 90 to 100 | A | You have exceeded the subcourse goal. |
| 80 to 89 | B | You have met the subcourse goal. |
| 70 to 79 | C | You have marginally met the subcourse goal. |
| Less than 70 | U | You have not met the subcourse goal. |

These final points are determined by applying the following weight to the score you achieve on the multiple choice exam.

| <i>Method</i> | <i>Weight (percent)</i> | <i>Technique(s)</i> |
|---------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Exam</i> | 100 | Multiple choice |

Figure 1. S310B evaluation.

c. Subcourse examination. You will receive the examination with the subcourse. The exam will measure your comprehension of the material covered in lesson 1 through 3 and will constitute 100 percent of your course grade.

3. FEEDBACK

a. You will receive a final subcourse score on a Student Evaluation Report (CGSC Form 128). To receive a final score and proceed to the next phase, you must have achieved a passing score on the multiple choice exam. If you do not receive a passing score on the multiple choice exam, you will be sent another exam which will test the same TLOs and ELOs. Refer to CGSC Circular 351-1, the CGSC nonresident catalog, for student assistance telephone numbers and for the academic standards of the course.

COURSE MATERIALS

1. STUDENT ADVANCE ISSUE.

a. The publications listed below were issued with S310A and will be needed for completion of S310B.

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- (1) FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process, Mar 96
- (2) FM 63-2, Division Support Command, May 91.
- (3) FM 63-3, Corps Support Command, Sep 93.
- (4) FM 63-20, Forward Support Battalion, Feb 90.
- (5) FM 63-21, Main Support Battalion, Aug 90.
- (6) FM 63-23, Aviation Support Battalion, Jun 96.
- (7) FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, Sep 88, with change 1 dated 17 Aug 94.
- (8) FM 71-3, Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Jan 96.
- (9) FM 71-100, Division Operations, Aug 96.
- (10) FM 100-5, Operations, June 93.
- (11) FM 100-15, Corps Operations, Oct 96.
- (12) FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols, 21 Oct 85.
- (13) ST 63-1, Division and Corps Logistics, June 96.
- (14) ST 100-3, CGSC Battle Book, June 96.
- (15) ST 100-7, OPFOR Battle Book, Aug 96.
- (16) ST 101-5, Command Staff Processes, Feb 96.
- (17) ST 101-6, G1/G4 Battle Book, Jul 96.

b. The following items were issued with S310B.

- (1) FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, Jul 94
- (2) Map, Series USACGSC 250-140, Western United States, Sheet 1 (St. Joseph - Topeka). 1:250,000, 1976.
- (3) Map D, Kansas-Missouri, 150,000, Leavenworth County, USACGSC 50-359.
- (4) S310B/8 Advance Book.

HOMEWORK

1. Each lesson advance sheet lists specific study questions. Study assignments assure you have the knowledge required to pass the examination. Most study assignments are categorized as *study*, *read*, and *review*.

a. Homework requiring you to *study* expects mastery of the subject matter before you participate in classroom activities.

b. An assignment to *read* requires you to gain sufficient depth to make subjective decisions.

c. Requirements to *review* are self-paced assignments that lend additional depth to your comprehension of the subject matter addressed in the current lesson. Review assignments usually cover information you have previously read or studied in this or another subcourse.

3. Some study assignments may require you to practice a task or perform an analysis in writing. While this is not graded homework in the strictest sense, your performance of these exercises will prepare you to pass the examination.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

Appendix 1 to Advance Sheet, S310B. Program for Joint Education Objectives

It is important for you to recognize both the distinctiveness and interdependence of joint and service schools in the education of officers in joint matters. Joint schools provide joint education from a joint perspective. Service schools provide joint education from a service perspective. The Command and General Staff Officer Course provides you with a service perspective education.

Instruction in S310B complements joint instruction presented thus far in the course. S310B focuses at the brigade level and provides a service perspective of the tactical level of war. In addition, you will see the integration of the sister services in operations conducted at the tactical and operational levels of war.

The highlighted Programs for Joint Education (PJE) Phase I objective is taught in S310B. All of the objectives below were taught in S310A.

- 1a. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces.
- 1b. Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.
- 1e. Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain and train for joint and multinational operations.
- 2a. Comprehend current joint doctrine
- 3e. Summarize the relationships between strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- 5b. Understand how command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C⁴ISR) systems apply at the operational level of war.
- 5c. Comprehend how Joint and Service systems are integrated at the operational level of war.

COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 1. Overview of The Tactical Decisionmaking Process**

Advance Sheet, Lesson 1

SCOPE

This lesson will provide you with an introduction to the TDMP by addressing the systematic approach that commanders and staffs use to make decisions.

ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES

C.01 TASK: Explain the tactical decisionmaking process.

CONDITION: With references, out of class, and given a written requirement.

STANDARD: The explanation must address-

- The relationship between battle command, visualization, and decisionmaking IAW FM 100-5, FM 100-15, and ST 101-5.
- The relationship between the commander's intent, the concept of operation, and decisionmaking IAW FM 100-5, FM 100-15, and ST 101-5.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE Phase I Objective Number: None.

C.02 TASK: Compare the three methods of the tactical decisionmaking process.

CONDITION: With references, out of class, and given a written requirement.

STANDARD: The comparison must include the differences between the deliberate decisionmaking process (DDMP), combat decisionmaking process (CDMP), and the quick decisionmaking process (QDMP) IAW ST 101-5.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE Phase I Objective Number: None.

C.03 TASK: Describe the deliberate decisionmaking process.

CONDITION: With references, out of class, and given a written requirement.

STANDARD: The description must include the four steps of the deliberate decisionmaking process IAW ST 101-5.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE Phase I Objective Number: None.

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STUDY ASSIGNMENT**1. STUDY REQUIREMENTS**

a. First requirement. Based on the ELO and the following reading assignments, answer the study questions in subparagraph (2) below.

(1) *Read.*

(a) Adv sheet and app 1 to adv sheet, lesson 1.

(b) FM 100-5, p. 2-14 (Battle Command) and p. 2-15, pp 6-6 (Mission) through 6-7 (Concept of Operation)

(c) FM 100-15, pp 2-1 (Battlefield Visualization) through 2-3, pp 4-1 (The Commanders Role) through 4-3.

(d) ST 101-5, chapter 1 (Tactical Decisionmaking)

(2) *Study Questions.*

(a) Why are battle command and battlefield visualization an integral part of military decisionmaking?

(b) Is military decisionmaking an art or a science?

(c) Describe the TDMP and its relationship to the three decisionmaking methods.

(d) Describe the DDMP.

(e) What is the relationship between the TDMP and the decide-detect-deliver-assess (D³A) targeting process.

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Lesson 1. Tactical Decisionmaking Overview

Appendix 1 to Advance Sheet, lesson 1.

| MISSION RECEIVED | MISSION ANALYSIS | COA DEVELOPMENT | COA ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON |
|------------------|--|--|---|
| | <p>1. Receive or deduce mission.</p> <p>2. Receive initial Commander's guidance (optional).</p> <p>3. Gather initial facts and assumptions.</p> <p>4. Conduct initial time analysis.</p> <p>5. Issue initial warning order (optional).</p> <p>MISSION ANALYSIS</p> <p>1. Commander analyzes missions and intents of 2 higher echelon commanders and communicates his understanding to the staff.</p> <p>2. Staff analyzes the mission and intent of higher commander.</p> <p>3. Identify specified and implied tasks.</p> <p>4. Identify tentative essential tasks and develop restated mission.</p> <p>5. Review available assets.</p> <p>6. Determine limitations.</p> <p>7. Determine broad C²-W considerations.</p> <p>8. Propose acceptable risk.</p> <p>9. Determine critical facts and assumptions.</p> <p>10. Continue time analysis.</p> <p>11. Prepare restated mission for commander's approval.</p> <p>INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS</p> <p>INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD</p> <p>Define the battlefield environment and describe its effects.</p> <p>How do terrain, weather, and other characteristics affect military operations?</p> <p>Modified combined obstacle overlay.</p> <p>Evaluate the threat.</p> <p>How does threat doctrine say the threat will fight?</p> <p>Doctrinal templates, threat capabilities, high-value targets.</p> <p>Determine threat COAs.</p> <p>How will the enemy modify his doctrine to compensate for terrain and weather?</p> <p>Threat COAs, situation templates, initial event template.</p> <p>OPERATION ANALYSIS</p> <p>Higher HQ mission and intent.</p> <p>Higher HQ deception plan.</p> <p>Own unit status and organization.</p> <p>C²-W considerations.</p> <p>Other units (flank, supporting, uncommitted).</p> <p>OEG, RES, MOHP</p> <p>Specified and implied tasks.</p> <p>Limitations.</p> <p>Risks.</p> <p>Essential tasks.</p> <p>Proposed restated mission statement.</p> <p>Situation portion of operation estimate.</p> | <p>1. Analyze relative combat power.</p> <p>2. Generate conceptual possibilities.</p> <p>3. Array initial forces.</p> <p>4. Develop the scheme of maneuver.</p> <p>5. Determine C² means.</p> <p>6. Prepare COA statement and sketches.</p> | <p>1. Gather the tools.</p> <p>2. List all friendly forces.</p> <p>3. List assumptions.</p> <p>4. List known critical events and decision points.</p> <p>5. List significant factors.</p> <p>6. Select the war game method.</p> <p>7. Select a technique to record and display results.</p> <p>8. Wargame the battle and assess the results.</p> <p>COMPARISON</p> <p>1. Select comparison method.</p> <p>2. Determine decision criteria.</p> <p>3. Assign weighting values to criteria (optional).</p> <p>4. Determine "best" COA and make recommendation.</p> |
| S2/G2 | <p>INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE</p> <p>1. Mission.</p> <p>2. Area of operations.</p> <p>Weather.</p> <p>Terrain.</p> <p>3. Enemy situation.</p> <p>4. Enemy capabilities.</p> <p>5. Conclusions.</p> | <p>1. Update facts.</p> <p>2. Refine assumptions.</p> <p>3. Validate COAs for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability against enemy COAs.</p> | <p>WAR GAMING</p> <p>MEANS: Action-Reaction-Counteraction with G3.</p> <p>KEY PRODUCT: Event template with NALs</p> <p>COMPLETES IPB</p> <p>COMPARISON</p> <p>MEANS: Decision matrix.</p> <p>PRODUCT: Which COA can the G2 best support?</p> <p>COMPLETES THE INTEL ESTIMATE</p> |
| S3/G3 | <p>OPERATION ESTIMATE</p> <p>1. Mission.</p> <p>2. The Situation and COAs.</p> <p>3. Analysis of COAs.</p> <p>4. Comparison of COAs.</p> <p>5. Recommendation.</p> | <p>Leads in developing suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete COAs.</p> | <p>WAR GAMING</p> <p>MEANS: Action - Reaction - Counteraction with G2.</p> <p>Critical events tied to 7 BOS.</p> <p>Synchronization matrix.</p> <p>KEY PRODUCT - DST WITH DP, AND TALs</p> <p>COMPARISON</p> <p>MEANS: Decision matrix.</p> <p>PRODUCT: Which COA best accomplishes the mission?</p> <p>COMPLETES THE OPS ESTIMATE</p> |

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|------------------|---|---|---|--|
| S1/G1 | PERSONNEL ESTIMATE 1. Mission. 2. The situation and considerations. General. Troop preparedness. Assumptions. 3. Analysis of COAs. 4. Comparison of COAs. 5. Conclusions. | PERSONNEL ANALYSIS (BEFORE) Unit strength maintenance. Replacements. Noncombat matters. Soldier personal readiness. Service support. Organizational climate. Commitment. Cohesion. Situation portion of personnel estimate. LOGISTIC ANALYSIS (BEFORE) Maintenance. Supply. Services. Transportation. Labor. Facilities and construction. Other. Situation portion of logistics estimate. | 1. Updates facts. 2. Refines assumptions. 3. Assists in developing COAs. 4. Validates COAs for personnel suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Requirements vs Capabilities | WAR GAMING MEANS: Action-Reaction-Counteraction with G2/G3 KEY PRODUCT: During and after portions of manning. COMPARISON MEANS: Decision matrix. PRODUCT: Which COA can the G1 best support? COMPLETES THE PERSONNEL ESTIMATE |
| S4/G4 | LOGISTICS ESTIMATE 1. Mission. 2. The situation and considerations. General. Logistics. Assumptions. 3. Analysis of COAs. 4. Comparison of COAs. 5. Conclusions. | | 1. Updates facts. 2. Refines assumptions. 3. Assists in developing COAs. 4. Validates COAs for logistic suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Requirements vs Capabilities | WAR GAMING MEANS: Action-Reaction-Counteraction with G3/G2 KEY PRODUCT: During and after portions of log issues. COMPARISON MEANS: Decision matrix. PRODUCT: Which COA can the G4 best support? COMPLETES LOG ESTIMATE |
| PRODUCT S | STAFF 1. Draft restated mission. 2. Brief mission analysis. 3. Issue warning order. COMMANDER 1. Conduct commander's estimate. 2. Approves restated mission. 3. Issues guidance. | | STAFF: 1. Produces several suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable and complete COAs for each enemy COA. 2. Conducts COA brief. COMMANDER: Approves COA for analysis. | CHIEF OF STAFF: 1. Develops consolidated staff decision matrix. 2. Conducts decision briefing. 3. Recommends "best" COA. COMMANDER: 1. Validates staff recommendation against the enemy. 2. Evaluates COAs. 3. Makes decision. |

COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 2. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**

Advance Sheet, Lesson 2

SCOPE

This lesson will address the techniques and procedures that commanders and staff officers employ to apply the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. This lesson will help you understand the four steps that constitute IPB:

- Define the battlefield environment.
- Describe the battlefield's effects
- Evaluate the threat.
- Determine threat courses of action.

This lesson will begin with a short introduction to the IPB process and how it relates to the DDMP. The first requirement will focus on the first two steps of the IPB process. You will do a practical exercise (PE) to reinforce your understanding of the readings. The PE will focus on development of a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) for the 3d Bde, 55th Mech Div area of operation (AO).

The second requirement of the lesson will focus on evaluating the threat. Using a heavy opposing force (OPFOR) as a training vehicle, you will do a PE designed to enhance your understanding of threat evaluation. This PE will focus on OPFOR organization, weapons and equipment, and tactical doctrine.

The third requirement will focus on step four of the IPB process. You will analyze threat COAs.

ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES

C.04 TASK: Define the battlefield environment.

CONDITION: Given a practical exercise and maps, out of class, and with references.

STANDARD: The definition must address the area of operations, the area of interest, and battlespace IAW FM 34-130, FM 100-5, and S310B Advance Book.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE Phase I Objective Number: None

C.05 TASK: Describe the battlefield effects

CONDITION: Given a practical exercise and maps, out of class, and with references.

STANDARD: The description will-

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- Address the effects of terrain, weather, and other factors on friendly and enemy operations.
- Include a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO).

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE Phase I Objective Number: None.

C.06 TASK: Evaluate the threat.

CONDITION: Given a practical exercise and maps, out of class, and with references.

STANDARD: The evaluation will include-

- Threat composition, including organization and equipment, IAW FM 34-130, ST 100-7, and S310B Advance Book.
- Threat capabilities IAW ST 100-7 and S310B Advance Book.
- Development of doctrinal templates IAW FM 34-130, ST 100-7, and S310B Advance Book.
- Target value analysis IAW FM 34-130, ST 100-7, and S310B Advance Book.

LEVEL: Comprehension

PJE Phase I Objective Number: None.

C.07 TASK: Develop threat courses of action.

CONDITION: Given a practical exercise, threat doctrinal templates, high value target list, and references, out of class.

STANDARD: The threat courses of action will include-

- A narrative describing threat mission, objectives, scheme of maneuver and fires, and desired end state IAW FM 34-130, ST 100-7, and S310B Advance Book.
- A situation template drawn to scale, graphically depicting the threat disposition for each course of action IAW FM 34-130, ST 100-7, and S310B Advance Book.
- A high value target list by category set, identifying threat assets critical to threat success IAW FM 34-130, ST 100-7, and S310B Advance Book.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE Phase I Objective Number None

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C.08 TASK: Determine initial intelligence collection requirements,

CONDITION: Given an event template, an enemy course of action, references, and a written requirement, out of class.

STANDARD Initial intelligence requirements will address-

- Event templates IAW 34-130.
- Reconnaissance and surveillance planning IAW FM 34-2-1.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE Phase I Objective Number: None.

ISSUE MATERIAL

1. ADVANCE ISSUE

Map D - Series USACGSC 50-539, Kansas-Missouri, sheet 1 (Leavenworth County), 1:50,000.

STUDY ASSIGNMENT

1. STUDY REQUIREMENTS

a. First requirement. Based on the reading assignment below, develop an understanding of the first two steps of the IPB process and how these steps relate to the 55th Mech Div. Answer the study questions in subparagraph (2) below.

(1) *Read.*

- (a) Adv sheet and Appendix 1 to Adv Sheet, lesson 2.
- (b) FM 34-130, chap 1 and pp 2-1 (Describe the Battlefield effects) through 2-29.
- (c) App 1 (General Situation), app 2 (OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR) and app 3 (OPLAN WHITE) to adv book, S310B.

(2) *Complete.* Appendix 1 to advance sheet, Lesson 2. First Practical Exercise.

(3) *Study Questions.*

- (a) Determine the A0 and AI for the 55th Mech Div.
- (b) Using the terrain factors and the military aspects of terrain, describe the effects of the terrain on threat and friendly offensive and defensive operations.
- (c) Using the military aspects of weather, describe the effects of weather on threat and friendly offensive and defensive operations.

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(d) Describe how terrain and weather influence cross-country mobility in the 55th Mech Div AO.

(e) What is an MCOO? What types of information should be depicted on the MCOO? Describe how commanders use the MCOO to visualize the AO and AI.

(f) Does terrain in the 55th Mech Div AO best support offensive or defensive operations?

b. *Second requirement.* Based on the reading assignment below, conduct step 3 of the IPB process, evaluate the threat.

(1) *Read.*

(a) App 2 to adv sheet, lesson 2.

(b) FM 34-130, pp 2-29 (Evaluate the threat) through 2-39 (Additional considerations).

(c) App 3 to adv book (OPLAN White, Annex B).

(2) *Review.* App 1, 2 and 3 to Adv Book, S310B

(3) *Complete.* App 2 to advance sheet, Lesson 2. Second Practical Exercise.

c. *Third requirement.* Based on the reading assignments below, conduct step 4 of the IPB process, determine threat COAs. Answer the study questions in par (4) below.

(1) *Read.* FM 34-130, pp 2-39 (Determine threat COAs) through 2-54.

(2) *Review.* App 2 to adv book (OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR, Annex B) and App 3 to adv book (OPLAN White, Annex B).

(3) *Complete.* App 3 to adv sheet, lesson 2

(4) *Study Questions.*

(a) How are terrain, weather, and threat analyses used to determine threat courses of action? Why are the threat mission and objective so key to this process?

(b) How is the situation template used to depict the threat course of action? How does the situation template relate to the doctrinal template? How is the situation template used to determine enemy high value targets (HVT) and why is this important?

(c) How is the event template used to focus our collection planning? How is it used to determine which course of action the threat will adopt?

(6) What are the likely objectives of the Nebraska *Front* commander? What courses of action could he adopt to achieve these objectives?

COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 2. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**

Appendix 1 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 2. Special Situation and First Practical Exercise, Lesson 2: Terrain Analysis

1. SPECIAL SITUATION

You are the S2 of 3d Bde, 55th Mech Div. The brigade commander has just returned from the division OPORD brief.

2. FIRST PRACTICAL EXERCISE, LESSON 2

a. Task. Develop an MCOO for 3d Bde, 55th Mech Div.

b. Condition. Given a map of the 3d Bde, 55th Mech Div, AO (Map D -- Series USACGSC 50-539, Kansas-Missouri, sheet 1 (Leavenworth County), 1:50,000), a symbology legend, and FM 34-130.

c. Standard. The MCOO must be IAW FM 34-130 and the symbology legend, and must visually display the military aspects of the terrain, including the following:

(1) *Cross-country mobility classifications.* Mark areas of RESTRICTED and SEVERELY RESTRICTED cross-country mobility with easily distinguishable symbology.

(2) *Avenues of approach (AAs) and mobility corridors.* Develop company-level mobility corridors. Group these mobility corridors into battalion-level AAs. Include at least one air AA. Consider AAs as they apply to both friendly and threat maneuver.

(3) *Countermobility obstacles.* Include both manmade and natural obstacles, such as rivers, lakes, built-up areas, etc.

(4) *Defensible terrain.* Evaluate terrain along each AA to identify potential battle positions or possible defensive sectors for subordinate units. Consider both company and battalion BPs.


(5) *Engagement areas.* Combine the results of evaluating defensible terrain with the results of evaluating observation and fields of fire to identify potential engagement areas.

(6) *Key terrain.* Identify any areas of terrain features which dominate the AAs.

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
d. MCOO symbols.

Severely restricted terrain




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Restricted terrain




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Built-up areas




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Mobility corridor




(Brown)

Avenue of Approach




(Red or Blue)

Air avenue of approach




(Red or Blue)

Battle position




(Black)

Engagement area




(Green)

Key terrain




(Purple)



(Black)

(Blue)

Bridge



(Black)

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COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 2, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**

Appendix 2 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 2. Special Situation and Second Practical Exercise Lesson 2: Threat Evaluation

1. SPECIAL SITUATION.

You are still the S2, 3d Bde, 55th Mech Div. The brigade commander has just returned from the division OPORD brief and has several questions about threat capabilities and equipment. He is specifically concerned about threat divisional reconnaissance, maneuver, air defense and fire support.

2. SECOND PRACTICAL EXERCISE, LESSON 2: THREAT EVALUATION

a. Task: Evaluate threat capabilities in the following four battlefield functional areas: (1) Reconnaissance, (2) Maneuver, (3) Fire Support, and (4) Air Defense.

b. Condition: Given FM 34-130, ST 100-7 and the S310B Advance Book as references, and a written requirement, out of class.

c. Standard: The evaluation will address-

(1) *Reconnaissance:*

- Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) and Tank Division (TD) reconnaissance organizations and equipment.
- Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) and Tank Regiment (TR) reconnaissance organizations and equipment.
- Tactical employment in the offense.

(2) *Maneuver:*

- MRD and TD maneuver organizations and major equipment.
- MRR and TR reconnaissance organizations and equipment.
- Advance Guard and Forward Detachment organization and missions.
- Tactical employment in the offense.

(3) *Fire Support:*

- MRD and TD artillery organizations and major equipment.
- MRR and TR artillery organizations and major equipment.
- Tactical employment in the offense.

(4) *Air Defense:*

- MRD and TD air defense organizations and major equipment.
- MRR and TR air defense organizations and major equipment.
- Tactical employment in the offense.

NOTE: A possible solution to this PE is at appendix 4 to lesson 2.

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COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 2. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**

Appendix 3 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 2. Special Situation Continued and Third Practical Exercise
Lesson 2: Threat Course of Action (COA) Development

1. SPECIAL SITUATION CONTINUED.

You are still the S2, 3d Bde, 55th Mech Div. After reviewing the division intelligence estimate (app 3 to adv book, app 1 (Intel Est) to Anx B to OPLAN White) you determine that the probable enemy COAs for the division lack the detail you will need for planning at the brigade level. You decide to refine the enemy COA depicting an MRD attacking on avenue of approach C, along the west bank of the Missouri River.

2. THIRD PRACTICAL EXERCISE, LESSON 2: THREAT COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

a. Task: Develop a threat COA statement and sketch depicting an MRD in an attack from the march against a prepared defense along avenue of approach C. Use Enclosure A to this Appendix as a worksheet.

b. Condition: Given FM 34-130, ST 100-7, an initial high-value target list (HVTL), a partially completed threat COA statement and sketch, and the S310B Advance Book.

c. Standard: LAW FM 34-130 and the following guidance.

- (1) Depict maneuver and fire support units down to battalion level.
- (2) Depict division artillery groups (DAGs) and regimental artillery group (RAGs). Include Army artillery normally DS to the division.
- (3) Depict reconnaissance and security units down to company level
- (4) Depict boundaries and other graphic control measures, as required.
- (5) Include a narrative, explaining the OPFOR mission, objectives, scheme of maneuver and fire support, and desired end state.
- (6) Include a High Value Target (HVT) list.

NOTE: A possible solution to this PE is at Appendix 5 to lesson 2.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 2. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Enclosure A to Appendix 3 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 2. Threat Course of Action Worksheet

THREAT COURSE OF ACTION STATEMENT

1. **MISSION.** On order, 9 MRD attacks in zone to destroy enemy forces and seize river-crossing sites on the Kansas River between Desoto (UP2916) and Bonner Springs (UP3825) to create a maneuver corridor for possible commitment of the 2 Army main effort in zone.

2. OBJECTIVES.

Division immediate objective:

Division subsequent objective:

3. SCHEME OF MANUEVER

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal blue or grey ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are approximately 20 lines visible. The paper has a slight shadow on the right side, suggesting it's resting on a surface.

[illegible]

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8. HIGH VALUE TARGET LIST

Command and control: _____

Fire support: _____

Maneuver: _____

Air Defense: _____

Reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition: _____

Nuclear and chemical: _____

Engineer: _____

Radio electronic combat: _____

Ammo: _____


POL: _____

Maintenance: _____

Lift: _____


Lines of communication: _____

Threat Course of Action Worksheet 1



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Threat Course of Action Worksheet 2



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COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 2, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**

Appendix 4 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 2. Solution to Special Situation and Second Practical Exercise: Threat Evaluation

1. Reconnaissance:

(a) MRD/TD recon organizations and equipment [diagram ST 100-7 p. 6-38]

(1) Capabilities:

- Eight, two vehicle patrols (BMP/BRDM).
- BMP2: Amphibious, full-tracked, armored vehicle, Has a 500-600 km range, 65 kmph road speed, and various cannons and machine gun weapons for self defense. Has AT-5 ATGM with a 4000m range.
- BRDM-2: Amphibious, wheeled vehicle. Armed with machine guns for self defense. Has a 750 km range, gasoline engine, can resupply from civilian sources.
- BTR-70: Amphibious, wheeled vehicle. Armed with machine guns for self defense. Has 500km range, 65-85 kmph road speed, and a gasoline engine.
- TALL MIKE ground surveillance radars, BMP mounted (BRM-1K), 10km range.
- HF/VHF/UHF radio intercept capability, 80 km range HF groundwave, 40km LOS range VHF/UHF. Accurate to within 50-200 meters. Can plot and target enemy radio transmitters from transmissions of 25 seconds or more. Plots are translated to jamming, indirect fire, or maneuver unit attack missions within 3 minutes of intercept.
- HF/VHF/UHF radio jamming capability, focused on enemy radars, command posts, and communications nodes.

(2) Vulnerabilities:

- Limited night vision capability. Current active IR and passive night vision device range capabilities limited to 1km or less. 300m or less for vehicle drivers.
- Dependant upon radio communications with parent organization. Vehicles equipped with VHF medium power radios, 20 km range while moving, 50 km range while stationary with telescoping antenna. Division attack zone up to 25km wide and 70km deep and 60-75km forward of division assembly areas, division defensive security zones can be up to 30km wide and 50 km forward of main defensive belts.
- Radio intercept and DF capability vulnerable to deception because it only locates emitters, not necessarily units.

(b) MRR/TR recon organizations and equipment [diagram ST 100-7 p. 6-38]

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(1) Capabilities:

- Three, 3 vehicle or four, 2 vehicle patrols.
- 3 BRM-IK TALL MIKE ground surveillance radars.
- No radio electronic combat capability.

(2) Vulnerabilities:

- Same as above.
- Regimental attack zones in the offense can be up to 15km wide and 30km deep. Regimental defensive sectors can be up to 15km wide and 10km deep.

(c) Operations. Each threat maneuver division employs an organic reconnaissance and radio electronic combat (REC) battalion. Each maneuver regiment has an organic reconnaissance company, and motorized rifle battalions each have an organic reconnaissance platoon. As threat forces are force oriented, the primary focus of reconnaissance is to find and track enemy forces.

(1) In the offense, the location of reconnaissance objectives are related to targeted enemy force dispositions. The anticipated time required to move to and reconnoiter objectives determines how far in Front of their parent organization reconnaissance assets move. In an attack against a defending enemy, reconnaissance units typically reconnoiter and report the enemy force whose destruction is the parent organization's immediate mission; they would then move on toward the depth of the subsequent mission. Divisional recon patrols will try to bypass forward defending enemy units, regimental recon of lead regiments, will focus on forward defending units. In the march, their purpose is to provide the commander with maximum warning, in terms of time and space, of enemy forces and to establish the strength and disposition of enemy forces. Recon units also identify terrain features that support or hinder mission accomplishment. As losses occur, each commander will regenerate reconnaissance capabilities from the regiments and battalions.

(2) In the defense, the division will establish a security zone 15-50 kilometers deep (depending upon enemy dispositions) using combat forces as well as reconnaissance units. Reconnaissance units are employed in squad to platoon sized patrols to find and track enemy forces as they move through high speed avenues of approach. Reconnaissance patrols normally avoid contact and report enemy forces and locations for engagement by indirect fires or combat forces in the security zone.

2. Maneuver.

(a) MRD/TD maneuver organizations and major equipment [MRD p. 6-29, TD p. 6-18]

(1) Capabilities:

- Maneuver units: The MRD fields two BMP equipped motorized rifle regiments (290 BMPs, 62 tanks), a BTR equipped MRR (148 BTRs, 31 tanks), and a tank regiment (94 tanks). The TD fields three tank regiments (282 tanks, 195 BMPs) and a BMP regiment (145 BMPs, 31 tanks).

-- T-80 tank: 42 tons, road range without combat 500km, 125mm main gun, 2.4km range with conventional ammunition, 4km range with AT-8 ATGM. Carries 40rds 125mm ammunition, 6 AT-8. Rate of fire, 6-8 rds/min. Night vision less than 1km. Thermal capability anticipated soon, increases range to approx 3km.

-- BMP-2: Amphibious, 14 tons, road range without combat 500km, 100mm gun, 2km range with conventional ammunition, 4km with AT-6 ATGM. 30mm cannon, 2km direct fire range, 4km indirect fire range. Night vision less than 1km.

-- BTR-70/80: Amphibious, 11 tons, 14.5mm MG with 2km range, 500 rds on board, ROF 150 rds/min: night vision less than 500m. BTR-80 has improved armor protection and diesel engine.

- Responsible for attack zone generally 15-25 km wide and 70km deep.
- Masses main axis forces across a strike sector as narrow as 4km and as wide as 18km. Supporting attacks on secondary axes in the remainder of the attack zone.
- One or two regiments attack along division's main axis. Remaining regiment along a secondary axis. [ST 100-7 fig 1-15 p 1-28] A second echelon regiment generally moves by bounds 15-30km behind the first echelon regiment and must compete for movement and maneuver space with artillery, anti-tank, engineer and other CS and CSS units..
- A maneuver division typically is assigned defensive responsibility for a sector 20-30km wide and 15-20km deep. If possible, a security zone may extend 15-50km forward of the main defense.
- Divisions carries a 3-5 day stock of mobile fuel distributed between battalion and division CSS units.

(2) Vulnerabilities:

- Vulnerable to attack during transition periods, especially at night, Assembly area to march formation, march formation to prebattle, decision points for employing artillery or shifting assets to supporting attacks, and unexpected contact with enemy forces all take precious time and maneuver space.
- Division assembly areas normally 60-75 km from enemy, require 300-600 square km. Upon receipt of attack mission, divisions usually require 24 hours of reaction time and 1-3 hours of planning time. It takes 1-2 hours for its regiments to form into march columns.
- MRR/TR maneuver organizations/major equipment. [MRR p. 6-42, 6-43; TR p. 6-30]

(1) Capabilities.

- Maneuver units: The BMP equipped MRR fields three MRBs (MRR in the TD has two MRBs) of 132 BMPs each and a tank battalion of 31 tanks. The BTR equipped MRR fields three MRBs of 153 BTRs and a tank battalion with 31 tanks. The tank regiment in an MRD fields three battalions of 31 tanks each. The TRs in a TD each field three tank battalions of 31 tanks each and a MRB with 44 BMPs.
- Attack zone typically requires 5-10km, within that zone one or two battalions attack a strike sector of 2-4 km. [ST 100-7 fig 1-17, p. 1-36]

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- May task organize to form three reinforced battalions advancing in one or two echelons. Echelonment is a term used to describe the manner in which Nebraska commanders organize their forces throughout the depth of the battlefield. Echelonment is determined largely by factors of METT-T, with knowledge of the enemy situation being a preeminent factor. For example, in the offense, if the enemy force is weak, Nebraskais prefer to organize in one echelon. But in an attack against a strong force, they may organize into two exhelons using the second echelon to exploit success gamed in the first.

- Normally employs a reinforced company sized combined arms reserve, particularly in a single echelon attack.

- The MRR has an anti-tank reserve consisting of its organic AT battery and a mobile obstacle detachment.

(2) Vulnerabilities

- Vulnerable to attack during transition periods, especially at night; same as division. A regiment takes 1-2 hours to assemble into march columns from its assembly area. The regiment generally requires 1-3 hours reaction time to plan, issue orders, and begin movement after receipt of an order from division.

(c) Operations:

(1) Offense. The threat commander uses maneuver to seize and hold the initiative and defeat enemy plans. Maneuver forces are employed to achieve superiority of fires, forces, and equipment in a designated sector. The most common forms of maneuver are *close, deep, and double envelopments*. The frontal attack, once one of the most frequently employed forms of offensive maneuver, has fallen into disfavor.

- Divisions and regiments almost always attack as part of a higher organization's offensive. The threat commander focuses more on the destruction of enemy forces than on key terrain when it assigns offensive missions and objectives. Unit missions are related to the ratio of forces required in the attack zone and strike sector. Mission depths are therefore expressed in terms of enemy deployments rather than a fixed number of kilometers. The mission assigned to a subordinate unit is graphically represented by a line corresponding to the estimated rear boundary of the targeted enemy force. Therefore, a tactical mission includes two elements: destruction of the enemy within a zone and seizure of the assigned line. The two elements are expressed as immediate and subsequent objectives. The immediate objective involves destruction of the enemy's main forces and seizure of an initial line that the threat can use to start an exploitation and begin completing the destruction of the enemy. Achieving the subsequent objective should result in the complete destruction of the enemy force, including his reserves, and seizure of a specified line deep in the targeted enemy's rear. [Reference: ST 100-7 figure 1-10 p. 1-20 & 1-11 p. 1-21]

- First echelon units that have accomplished their original immediate and subsequent missions and are still combat effective may receive new missions. In this case, however, they would receive only one (immediate) mission and a subsequent direction of advance. The attacking division or regiment continues the attack as long as it retains the combat capability to do so. Threat commander's consider a temporary halt to the offensive to reorganize forces when combat power drops to 60%. However, this is a judgement made by the commander and units often continue to attack with only 45% strength and resist defensively at only 20% strength.

- The threat classifies three types of offensive actions. *attack against a defending enemy, meeting battle, and pursuit*. Attack against a defending enemy is the most common and can be conducted either from positions in contact or from the march. Obviously it is possible to combine the two types of attack against a defending enemy. The most desirable conditions are an attack from the march, passing through a friendly force already in contact with the enemy to allow transition from march to prebattle formations to occur in friendly territory. The situation threat commanders try to avoid is an unexpected meeting battle that occurs during the course of the march.

- The threat commander always selects an axis of main effort and concentrates the bulk of his resources there to obtain the ratio of forces required for success. There is never more than one axis of main effort. Resources are never shared equally among subordinates. If, during the course of the operation, the force on the main axis is not achieving the expected result, the threat commander will not hesitate to strip assets away to support a secondary axis that is having greater success.

- Timing is critical when attacking from the march and moving troops to the line of attack. The next higher commander specifies the start point and routes for the march, lines of deployment, and the line and time of attack for subordinate forces. Planners measure the length of routes and the distances from a start point to other control measures, breaking them down by 5 kilometer increments. March speeds are based on the conditions of the routes, the weather, the composition of the columns, capabilities of the vehicles, and possible enemy contact during movement. Average speeds are used to develop schedules for troop movements.

- Division and regimental offensive combat formations are a function of the threat commander's analysis of the depth and level of preparedness of the enemy's defenses. His goal is to continuously generate overwhelming combat power at the line of contact. To accomplish this, commander's at division, regiment, and battalion levels organize their forces in either two echelons against a prepared enemy or a single echelon with a small combined arms reserve against an unprepared or partially prepared defense.

- In a two echelon combat formation, the first echelon normally contains the majority of the combat power. It's mission is to destroy the enemy's forward defenses and achieve the immediate mission of the higher formation. At the same time the commander issues missions to first echelon forces, he assigns the second echelon force a mission, route of advance, and a likely line and time for its commitment. The second echelon is normally committed through gaps or at flanks to avoid passage of lines or intermingling of forces. Specific missions for the second echelon may include pursuit, destroy bypassed enemy forces, defeating an enemy counterattack, achieving the parent organizations' subsequent mission, or completing the mission of successful first echelon forces which have been rendered combat ineffective. Once the second echelon is committed, the commander forms a combined arms reserve from elements of the first echelon.

- Although the commander pre-plans deployment lines and times for committing the second echelon, he strives to retain flexibility in implementing them, depending on the progress of the battle. The commander's decision point to commit is at the latest possible point the terrain and situation allow. It is important to remember that a second echelon is an application of additional force, not a reinforcement for the first echelon. The commander commits to reinforce success, not to complete an unsuccessful portion of the first echelon's attack.

- Consistent with the principle of surprise, the threat commander will attempt to attack through difficult terrain against lightly defended or undefended areas. The threat commander considers an undefended wooded area a better avenue of approach than an open area dominated by enemy

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anti-tank weapons. Attacks by maneuver units along forest trails or ridge lines are likely, particularly if threat recon identifies no resistance along those routes.

- As the division moves in march column, the advance guard battalion functions as a forward security force. The advance guard is usually based on an MRB with reinforcements of up to a battalion of SP artillery; a company of tanks; and antitank, air defense, engineer, and chemical units. Its mission is to protect the main body of the regiment, or division, by making initial contact with the enemy and providing early warning. The advance guard equals about one- third of the combat power of the regiment.

- Divisions and regiments may form combined arms based forward detachments (FD) to maneuver ahead of the lead regiments/battalions of an advancing division or regiment. The mission of the FD is defined by an objective that ensures unhindered advance of the parent organization, usually seizure of key terrain and/or destruction of a particular enemy force. Unlike advance guards whose purpose is to protect a maneuver force by making early contact with the enemy, FDs do not necessarily follow a specific axis of attack or follow the same axis following forces will use. They attempt to avoid enemy contact while moving to their objective. Critical passes, defiles, road junctions, and water crossing sites (and the enemy force defending them) are common FD objectives.

- Divisions, regiments, and battalions, can form a combined arms reserve, but usually only if attacking in a single echelon. The commander does not assign the combined arms reserve a specific mission, but only a route and a method of advance. The combined arms reserve is a contingency force that give a commander the capability to meet unanticipated events such as repelling counterattacks or exploiting unexpected success.

- Within each element of the combat formation, an attacking force can deploy, into any of three types of tactical formations -*march, prebattle, or battle*- depending on mission and the combat situation. The OPFOR employs a standard drill for deployment into battle, the drill proceeds from march formation (regimental and battalion columns), through prebattle formations (company and platoon columns), into battle formation (platoons deployed on line). The sequence of deployment and the distances of the lines of deployment from the enemy are determined by tactical considerations. Primary tactical considerations include knowledge of the enemy's defenses, ranges of enemy artillery systems, the time and space required to transition and the locations where terrain will support transition. and the positioning of threat artillery.

- March formations support rapid movement of large units. Prebattle formations support transition from the march to battle formations. Transition into successively smaller unit and subunit columns increases combat power forward while maintaining movement rates and minimizing vulnerability to enemy direct and indirect fire systems.

- The division does not have an actual prebattle formation, Its formation results from the maneuver regiments assuming their own prebattle formations. Forward detachments and advance guards assume prebattle formation when the chance of enemy contact increases or when they are about to attack an objective. Not every element in a division, regiment, or battalion assumes prebattle formation at the same time. The main bodies of each element of the march remain in march formation until required to transition to prebattle formation. This applies to second echelon forces as well and helps to maintain the division's speed of advance.

- The regiment resumes a prebattle formation by deploying from a single regimental column of battalions in its main body into individual battalion columns. The number of battalion columns depends upon tactical situation, the terrain, and the choice of echelonment the

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situation dictates. Optimally, deployment into battalion columns begins beyond the range of the bulk of the enemy's artillery and is complete as the forward most units reaches the enemy forward edge.

- Divisions and regiments also do not have actual battle formations. Only those elements in contact with, or expecting immediate contact with, the enemy (battalions and companies) deploy into the battle formation. The optimum transition point to battle formation is just beyond the range of enemy anti-tank guided missiles.

(2) Defense:

- Threat commanders recognize that conducting a defense is, at times, a necessity on the battlefield. Goals of the defense may be to repel an enemy attack, hold important terrain and objectives creating favorable conditions for launching an attack, or to protect a force from overwhelmingly superior enemy forces.

- Threat defenses can be *positional* or *mobile*. The form used depends upon the mission assigned, the combat power and capabilities of both sides, the nature of the terrain, and the extent of engineer preparation. Positional defense is the basic form. Its goal is to hold multiple subunit strongpoints within a defended area for a specified time. Positional defenses may be used on most enemy avenues of approach, but especially on those where the threat can least afford to lose ground. Mobile defenses involve giving some ground and abandoning some areas. This preserves forces by fighting successive defensive battles at pre-planned lines at various depths. It is commonly used when defending a security zone.

- In both cases, the threat attempts to engage an attacking enemy when he is moving forward and taking up an attack position, or when he is assaulting the forward edge. Defending subunits select defensive positions that use the terrain's natural protective features, such as behind natural obstacles and in areas that allow maximum observation and engagement ranges. Threat commanders tend to avoid defending from "commanding terrain", since they easily could become targets for massed enemy fires or precision weapons.

- Threat commanders avoid establishing stereotyped patterns that would make enemy templating and targeting easier. Still, commanders will attempt to organize their defense to include two echelons, a security zone or forward positions, and possibly a combined arms reserve. Given sufficient time, the priority of engineer support goes first to the forward defenses within the main defensive belt and then to the security zone. From there, support priority goes backward through the defensive belt. [ST 100-7 fig 2-2, p. 2-6 & fig 2-4, p 2-16]

- The focus of the defense is the main defensive belt established by first echelon regiments. The basic element of the main defensive belt is battalion defensive areas. The battalion defensive areas comprise interlinked company and platoon strongpoints protecting key terrain and providing mutual support. Their mission is to stop the enemy in front of their forward edge. The division allocates 1/2 to 3/4 of its combat strength to the main defensive belt. The second echelon is used to repel or destroy any penetrations of the main defensive belt. The division allocates 1/2 to 1/4 of its combat power to the second echelon. [ST 100-7 p. 2-21, 2-22]

- Security zones are normally established by army corps or division level headquarters. It is deployed in front of first echelon divisions. Responsibility extends across the entire zone and does not necessarily conform to lateral division/regimental boundaries. In addition to recon patrols, the security zone is defended by a battalion sized forward detachment comprised of forces from the second echelon. Their mission is to delay, disrupt, or destroy advancing enemy forces on primary

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avenues of approach. Security zone forces delay back to a point forward of the main defensive belt and pass to the rear under the cover of indirect fire.

- If there is insufficient time and space to establish a security zone, the threat commander may establish forward positions. Forward positions are prepared by the first echelon regiments and manned by combat forces from the second echelon. The primary mission of the forward positions is to mislead the enemy about the location of the forward edge of the defense.

3. Fires

(a) MRD/TD artillery organizations and major equipment. (ST 100-7 p. 6-32, 6-41, 6-47)

(1) Capabilities:

- Threat division and regimental sized attacks require more artillery support than organic capabilities can provide. Therefore, higher headquarters allocate additional artillery units to a maneuver force to execute assigned operations. These temporary, mission-oriented groupings ensure continuous artillery support to maneuver commanders and still allow the required degree of centralized control. The guiding maxim is the achievement of maximum concentration on the decisive axis. In organizing artillery for combat:

- Front or Army/Army Corps may allocate artillery battalions according to the importance of a division's mission to success of the higher headquarters plan.

- Artillery groups usually consist of at least two battalions of similar or mixed-type units, either guns, gun-howitzers, howitzers, and MRLs.

- With up to 6-8 battalions, a division commander may elect to form two DAGs.

- A division may allocate some of its organic and attached artillery to leading regiments.

- A regiment can attach artillery to leading maneuver battalions.

- A division's second echelon regiments normally retain their organic artillery.

- MRD artillery regiment employs three 152mm SP howitzer battalions (54 howitzers) and a 122mm MRL battalion (18 BM-21s). The TD has only two 152mm battalions (36 howitzers). The MRD and TD also have an artillery command battery which provides redundant artillery command and control and target acquisition capabilities when forming DAGs.

- Front and Army/Army Corps artillery assets that may support a division include cannon artillery brigades and rocket launcher regiments. Front and Army SSM brigades employ tactical ballistic missiles and short range ballistic missiles.

- Weapons systems:

- 9P140 220mm MRL: Front or Army asset, range 40 km, 16 rds on launcher.

- BM-21 122mm MRL: range 20 km, 40 rds on launcher.

- 2S7 203mm SP gun: Front asset, range 37.5 km, ROF 1 rd/min.

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- 2A36 152mm towed gun: Army asset, range 28 km, ROF 5-6 rds/min.
- 2A65 152mm towed gun-howitzer: Front asset, range 30 km, ROF unk.
- D-20 152mm towed gun-howitzer: Front asset, range 17 km, ROF 5 rds/min.
- 2S3 152mm SP howitzer: range 17.23 km, ROF 4-5 rds/min.
- SS-21: TBM, range 100 km.
- SS-1C: SRBM, range 270 km.

- Artillery Radars:

- BIG FRED: Battlefield surveil radar; target acquisition battery; 20 km range.
- ARK-1, (RICE BAG Radar): Counterbattery radar, Front/Army asset, 30 km

range.

(2) Vulnerabilities:

- Artillery positioning is determined by mission, density of enemy targets, terrain in the target area, and ability of terrain in the attack zone or defensive sector to support artillery employment and survivability. Artillery requires significant space in order to achieve the required effects. Although employed as battalions, gun/howitzer artillery units normally maintain 1000m between batteries and 20-40m between weapons. MRL battalions maintain up to 2000m between batteries and up to 50 m between launchers. Artillery units will fire on each target phase line for at least five minutes at a rate of 4-6 rounds per 100 meters per minute. They fire on intermediate phase lines for 1-2 minutes at the same rate. Ammunition requirements are extensive. Although resupply plans are based on meeting planned units of fire required to maintain this intensive fire superiority over a specific duration, soft skinned resupply trucks are vulnerable and stockpiles and convoys take up valuable space on primary movement routes.

- Artillery regiments and battalions establish Command Observation Posts (COPs) to control their fires. The COP provides immediate indirect fire requests and adjustment data for firing units. A COP is usually located well forward with a supported maneuver unit commander. Destruction of the COP or disruption of communications with the firing units significantly slows down artillery reaction times, tire plan adjustments, immediate fire requests, and fire mission corrections. Firing batteries are dependent upon timely, reliable communications with both radars and COPs for targeting information and mission corrections,

(b) MRR/TR artillery organizations and major equipment.

(1) Capabilities:

- Each regiment has an organic artillery battalion (18 howitzers) and will be reinforced with additional firing units from divisional artillery as needed to accomplish its designated mission.

- Weapons Systems:

- 2S1, 122mm SP howitzer: range 15.3 km, ROF 5-8 rds/min, 70 rds/1st hr..
- D-30, 122mm towed gun-howitzer: range 15.3 km, ROF 7-8 rds/min.
- 2S4, 240mm SP mortar: range 9.7 km, ROF unk.
- 2S12, 120mm mortar: range 7 km, ROF 10 rds/min.
- 2B9, 82mm automatic mortar: range 5km, ROF 40-60 rds/min from 4-rd clips.

- Radars:

- SMALL FRED: Battlefield surveillance, artillery battalion asset, 20 km detect range, 7 km track range.

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(2) Vulnerabilities: Same as for divisional artillery.

(c) Operations:

- In the offense, threat commanders believe that massed firepower is the key to attacking successfully and quickly, exploiting weaknesses created by such overwhelming fires. They try to accomplish their mission using massed fires and then rapidly exploiting with maneuver forces. In the defense, threat commanders try to achieve fire superiority by quickly massing fires in a selected sector for a specific period of time to destroy enemy formations.

- In threat fire support doctrine, artillery is the principal means for neutralizing enemy forces. The term artillery encompasses guns, gun-howitzers, heavy mortars, anti-tank artillery, MRLs, rockets, and SSMs. Helicopters and attack aircraft are also used to make up for artillery shortfalls, such as if a maneuver unit outruns its artillery or artillery outruns its logistics tail. Strategic nuclear and conventional forces may be integrated to achieve maximum results in critical sectors.

- Protection of maneuver forces from anti-tank threats is a primary responsibility of the artillery. The OPFOR uses massive, continuous artillery fires targeted to neutralize anti-tank weapons. To achieve neutralization of a typical enemy platoon position, threat artillery fire planning supports firing 800-1200 122mm rounds or 600-900 152mm rounds against the position. Even if these fires do not destroy enemy anti-tank weapon systems, the volume of fire is expected to keep them from effectively engaging threat forces.

- The threat distinguishes between close and long range fire support zones. The close range zones extend as far as the threat direct fire weapons ranges, approximately 3km forward of lead units. Close range fire support is intended to destroy forward enemy troops and their weapons. Long range fires extend out to the limit of the division's subsequent objective.

- Offensive Fires. The offensive fire plan has four phases: *Phase I: Fire Support for the Movement Forward, Phase II: Fire Preparation for the Attack, Phase III: Fire Support of the Attack, Phase IV: Fire Accompaniment.*

-- The goal of Phase I fires is to protect advancing columns moving up from assembly areas more than 20km from the forward edge by destroying or harassing enemy systems that could interfere with the movement. Fires in this phase are likely conducted from temporary firing positions, with the artillery shifting to its main positions for the next phase. Phase I fires are normally fired by the AAG and DAG. Phase I ends when maneuver units are ready to deploy into battalion columns.

-- Phase II, the prep, is planned to suppress and/or destroy a defending enemy with organized, preplanned, massed fires. Because of the mobility of potential enemy targets and the threat of Counterbattery fire, the threat strives to increase the intensity of fire. They will try to reduce the length of this phase by adding more artillery, with special emphasis on MRL units, to the attacking force organization for combat. Prep fires are particularly targeted against enemy anti-tank systems, C2 elements, and enemy troops at a point of penetration, Phase II fires are fired by AAG, DAG, and RAG.

-- Phase III begins when the attacking forces reach their line of deployment into battalion columns and is intended to maintain fire superiority as the attacking maneuver forces move progressively deeper into the enemy defensive positions. Phase III uses the rolling barrage in which fires are planned on sequential lines forward of attacking forces and to the flanks to maintain the suppression effects attained during the prep phase. [TRADOC Pam 350-16 fig 8-8, p. 8-17 and fig 8-9, p. 8-18] In the rolling barrage, phase lines are planned every 400-800 meters, with intermediate phase lines

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- The threat has extensive and effective radar target detection and fire control capabilities. Radars fall in to two general categories, surveillance and fire control. Surveillance includes early warning, target acquisition, and height finding radars. The majority of target acquisition radars are concentrated above the division level. Threat radars are intended to work as integrated systems, not as separate units. Front, army, and division target acquisition radars detect and monitor targets. Most target information comes down from army level. Those radars provide the necessary data for engagement without exposing the air defense firing battery and radar to early detection by enemy forces.

- The division's air defense regiment provides overlapping coverage for the entire division area and overlaps adjacent division coverage. Division air defense priorities, in general order of priority, are divisional CPs, main axis maneuver forces, division artillery group, second echelon and minor axis units, and the division logistics tail.

(1) Support for the offense:

- The division commander allocates more of his air defense assets to support maneuver units in areas where the threat of enemy air attack is the greatest. This does not mean that batteries have to operate in the maneuver unit formation. They utilize the specific range capabilities of systems to provide protection for the first echelon from locations further to the rear. This also increases the survivability of the firing batteries.

- The air defense systems from the regimental air defense battalion support maneuver units in the first echelon. Exact positioning of tactical air defense weapons depends on the mission of the supported subunit, the commander's chosen attack formation, and the terrain. [350-16 fig 11-1, p. 11-6.1]

(2) Support for the defense:

- The threat commander coordinates fires between all air defense units and maneuver units to form a comprehensive defensive fire plan, providing an integrated air defense. The threat believes that first echelon regiments are priority targets for attacking enemy aircraft. Air defense systems, including batteries of the divisional SAM regiment are allocated forward to protect these regiments. The remaining air defense priorities are the division CPs, and artillery.

- The regiment's air defense battalion capabilities are part of an overall division air defense fire plan. The primary focus of battalion systems is against low-flying aircraft that are capable of penetrating the air defense network. SA-16/18s are integrated into maneuver unit positions. 2S6's are employed in pairs well within a maneuver battalion's defensive area, with 1-2km between guns. [350-16, fig 11-2, p. 11-91]

- Second echelon battalions of a regiment located several kilometers behind the main defensive belt positions usually do not have attached air defense elements. They benefit from the efforts of air defense fires to their front. Second echelon regiments of a division, however, integrate their air defense into the division's air defense plan. They often have one of the division's missile firing batteries located in their defensive areas.

COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 2, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**

Appendix 5 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 2. Solution to Special Situation and Third Practical Exercise: Threat COA Development

1. Threat Course of Action Statement.

a. Mission. On order, 9MRD attacks in zone to destroy enemy forces and seize river crossing sites on the KANSAS River between DESOTO (UP2916) and BONNER SPRINGS (UP3825), in order to create a maneuver corridor for the possible commitment of 2 Army's main effort in zone.

b. Objectives:

(1) Division Immediate Objective: The high ground along I-70 (UP2225 to UP4230).

(2) Division Subsequent Objective: High Ground south of the KANSAS River (UP2207 to UP3708 to UP4715)

c. Scheme of maneuver and fire support.

On order the 9 MRD attacks from the march with two motorized rifle regiments in the first echelon and a tank regiment (main effort) and motorized rifle regiment in the second echelon to destroy enemy in zone and to seize the high ground south of the KANSAS River (UP2207 to UP3708 to UP4715). The 28 MRR (BMP) and 26 MRR (BTR), first echelon, attacks in the west and east respectively to penetrate enemy defenses (UP1861 to UP 2867) and seize the high ground along HWY 92 (UP2030 to UP3051). This will create and protect maneuver space for the commitment of the second echelon regiments. The second echelon regiments, 120 MRR (BMP) and the 27 TR (main effort), will pass through the first echelon regiments along HWY 92 and continue to attack to the south. The 120 MRR will attack in zone, in the west, to seize high ground to the west of BASEHOR (UP2540 to UP2834). This will block the commitment of enemy reserve forces preventing them from interfering with the movement of the 27 TR (main effort) to the south. Upon completion of the blocking mission the 120 MRR will continue its movement to the south to seize crossing sites across the KANSAS River in the vicinity of DESOTO (UP2916). Right flank security will be provided by the 9 ATB initially moving behind the 28 MRR. The 9 ATB will establish successive firing lines oriented on possible crossing sites over STRANGER Creek to protect the 28 MRR from counter-attack from the west. The 27 TR will pass through the 26 MRR, in the east, and attack in zone to seize crossing sites over the KANSAS River in the vicinity of BONNER SPRINGS (UP3825), completing the destruction of enemy forces in zone while creating a maneuver corridor for the possible commitment of 2 Army main effort in zone.

The 43d Artillery Regiment, with augmentation from 2 Army, will support the 9 MRD attack. Phase I fires will be delivered by DAG and AAG assets to neutralize all identified intelligence collection assets, artillery command and control, and artillery systems to deny the enemy the ability to interfere with the first echelon regiments movement to battalion deployment lines. As the lead regiments deploy into battalion columns, phase II fires shift into the strike sector to annihilate defending enemy forces to facilitate the penetration of enemy defenses by the first echelon regiments. As the first echelon regiments penetrate the defense, phase III fires shift to the area between the southern edge of the strike sector, and the high ground along HWY 92 (UP2030 to UP3051). These fires facilitate the exploitation of the first echelon MRRs by denying the enemy the ability to interfere with their movement. Nonpersistent

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chemical agents will be utilized during phase II and III fires to disrupt and neutralize MBA forces along the main axis of advance. Smoke will be used extensively to screen movement in Phase II and III. Phase 4 fires shift to targets of opportunity and to uncommitted enemy units with the ability to interfere with the commitment of the second-echelon regiments into the depth of the enemy defense.

Deep operations will be conducted by a forward detachment composed of the 21 ITB, reinforces with a motorized rifle company, and artillery battery, and a mobility support detachment consisting of tracked GPS ferries and K-61 amphibians. The forward detachment will initially follow the 26 MRR in the center of the division sector, once penetration is achieved in the division sector, will conduct a forward passage into the rear of the enemy defenses. They will bypass enemy forces in sector to seize crossing sites across the KANSAS River in the vicinity of BONNER SPRINGS (UP3825) to facilitate the rapid movement of the 27 TR across the river.

Reconnaissance operations will be conducted by the division's reconnaissance and radio electronic (REC) battalion. Initial reconnaissance operations will be conducted by one recon company and patrols from the recon assault company. The recon company will organize into patrols to conduct reconnaissance of the main axis of advance to a line south of the regimental immediate objective (HWY 92). Once these objectives have been seized the surviving patrols will continue south. The patrols from the recon assault company will be air inserted to provide observation of the crossing sites over the KANSAS River at DESOTO and BONNER SPRINGS. Additionally, the division will form a recon reserve consisting of the second recon company and the assault company (-). This organization will be committed once the regimental immediate objectives have been seized. They will organize into patrols and move ahead of second-echelon regiments to recon routes for the forward detachment and obtain observation of any uncommitted enemy forces. The REC will determine the location of brigade and battalion command posts, artillery command posts, signal nodes and weapons locating radars in sector. This information will be used to determine enemy order of battle and to produce targeting data for jamming or destructive fires.

d. Desired End State: At the conclusion of this operation, 9 MRD will have seized multiple crossing sites over the KANSAS River in the vicinity of BONNER SPRINGS. The 9 MRD will be at 80% strength, in an area defense, holding both the north and south banks of the KANSAS River.

Command and Control: 9 MRD main and forward Cps, 26, 28, 120 MRR main and forward Cps, 27 TR main and forward CP, and MERCURY GRASS VHF radio relay.

Fire Support: 43 Arty Rgt HQ COP, Bn COPs, 2A36, BM-21, 2S3, 2S1, 2A65, END TRAY Meteorological Radar, Artillery Groups (DAG and RAG).

Maneuver: Regiment Advance Guard, MRBs and Tbs in column, ITB, Div AT Bn, Regt AT Bn

Air Defense: 29 SAM Regt HQ, SA-6 Btry, STRAIGHT FLUSH Radar (fire control for SA-6), SA-13 Btry.

Reconnaissance. Surveillance. and Target Acquisition: Regt Recon Co, Div Recon and Rec Bn, DOG EAR Radar (target acquisition for SA-13), TALL MIKE GSR, SMALL FRED GSR ARK 1 CM/CB Radar, LONG TRACK Radar, THIN SKIN Radar.

Nuclear/Chemical: 152 Arty; or larger, END END TRAY Meteorological radar.

Engineer: Div Engr Bn HQ, PMP bridge, TMM bridge, MODs, MSDs.

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Radio Electronic Combat: R330P jammer, Div direction finding sight, GSR radar direction finding site.

Ammunition: Div and Regt ASPs.

POL: Div POL sites.

Maintenance: N/A.


Lift: HETs, rail cars, barges.

Lines of Communication: Bridges - Millwood, Easton, Leavenworth
 Railroads -- Atchinson Topeka and Santa Fe
 Highways -- SH 74, US 59, US 73

COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 2, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Enclosure A to Appendix 5 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 2. Threat Course of Action Sketches



COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 3. The Tactical Decisionmaking Process**

Advance Sheet. Lesson 3

SCOPE

This lesson teaches the application of the TDMP. The focus of the lesson will be one tactical decisionmaking technique commanders and staffs use to plan military operations: DDMP. Using ST 101-5 and a brigade defensive scenario, you will study how the DDMP integrates the products of the staff officers' estimates to help the commander develop a sound tactical plan. You will be guided through the four steps of the DDMP: mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis and comparison, and decision.

During the first requirement you will study staff mission analysis emphasizing the process and products of mission analysis by the S1, the S3, and the S4, including the personnel, operations, and logistics estimates. (You discussed the process and products of S2 mission analysis in lesson 2.)

Next, you will study the second step of the DDMP: COA development. You will learn how to develop COAs. You will then complete a simple 3d Bde, 55th Mech Div, COA development exercise. You will then conduct a PE that will require you to develop a statement and sketch for a second COA for 3d Bde, 55th Mech Div.

During the last PE, you will serve as a member of the 3d Bde, 55th Mech Div, staff and analyze selected COAs already developed.

ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES

C.09 TASK: Explain heavy brigade operations in combined arms operations.

CONDITION:, With references, given a written requirement, out of class.

STANDARD: The explanation must-

- Include the organization, role, functions, capabilities, and limitations of United States Army heavy brigades in combat operations.

- Include how brigades structure the battlefield and synchronize the battlefield operating systems in the deep, close, and rear operations.

- Include the tactics for conducting offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations.

- Be JAW FM 71-2, FM 71-3, ST 100-3, ST 101-6, and the S310B Advance Book.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE Phase I Objective Number: 1a.

C. 10 TASK: Conduct mission analysis.

CONDITION: As a staff officer of a heavy brigade, given the deliberate decisionmaking process, appropriate references, automated and manual data bases and decision aids, a combat situation, a division operation plan, and a logistics estimate; current personnel, operations, and logistic status reports; and a written requirement, out of class.

STANDARD: The analysis must-

- Include a restated mission that addresses all essential tasks and facilitates the commander's intent two levels up.
- Determine whether the unit is adequately task organized to accomplish its purpose and determine if the unit personnel readiness, operations readiness, and logistic readiness are sufficient to accomplish the mission assigned to the unit.
- Include calculations of personnel, maintenance, transportation, and supply classes I, III(B), IV, V, and VIII requirements; identification of any shortfalls; and initial proposals for solutions.
- Be in accordance with ST 101-5, ST 101-6, and the S310B Advance Book.
- Be communicated using the formats in ST 101-5 and ST 101-6.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE Phase I Objective Number: None.

C. 11 TASK: Develop courses of action

CONDITION: As a staff officer in a heavy brigade, given the deliberate decisionmaking process, appropriate references, automated and manual data bases and decision aids, a combat situation, the orders and intents of higher headquarters, a completed mission analysis to include the brigade commander's planning guidance, and a written requirement, out of class.

STANDARD: The development must-

- Apply techniques described in ST 101-5 and demonstrated in class.
- Employ forces and address planning considerations for offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations IAW FM 71-3, FM 100-5, ST 101-5, and ST 101-6.
- Result in two suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete courses of action IAW ST 101-5.
- Communicate the courses of action in statements and sketches that meet the requirements specified in FM 10 1-5-1, ST 100-3, and ST 101-5; use the formats in ST 101-5; and follow the guidelines on substance, organization, style, and correctness in ST 22-2.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE Phase I Objective Number: None.

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C. 12 TASK: Conduct a course of action analysis.

CONDITION: As a staff officer in a heavy brigade, given the deliberate decisionmaking process, appropriate references, automated and manual data bases and decision aids, a combat situation, the orders and intents of higher headquarters, a feasible course of action, and a written requirement, out of class.

STANDARD: The COA analysis must-

- Effect the synchronization of all the battlefield operating systems to achieve the end state visualized by the commander in his preliminary statement of intent.
- Incorporate operational risk assessment.
- Use one of the standard recording techniques described in ST 101-5,
- Modify the course of action to reflect the results of the analysis.
- Result in the identification of high pay-off targets and the preparation of event and decision support templates.
- Be IAW ST101-5.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE Phase I Objective Number: NYone.

C. 13 TASK: Compare courses of action.

CONDITION: As a staff officer in a heavy brigade, given the deliberate decisionmaking process; appropriate references; automated and manual data bases and decision aids; a combat situation; the orders and intents of higher headquarters; the record of the analysis of two distinctly different, feasible courses of action; and a written requirement, out of class.

STANDARD: The comparison must-

- Include alternative courses of action using the commander's stated or implied decision criteria.
- Be IAW ST 101-5 and the guidelines on substance, organization, style, and correctness in ST 22-2.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE Phase I Objective Number: None.

ISSUE MATERIAL

1. ADVANCE ISSUE

None

STUDY ASSIGNMENT**1. STUDY REQUIREMENTS**

a. First requirement. Based on the ELOs and the following reading assignments, answer the study questions in subparagraph (2) below. Complete Appendix 2 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 3.

(1) Read.

- (a) Adv sheet and app 1, 2 and 3 to adv sheet, lesson 3.
- (b) ST 101-5, pp 1-1 through 1-6 (the DDMP); pp 2-1 through 2-14; 9-1 through 9-4 (Personnel Estimate - Mission and The Situation and Considerations); and pp 9-5 through 9-8 (CSS Estimate - Mission and The Situation and Considerations).
- (c) App 1, 2 and 3 to adv book, S310B.
- (d) FM 71-3, chap 1, set II; chap 3, set I and II; chap 5, set I; and app I.
- (e) FM 71-100, pp 2-8 through 2-9 (Battlefield visualization)
- v) FM 34-130, pp 1-6 through 1-8

(2) Study Questions.

- (a) How does mission analysis relate to the commander's visualization of the battlefield?
- (h) Describe the mission analysis process. What causes the dynamic nature of this process?
- (c) Why is it important for the staff officer to fully understand the intents of the higher commanders?
- (6) Where can staff officers find specified tasks? How do they deduce implied tasks?
- (e) What is an essential task? What distinguishes an essential task from other specified and implied tasks?
- (f) What is a constraint? How does a constraint limit a commander's freedom of action?
- (g) What are command and control warfare (C²W) employment considerations as they impact on mission analysis?
- (h) Under what circumstances must a staff officer make an assumption? What distinguishes valid from invalid assumptions'?
- (i) What are the components of a complete restated mission?
- (j) Where do the S1/G1 and the S4/G4 get their information during mission analysis?
- (k) What important information can CSS planners obtain from the S2/G2 to assist them in their mission analysis?

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- (l) Why must CSS planners analyze all command and support relationships in the higher HQ task organization during mission analysis?
- (m) Why does the commander issue guidance after the mission analysis briefing? What is included in the commander's planning guidance?
- (n) Determine CSS considerations for brigade defensive and offensive operations

b. Second requirement. Based on ELO C. 11 and the following reading assignments, answer the study questions in subparagraph (3) below. Complete Appendix 3 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 3.

(1) Read.

- (a) Appendix 3 to adv sheet, lesson 3.
- (b) Enclosure B to app 3, lesson 3 (relative combat power).
- (c) ST 101-5, chap 3 and pp 6-6, 6-7, and 6-42.
- (d) FM 71-3, chap 5, set II through V, and chap 6, set III.
- (e) FM 71-2, chap 4, set IV.

(2) Review. ST 100-3.

(3) Study Questions.

- (a) What is the purpose of a warning order?
- (b) During the DDMP, when is the best time to issue a warning order? What format should be used?
- (c) Why is it important to consider deception early in the DDMP?
- (d) Describe the process of COA development.
- (e) What types of differences among COAs make them distinguishable?
- (f) What items are essential to a complete COA sketch?
- (g) What must be included in the COA statement?
- (h) Discuss the tests of suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness.
- (i) What is the focus for CSS planners during COA development?

c. Third requirement. Based on ELO C.12 and the following reading assignments, service the study questions in subparagraph (3) below.

(1) Read.

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(a) ST 101-5, pp 4-1 through 4-28, chap 8, and pp 9-4 (Analysis of Courses of Action), 9-8, and 9-9 (Analysis of Courses of Action).

(b) FM 71-3, chap 6, set VI, and pp 8-20 through 8-22 (Supporting the Offense and Supporting the Defense).

(2) *Review.* ST 100-3.

(3) *Study Questions.*

(a) What is the purpose of COA analysis (war gaming) in the DDMP?

(b) Discuss the risk assessment procedure.

(c) What are the general rules a war gamer should follow?

(d) Describe the process of war gaming. Define the meaning of a critical event,

(e) Describe the three war game methods outlined in ST 101-5.

(f) Describe the methods of recording a war game.

(g) What are the products each staff member develops during and after the war game?

(h) How do the personnel and CSS estimates assist commanders in the DDMP?

(i) What portions of the personnel and CSS estimates can be developed before war gaming? Developed or refined during war gaming? Completed based on the results of war gaming?

(j) How does war gaming help the CSS planner synchronize tactical logistics functions to support a tactical operation?

(k) How do the logistics characteristics assist the CSS planner during war gaming?

d. Fourth requirement. Based on ELOs C. 13 and C. 14 and the following reading assignments, answer the study questions in subparagraph (3) below.

(1) *Read*

(a) ST 101-5, pp 4-28 through 4-30 (Comparison of War Game Results), 5-1 through 5-16 (Execution and Supervision), 6-1 through 6-5, 6-8 through 6-20, 6-47, 9-4, and 9-5 (Comparison of Courses of Action and Conclusion), 9-9 (Comparison of Courses of Action and Conclusions), chap 10, app B, app E, app H, and app I.

(2) *Review,* Annexes A (Task Organization) and Q (Service Support) to OPLAN WHITE (app 3 to advance book, S310B).

(3) *Study Questions*

(a) Explain the differences between COA analysis and COA comparison

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- (b) What are the means and products of COA comparison?
- (c) What criteria does the staff use to justify its recommended COA to the commander?
- (d) What issues does the staff officer consider when he determines his decision criteria and weighting factors?
- (e) How does the chief of staff (Cofs) or the executive officer (XO) arrive at a consolidated staff recommendation?
- (e) What is the purpose of a decision briefing? What is its result?
- (g) Describe the purpose, content, and format of an operation order (OPORD).
- (h) How and where can the task organization be stated in an OPORD?
- (i) Where is the commander's intent stated in the OPORD? The higher commander's intent?
- (j) How are brigade supply routes selected and approved?
- (k) How, and in what terms, should the concept of support be communicated to the commander and his subordinate commanders in the OPLAN or OPORD briefing?

COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 3. The Tactical Decisionmaking Process**

Appendix 1 to Advance Sheet; Lesson 3. Combat Service Support Status-3d Bde, 55th Mech Div

1. PERSONNEL*a. Supported strengths, 3d Bde. 55th Mech Div.**(1) 3d Brigade:*

| <i>Unit</i> | <i>SRC</i> | <i>Auth</i> | <i>Asgd</i> | <i>PDY</i> | <i>CW</i> |
|-------------------------------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-----------|
| HHC, 3d Bde | 87042L200 | 80 | 78 | 71 | (89) |
| TF 4-77 Mech | 07245L500 | 621 | 545 | 500 | (81) |
| 4-81 Mech | 07245L500 | 774 | 665 | 657 | (85) |
| 4-25 Armor | 173751000 | 605 | 565 | 550 | (91) |
| <i>Maneuver brigade total</i> | | 2,080 | 1,853 | 1,778 | (85) |

NOTE: TF 4-77 Mech is OPCON to 55th Avn Bde until after completion of guard mission. Brigade personnel not PDY are hospitalized (16), sick call (44), and on quarters (15). D/4-77 Mech is attached to 1st Bde. D/4-2 Armor is attached to TF 4-77 Mech.

(2) Brigade slice:

| <i>Unit</i> | <i>SRC</i> | <i>Auth</i> | <i>Asgd</i> | <i>PDY</i> | <i>(%)</i> |
|----------------------------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|
| 4-42 FA | 06365L500 | 725 | 692 | 667 | (92) |
| 3/E/20 FA (Tgt Acq/Q36) | 06413L000 | 0 | 4 | 4 | (100) |
| C/4-441 ADA (-) | 44177L200 | 93 | 90 | 87 | (94) |
| 33d Engr | 05335L000 | 438 | 430 | 425 | (97) |
| C/500th Engr | 05427L000 | 118 | 112 | 107 | (91) |
| 3/55th Cm1 Co | 03157L200 | 24 | 24 | 22 | (92) |
| C/55th MI Bn | 34397A000 | 27 | 27 | 27 | (100) |
| 3/55th MP Co | 19333L000 | 20 | 20 | 18 | (90) |
| 3/1/A/55th Sig | 11068L100 | 24 | 24 | 24 | (100) |
| 553d FSB | 630051300 | 442 | 414 | 393 | (89) |
| <i>Brigade slice total</i> | | 1,911 | 1,837 | 1,774 | (93) |

NOTE: 3/C/4-441 ADA is DS to 55th Avn Bde until after completion of the guard mission. Brigade slice personnel not PDY are hospitalized (14), sick call (38), and on quarters (11).

(3) Brigade total:

| | | | | |
|------------------------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| Maneuver brigade total | 2,080 | 1,853 | 1,778 | (85) |
| Brigade slice total | 1,911 | 1,837 | 1,774 | (93) |
| Net brigade total | 3,991 | 3,690 | 3,552 | (89) |

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b. Personnel shortages.

| | <i>Auth</i> | <i>Asgd</i> | <i>PDY</i> |
|---|-------------|-------------|------------|
| <i>11M (Fighting vehicle infantryman)</i> | | | |
| TF 4-77 Mech | 228 | 207 | 206 |
| 4-81 Mech | 428 | 381 | 377 |
| <i>i9K A41 (Armor crewman)</i> | | | |
| 4-25 Armor | 263 | 239 | 233 |
| TF 4-77 Mech | 55 | 50 | 48 |
| <i>55B (Ammunition specialist)</i> | | | |
| 553d FSB | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| <i>92Y (Unit supply specialist)</i> | | | |
| 4-81 Mech | 18 | 15 | 15 |
| 4-25 Armor | 15 | 13 | 10 |
| TF 4-77 Mech | 16 | 14 | 11 |
| 553d FSB | 12 | 10 | 10 |
| <i>92A (Automated logistics specialist)</i> | | | |
| 4-81 Mech | 7 | 4 | 4 |
| 4-25 Armor | 6 | 4 | 4 |
| TF 4-77 Mech | 7 | 5 | 4 |
| 553d FSB | 42 | 37 | 37 |

c. Morale. Morale, unit cohesiveness, and esprit de corps are high throughout the brigade.

2. SUPPLIES

a. Unit basic loads (UBLs) are at 100 percent fill.

b. Unit prescribed load lists (PLLs) average 70 percent fill with 20-percent zero balance lines. 4-81 Mech and 4-25 Armor are zero balance on replacement batteries for KY-57 secure equipment.

c. DS stocks:

(1) Class I: 1 day of supply (DofS) meal, ready to eat (MRE) on hand at 553d FSB. Units have 3 DofS MREs on hand.

(2) Classes II, IV, V, VI, and VII stocks have not been issued to 553d FSB

(a) Ammunition transfer point (ATP) packages 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 are currently scheduled for delivery to the designated brigade ATP site.

(b) Classes IV and V combat-configured loads (CCLs) of mines and barrier material will be delivered to the brigade class IV/V supply point in the vicinity of UP233515. 3d Bde is allocated 40 percent of the division stockage (Annex Q (Service Support) to OPERATION PLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div (app 3 to S3 10B adv book).)

(3) Class III.

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(a) Packaged: 5 DofS of package products basic load on hand at the 553d FSB. Fog oil stocks are zero balance.

(6) Bulk: 50,000 gallons JP8 is on hand at the 553d FSB.

(4) 4-81 Mech has a shortage of AN/PVS-5 night vision goggles (NVGs). Current fill is 55-percent.

(5) Class VIII ASL is at 90-percent fill.

(6) Class IX ASL is at 90-percent fill with no zero balance lines. The following items are critically short:

Tank engines, M1A2 series.

Transmission, 5-ton truck series.

Transmission, M2 series.

Final drive, M109A6.

Engine, M88A1.

3. EQUIPMENT STATUS

a. Major combat and combat support systems (authorized/on-hand/mission capable) (auth/OH/MC).

| LIN | Nomenclature | HHC | TF 4-77 | 4-81 Mech | Units | | 4-42 FA | C/4-441 | 33d Engr | C/500th | Total |
|--------|--------------------------|-------|----------|-----------|------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------|----------|
| | | | | | 4-25 Armor | | | | | | |
| C10990 | CARRIER, 120MM MORT | | 6/6/6 | 6/5/4 | 6/6/5 | | | | | | 18/17/15 |
| C11158 | CARRIER, ARM CMD PT | 5/5/4 | 3/3/2 | 3/3/3 | 3/3/3 | 13/13/13 | 1/1/1 | 3/3/3 | | | 31/31/29 |
| C18234 | CARRIER, PERSONNEL | 1/1/0 | 6/6/6 | 6/6/5 | 5/5/5 | | 2/2/2 | 25/24/23 | | | 45/44/41 |
| C76335 | CFV, M3 (BSFV) | | | | | | 10/10/10 | | | | 10/10/10 |
| C12115 | SPT VEH, XM981 (FIST-V) | 0/6/4 | 0/3/3 | 0/4/3 | 0/4/3 | 18/0/0 | | | | | 18/17/13 |
| D11049 | M548A1, VOLCANO SYS | | | | | | | 6/6/2 | 2/2/2* | | 8/8/4 |
| D11538 | CARR. CMD PST, M577A1 | 1/1/0 | 5/5/5 | 5/5/5 | 5/5/5 | | | 3/3/2 | | | 19/19/17 |
| E56578 | CBT VEH, ENG M728 | | | | | | | 6/6/6 | | | 6/6/6 |
| F40375 | FIGHTING VEH, M2 | | 30/30/28 | 58/52/47 | | | | | | | 88/82/75 |
| G74783 | GRADER ROAD MOTOR | | | | | | | | 3/3/3 | | 3/3/3 |
| H57642 | HOW, SP 155M, M109A6 | | | | | 24/24/22 | | | | | 24/24/22 |
| L67342 | LNCHR MICLIC | | | | | | | 12/12/12 | 4/4/4 | | 16/16/16 |
| L76556 | LDR SCP 2 1/2 CU YD | | | | | | | | 2/2/2 | | 2/2/2 |
| M68405 | MORTAR, 120-mm | | 6/6/6 | 6/5/4 | 6/6/5 | | | | | | 18/17/15 |
| R14216 | RADAR SET, AN/TPQ-36 | | | | | 0/1/1 | | | | | 0/1/1 |
| S10682 | ROLLERRESSIK VR55TM | | | | | | | | 1/1/1 | | 1/1/1 |
| T13305 | TANK, FULL TRK, M1A2 | | 14/14/13 | | 58/54/51 | | | | | | 72/68/64 |
| T34437 | TRK WHL DSL EXCV (SEE) | | | | | | | 6/6/6 | 6/6/6 | | 12/12/12 |
| T61494 | TRK, UTIL, M998 (SCOUT) | | 10/9/8 | 10/10/10 | 10/10/9 | | | | | | 30/29/27 |
| V11001 | TAMPERPISTHAMRVRII | | | | | | | | 1/1/1 | | 1/1/1 |
| W76473 | TRAC, HIGH SPD, M9 (ACE) | | | | | | | 21/19/19 | | | 21/19/19 |
| W76816 | DOZER D7 | | | | | | | | 4/4/4 | | 4/4/4 |
| Z10988 | BRIDGE, HVY ASLT 26M | | | | | | | 12/12/11 | | | 12/12/11 |
| Z15752 | CMD/LNCH UNIT (JAVELIN) | | 23/23/21 | 41/41/40 | 5/5/4 | | | 9/9/8 | 4/4/4 | | 82/82/77 |
| Z37727 | LNCHR, M1 CHASSIS, BRG | | | | | | | 12/12/11 | | | 12/12/11 |

* Mounted on LIN Z40439.

Note: One 4-25 Armor M1A2 tank is not mission capable (NMC) for engine failure; the other two tanks are NMC for transmissions. Two 4-81 Mech BFVs are NMC for transmission failure. 120-mm mortar NMC statuses are due to transmission failure of the carriers. FISTV NMC statuses are due to turret maintenance problems. Two of the five STE M1/BFS organizational test sets in 4-81 Mech are deadlined with repairs not expected within the next 72 hours. The Direct Support Enhanced Test Set (DSETS) used to test and repair M1 and Bradley modules at the 553d FSB is also inoperative. Volcano systems are NMC due to nonstockage list (NSL) parts. Requisition status is good. Logistics intelligence file (LIF) identifies estimated shipment date (ESD) for parts in 15 days. 4-25 Armor has 57 NMC combat vehicle crewman (CVC) helmets, and 4-81 has 78 NMC CVC helmets. Helmets are NMC for supply. Both units received invalid status on parts requisitioned. All other NMC deficiencies above can be corrected within 24 hours if class LX parts are available.

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b. Major combat service support systems (auth/OH/MC).

| LIN | Nomenclature | IHC | TF 4-77 | 4-81 Mech | 4-25 Armor | 4-42 FA | C/4-441 | 33d Engr | C/500th | 553d FSB | Total |
|---------|---------------------------|-------|----------|-----------|------------|----------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| C10908 | M992, CARR AMMO TRKD | | | | | 24/24/24 | | | | | 24/24/24 |
| C18234 | ARMORED AMB | | 8/8/6 | 8/8/8 | 8/8/8 | | | 3/3/3 | | 6/6/5 | 33/33/30 |
| C36151 | CRANE 7 1/2 TON | | | | | | | | | 1/1/1 | 1/1/1 |
| D11538 | CARR, CMD PST M577A1 | | | | | | | | | 4/4/4 | 4/4/4 |
| S73372 | TNKR POL 5K GAL | | | | | | | | | 11/11/10 | 11/11/10 |
| T38844 | TRK AMBULANCE M997 | | | | | 1/1/1 | | | | 4/4/4 | 5/5/5 |
| T39518* | TRK CGO, TACT M977 | | 16/16/16 | 16/16/16 | 15/15/15 | | | 8/8/8 | | | 55/55/55 |
| T41067* | TRK CGO HVY PLS TRANSP | | | | | 18/18/10 | | | | 3/3/3 | 21/21/13 |
| T49255 | TRK LFT DSL M4K | | | | | | | | | 1/1/1 | 1/1/1 |
| T61171 | TRK TRIR M920 | | | | | | | | 4/4/3 | | 4/4/3 |
| T63093 | TRK WRECKER M984 | | 1/1/1 | 1/1/1 | 1/1/1 | 2/2/1 | | 1/1/1 | | 6/6/ | 12/12/11 |
| T87243* | TRK FUEL TACT M978 | | 8/8/8 | 8/8/7 | 16/16/16 | 4/4/4 | | 4/4/4 | | | 40/40/39 |
| V12141 | TK PUMP UNIT | 1/1/1 | | | | | | | | 1/1/1 | 2/2/2 |
| W48391 | WLD SHOP M62701000 | | 1/1/1 | 1/1/1 | 1/1/1 | | | 1/1/1 | | 1/1/1 | 5/5/5 |
| Z06157 | MAINT VEH ARMORED | | 6/6/6 | 6/6/6 | 4/4/4 | 4/4/4 | | | | 5/5/5 | 25/25/25 |
| Z20150 | CRANE WHL MTD HYD 25T | | | | | | | | 1/1/1 | | 1/1/1 |
| Z40439* | TRK CGO, 5-T SERIES (MTV) | 1/1/1 | 5/5/5 | 5/5/5 | 3/3/3 | | 2/2/2 | 3/3/3 | 2/2/2 | 16/16/14 | 37/37/35 |
| Z62381* | RECVY VEH, M88A1E | 1/1/1 | 7/7/4 | 7/7/7 | 7/7/5 | 4/4/4 | 1/1/1 | 2/2/2 | | 1/1/1 | 30/30/25 |
| Z85341* | TRK TRACTOR MTV W/E | | | | | 1/1/1 | | | | 31/31/31 | 32/32/32 |
| Z93669* | TRK DUMP MTV | | | | | | | | 18/18/16 | | 18/18/16 |
| Z94028 | TRK FORKLIFT ATLAS | | | | | | | | | 7/7/7 | 7/7/7 |
| Z94047 | TRK TANK POL MTV W/E | | 1/1/1 | 1/1/1 | 1/1/1 | | 2/2/2 | | | 3/3/3 | 8/8/8 |
| Z94433 | TRK WRKR MTV W/W W/E | | 1/1/1 | 1/1/1 | 1/1/1 | | | | | 3/3/3 | 6/6/6 |

* *Represents equipment type with multiple LINs.*

NOTE: 4-42 FA PLSs are NMC due to 15 unserviceable tires (ESD is 28 days) and hydraulic problems. TF 4-77 M88s are NMC for engines (2) and a transmission (1); 4-25 Armor M88s are NMC for an engine (1) and a hydraulic leak (1). All other NMC failures above will be repaired within 24 to 72 hours if parts are on hand.

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COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 3. The Tactical Decisionmaking Process**

Appendix 2 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 3. Special Situation and First Practical Exercise, Lesson 3: Mission Analysis

1. SPECIAL SITUATION

You are a 3d Bde, 55th Mech Div, staff officer. The brigade is currently in an assembly area in the vicinity of OTTAWA (UN0376), preparing to conduct operations to defend Centralia against attack by Nebraska. It is now 14 Aug 1999. Earlier this morning, the brigade commander and S3 attended a briefing at the 55th Mech Div main CP, during which the division G3 issued OPLAN WHITE. The commander has returned and briefed the staff on his understanding of the operation. He told you that, though he did not expect imminent attack, he does not want the brigade to waste any time before preparing to execute OPLAN WHITE. He handed the XO a copy of OPLAN WHITE, asked him to closely monitor the staff mission analysis, and told him he would return in 4 hours to hear the results of the analysis. You are prepared to examine OPLAN WHITE in detail. The mission analysis process described in ST 101-5 provides the framework for your analysis.

2. FIRST PRACTICAL EXERCISE, LESSON 3: MISSION ANALYSIS

a. Complete the mission analysis for the 3d Bde, 55th Mech Div. Use the procedures described in ST 101-5 and the outline provided at Enclosure A to this appendix, and record the results of your analysis. You may use all course material previously issued.

3. LOGISTICS/PERSONNEL ESTIMATE FOR MISSION ANALYSIS

a. Use the blank worksheets provided at Enclosure B to this appendix to assist you in determining the unit's consumption or requirements. These worksheets are interrelated with the planning factors in ST 101-6, G1/GJ Battle Book, and they provide the planner with a systemic methodology. Use of these worksheets should decrease the time that is spent on number crunching and free up more time for analysis.

b. Use ST 101-6, as the source for all planning factors for any data not provided in Appendix 1 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 3, Combat Service Support Status-3d Bde, 55th Mech Div.

c. Filling out these worksheets is only the beginning of the logistics/personnel portion of mission analysis. Once the sheets are completed you have the requirements needed, but do not know if you have the capabilities to fulfill the requirements. To determine the capabilities, look up the capabilities of the units supporting the brigade and determine if they can fulfill the requirements.

NOTE: The worksheets have been partially completed for you. This was done to assist you in completing the worksheets. Look in chapter 1, ST 101-6 for the rest of the data needed to complete the worksheets. A completed version of the worksheets will follow later in the lesson.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

Enclosure A to Appendix 2 to Advance Sheet Lesson 3.

STUDENT GUIDE TO MISSION ANALYSIS**1. INTRODUCTION:**

Mission analysis (which includes IPB) is the most important application skill we teach in S310B. In order to understand the relationships between initiative-oriented warfighting, our tactical doctrine, and our DDMP, you must understand mission analysis. If done correctly, the other steps flow quite logically. Done incorrectly, the remainder of CGSC tactics instruction looks like “form over substance” or a “briefing slide” emphasis.

Learning this takes time. Do not expect to be able to conduct mission analysis in 2 hours. We are establishing the knowledge base. Experience and knowledge makes mission analysis go faster, but simply “checking the blocks” is unacceptable. In the field, making the most of limited time to provide the commander analysis is more important than using the time to make pretty briefing slides.

The first thing you must understand is the purpose of mission analysis, something which is not explained in ST 101-5. *The purpose of mission analysis is to understand our tactical problem. The products of mission analysis are conclusions that support decisionmaking by enabling the commander and staff to visualize the problem and its parameters.*

2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

a. DOCTRINE. “Understanding is distilled from knowledge that has been synthesized and applied to a specific situation to gain a deeper level of awareness - a knowledge of the situation’s inner workings. We may know what is going on; we *understand* why. Understanding equates to situational awareness, through which we can see patterns emerging from events in the battlespace and anticipate the consequences both of our actions and those of the enemy. *True understanding should be the basis for our decisions.*” (NDP-6: Naval Command and Control.)

b. ROLE. (NDP-6 again says it better than we do) There are two types of information associated with decisionmaking:

(1) “Image-Building Information” that creates an understanding of the situation as the basis for making a decision. Simply - see yourself, see the terrain/environment, see the enemy.

(2). “Execution Information” as a means of conveying a clearly understood mental image of the operation and desired outcome after a decision is made. Examples are - conclusions, recommendations, guidance, intent, concept statements, and orders.

c. FEASIBILITY. Feasibility analysis is not a one-time step. It is a continuous assessment of our capability to meet requirements given constraints of time, space, and resources. It is a primary responsibility of field grade staff officers and starts with mission analysis, not with COA analysis. Potential solutions to the tactical problem must begin with understanding what is feasible. In mission analysis, feasibility analysis asks “what is doable?”. In COA analysis, feasibility analysis asks “is this COA doable”.

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“For senior leaders, the key to success in dealing with the rapid pace of modern operations in peace and war is, first to determine what options are not possible. They continue refining this process until they are left with only one or two options which may work. They can then choose between the remaining choices, confident that the chances for SUCCESS are increased.” (FM 23-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels)

d. The INFORMATION. More wisdom from the Navy (NDP-6): “The rapid tempo of modern operations limits the amount of information that the commander can gather and process before having to make another decision.” Commanders and staffs never believe they have enough time and information to draw conclusions and make decisions. They do. Identifying the truly critical elements of the problem from the peripheral elements is central to the challenge. Since time is the crucial variable in the decision and execution cycle, the commander who, assisted by his staff, can gather information, identify critical elements of the problem, and make decisions faster and better than his opponent will generate a quicker tempo of operations and gain a decided military advantage. We want to develop the ability to accept the information available to us (incomplete though it may be), quickly draw relevant conclusions, decide on our next move, and begin executing it while the enemy is still trying to orient himself to our last move.”

ST 101-5, DDMP: Purpose takes precedence over procedure. Understand the logic and purpose behind the DDMP. It is merely a commonly understood procedure for organizing and presenting the two types of information listed above. ST 101-5 provides a familiar structure for US Army commanders and staffs to perform the tasks required for effective and efficient decisionmaking. The ST 101-5 mission analysis briefing guide is not a “standard”; it is nothing more than a guide for presenting critical information. Analysis drives the briefing products. Too often we let the briefing products drive the analysis. Making the distinction and determining what is briefed to the commander is a field grade officer responsibility.

ST 101-5, CHAPTER 2: The elements of gathering facts, making assumptions, analyzing higher mission and intent, and issuing commanders guidance are O.K. conceptually, but it is the field grade officer’s responsibility to ensure that the products of mission analysis provide understanding, and not just knowledge. Products must answer the “so what” question.

3, MISSION ANALYSIS. Paragraph 4 is a technique for understanding correct mission analysis, but uses the 10 steps listed in ST 101-5, Chapter 2. Also discussed is a technique to conduct the dreaded mission analysis briefing using the format in ST 101-5, page 5-16.

4. MISSION ANALYSIS AND THE REST OF THE DDMP

Decisionmaking within each subsequent step in the DDMP depends on the quality of the staff’s mission analysis. You should leave this lesson with an understanding of how we doctrinally want to fight, how we visualize tactical problems given a unique situation, and how critical the staff’s role is in helping the commander command. If mission analysis is done correctly, the quality of commander’s guidance and intent no longer is solely a function of a commander’s personal communications skills.

With correct mission analysis, COA development now deals, up front, with only those feasible, acceptable, and suitable COAs that get the organization from its current state to the decisive point articulated by the commander and then to the transition point (or end state). The entire staff has a common visualization of the operation and the problems of time/space, requirements/capabilities, and the enemy. Your student staff has also developed planning factors regarding unit capabilities, movement, timing, resource requirements, space requirements, etc. that are relevant to the situation at hand. This common understanding and these planning factors are used during war gaming, orders development, rehearsals, and ultimately execution.

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5. MISSION ANALYSIS STEPS (ST 101-5, chapter 2, pp. 2-1 through 2-3)

a. STEP 1: Establish horizontal and vertical nesting. Not just maneuver, look at fire support, aviation, engineers, and CSS. Establish relationships between friendly units in terms of purpose.

b. STEP 2: “Acknowledge the transmission.” Establish the “givens” from the higher HQ order: AO, task organization, current unit locations, higher HQ most likely enemy COA, etc. Gather your IPB products.

c. STEP 3: Identify tasks. This simply means determining your purpose and identifying supporting effort purposes you will have to address in any feasible COA. This step should help you better understand “our unique contribution to our higher headquarters success” and “what contributions our subordinates have to make contribute to our overall success’l”. It is important to use this step to really understand our written doctrine. Determine the doctrinal functions and requirements, by BOS, associated with each task. For each identified task, research in the appropriate BOS FM, for the essential doctrinal requirements that must be addressed (through assigning responsibility or allocating resources). Determining what functional requirements to address is driven by specified and implied tasks and the troop list, not by a COA. It may include things commonly considered routine or SOP, but which require allocating specific resources. For example, if the troop list gives you the capability to conduct an air assault, look up the requirements, even though you may later decide not to conduct one. You should cover all BOSS and only go into as much detail as needed to visualize the critical battlefield activities associated with the overall operation.

EXAMPLE: Implied task (division)- river crossing

- Maneuver: FM 71-100, chapter 7, describes requisite tactical conditions, command and control relationships, control measures, sequence of activities.

- Fire support: FM 6-20-30, chapter 6, describes fire support task requirements and planning considerations.

- Engineer: FM 5-7 1-100, chapter 5, and FM 90-13 describe engineer requirements, responsibilities, and planning considerations.

- CSS: FM 71-100, Appendix E, describes critical functional requirements and planning considerations for sustainment,

d. STEP 4: Recognize that the commander is doing his own analysis at the same time. The staff group develops consensus on defining our unique contribution to higher HQ success (purpose), articulating success (what do we, the enemy, and the terrain look like when we have succeeded), and defining the decisive point, and begins separating our current operation from the sequel. It is important to explain that the higher HQ order will cover a greater period of time and space than we will. How much of the higher HQ concept will we tackle in this plan, and how much will be developed as a sequel?

e. STEP 5: Compare your given troop list capabilities to perform the critical doctrinal t?mctions identified in Step 3 and associated with (1) our purpose, (2) achieving the decisive point, and (3) performing the battlefield activities (see example below) by determining the time, space, and resource requirements associated with each activity and compare against unit capabilities to meet the requirements.

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EXAMPLE: Task: Suppress enemy positions. Answer the following in GENERAL terms; specifics come later.

- How big is the area to be suppressed?
- What type/size enemy force must be suppressed?
- How long does the area need to be suppressed?
- How many rounds of what type will it take?
- How many tubes are available to fire?
- What is their basic load?
- Where do the guns need to be to range'?
- How much space do they need to fire/survive?
- How far do they have to move to get there from current location?
- What is the optimum, NET, NLT time for them to be there'? (in relation to other activities, not in terms of H+time)
- Are the available guns capable of firing the number of rounds required to achieve suppression for the required duration?
- What other field artillery tasks will compete for these resources?

f. STEP 6. Articulate the limitations and constraints imposed, not only by higher HQ, but also by:

- Our purpose, horizontal, and vertical nesting.
- Physics: time, terrain, weather, night/day, resources, unit capabilities.
- Imposed by the enemy: enemy capabilities, OPSEC requirements.

g. STEP 7. Address C2W as a part of steps 3 and 5.

h. STEP 8. Risk Analysis or Force Protection Analysis. There are two types of risk inherent to any operation, 1) risks that fail to protect the force and incur unacceptable friendly casualties, and 2) that the enemy does something unexpected, preventing us from achieving our purpose. All combat incurs both risks. Previous Steps will identify that, at some point, requirements exceed capabilities to perform them adequately.

In this Step:

- Define the capability shortfall
- Analyze the enemy capability to exploit the shortfall
- Assess other combat multipliers available to minimize the risk
- Develop a conclusion as to whether the risk is worth your soldiers accepting.

Risk analysis is not wargaming. It is determining basic force protection requirements by analyzing enemy capabilities (within the given enemy COAs), to recognize and capitalize on a friendly capability shortfall. Do not accept risk just because something is in the "too hard" box; this reflects indiscipline, and in the eyes of future commanders and subordinates quickly becomes associated with incompetence.

i. STEP 9: Develop logical conclusions about the nature of our tactical problem. These become a rough draft of your final mission analysis conclusions. From the previous steps, define what we either know or don't know about ourselves, the enemy, and the terrain/environment. Missing pieces of critical information are normal in combat operations. Develop necessary and valid assumptions and begin defining commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) to address filling in the gaps over time.

j. STEP 10: Determine the duration of the operation by-

- Reducing critical tasks, events, functions and procedures to their basic time, space, and resource requirements. Include orders process activities.

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- Arranging these activities in a logical sequence in relation to each other. Determine an optimum, NET, and NLT time and evaluate the capability of the terrain to accommodate space requirements over time.

- Identify our current operation. The point beyond which we have achieved our purpose and we have more assumptions than facts regarding enemy and friendly capabilities generally defines the transition point between “current operation” and “sequel.” (FM 100-5, p 6-9)

This is not a one time product. Develop an operations timeline that the staff will use, modify, and refine later in the process. Done correctly, this timeline helps everyone have the same understanding and vision of how the operation will unfold.

Again, this is not COA development or wargaming. This is understanding the problem, so that we can develop feasible, suitable, and acceptable COAs.

k. STEP 11: This is the most overlooked step, yet the most important for providing the commander the information he needs to make decisions. The restated mission is only one conclusion. This step is the responsibility of the field grade officer. It is in developing conclusions that the field grade officer begins to demonstrate-

- A sound foundation in US Army warfighting doctrine
- The ability to accept information from various sources, process it intelligently, visualize outcomes, and disseminate the results clearly and concisely.
- The ability to confidently solve complex problems systematically and under pressure.
- The ability to train and set standards for subordinate staff members.
- The ability to assist the commander in developing his guidance or developing it in lieu of the commander if he is unavailable.

EXAMPLE

- Articulate an appropriate mission order.
- Define our current operation and horizontal and vertical nesting.
- Recommended decisive point supported by logical, critical analysis.
- Critical event timeline - those activities we must assign responsibility for or allocate resources to accomplish.
- Minimum combat power (or CS/CSS resources) required to accomplish (or sustain) activities over the duration of the operation. Points at which requirements exceed capabilities.
- Times and places of *decisive commitment*, where we lose the flexibility to deviate from our current activity or course.
- Times and places of potential CSKSS decisive commitment, where we lose flexibility through shortfalls of supply availability, distribution capability, or resources.
- Requirements (time and assets) for reconnaissance over duration of the operations. Identify reconnaissance required to fill information gaps about terrain and the enemy.
- Critical terrain and space requirements or shortfalls associated with activities.
- Transition points and the capabilities needed to transition to sequels.
- Assessment of the capabilities of subordinate units to perform doctrinal tasks to expected standards (human endurance, key leader casualty replacements, training proficiency, equipment status and capabilities, sustainment capabilities).

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6. MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEFING (ST 101-5, p. 5-16)

Use the ST 101-5 briefing format only as a guide to presenting conclusions to the commander. The field grade officer's responsibility is to ensure this is a mission analysis briefing, not a mission information briefing. Talking from the map or overlay and providing one *page* handouts to the commander is better than lots of briefing slides. The commander has already read or heard the higher HQ order brief.

Emphasis must be on the quality of the information presented and how the staff arrived at conclusions. The format is important only in that it makes presentation of information orderly and efficient. This is not CNN news. A decision brief demands only two types of information:

- That which helps the commander visualize his tactical problem and make decisions (see himself, see the enemy, see the terrain).
- Information, in the form of conclusions and recommendations, that the commander can use to make decisions, provide planning guidance, and formulate his intent.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

Enclosure B to Appendix 2 to Advance Sheet Lesson 3. Logistic Worksheets

ESTIMATE OF DAILY PERSONNEL LOSSES/STATUS

| ROW | ITEM | SOURCE/COMPUTATION | D+0 | D+1 | D+2 DEFENSE | D+ _____ | D+ _____ |
|-----|--|--|--------|-----|----------------|----------|----------|
| 1 | PARENT UNIT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH | MTOE LINE 1 PREVIOUS DAY | 3991 | | | | |
| 2 | ATTACHED UNIT(S) AUTHORIZED STRENGTH | MTOE UNIT(S) ATTACHED DURING RPT PERIOD | 0 | | | | |
| 3 | DETACHED UNIT(S) AUTHORIZED STRENGTH | MTOE UNIT(S) DETACHED DURING RPT PERIOD | 0 | | | | |
| 4 | TOTAL AUTHORIZED STRENGTH | SUM OF ROWS 1 AND 2 MINUS ROW 3 | 3991 | | | | |
| 5 | PARENT UNIT PRESENT FOR DUTY STRENGTH | PDS REPORT OR ROW 14 FROM PREVIOUS DAY | 3552 | | | | |
| 6 | ATTACHED UNIT (S) PRESENT FOR DUTY STRENGTH | PDS REPORT FOR UNIT(S) ATTACHED DURING RPT PERIOD | 0 | | | | |
| 7 | DETACHED UNIT(S) PRESENT FOR DUTY STRENGTH | PDS REPORT FOR UNIT(S) DETACHED DURING RPT PERIOD | 0 | | | | |
| 8 | TOTAL PRESENT FOR DUTY STRENGTH | SUM OF ROWS 5 AND 6 MINUS ROW 7 | 3552 | | | | |
| 9 | LOSS RATE | ST 101-6 LOSS FACTOR (PAGE 1-1) DIVIDED BY 100 | .010 | | | | |
| 10 | TOTAL LOSSES | ROW 8 TIMES ROW 9 | 36 | | | | |
| 11 | NUMBER OF REPLACEMENTS | HIGHER HEADQUARTERS S1/G1/AG/DCSPER | 18. | | | | |
| 12 | HOSPITAL RETURNS (RTDs) | PERSONNEL WORKSHEET 2, ROW 1 ST 101-6 FACTOR (PAGE 1-2) | 17 | | | | |
| 13 | NET LOSSES | ROW 10 MINUS THE SUM OF ROWS 11 AND 12 | 1 | | | | |
| 14 | END OF DAY PRESENT FOR DUTY STRENGTH | ROW 8 MINUS ROW 13 | 3551 | | | | |
| 15 | ENDOFDAYPERCENT OF AUTHORIZED STRENGTH | ROW 14 DIVIDED BY ROW 4 | 90.79% | | | | |

ASSUMPTION: 3D BDE WILL RECEIVE APPROX 20% OF THE DIVISION'S 92 REPLACEMENTS PER DAY EVEN
THOUGH THEY ARE INITIALLY LOW ON THE DIVISION'S PRIORITY LIST

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CASUALTIES BY TYPE

| ROW | <u>D+0</u> | TOTAL LOSSES ROW 10 WORKSHEET 1 | LOSS BY TYPE FACTOR ST 101-6, p. 1-2 | TOTAL LOSSES BY TYPE (TOTAL LOSS TIMES LOSS FACTOR) | NUMBER WOUNDED | WOUNDED FACTOR ST 101-6, p. 1-2 | TOTAL BY TYPE (WOUNDED TIMES FACTOR) |
|-----|------------|------------------------------------|--|--|-------------------|--|--|
| 1 | | 36 | .18 KIA | 6 | 26 | .64 RTD LEVEL I AND II | 17 |
| 2 | | | .72 WOUNDED | 26 | | .01 DIE OF WOUNDS | 0 |
| 3 | | | .10 MIA | 4 | | .35 EVAC TO CORPS | 9 |

| ROW | <u>D+1</u> | TOTAL LOSSES ROW 10 WORKSHEET 1 | LOSS BY TYPE FACTOR ST 101-6, p. 1-2 | TOTAL LOSSES BY TYPE (TOTAL LOSS TIMES LOSS FACTOR) | NUMBER WOUNDED | WOUNDED FACTOR ST 101-6, p. 1-2 | TOTAL BY TYPE (WOUNDED TIMES FACTOR) |
|-----|------------|------------------------------------|--|--|-------------------|--|--|
| 1 | | | .18 KIA | | | .64 RTD LEVEL I AND II | |
| 2 | | | .72 WOUNDED | | | .01 DIE OF WOUNDS | |
| 3 | | | .10 MIA | | | .35 EVAC TO CORPS | |

| ROW | <u>D+2</u> DEFENSE | TOTAL LOSSES ROW 10 WORKSHEET 1 | LOSS BY TYPE FACTOR ST 101-6, p. 1-2 | TOTAL LOSSES BY TYPE (TOTAL LOSS TIMES LOSS FACTOR) | NUMBER WOUNDED | WOUNDED FACTOR ST 101-6, p. 1-2 | TOTAL BY TYPE (WOUNDED TIMES FACTOR) |
|-----|-----------------------|------------------------------------|--|--|-------------------|--|--|
| 1 | | | .18 KIA | | | .64 RTD LEVEL I AND II | |
| 2 | | | .72 WOUNDED | | | .01 DIE OF WOUNDS | |
| 3 | | | .10 MIA | | | .35 EVAC TO CORPS | |

| ROW | <u>D+___</u> | TOTAL LOSSES ROW 10 WORKSHEET 1 | LOSS BY TYPE FACTOR ST 101-6, p. 1-2 | TOTAL LOSSES BY TYPE (TOTAL LOSS TIMES LOSS FACTOR) | NUMBER WOUNDED | WOUNDED FACTOR ST 101-6, p. 1-2 | TOTAL BY TYPE (WOUNDED TIMES FACTOR) |
|-----|--------------|------------------------------------|--|--|-------------------|--|--|
| 1 | | | .18 KIA | | | .64 RTD LEVEL I AND II | |
| 2 | | | .72 WOUNDED | | | .01 DIE OF WOUNDS | |
| 3 | | | .10 MIA | | | .35 EVAC TO CORPS | |
| | | | | | | | |

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AMMUNITION REQUIREMENT

| UNIT OR WPN SYSTEM | REQUIREMENT IN SHORT TONS (ST 101-6, p. 1-6) | | | | | TOTAL RQMT |
|-----------------------|--|------------|----------------------|---------|---------|---------------|
| | <u>D+0</u> | <u>D+1</u> | <u>D+2 (DEFENSE)</u> | D+_____ | D+_____ | |
| TF 4-77 MECH | 25X.4=10 | | | | | |
| 4-81 MECH | 25X.4310 | | | | | |
| 4-25 ARMOR | 9X.4=3.6 | | | | | |
| 4-42 FA | 30X.4=12 | | | | | |
| C/4-441 ADA | 4X.4=1.6 | | | | | |
| 33D ENGR | 13X.4=5.2 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| GRAND TOTAL | 42.4 | | | | | |

COMPARE THE DAILY TOTAL AMMUNITION REQUIREMENT AGAINST THE UNIT'S AMMUNITION HANDLING CAPABILITY.

I.E. A DIVISION HAS THREE FSB's THAT CAN HANDLE 572 STONS/DAY OR A TOTAL OF 1716 STONS/DAY.

A BRIGADE WOULD HAVE ONE FSB THAT CAN HANDLE 572 STONS/DAY.

IF THE DAILY TOTAL REQUIREMENTS EXCEED THE UNIT'S CAPABILITY TO HANDLE THE AMMUNITION, REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM HIGHER OR SURGE YOUR UNIT'S CAPABILITY TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT.

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AMMUNITION DAILY REQUIREMENTS

| COLUMN 1 | COLUMN 2 | COLUMN 3 | COLUMN 4 | COLUMN 5 | COLUMN 6 |
|--------------------------|---|--|--|--------------------------------------|---|
| | BEGINNING BASIC LOAD (PER WEAPON) | REQUIRED SUPPLY RATE (RSR) PER WPN | CONTROLLED SUPPLY RATE (CSR) PER WPN | ENDING BASIC LOAD (PER WEAPON) | NUMBER OF AUTHORIZED WEAPON SYSTEMS |
| SOURCE OR COMPUTATION | ST 101-6, p. 1-7 APPROVED UBL/ COL 5 PREV DAY | ST 101-6, p. 1-7 HISTORICAL DATA | HIGHER HQ's CSS PLAN/ ORDER | COL 2 PLUS COL 4 MINUS COL 3 | MTOE ST 101-6, APPENDIX N |
| AMMUNITION TYPE | | | | | |
| D+0 THROUGH D+1 | | | | | |
| 155 MM HE | 18 | 0 | 0* | 18 | |
| 155MM DPICM | 135 | 0 | 0* | 135 | |
| 15MM HE-RAP | 24 | 0 | 0* | 24 | |
| ATGM, TOW | 16 | 0 | 0* | 16 | |
| D+2 (DEFENSE) | | | | | |
| 155 MM HE | | | | | |
| 155MM DPICM | | | | | |
| 15MM HE-RAP | | | | | |
| ATGM, TOW | | | | | |

SINCE THE BRIGADE DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY AMMUNITION ON THESE DAYS, THEY WOULD NORMALLY NOT RECEIVE THEIR ALLOCATED CSR.

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DAILY FUEL CONSUMPTION
(ST 101-6, p 1-5)

| UNIT | <u>D+9</u> | | | <u>D+1</u> | | | <u>D+2</u> <u>/DEFENSE</u> | | | <u>TOTAL FUEL</u> <u>REQUIREMENTS</u> | | |
|----------------------------|------------|--------|---------|------------|-------|-------|-------------------------------|-------|-------|--|-------|-------|
| | JP8 | MOGAS | TOTAL | JP8 | MOGAS | TOTAL | JP8 | MOGAS | TOTAL | JP8 | MOGAS | TOTAL |
| TF 4-77 MECH | 19,212 | 1,979 | 21,191 | | | | | | | | | |
| 4-81 MECH | 19,212 | 1,979 | 21,191 | | | | | | | | | |
| 4-25 ARMOR | 39,917 | 1,885 | 41,802 | | | | | | | | | |
| 4-42 FA | 13,525 | 1,659 | 15,184 | | | | | | | | | |
| CI4-441 ADA | 2,579 | 355 | 2,934 | | | | | | | | | |
| 33D ENGR | 23,941 | 3,103 | 27,044 | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL FUEL REQUIREMENTS | 118,386 | 10,960 | 129,346 | | | | | | | | | |

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MAINTENANCE STATUS
(EQUIPMENT READINESS)

| COLUMN 1 | COLUMN 2 | COLUMN 3 | COLUMN 4 |
|---------------|----------------------------------|--|---|
| WEAPON SYSTEM | NUMBER OF WEAPON SYSTEMS ON-HAND | NUMBER OF WEAPON SYSTEMS MISSION CAPABLE | ER RATE % (COL 3 DIVIDED BY COL 2 = COL 4) |
| D+0 | | | |
| M1A2 | 68 | 64 | 94% |
| M2 | 82 | 75 | 91% |
| 155 HOW | 24 | 22 | 92% |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
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| | | | |
| | | | |

NOTE: COMMANDERS WILL NORMALLY DIRECT WHAT SYSTEMS THEY WANT TRACKED OR MONITORED

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DAILY EQUIPMENT LOSS

| COLUMN 1 | COLUMN 2 | COLUMN 3 | COLUMN 4 | COLUMN 5 | COLUMN 6 | COLUMN 7 | COLUMN 8 | COLUMN 9 | COLUMN 10 |
|------------|---|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|---|---|---|---|--|---|
| ITEM | TOTAL NUMBER ON-HAND (ENSURE TO ADD REPAIRED ONSITE AND AT DS NEXT DAY) | LOSS RATE %, ST 101-6, p. 1-7 | NO. LOST (COL 2 X 3) | LOSS CATEGORY NON-REPAIR FACTOR, ST 101-6, p. 1-8 (COL 4 X 5) | LOSS CATEGORY REPAIRABLE FACTOR, ST 101-6, p. 1-8 (COL 4 X 6) | EVAC TO TA MAINT UNIT FACTOR, ST 101-6, p. 1-8 (COL 6 X 7) | REPAIR ONSITE FACTOR, ST 101-6, p. 1-8 (COL 6 X 8) | REPAIR AT DS FACTOR, ST 101-6, p. 1-8 (COL 6 X 9) | REPAIR AT B/U DS FACTOR, ST 101-6, p. 1-8 (COL 6 X 10) |
| D+0 | | | | | | | | | |
| M1A2(TANK) | 68 | .05 | 3 | 3X.10=0* | 3X.90=3 | 3X.20=1 | 3X.30=1 | 3X.30=1 | 3X.20=0* |
| M2 (BFV) | 82 | .05 | 4 | 4X.10=0* | 4X.90=4 | 4X.20=1 | 4X.30=1 | 4X.30=1 | 4X.20=1 |
| 155 HOW | 24 | .05 | 1 | 1X.10=0* | 1X.90=1 | 1X.20=0 | 1X.30=1* | 1X.30=0 | 1X.30=0 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| D+1 | | | | | | | | | |
| M1A2(TANK) | 68-3+2=67 | | | | | | | | |
| M2 (BFV) | 82-4+2=80 | | | | | | | | |
| 155 HOW | 24-1=1=24 | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| D+2 | | | | | | | | | |
| M1A2(TANK) | DEFENSE | | | | | | | | |
| M2 (BFV) | | | | | | | | | |
| 155 HOW | | | | | | | | | |

* NUMBERS WERE ROUNDED TO THIS NUMBER TO ENSURE TOTALS ADDED UP.

NOTE: THESE FIGURES ARE BASED ON EQUIPMENT BEING FIXED ON SITE OR AT DS BEING RETURNED TO THE OWNING UNIT WITHIN 24 HOURS, EVEN THOUGH DS CAN KEEP THE REPAIR JOB LONGER

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SUPPLY WORKSHEET

| COLUMN 1 | | COLUMN 2 | COLUMN 3 | | COLUMN 4 | | COLUMN 5 | |
|----------|--------------------------------------|---|---|--|---|--|--|--|
| | | CONSUMPTION RATE LBS/MAN | <u>D+0</u> COL 3A PERSONNEL STRENGTH | COL 3B STONS REQUIRED | <u>D+1</u> COL 4A PERSONNEL STRENGTH | COL 4B STONS REQUIRED | <u>D+2</u> (DEFENSE) COL 5A PERSONNEL STRENGTH | COL 5B STONS REQUIRED |
| ROW | CLASS OF SUPPLY | ST 101-6, PAGE 1-4 TO 1-5 OR HISTORIC DATA | PDS RPT PERSONNEL PROJECTIONS | COL 2 TIMES COL 3A DIVIDED BY 2000 | PDS RPT PERSONNEL PROJECTIONS | COL 2 TIMES COL 3A DIVIDED BY 2000 | PDS RPT PERSONNEL PROJECTIONS | COL 2 TIMES COL 3A DIVIDED BY 2000 |
| AA | I | 5.535 | 3552 | 9.8 | | | | |
| BB | II | 6.129 | 3552 | 10.9 | | | | |
| CC | III (PKG) | 0.51 | 3552 | 0.9 | | | | |
| DD | IV | 8.5 | 3552 | 15.1 | | | | |
| EE | VI | 0 | 3552 | 0 | | | | |
| FF | VIII | 1.03 | 3552 | 1.8 | | | | |
| GG | IX | 2.5 | 3552 | 4.4 | | | | |
| HH | WATER | 7 | 3552 | 12.4 | | | | |
| JJ | TOTAL STONS ALL CLASSE S | SUM OF ROWS AA THRU HH | | 55.3 | | | | |

CLASS I FIGURE = 3 MREs + HCPI + HCP2 = 5.535 PMD

CLASS II FIGURE = SWA FACTOR + 4.038 PMD CDE FACTOR = 6.129 PMD

CLASS VIII FIGURE = MCR-E FACTOR = 1.03 PMD

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COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 3. The Tactical Decisionmaking Process**

Appendix 3 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 3. Special Situation and Second Practical Exercise, Lesson 3: Course of Action Development

1. SPECIAL SITUATION

You are the **S3**, 3d Bde, 55th **Mech** Div. The brigade is currently in an assembly area in the vicinity of **OTTAWA (UN0376)**, preparing to conduct operations to defend Centralia against attack by Nebraska. Earlier, you and the brigade commander attended a briefing at the 55th **Mech** Div main CP during which the division G3 issued OPLAN WHITE. The brigade staff has now issued a warning order, completed its mission analysis, briefed the commander, and received his approval of the brigade restated mission. The commander has issued his planning guidance to the **staff** (Enclosure A).

It is now the afternoon of 14 Aug 199_. The brigade **XO** has directed that you develop two **COAs** that will accomplish the brigade mission in a way that satisfies the commander's guidance. He expects you to prepare a COA statement and sketch (use Enclosure C to assist you), but you know him well enough to understand that you ought to be prepared to justify your **COAs** using the threat and friendly force arrays. Your assistant S3 has already developed one COA, and you decide to prepare the other personally. You retire to your tent (which has the appropriate maps and overlays posted) to develop your COA.

2. SECOND PRACTICAL EXERCISE, LESSON 3: COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

Use the procedures described in ST 101-5 to develop one suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete COA for the brigade mission. You may use all previously issued course material to help you accomplish this task. Be sure that your COA is distinctly different from COA 1 (Enclosure B)

Record your COA sketch on the sketch of the brigade **AO** provided at Enclosure A. Record the COA statement on the facing page.

To adequately explain the rationale for your COA, you must produce an overlay that, when posted on your map, depicts avenues of approach, key terrain, maneuver control measures, and the enemy and friendly force arrays you used to develop your COA. An analysis of relative force ratios is also necessary.

Individual work is required on this practical exercise.

COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 3. The Tactical Decisionmaking Process**

Enclosure A to Appendix 3 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 3: Commander's Guidance

After the staff completed the mission analysis briefing, the brigade commander issued the following guidance:

“OK, staff. Your mission analysis was sound and provided me insights into the operation I did not glean from my own initial estimate. X0, we need to issue a warning order; but before we do so, I wish to provide my thoughts on the operation.

“I do not believe the Nebraskiis would attempt to push a division through our sector if they knew we were preparing to defend north of the KANSAS River. As the S2 has outlined for us, we have a narrow sector and the terrain restricts movement of armored or mechanized forces. Recent weather, which has swollen streams, raised river levels to near flood stage, and saturated the soil in our AO, further limits the attacker's maneuver options. The deception, however, makes this course of action credible, and I believe the division G2 has drawn an accurate picture of the enemy. The 2 Army will place its main effort west of STRANGER Creek, in 2d Bde's AO. We will initially defend against a supporting effort MRD.

“The S2 expects the 9 MRD will conduct the supporting attack. Whether we face the 9 MRD or 3 MRD is inconsequential. The divisions have virtually the same organizational structure. We project their equipment operational readiness rates and personnel strengths to be nearly identical. Also, we have no information indicating one division's leaders are more capable than their counterparts in the other division. Therefore, the S2's threat evaluation and determination of enemy COAs apply equally to both divisions. I concur with the most probable COA, and I also consider it to be the most dangerous. We will develop our COAs against this one. Time permitting, I want you to also plan against a possible early commitment of a forward detachment through our sector to seize K4NSAS River crossing sites - the first branch the S2 identified during mission analysis.

“I agree with your assessment of why we are conducting this operation. However, I don't believe we will have to destroy the MRD to be successful. I want to destroy the lead MRBs of the hvo first-echelon regiments and block 2 Army follow-on forces. Change the restated mission to reflect these two ursks.

“Clearly, the purpose of our operation is to deny 2 Army the east avenues of approach, protecting the right flank of the division's main effort, the 2d Bde, from envelopment. This will enable 2d Bde to expose second-echelon elements of 2 Army to the direct tires of the corps main effort (10th Avn Bde).

“At the end of the operation, I want 3d Bde in defensive positions north of a line that runs from EASTON (UP177570) to HAPPY HOLLOW Lake (UP243573) to GOVERNMENT Hill (UP323567). We will have destroyed the advance guards and lead MRBs of the first-echelon regiment, and the remnants of first-echelon division follow-on forces will have advanced no further south than Highway 192 in the west and Highway 7/73 in the east. They will be defending from hasty defensive positions or conducting a retrograde. The 1st Bde will be available for commitment to the corps exploitation, and we will be preparing to transition to the offense.

“As I see it, the enemy will concentrate his attack in the center mobility corridor. AA1 and a branch of AA2 converge just north of LOWEMONT and parallel one another for approximately one mile. I want to kill the enemy at the decisive point represented by the open area around LOWEMONT, (UP230608) EIGHTMILE HOUSE (UP240598), and the HIGH SCHOOL (UP229589).

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“The brigade will defend well forward in sector using an area defense. After accepting battle handover from the 55th Avn Bde, we will strike a hard first blow against the advance guards and lead MRBs of the two first-echelon regiments to destroy them and to send a signal to 2 Army that the avenues of approach in the east are well-defended. We will then shift the focus of our effort to block follow-on forces. Using the terrain to the greatest advantage, we will force the enemy to use the central mobility corridor. We will pound the enemy with massed fires at the decisive point and make his losses heavy.

“With TF 4-77 Mech OPCON to the 55th Avn Bde until battle handover, I envision two TFs abreast initially. Orient the main effort on the decisive point, and weight it with the bulk of our combat power. A supporting effort in the east should be able to take advantage of the more defensible terrain. Don’t feel constrained; if you have other feasible solutions, I want to hear them.

“I do not want the enemy to bypass the decisive point. Look at blocking northwest and west of KICKAPOO to deny the enemy’s supporting effort the northern access to SALT CREEK Valley.

“Minimize the control measures you impose on the TF commanders. They’re experienced, and I don’t want to restrict their freedom of action. Use phase lines to keep tabs on the battle, but avoid imposing battle positions on them unless there is a good reason to do so.

“Don’t expect to have the full combat potential of TF 4-77 Mech. In the worst case, it may be pretty well beat up by the time it comes to us. Get it back to an assembly area to reorganize, rearm, refuel, and prepare for the mission you give it. Consider an immediate employment option if it comes to us pretty well intact.

“We must fight the enemy piecemeal. Do not let him mass more than one battalion in any one area. The terrain will help us slow his pace and isolate echelons. Deep operations should focus on delaying the enemy and causing enough attrition that we will be able to achieve favorable combat power ratios to defeat his echelons in succession. Our deep battle must locate and destroy enemy artillery assets before they join the fight, and we must also locate and disrupt the ITB.

“Ensure the western TF ties in with 2d Bde. I want to know where 2d Bde’s line of containment is to ensure the enemy is unable to move into our left flank and rear. It is unlikely enemy ground units will attempt to penetrate our right flank, and the Leavenworth Militia and/or the 3 13th Sep Mech Bde should be able to provide ample warning of a threat from the east. I do want you to examine and be prepared to neutralize a potential artillery threat coming from 1 Army. I also want to ensure we have coordinated with the Leavenworth Militia to keep a watch on SHERMAN Airfield and CENTENNIAL Bridge.

“Without jeopardizing the deception plan, identify combat, CS, and CSS assets we can move into the AO early under the guise of being a part of the corps covering force. We must begin counterreconnaissance in our AO before we occupy it. We will have little time to prepare the defense once we arrive in our AO, and we can expect enemy division reconnaissance teams to begin moving through the sector and establishing OPs as early as H+6. Let’s keep enemy eyes off of our defensive preparations. I also want to get a jump on pushing CSS resources up into the AO so that they are in position and ready to support our combat units when needed.

“Initially, we won’t be able to maintain a large reserve. Until TF 4-77 Mech has reorganized, do not plan on more than a company team for a reserve. I am willing to take risk here in order to ensure we have sufficient combat power to deal with the enemy in front of our forward TFs. Keep your COAs for the reserve simple. I don’t want to overtax the team commander’s C² and planning capabilities. I believe we would most likely commit the reserve in the west.

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“We will also accept some risk in the rear. Nothing the S2 or division G2 has told me indicates a significant ground threat to our rear operations. Unless the templated threat changes, we will forego a TCF in favor of keeping combat power in the MBA.

“Focus our deception effort to support the corps Phase I deception objective; i.e., the Nebraska Front commander directs 1 Army and 2 Army to attack on the most direct approaches to KANSAS CITY. We will support the division ruse to portray itself as the corps reserve in AA OTTAWA in order to convince the front commander that 10th Corps will not seek a decisive engagement north of the KANSAS and MISSOURI Rivers. In more practical terms, this means we will be unable to give an all-out effort to preparing defensive positions before the Nebraskiis attack into CENTRALIA.

“In this battle, fire support is a critical supporting effort. Counterfire against the RAGs and mortars will keep our artillery busy. We must limit other fires to priority efforts. Suppress enemy in front of our main effort. Concentrate on the decisive point. After the main effort, give priority to the supporting effort in the east and the reserve. I don’t want to have to use our precious artillery to lay FASCAM.

“Although a supporting effort, the MRD will receive some air support, Map out the air avenues of approach, and get a fix on his targets. Include air defense in the counterreconnaissance. I want to prevent enemy air from observing our occupation of the AO and piecing together a picture of our defenses.

“Give first priority for survivability to the main effort. I would like this TF to have multiple positions for its combat vehicles and crews. Countermobility must help slow enemy movement into the decisive point and help separate enemy echelons, but don’t forget I want to block the north access to SALT CREEK Valley. We must also place obstacles along STRANGER Creek to prevent penetration of our flank or rear. Remember, I don’t want to have to use artillery-delivered FASCAM. Let’s make sure we keep routes to the rear clear for TF 4-77 and 55th Avn Bde units.

“Division has tasked us to operate an AXP at PP7 for division guard units, The passage point sits on top of the enemy’s eastern avenue of approach. Let’s get the division’s approval to move it away from the center of the that enemy zone of attack. Begin coordination now with the 55th Avn Bde to do the same with the rearward passage of lines. Get prestocks of ammunition and our barrier materials to the MBA before we occupy it. Maintenance priority for combat systems must go to our tanks. Bradleys, and howitzers. With regard to support systems, give priority to the M88s, POL tanker, and fuel truck.

“I understand the brigade staff and TF commanders, S3s, and FSOs have already conducted a terrain walk. Get other key leaders out on the terrain also.

“Tentatively, my CCIR are as follows:

PIR -

1. Where are the RAGs and mortars’?
2. Is the enemy attack going to occur on AA1 and AA2?
3. Where are the second-echelon regiments. Where and when will the enemy commit them?
4. Where is the ITB? Where will it be committed? When?
2. Where is the lead regiment of the second-echelon TD?

EEFI -

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- 1 Where 3d Bde will defend.
- 2 The location and composition of the brigade reserve.

FFIR -

- 1 Status of AN/TPQ-36 radar.
- 2 Status of TF 4-77 at battle handover from division guard.
- 3 Status of survivability positions and obstacles every six hours (before MBA fight).
- 4 Any enemy penetration of 2d Bde's containment vicinity STRANGER Creek.

"Now, let's talk about time. I accept the S3's initial analysis, but I want to begin to refine it. Immediate attack does not appear likely. Regardless, I want our planning to move at a rapid, though deliberate, pace to provide the-TFs and our support slice more than enough time to prepare to execute the operation. Therefore, assume H-Hr will be 0600 16 August. We will issue a five-paragraph OPLAN to our commanders and support units at 2200 tonight at the Main CP. Be prepared to present COAs to me at 1400 hours and a decision brief at 1800.

"Schedule time tomorrow for backbriefs by the TF commanders. Let's also plan on conducting a combined arms rehearsal with key leaders using the sketch map technique sometime late tomorrow.

"If there are no questions, I will let you get back to work. We have much to do. Semper Paratus!

COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 3. The Tactical Decisionmaking Process**

Enclosure B to Appendix 3 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 3: Course of Action 1.

After the brigade commander issued his planning guidance, the brigade XO directed the S3 to issue a warning order to subordinate and supporting units and to develop two COAs. Knowing his boss was pressed for time, the assistant S3 developed the first COA, with statement and sketch, below.

COA STATEMENT

On order, 3d Bde defends in sector from UP171610 to UP299660 to destroy lead MRBs of 2 Army first-echelon MRD and blocks follow-on forces to deny 2 Army the east avenues of approach and protect the 2d Bde (div main effort) right flank from envelopment.


An advance party company team under brigade control destroys MRD reconnaissance teams from H+6 to H+22 between Highway 192 and PL GRAY and west of EIGHTMILE HOUSE to prevent enemy observation of the brigade occupation of the sector and preparation of the defense.

On order, fire support assets neutralize RAGs in EA DAGGER (center of mass UP676190) to prevent the suppression of friendly forces by Phase II and Phase III fires. On order, disrupt the ITB in EA DAGGER to enable the main effort to maintain favorable force ratios against enemy forces advancing on AA1.

On order, an armor-heavy TF, the main effort, destroys the advanced guard and first-echelon MRBs of a lead MRR on AA1 vicinity of MILLWOOD, and blocks follow-on forces along AA1 north of PL GRAPE to deny AA1 to the enemy and protect 2d Bde's eastern flank. Another armor-heavy TF, a supporting effort, destroys the advanced guard and first-echelon MRBs of a lead MRR on AA2, vicinity UP 225640, and contains follow-on enemy forces in sector to prevent the envelopment of the main effort right flank.

After reorganization, TF 4-77 Mech becomes brigade reserve. TF 4-77 Mech will be prepared to destroy enemy forces which penetrate PL GRAPE or the brigade west boundary between PL GRAPE and PL BLUE in order to protect the flanks of the brigade main effort. TF 4-77 Mech will be prepared to destroy platoon and larger-sized elements inserted into the brigade rear to protect lines of communication and the uninterrupted support to MBA units.

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COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 3. The Tactical Decisionmaking Process**

Enclosure C to Appendix 3 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 3: COA DEVELOPMENT WORKBOOK

1. MISSION ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS

Prior to COA development, you must draw certain specific conclusions from your analysis of the mission and the commander's guidance. At a minimum, you must understand the unit's purpose, the unit's current operation, most likely enemy COA, our anticipated decisive point, the estimated duration of the current operation, and the operation's critical events.

a. STEP 1: ANALYZE RELATIVE COMBAT POWER

(1) Make a rough estimate of relative force ratios and compare against historical minimum planning ratios (ST 1015, FIG 3-2, and C-310, Appendix 5, Lsn 3).

| FRIENDLY FORCES | | ENEMY FORCES | |
|------------------------|---------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| TYPE UNIT | NUMBER | TYPE UNIT | <u>NUMBER</u> |
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(2) These numbers do not, by themselves, tell you anything about friendly or enemy force capabilities. However, planning without regard to relative combat power capabilities at specific places and times leads to flawed planning assumptions. The numbers derived in this step are tools for planning the array of forces and drawing logical conclusions about estimated combat power capabilities at the start point, decisive point, and end state throughout the COA development process.

6. Use your conclusions from mission analysis and analysis of relative combat power to fill in these boxes.

(1) ENEMY FORCES:

(a) Define mission success and mission failure through the eyes of the enemy force commander.

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(b) Define criteria that will cause the enemy force commander to change his COA or execute a contingency plan.

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(c) Define the times and places where the enemy commander can decide to change his COA or execute a contingency/counterattack plan.

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(d) Define the times and places where major enemy maneuver forces are decisively committed (cannot change their COA, even if the commander tries to).

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(e) Define points at which the enemy commander can mass combat power faster than us.

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(2) FRIENDLY FORCES.

(a) Define the space requirements associated with critical events (minimum space subordinate units require to occupy and the frontage, depth, and size of sectors, positions, or objectives).

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(b) Duration of the current operation and time, location and duration of critical events.

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(c) Define the minimum combat power or resources required to perform critical events and accomplish task and purpose:

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(d) Define the time and place of decisive commitment (point during execution where we lose flexibility to change a COA).

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(e) Decision points and transition points (transition to a branch or sequel with anticipated capability required to execute).

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(f) Define the reconnaissance priorities and time required for reconnaissance over the duration of the operation.

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(g) OTHER CONCLUSIONS:

(2) ANALYSIS OF COMBAT POWER CONCLUSIONS. Compare friendly and enemy strengths and weakness using the dynamics of combat power (See notes below). List your conclusions regarding relative combat power strengths and weaknesses for this operation.

| DYNAMICS OF COMBAT POWER | ENEMY STRENGTHS/WEAKNESSES | FRIENDLY STRENGTH/WEAKNESS | ADVANTAGE | |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------|----|
| | | | THEM | US |
| MANEUVER | | | | |
| FIREPOWER | | | | |
| PROTECTION | | | | |
| LEADERSHIP | | | | |

****Notes:** 1. Maneuver: Explain why each side has positional or mobility advantages or disadvantages in relation to other friendly forces, the enemy, and the terrain.

2. Firepower: Explain the advantages and disadvantages associated with direct and indirect fire capabilities. Consider weapon system range capabilities, day and night target acquisition capabilities, joint capabilities, sustainment capabilities.

3. Protection: Explain the advantages and disadvantages associated with each side's ability to prevent the enemy from disrupting preparation and execution of the operation. Consider reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance capabilities, passive and active protective engineer, ADA, and signal capabilities, and line of communication security capabilities.

4. Leadership: Explain any factors that may enhance or inhibit either side's ability to operate at its optimum (or doctrinal) level of proficiency. At the tactical level, unit leadership capabilities are more important than specific leader personalities. The practical experience gained through combat is, in the short term, offset by the higher rate of casualties suffered by unit leaders. Consider how long a force has been in combat, the effect of casualties and replacements, the effect of unit reorganization or organization changes, and communications capabilities. Are soldiers still capable, given their training, experience and equipment, of doing what their commanders are ordering?

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b. STEP 2: GENERATE CONCEPTUAL POSSIBILITIES. From the conclusions drawn in STEP 1, we can begin to develop feasible, acceptable options for exploiting enemy weaknesses and capitalizing on our strengths in order to achieve our purpose. Establish a relationship between enemy forces, friendly forces, and the terrain to our decisive point. To develop a plan for us to impose our will on an enemy, we must visualize the point at which, relative to time, space, requirements, and realistic capabilities, we will start winning and the enemy starts losing. On these two pages record essential considerations that the COA must address in order to pass a test of suitability.

| ENEMY FORCES | | |
|------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| <u>STRENGTHS</u> | MISSION: | VULNERABILITIES |
| | <u>OBJECTIVE:</u> | |
| | | |
| | DECISIVE POINT: | |
| | | |
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| <u>MOST LIKELY COA</u> | | |
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OTHER ENEMY CONCLUSIONS:

| FRIENDLY FORCES | | |
|---|------------------------|------------------------|
| STRENGTHS | TASK: | VULNERABILITIES |
| | PURPOSE: | |
| | DECISIVE POINT: | |
| | END STATE: | |
| COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE: | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| <u>CRITICAL EVENTS AND ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS:</u> | | |
| | | |

c. STEPS 3-5: ARRAY FORCES; Develop the initial scheme of maneuver and determine command and control means.

- Show the most likely enemy COA SITEMP at the decisive point. Portray enemy forces two levels down.

- Describe the desired effects of combat power at the decisive point.

- Describe the purposes for the main and supporting efforts.

- Describe the task that provides the estimated minimum effects needed to achieve the purpose.

- Describe the type and size of units capable of accomplishing the tasks and purposes.

- Describe the C² and HQ requirements for each unit.

- Reevaluate the vertical and horizontal nesting of your subordinate unit tasks and purposes.

- From the decisive point, develop the scheme of maneuver by working your way backwards to the start point and forward to the end state.

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Show the array of friendly combat power two levels down (this means that at brigade level, show maneuver companies, not battalions, on this first sketch.). Array forces independent of the current task organization command and support relationships. Allocate sufficient combat power required to accomplish all critical events. Where requirements exceed the available combat power, conduct risk analysis and reassess the COP; for feasibility and suitability.

Establish minimum control measures required to clearly convey the scheme of maneuver and the responsibility for the terrain.

Use stickers and pencil first. Do not commit pen to paper until satisfied with the array of friendly forces required to accomplish the mission.

Stay focused on the current operation. Note the requirements, but do not get sidetracked by branches or sequels at this point.

NOTE: If you have determined more than one decisive point, or have more than one essential task and purpose for the main and supporting effort forces, while not wrong, it means you will probably soon realize one or more of the following problems. The COA will fail tests of feasibility or acceptability due to -

- Incorrect analysis of the unique contribution of your unit to higher HQ success.
 - Incorrect analysis of time and space requirements.
 - Incorrect analysis of subunit capabilities to meet critical requirements
 - Addressing a branch or sequel rather than the current operation
 - A COA too complicated to articulate and coordinate clearly, concisely, simply and in a timely manner.
- Draft Sketch: Use an extra sheet of paper to draw a draft sketch.
 - Risk Analysis: Analyze the risks to the force and determine measures required to protect the force. There are two types of risk inherent to any COA. The first risk is that a COA incurs unacceptable friendly casualties and the force cannot continue to fight. The second risk is that the enemy does something unexpected that our COA cannot handle. All combat incurs both risks, the objective is to minimize them to acceptable levels. Develop an understanding of the risks by comparing potential enemy threats, the availability of combat power or combat multipliers to mitigate the threats, and whether mission success outweighs the risk. Never accept unnecessary risk. Do not accept risk just because something is in the “too hard” box; this reflects indiscipline and, in the eyes of your future superiors and subordinates is quickly associated with incompetence.

| FORCE PROTECTION ANALYSIS | | | |
|----------------------------|--|------------------------------------|---|
| DEFINE THE ENEMY ACTION | <u>FRIENDLY</u> <u>COMBAT POWER</u> <u>SHORTFALL</u> | AVAILABLE COMBAT MULTIPLIERS | <u>IS RISK</u> <u>ACCEPTABLE OR</u> <u>UNACCEPTABLE</u> |
| | | | |
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NOTES:

d. STEP 6: COA STATEMENT AND SKETCH. The COA statement must be clear, concise, easy to read and understand in a single rapid reading by a subordinate. Use proper English sentences and paragraphs (ST 22-2). Do not use bullets. Draft, revise, and rewrite on scratch paper until you can meet the standard, Use the following *outline* to construct the COA statement in paragraph form. Do not exceed one page.

I. Restated Mission statement.

- a. Who, what, where, when, why (The purpose of the operation).

II. Articulate the decisive point.

- a. Friendly force location and combat power
- b. Desired effect on enemy force
- c. Terrain and time

111. How major subordinate maneuver units will achieve the decisive point.

- a. Form of maneuver or pattern of defense for force as a whole
- b. Responsibility for critical doctrinal tasks associated with form of maneuver/pattern of defense
- c. Mission essential tasks and purpose for major subordinate maneuver forces
 1. Main effort
 2. Supporting efforts
 3. Deep
 4. Recon & Security
 5. Reserve planning priorities
 6. TCF

IV. Acceptable risk

- a. Define the risk
- b. Justification that risk is worth your soldiers accepting

V. End State

- a. Location and status of major subordinate maneuver units
- b. Location and status of enemy forces

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a. COA STATEMENT.

[illegible]


b. FINAL COA SKETCH. Sketch must clearly convey the scheme of maneuver articulated in the statement using correct graphics (See FM 101-5-1 and ST 100-1). Use *decision graphics* to show combat power allocated to accomplish the task and appropriate level command responsibility. Show units in a manner that conveys relationship to overall form of maneuver or pattern of defense. Use dashed symbols to convey end state. Draw solid and dashed boundaries to convey subordinate responsibility for the terrain.

Include the following, as appropriate, to provide a clearer picture of the scheme of maneuver and areas of responsibility:

- Boundaries one level down.
- Main attack in the offense.
- Additional phase lines.
- Axes of a advance.
- Zones and/or sectors.
- Assembly areas.
- Battle positions.
- Engagement areas.
- Objectives.
- FEBA or LD/LC.
- Major manmade and natural obstacles.
- Fire support coordination measures.
- Key terrain.
- Identifying features (cities, rivers, highways, etc).

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BRIGADE AO SKETCH



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COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 3. The Tactical Decisionmaking Process

Enclosure D to Appendix 3 to-Advance Sheet, Lesson 3: Computing Relative Force Ratios

1. GENERAL

This section provides a more detailed method for the computation of relative force ratios than that described on pages 3-3 through 3-5 (Step 1. Analyze relative combat power) of ST 101-5. The comparison values located at Tab 1 to this Enclosure use a US mechanized rifle company at 100-percent strength equipped with M2AIs as the base unit (value = 1.0) and assess the comparative combat capability of all other units, including artillery, against this base unit. The values in this appendix are illustrative and for instructional use only. In practice, combat power comparisons would be based on classified studies tailored to the specific enemy force and environment that the friendly force would likely encounter.

During COA development, the S2 and S3 must determine and compare the combat power available to friendly and enemy commanders. By analyzing the resulting relative force ratios, the S3 can begin to draw conclusions about what types of friendly operations are possible. What follows here is an illustration of how these procedures could be applied to the situation involving the 3d Bde, 55th Mech Div.

Planners must begin with a clear understanding of what maneuver and fire support assets friendly and enemy forces have available and their relative combat power. The S2 must also understand how the enemy organizes his forces to fight-in this case he knows that Nebraskiis habitually split up the TB in the MRR by attaching one tank platoon to each motorized rifle company (MRC). The enemy treats the MRB in the TR of a TD in a similar manner. The S3 must account for this task organization as he determines the relative force ratios.

Discussion of the enemy will focus on forces available to the 9 MRD commander as he commits his first-echelon regiments (28 MRR or 120 MRR in the west and 26 MRR in the east), followed by the second-echelon regiments (27 TR in the west and 28 MRR or 120 MRR in the east) and the 21 ITB, against the 3d Bde. However, the S3 must also keep in mind that the Nebraskiis echelon their forces at battalion level and above. This means that 3d Bde will not have to fight all of the Nebraskii forces at the same time. The S3 has chosen to consider the echelonment of 9 MRD units after he determines overall force ratios.

Tab 1 this Enclosure lists the relative combat power assigned to friendly and enemy companies and company-equivalent maneuver forces. Combat power for cannon FA units is shown at the battalion level, since that is the level at which fires are controlled. The computations that follow are based on the relative force values depicted in Tab 1. For the sake of clarity, computations are rounded to the nearest tenth.

2. RELATIVE COMBAT POWER COMPUTATIONS

- a. The S2 and S3 ought to begin with a review of the friendly and enemy forces available.

(1) *Friendly.*

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3d Bde has four mechanized rifle companies and four tank companies throughout the operation.

TF 4-77 Mech will bring two mechanized rifle companies and one tank company when it comes under 3d Bde control after battle handover. (In mission analysis, the S3 assumes that TF 4-77 Mech will come to 3d Bde at 80-percent strength in mission capable combat systems, and the task force will require 5 hours reorganization before being committed to the 3d Bde fight.)

3d Bde has two 15mm SP FA battalions-one direct support (DS) and one reinforcing (R). The reinforcing battalion comes to 3d Bde at battle handover from the division guard force.

3d Bde has two TF HQs available throughout the operation and gains an additional TF HQ at battle handover.

(2) *Enemy.*

The enemy will attack 3d Bde with four regiments and an independant Tank Battalion (ITB). The first fight will be against two MRRs using advance guards. One regiment is BMP-equipped and the other is equipped with BTR-70s. The 9 AT Bn from the 9 MRD is also available. The second fight will be against a T-80-equipped TR, a BMP-equipped MRR, and the T-80-equipped ITB.

The Nebraskiis have considerable artillery available. Mission analysis concluded the enemy has 10 battalions of various types committed to support the attack of the first-echelon regiments into the 3d Bde sector - four in the RAG of the main attack, two in the supporting attack RAG, and four in the DAG - as well as the 2S1 battalion organic to each of the two secondechelon regiments. This does not include army artillery focused on support of the main attack axis against 2d Bde.

Enemy forces will not arrive at the FEBA at full strength. Corps and division deep operations, corps covering force operations, and division guard force operations will cause some attrition.

b. The S3 has depicted the results of the preliminary tally of units (before attrition) in the following table.

| <i>Friendly forces</i> | | <i>Enemy forces</i> | |
|------------------------|------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Number | Unit | Number | Unit |
| 6 | Mech cos | 18 | MRC tms (BMP-2) |
| | | 9 | MRC tms (BTR-70) |
| 5 | Tank cos | 12 | Tank cos |
| | | 1 | AT bn (div) |
| | | 3 | AT btrys (regt) |
| 2 | M109A6 bns | 4 | 2S1 bns |
| | | 3 | 2S3 bns |
| | | 1 | 2A3b bn |
| | | 1 | 2A65 bn |
| | | 2 | BM-21 bns |
| | | 1 | D-30 bn |

Note that at this point the S3 does not know how he will task organize friendly forces, so all of them are listed as "pure."

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c. The next step is to apply the attrition expected prior to battle handover. Losses can come from a number of sources. TF 4-77 Mech will have already fought as part of the guard force. Other friendly forces might not have begun at full strength or might have lost combat power during the move from OTTAWA. Enemy forces should suffer attrition at the hands of the corps and division deep operations and the corps covering force and division guard force.

(1) *Friendly.*

The S3 expects TF 4-77 Mech to begin the battle at 80 percent.

| <i>TYPO</i> | <i>Unit</i> | <i>Strength (%)</i> | <i>No. of units available</i> |
|-------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| 2 mech cos | TF 4-77 | 80 | 1.6 |
| 1 tank co | TF 4-77 | 80 | 0.8 |

Note that the S3 is considering TF 4-77 Mech even though it is initially under the operational control (OPCON to) the aviation brigade. The planner can include its contribution if he realizes it will not be available until 5 hours after division battle handover. He must keep this in mind when he decides how to use this unit in his COAs.

The S3 can base figures on other units on data contained in the brigade CSS status (app 1 to adv sheet, lesson 6).

| <i>Type</i> | <i>Unit</i> | <i>Strength (%)</i> | <i>No. of units available</i> |
|-------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| 4 mech cos | 4-81 | 85 | 3.4 |
| 4 tank cos | 4-25 | 91 | 3.6 |
| 1 FA bn | 4-42 | 92 | 0.9 |
| 1 FA bn | 2-642 | 80 | 0.8 |

Note that these strength percentages are based on the availability of major combat systems and not on personnel strength. (For example, 4-81 Mech has 47 mission-capable BFV M2s against 58 authorized. Three more should become mission capable within 24 hours.) The figure for 2-642 FA is an assumption based on an estimate of the losses incurred during its support of the division guard force mission,

(2) *Enemy.* Expected enemy losses vary by echelon. We assumed the lead regiments and their RAGS would be at 60-percent strength when we accept battle handover from the division, and we anticipate the second-echelon regiments and reserve will be committed against our brigade at 85percent strength. The resulting enemy losses are as follows:

| <i>Type</i> | <i>No. of units lost</i> | | <i>Total</i> |
|-----------------|--------------------------|-------------------|--------------|
| | <i>1st echelon</i> | <i>2d echelon</i> | |
| MRC tm (BMP-2) | 3.6 | 1.4 | 5.0 |
| MRC tm (BTR-70) | 3.6 | | 3.6 |
| Tank co | | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| AT bn (div) | | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| AT W (regt) | 0.8 | 0.2 | 1.0 |
| 2S1 bn | 0.8 | 0.3 | 1.1 |
| 2S3 bn | 1.2 | | 1.2 |
| 2A36 bn | | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| 2A65 bn | | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| BM-21 bn | | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| D-30 bn | 0.4 | | 0.4 |

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d. Now the S3 can adjust the unit count by applying this attrition to friendly and enemy forces. When he does so, the unit count is reflected as follows:

| Friendly forces | | Enemy forces | |
|-----------------|-------------|---------------|------------------|
| <i>Number</i> | <i>Unit</i> | <i>Number</i> | <i>Unit</i> |
| 5.0 | Mech cos | 13.0 | MRC tms (BMP-2) |
| | | 5.4 | MRC tms (BTR-70) |
| 4.4 | Tank cos | 10.2 | Tank cos |
| | | 0.8 | AT bn (div) |
| | | 2.0 | AT btry (regt) |
| 1.7 | M109A6 bns | 2.9 | 2SI bns |
| | | 1.8 | 2S3 bns |
| | | 0.8 | 2A36 bn |
| | | 0.8 | 2A65 bn |
| | | 1.7 | BM-21 bns |
| | | 0.6 | D-30 bn |

e. The next step is to apply the comparison values from the table in Tab A to this Enclosure to section II. After multiplying the appropriate factors by the number of company or battalion equivalents, the force comparison looks like this:

| Friendly forces | | Enemy forces | |
|-----------------|-------------|--------------|------------------|
| <i>Value</i> | <i>Unit</i> | <i>Value</i> | <i>Unit</i> |
| 5.0 | Mech cos | 11.7 | MRC tms (BMP-2) |
| | | 4.3 | MRC tms (BTR-70) |
| 5.3 | Tank cos | 9.2 | Tank cos |
| | | 1.3 | AT bn (div) |
| | | 2.0 | AT btrys (regt) |
| 6.8 | M109A6 bns | 41.2 | FA bns (total) |

f. The S3 now tallies the contributions made by all the friendly and enemy units and determines the overall ratios.

Ratio for maneuver: 10.3:28.5 or 1:2.8

Ratio for artillery: 6.8:41.2 or 1:6.1

Overall force ratios: 17.1:69.7 or 1:4.1

g. The last step is to analyze these ratios. The S2 and S3 must determine what they really mean. The ratios do not provide an absolute mathematical answer to what enemy or friendly forces can do. Rather, they help give the staff a feel for relative strengths and weaknesses and what options friendly and enemy forces have. Factors such as terrain, training, leadership, and morale cannot be assigned a numerical value, and the staff must consider their effects on the mission, too. For instance, terrain in the

3d Bde area generally favors the defense; the computations do not reflect this conclusion. Also, the available CAS sorties are not assigned a numerical value.

ST 101-5, page, 3-5, figure 3-2, shows force ratios required for various types of missions. Historical analysis shows that when a unit achieves these ratios, it can successfully conduct its mission

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50 percent of the time. From the computations and analysis of the table, the S3 can draw a number of tentative conclusions:

At first glance, the enemy's distinct advantage in artillery provides the combat power he needs to attack successfully. The enemy marginally lacks a 3:1 combat power advantage in maneuver forces, but the 6:1 ratio in artillery is of concern. The S3 concludes that the division must support 3d Bde with an aggressive counterfire program to reduce the enemy's artillery.

Up to this point, the S3 has considered the battle as a single fight. He has not yet taken into account the echelonment of the regiments and reserve. Deep operations could also delay the arrival of the second-echelon regiments and or ITB. The brigade would then be able to finish fighting the lead MRRs before the second echelon arrives and engage that echelon under more favorable terms. This would also provide more time to complete the reorganization of TF 4-77. The S2 and S3 conclude that they need division to conduct deep operations aimed at the second-echelon regiments and division reserve.

The maneuver and artillery force ratios highlight the importance of thorough preparation of defensive positions and obstacle construction to mitigate the effects of the enemy's artillery advantage and to compensate for marginal maneuver force ratios.

As the staff members develop the COAs, they can improve the force ratio on the most favorable enemy avenue of approach by massing there and economizing elsewhere. The S2's analysis of the terrain and avenues of approach will influence their thinking in this area.

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COMBAT OPERATIONS

US Versus Nebraskii Combat Unit Comparison Values

| <i>United States (L-series)</i> | <i>Value</i> | <i>Nebraskii</i> | <i>Value</i> |
|---------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------------|--------------|
| MANE WER | | | |
| Mech Co (M2A1) | 1.0 | MRC | |
| | | (BMP-2) | 0.9 |
| | | (B-R-70) | 0.8 |
| Tank Co (M 1A2) | 1.2 | Tank Co (T-80) | 0.9 |
| | | MRC Tm | |
| | | (BMP-2/T-80) | 1.2 |
| | | (BTR-70/T-80) | 1.1 |
| | | Tank Co Tm | |
| | | (T-80/BMP-2) | 1.2 |
| | | (T-80/BTR-70) | 1.1 |
| | | AT Bn (Div) | 1.6 |
| | | AT Btry (Regt) | 1.0 |
| Atk Hel Bn (AH-64) | 11.24 | Atk Hel Sqdn (Mi-24 HIND D) | 7.6 |
| ARTILLERY | | | |
| FA Bn (155-mm. SP), M109A6 | 4.0 | FA Bn (122-mm, T), D-30 | 2.5 |
| | | FA Bn (122-mm, SP), 2S1 | 2.8 |
| | | FA Bn (152-mm, SP), 2S3 | 3.4 |
| | | FA Bn (152-mm, T), 2A36 | 3.4 |
| | | FA Bn (152-mm, T), 2A65 | 3.4 |
| | | FA Bn (203-mm, SP), 2S7 | 2.7 |
| | | FA Bn (240-mm, Mort), 2S4 | 1.8 |
| MLRS Bn | 18.4 | MRL Bn BM-21 | 11.8 |
| MLRS Btry | 6.1 | MRL Bn, 9P140 | 14.0 |
| | | SS-21 Bn | 3.6 |

- NOTES:
1. Unit comparison values have been rounded to the nearest one-tenth.
 2. A Nebraskii MRC team consists of three motorized rifle platoons and one tank platoon, and a Nebraskii tank company team consists of three tank platoons and one motorized rifle platoon.
 3. These comparison values are for instructional purposes only and are to be used to support practical exercises during C3 10.

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COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 3. The Tactical Decisionmaking Process**

Appendix 4 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 3. Solution to Special Situation and First Practical Exercise, Lesson 3: Mission Analysis. See Enclosure A for the solution to the Logistics Worksheets.

1. HIGHER COMMANDERS' MISSIONS AND INTENTS

a. 10th Corps mission. On order, 10th Corps defends in sector to defeat the Nebraska Front forward of PL BLUE in order to protect the integrity of CENTRALIA.

b. 10th Corps commander's intent

(1) *Purpose:* The purpose of this operation is to protect the integrity of CENTRALIA in the event of a Nebraskii invasion.

(2) *End state:* The desired end state is the defeat of the Nebraska Front well north of KANSAS CITY, with 10th Corps units securing objectives on the CENTRALIA-NEBRASKA border.

(3) *Method:* Before the Nebraskii attack, the corps conducts a ruse in accordance with the deception plan to portray a defense in sector south of the KANSAS-MISSOURI Rivers to convince the front commander that 10th Corps will not seek a decisive engagement north of the rivers. This should encourage him to attack on the most direct approaches to KANSAS CITY. On the first hostile act, both ACRs delay the Nebraska Front for 48 hours to allow 55th Mech Div and 3 13th Sep Mech Bde time to deploy and prepare defensive positions north of the KANSAS-MISSOURI Rivers. 14th Avn Bde in the east and 10th Avn Bde in the west interdict the enemy's flanking first-echelon divisions to encourage the enemy to concentrate his attack in the center into the defenses of 55th Mech Div and 3 13th Sep Mech Bde. East of the MISSOURI River, 3 13th Sep Mech Bde fixes the first-echelon divisions of 1 Army, while 23d Armd Div conducts a flank attack from the east to defeat the second-echelon division canalized by 14th Avn Bde. The purpose of this action is to isolate 1 Army on the east side of the MISSOURI River. The decisive action takes place to the west of the MISSOURI River, where 55th Mech Div contains 2 Army, while 10th Avn Bde, main effort, causes the culmination of the Nebraska *Front* by the attrition of 2 Army's second-echelon division. 25th Armd Div, initially the corps reserve for this action, is to be prepared to assume the main effort and attack from the western flank to destroy the rear and LOCs of 2 Army if 10th Avn Bde is unable to cause the culmination of the Nebraska **Front** unaided. When the Nebraska Front attack has culminated, 25th Armd Div, now the main effort, and 23d Armd Div attack north to seize objectives on the CENTRALIA-NEBRASKA border, 55th Mech Div follows 25th Mech Div to clear bypassed enemy and restore the integrity of CENTRALIA. The operation will be phased as follows:

Phase I - Deception and Security Operations Prior to the Nebraskii Attack.

Phase II - Decisive Combat Operations

Exploitation to Restore the Centralian Border.

c. 33th Mech Div mission. On order, 55th Mech Div defends in sector to contain first-echelon elements of 2 Army north of PL YELLOW to enable 10th Avn Bde to defeat 2 Army to cause it to culminate through attrition of its second-echelon division.

d. Div commander's intent.

(1) *Purpose:* The purpose of our defense is to enable 10th Avn Bde to cause 2 Army to culminate through attrition of its second-echelon division.

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(2) *End state:* At the end of this operation, I want the division to have successfully contained lead elements of 2 Army north of PL YELLOW to allow the 10th Avn Bde to defeat it. Maneuver brigades will be defending along PL YELLOW with enough combat power to conduct offensive operations north. Lead divisions of 2 Army will be at 40-percent or lower strength and in hasty defensive positions. We must be prepared to clear enemy in zone up to objective ROYAL to support the restoration of CENTRALIA.

(3) *Method:* The 55th Mech Div will defend in sector to contain lead elements of 2 Army. We will defend with two brigades abreast. The main effort brigade will be west of STRANGER Creek. This is the decisive area where 2 Army will be contained to support 10th Corps main effort operations. The critical supporting effort in the east will block enemy forces along key terrain vicinity of PL YELLOW. Their purpose is to deny the enemy the east avenues of approach and protect the right flank of the main effort brigade from envelopment. We will establish a security zone forward of PL YELLOW first to accept battle handover from corps and then delay 2 Army lead elements for the purpose of buying an additional 6 hours to prepare MBA positions. Deep operations focus is to initially cause 2 Army to commit forces west of STRANGER Creek and to interdict follow-on forces and destroy enemy division and higher artillery groups. The reserve focus is to maintain the integrity of the containment of 2 Army.

2. ANALYSIS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS AND HIGHER COMMANDER'S CONCEPT OF OPERATION STATEMENT

a. *Define the battlefield environment.*


(1) *Area of operations.* Our sector is defined by PL GRAY in the north and the MISSOURI River and the city of LEAVENWORTH in the east. I-70 marks the brigade rear boundary, and STRANGER Creek defines our flank with 2d Bde in the west. The sector's width varies from approximately 13 to 17 kilometers north of PL BLUE and 14 to 23 kilometers south of the phase line. The distance from PL YELLOW to PL BLUE is approximately 21 kilometers.

(2) *Area of interest.* Our area of interest extends 10 km forward of PL GRAY. In the east, it includes the air space over the MISSOURI River and the approach to CENTENNIAL Bridge in LEAVENWORTH. In the south, the AI extends to the KANSAS River bridges at BONNER SPRINGS and DE SOTO, and it includes the eastern most avenue of approach in 2d Bde's sector in the west.


(3) *Battle space.* Our battle space will contract and expand over time, but initially it is more or less the same as our area of interest. This initial battle space will include the air space over our AO to an altitude of approximately 2500 feet.

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
6. Friendly forces.



- T: Contain tint-echelon elements of 2 Army north of PL YELLOW.
 P: Expose secondechelon elements of 2 Army to the direct fires of the 10th Avn Bde (corps M.E.) north of PL GREEN.




- T: O/O, contain lead divisions of 2 Army along a line from VALLEY FALLS to BRUSH CREEK to Highway 16 to Highway 92 to EASTON.
 P: Expose secondechelon elements of 2 Army to the direct fires of the 19th Avn Bde (corps M E.) north of PL GREEN.



- T1: B/P to block penetration via WINCHESTER.
 P1: Enable containment of lead divisions of 2 Army by 24 Bde (ME.).


- T2: B/P to destroy secondechelon regiments via OBJ MUSTANG.
 P2: Enable 3d Bde to deny 2 Army eastern avenues of approach and protect the 26 Bde (M E) right flank from envelopment.



- T1: 010, delay lead enemy divrsions north of PL GRAY for 6 hours.
 P1: Enable the M.E. to complete rts defenses to contain lead divisions of 2 Army


- T2: 010, destroy 2 Army AAG in EA ALVIN.
 P2: Protect M.E. from enemy phase II and phase III fires. and cause the 2 Army commander to commit to the western avenues of approach.

- T3: O/O, destroy ITBs in EAs RON and BILL.
 P3: Prevent enemy reserves from breaching the M.E.'s line of containment.




- T1: (OPCON to 55th Avn Bde). Delay lead enemy divisions north of PL GRAY for 6 hours
 P1: Enable ME. to complete its defenses to contain lead divisions of 2 Army.

- T2: (Division control). Screen division left flank from PL BLUE/PERRY Lake to the division rear boundary.
 P2: Protect the western flank and rear area of 2d Bde (M.E.).



- T: B/P to recapture KANSAS River bridges at LECOMPTON, LAWRENCE, DE SOTO, and BONNER SPRINGS.
 P: Penn the uninterrupted movement of CSS forward of the KANSAS River to resupply the main and supporting efforts of the divisron



- T: Secure FORT LEAVENWORTH and CENTENNIAL Bridge.
 P: Deny enemy access to the airfield and east-west link across the MISSOURI River.

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3. SPECIFIED AND IMPLIED TASKS

a. Specified tasks.

- (1) Destroy lead Mobs along PL YELLOW.
- (2) Block follow-on forces along a line from MILLWOOD to EIGHTMILE HOUSE to UP308578 to UP326615.
- (3) Neutralize RAGs and destroy mortar batteries in sector.
- (4) Provide division right flank security.
- (5) Establish passage points and develop routes for rearward passage of elements of the divisional guard force along PL GRAY.
- (6) Establish liaison with the Leavenworth Militia.
- (7) Receive attachment of TF 4-77 and 3/C/4-441 ADA on completion of division guard mission.
- (8) Construct obstacles in zones E, F, and G.
- (9) Perform intelligence acquisition tasks IAW para 3a(1) and perform measures for handling personnel, documents, and material IAW para 4 of the intelligence annex to OPLAN WHITE.
- (10) On implementation of CONPLAN TOP HAT-
 - (a) Block enemy forces.
 - (b) Reestablish defense along MILLWOOD to EIGHT MILE HOUSE to UP308578 to UP326615.
 - (c) Secure an LD/LC for the counterattack in the vicinity of PL YELLOW, assist in the passage of lines of 1st Bde, and block committed enemy forces.
 - (d) Be prepared to attack north toward objective ROYAL.

b. Implied tasks.

- (1) Move from division assembly area vicinity OTTAWA into sector.
- (2) Clear enemy division reconnaissance teams located in the brigade AO.
- (3) On arrival in sector, develop defenses.
- (4) Be prepared to block second-echelon TD of 2 Army along a line from MILLWOOD to EIGHT-MILE HOUSE.
- (5) Be prepared to clear enemy in zone up to objective ROYAL.

4. ESSENTIAL TASKS

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Destroy 2 Army firstechelon MRD along a line from MILLWOOD to EIGHTMILE HOUSE to UP308578 to UP326615.

5. AVAILABLE ASSETS.

NOTE: The following tables (Pam Sa through 5d) list major systems on hand for each unit. The tables neither depict all systems nor the number of major systems authorized by TOE.

a. Maneuver.

| UNIT | M1A 2 | M2A 1 | HMMW V SCOUT | JAVELI N | M121 MORTA R | COLT | FISTV |
|---|----------|----------|--------------------|-------------|--------------------|------|-------|
| HHC, 3d Bde | | | | | | 6 | |
| 4-25 AR | | | | | | | |
| <i>A Co</i> | 14 | | | | | | 1 |
| <i>B Co</i> | 13 | | | | | | 1 |
| <i>C Co</i> | 12 | | | | | | 1 |
| <i>D Co</i> | 13 | | | | | | 1 |
| HHC | 2 | | 10 | 5 | 6 | | |
| 4-81 Mech | | | | | | | |
| <i>A Co</i> | | 13 | | 9 | | | 1 |
| <i>B Co</i> | | 14 | | 9 | | | 1 |
| <i>C Co</i> | | 11 | | 9 | | | 1 |
| <i>D Co</i> | | 12 | | 9 | | | 1 |
| HHC | | 2 | 10 | 5 | 5 | | |
| TF 4-77 Mech (atch on completion of div guard mission) | | | | | | | |
| <i>A Co</i> | | 14 | | 9 | | | 1 |
| <i>B Co</i> | | 14 | | 9 | | | 1 |
| D/4-2 AR | 14 | | | | | | 1 |
| HHC | | 2 | 9 | 5 | 6 | | |

b. Fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability (cml and MP), intelligence. and C2.

| UNIT | M109A6 155-MM | AN/TP Q-36 | BSF V | MANPA DS | SMOKE GEN | GSR | IEWS E | HMMWV w/MK-19 | SEN |
|---|------------------|---------------|----------|-------------|--------------|-----|-----------|------------------|-----|
| 4-42 FA: DS | | | | | | | | | |
| A Btry | 8 | | | | | | | | |
| B Btry | 8 | | | | | | | | |
| C Btry | 8 | | | | | | | | |
| HHB | | | | | | | | | |
| 3/E/20: Atch | | 1 | | | | | | | |
| 2-642 FA: R 4- 42 FA; O/O, R 4-40 FA | | | | | | | | | |
| A Btry | 8 | | | | | | | | |
| B Btry | 8 | | | | | | | | |
| C Btry | 8 | | | | | | | | |
| HHB | | | | | | | | | |
| C/4-441 ADA: DS | | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Plt | | | 4 | | | | | | |
| 2d Plt | | | 4 | | | | | | |
| 3d Plt (Atch on completion of div guard mission) | | | | 10 | | | | | |
| 3/55 CML Co: DS | | | | | 7 | | | | |
| C/55 MI: DS | | | | | | 2 | 1 | | |
| 3/55 MP Co: DS | | | | | | | | 7 | |
| 3/1/A/55 SIG: DS | | | | | | | | | 1 |

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c. Mobility and survivability (enr).

NOTE: The M113s in the next table serve as the carrier for sapper squads and breach platoon leaders. Each company has two breach platoons with three, 8-man sapper squads in each platoon. The table also lists the 5-ton dump truck. This is the carrier for the sapper squads of C/500 Engr Cbt Bn (Corps) (Whl).

| UNIT | A C E | A V L B | C E V | M 1 1 3 | D O Z E R | G R A D E R | J A V E L I N | M I C L I C | S C O O P L D R | S E E | D U M P T R K | V O L C A N O |
|---|-------------|------------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 33d Engr Bn: OPCON | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A Co | 7 | 4 | 2 | 8 | | | 3 | 4 | | 2 | | 2 |
| B Co | 6 | 4 | 2 | 8 | | | 3 | 4 | | 2 | | 2 |
| C Co | 6 | 4 | 2 | 8 | | | 3 | 4 | | 2 | | 2 |
| HHC | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| C/500 Engr Cbt Bn (Corps) (Whl) (Atch to 33d Engr Bn); O/O Div Trp | | | | | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 18 | 2 |

d. Combat service support.

| UNIT | M11 3 AM B | HMM WV AMB | 5- TON CGO TRK | FORK - LIFT | MTV TRACT OR | 5,000 GAL TNK R | HVY PLS TRANS P CGO TRK | M88 REC VY VEH | WRECKE R |
|-----------------|---------------------|------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|--|-------------------------|-------------|
| 553d FSB: DS | 6 | 4 | 16 | 7 | 31 | 11 | 3 | 1 | 6 |

e. Other assets.

(1) Maneuver. None.

(2) Fire support.

(a) The division has distributed 10 CAS sorties per day to 3d Bde. For planning purposes, we can expect to use 2 sorties per mission

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(b) We can plan three 400- by 400-meter, artillery-delivered, medium-density minefields. The division commander retains authority to actually employ artillery-delivered FASCAM.

(3) Air defense. Unknown at this point in the planning process. The ADO is coordinating with the division to determine the air defense coverage that we can expect to overlap into the 3d Bde AO from other SHORAD units of the division, 3 13th Sep Mech Bde, corps HIMAD and Avenger units, the Leavenworth Militia, and or CAF combat air patrols.

(4) *Mobility and survivability.*

(a) The division engineer has been tasked to assist maneuver units in the construction of obstacles in their respective zones. Our engineer is determining what this means for 3d Bde.

(b) We can assemble 17 blade teams (including 3 dozers operating alone). For planning purposes, this equates to approximately 504 blade team 'hours (BTHs) and should yield 336 hull defilade positions, 144 turret defilade positions, 25.2 kilometers of antitank ditch, or various combinations of the three.

(c) We can plan to receive 40 percent of the division classes IV and V CCL minepacks stockage objectives. This yields:

4.75 kilometers of triple-standard concertina
17.9 kilometers of general purpose wire obstacle
20 kilometers of row AT minefield
8 kilometers of APERS minefield
384 claymore mines
Eighty-four 250- by 125-meter Volcano scatterable minefields.

(d) There is no shortage of personnel to lay the obstacles the division is providing 3d Bde. We can plan for 288 platoon hours (PHs) of work from our sapper platoons, enabling them to lay 86.4 kilometers of triple standard concertina, 192 standard fix minefields (each 250- x 120-meters), 57 standard block minefields (each 500- x 320-meters), or a combination of these and other obstacles in the two days we have to prepare the MBA defense.

(e) The second priority of div MPs is BCC at PL RED and PL YELLOW at battle handover. This will free our DS platoon for other tasks.

(5) *Intelligence.* Unknown at this time. The S2 is coordinating with the division G2 to determine the locations of division MI assets in our sector and the employment of ground-based and airborne collection assets which can help meet our intelligence collection requirements.

(6) *C².* None.

(7) *CSS.* None.

6. LIMITATION.

a. *Restrictions.*

- (1) Minimize activities that project defensive operations north of the KANSAS River.
- (2) CG, 55th Mech Div, retains authority to employ artillery-delivered FASCAM.

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(3) Do not position field artillery firing units or fire finder radars north of PL YELLOW.

(4) MSR EAGLE, which traverses the brigade sector, remains under corps control throughout the operation.

(5) Initial time analysis indicates that after arriving in sector, the brigade will have approximately 45 hours to prepare MBA defenses.

(6) C/500th Cbt Engr Bn returns to division control at H+48.

(7) 2-642 FA occupies PA5 (UP210580) to support the 55th Avn Bde during its guard and delay. A corps maintenance collection point is at UP3629 vicinity WALKER School). The locations of other corps or division units which will be operating in our AO, if any, are unknown at this time.

b. Constraints.

(1) Neutralize RAGs and destroy mortar batteries in sector.

(2) Responsible for division right flank security.

(3) Man contact points 6, 7, 8, and 9 and establish passage lanes to assist the rearward movement of division guard force.

(4) Establish liaison with the Leavenworth Militia.

(5) Construct brigade-directed obstacles in obstacle zones E, F, and G

(6) Operate an AXP vicinity contact point 7. Displace the AXP to vicinity PL BLUE after division battle handover to 3d Bde.

(7) Provide limited emergency area support of bulk POL to corps units operating in the div sector.

7. C²W CONSIDERATIONS

a. Supporting the corps and division deception plans limits our ability to conduct reconnaissance and prepare defensive positions north of the KANSAS River. Any brigade efforts north of the river must be covert and coordinated with the 208th ACR. Perhaps we will be able to prepare some survivability positions and stockpile supplies under the guise of successive delay positions and resupply for the ACR.

b. The division task organization does not place EW assets under brigade control. We must forward all requests for EW support to division. An initial assessment of the Nebraskii forces that oppose us indicates we may achieve a tactical advantage by jamming their divisional command nets to disrupt their relatively centralized C². This should delay and desynchronize commitment of the division's second-echelon units and its reserve ITB. The assessment also indicates that, given the artillery-heavy composition of Nebraskii forces, we should place high priority on the use of DF to locate and target artillery CPs and Jamming to disrupt Nebraskii fire support nets.

c. A Nebraskii division committed against the brigade will have a REC battalion capable of intercepting, jamming, and direction finding radio transmissions and direction finding our radars at acquisition ranges up to 40 kilometers, depending on weather and terrain. We must locate CPs and radar

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3. 4-81 Mech has on hand only 55 percent of its authorized NVGs. A shortage of NVGs is likely to hamper battalion operations during periods of limited visibility. No other significant equipment shortages exist.

4. Air evacuation is authorized as far forward as battalion aid stations. Division has tasked 553d FSB to operate an AXP at PP 7. One ground ambulance platoon and two air ambulances will locate at the AXP. Brigade will provide area medical support to covering force and guard force units transiting the brigade area.

5. Hospital support is available from the 83d Med Gp. CSH is in LSA CHARLIE, and a MASH is in the DSA.

6. Class VIII ASL is at go-percent fill.

7. SLCR services will be available in the DSA before and after the operation. During the division MBA fight, field services (except mortuary affairs) will be suspended.

8. MA augmentation is not available until D+4. 3d Bde must establish an MA collection point per division SOP.

9. BDOs are command regulated.

10. The brigade is zero balance on fog oil, severely limiting smoke operations.

11. MEDEVAC assets are adequate to handle the initial W1A projections.

(2) Other logistic facts.

(a) TF 4-77 Mech may require reconstitution with division ORF, if available.

(b) 3d Bde must conduct a 100 kilometer road march to get from AA OTTAWA to defensive positions in sector. Units will have to conduct thorough preventive maintenance before, during, and after the march. Units must plan to rapidly recover inoperable systems to collection points in sector.

(3) Projected logistic status of 3d Bde on D-day (before AFFMS portion of MAFFMS).

(a) Arm. The brigade ATP has the capability to support the anticipated RSR for assigned units, support slice, and a portion of the DS FA battalion. The reinforcing FA battalion and a portion of the DS FA battalion will be supported by the designated corps ATP or ASP.

(b) Fuel. Corps will provide support for a ROM if required.

(c) Fix. Equipment identified with NMC deficiencies which can be corrected within 24 to 72 hours if class IX parts are available will be operational on D-day.

(d) Move. No change.

(e) Sustain. No change.

(4) Other S4 assumptions.

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2 *Effects of terrain on friendly forces:*

- Limited observation and fields of fire will negate our long range weapons advantage. Engagements will be very close and exposure times will be very limited. TOW fires will be near impossible to obtain in the MBA.

- For us to mass fires, weapon system emplacement will be critical. It will be difficult to mass more than a company team in most areas of the MBA.

- The terrain near the high school is key for defensive positions

- We have good routes for movement of a reserve.

3 AA1 originates as a regiment-size AA in 2d Bde's sector. Over two crossing sites vicinity MILLWOOD, the AA crosses STRANGER Creek into the 3d Bde sector. AA1 decreases to battalion-size from MILLWOOD east to LOWEMONT and then south to PL BLUE. South of PL BLUE, and extending to the KANSAS River at DE SOTO, AA1 enlarges and becomes a regiment or division-size avenue of approach.

4 AA2 is a regiment-size avenue of approach that originates NNW of the brigade sector. AA2 turns east along three company corridors north of LOWEMONT. The AA opens up to battalion-size west of KICKAPOO and moves south to SALT Creek and Highway 7. The AA narrows to a single company corridor between Highway 7 and PL BLUE. South of PL BLUE and extending to the KANSAS River at BONNER SPRINGS, AA2 gradually opens to a regiment or division-size avenue of approach.

5 AA3 includes two crossing sites over STRANGER Creek near PL BLUE. The avenue of approach includes two company-size corridors that move east and join with AA1.

6 AA4 includes three crossing sites over STRANGER Creek south of PL BLUE. This AA turns SSE and joins AA1.

7 AA5 begins in the southeast corner of 2d Bde's sector at TONGANOXIE and crosses STRANGER Creek at three sites, including an I-70 bridge. This AA also merges with AA1 at DE SOTO.

(b) Weather effects on enemy and friendly forces:

- Temperatures and humidity will exhaust attacking enemy dismounts quickly.

- Warm temperatures and humidity will combine to slow the construction of individual and crew fighting positions.

- Lack of precipitation will favor the enemy's attack. Farmlands will be trafficable and allow the enemy to deploy his forces. A lack of precipitation will also improve the quality of our survivability positions. Positions can be constructed quickly, and in most places the terrain will support two-tier vehicle positions.

- CENTRALIA has received twice the average rainfall for July and August. Small streams are swollen, and major rivers are just below flood stage. This will limit enemy COAs that are based on trafficable mobility corridors.

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- Wind direction will hinder the enemy's use of chemical and smoke in the close fight.
- The winds generally support our use of smoke and will not limit aircraft.
- Visibility will not limit operations.
- Illumination is high. It will be decreasing over the next two weeks.
- High illumination and long periods of available moon will favor enemy reconnaissance. Enemy patrols will have good observation and be able to navigate with little problem.
- High illumination will speed our defensive preparation.

Evaluate the threat.

- (a) We expect to face the 9 MRD conducting a supporting attack for the Nebraska 2 Army.
- (b) 9 MRD is expected to attack with two regiments using advance guards in the first echelon, two regiments in the second echelon, and the ITB in reserve.
- (c) After fighting the 208th ACR and the 55th Avn Bde, the lead MRRs should be at 60-percent strength.
- (d) We can expect the second echelon (one BMP-equipped MRR and the TR) and the reserve to be at 80-to 85-percent strength.
- (e) The MRR conducting the main attack can be expected to have a RAG with two 2S3 battalions and one D-30 battalion augmenting its organic 2S1 battalion. The supporting attack will probably have its 2S1 battalion and a reinforcing 2S3 battalion. Two BM-21 battalions, one 2A36 battalion, and one 2A65 battalion will probably form the DAG. We can expect attrition from the fights with the 208th ACR and the 55th Avn Bde will bring regimental artillery down to 60-percent strength and the DAG down to 80-to 85-percent strength,
- (f) Though division reconnaissance will suffer losses at the hands of the 208th ACR, we can expect at least 3-4 dismounted observation posts and 4-6 vehicle patrols will successfully infiltrate and occupy the brigade AO.

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(g) *High value targets.*

| Category | Target | Category | Target |
|-----------------|---|------------------------------|---|
| C3 | 9 MRD main and forward CPs | RISTA | Div Recon & REC bn |
| | 26, 28, and 120 MRR main and forward CPs | | Regt Recon & REC co |
| | 27 TR main and forward CPs | | DOG EAR radar (SA-13 tgt acq) |
| | MERCURY GRASS VHF relay | | TALL MIKE GSR (10 km) |
| FS | 43d Arty Regt HQ COP | | SMALL FRED GSR (20+ km) |
| | Bn COPs | | BIG FRED GSR (20+ km) |
| | 2A36 (152-mm, T, 28-33 km) | | ARK 1 CM/CB radar (20 km) |
| | BM-21 (MRL, 20 km) | | LONG TRACK radar (150+ km) |
| | 2S3 (152-mm, SP, 17 km) | | THIN SKIN radar (200+ km) |
| | 2S1 (122-mm, SP, 15 km) | REC | R330P jammer |
| | END TRAY meteorological radar | | Div DF site (40 km) |
| | 2A65 (152-mm, T, 24-30 km, <i>Front</i>) | | GSR radar (DF, 25 km) |
| | RAGs and DAG | Nuclear/ Chemical | 152-mm artillery and larger |
| Maneuver | Regt adv guard | | END TRAY meteorological radar |
| | MRBs and TBs in column | Bulk Fuels | Div POL sites |
| | ITB | Ammo | Div and regt ASPs |
| | Div AT Special Reserve (bn) | Maint | n/a |
| | Regt AT Special Reserve (co) | Lift | HETs, rail cars, barges |
| ADA | 29 SAM Regt HQ | LOC | MILLWOOD, EASTON, and LEAVENWORTH bridges |
| | SA-6 btry (24 km) | | Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe RR |
| | STRAIGHT FLUSH radar (SA-6 fire control) | | Highways US 59, US 173, and SH 74 |
| | SA-13 btry | | |
| Engineer | Div engr bn HQ | | |
| | PMP (119-in, class 60) | | |
| | TMM (42-m, class 60) | | |
| | MODs | | |
| | MSDs | | |

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(3) *Determine threat COAs*

(a) *COA #1.* This is the most probable enemy COA. 9 MRD attacks with two regiments abreast into our sector.

1 *Main attack.* A BMP-equipped MRR (60-percent strength) marches in column along AA1, using a FSE as its security force. Upon identification of our defenses, the lead battalion deploys and attacks. The trail battalion follows and is committed where the first echelon has success.

2 *Supporting attack.* A BTR-equipped MRR (60-percent strength), also using a FSE as its security force, marches in column along AA2. Upon identification of our defenses, the FSE halts and waits for the arrival of the lead battalion. Together, they conduct a hasty attack. The trail battalion will be committed when the lead battalion's attack has culminated.

3 *Second echelon.* The TR (85-percent strength) will follow the main attack on AA1 about 10 km behind the lead MRR. This distance will close as the lead regiment reaches its immediate objective near PL BLUE. The other BMP regiment (85-percent strength) will follow the BTR regiment on AA2. It will be prepared to commit on AA2 south of PL BLUE.

4 *Reserve.* The ITB (85-percent strength), following the second-echelon regiments, will be the 9 MRD reserve.

5 *HV7s.* HVTs in this COA include bridging and dozers probably organized into MSDs; BM-21s placed in the DAG to provide suppressive and destructive phase II and III fires; 2S3s in the RAGs to provide suppressive phase III fires for advance guard operations; SA-6 and SA-13 assets organized and positioned to protect artillery groupings and CPs; divisional and regimental reconnaissance teams that provide the eyes for division and regimental commanders; and the fixed bridges across STRANGER Creek vicinity of MILLWOOD.

(b) *COA #2.* 9 MRD attacks with one regiment in our sector and one regiment in 2d Bde's sector.

1 *Main attack.* A BMP-equipped MRR (60-percent strength) attacks in 2d Bde's sector.

2 *Supporting attack.* A BTR-equipped MRR (60-percent strength) initially attacks south along AA2 to LOWEMONT, then continues south on AA1.

3 *Second echelon.* The TR (85-percent strength) will follow the main attack in the 2d Bde AO. The other MRR (85-percent strength) will follow the BTR-equipped regiment in our sector. It will be prepared to commit on AA1 south of PL BLUE.

4 *Reserve.* The ITB will follow the second echelon in reserve.

5 *HVTs.* HVTs include bridging and dozers probably organized into MSDs; BM-21s in the DAG to provide suppressive and destructive phase II and III fires; 2S3s in the RAGs to provide suppressive phase III fires for advance guard operations; SA-6 and SA-13 assets organized and positioned to protect artillery groupings and CPs; divisional and regimental reconnaissance teams that serve as the division and regimental commanders' eyes; and the fixed bridges crossing STRANGER Creek vicinity TONGANOXIE.

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(c) COA #3. 9 MRD attacks into our sector with two regiments abreast. The regiments converge at LOWEMONT and continue south in column. This is the least probable enemy COA.

1 *Main Attack:* A BMP-equipped regiment (60-percent strength) attacks south along AA2 to LOWEMONT and continues south on AA1.

2 *Supporting Attack.* A BTR-equipped regiment (60-percent strength) attacks on AA1 to LOWEMONT. The MRR then follows the main attack.

3 *Second Echelon.* The TR (85-percent strength) follows the main attack. The other MRR (85-percent strength) follows the BTR regiment and will be prepared to commit on MI behind the tank regiment.

4 *Reserve.* The ITB will follow the second echelon in reserve.

5 *HVTs.* The HVTs include bridging and dozers organized into MSDs; BM-2 Is in the DAG to provide suppressive and destructive phase II and III fires; 2S3 in the RAGs to provide suppressive phase III fires for advance guard operations; SA-6 and SA-13 resources organized and positioned to protect artillery groupings and CPs; divisional and regimental reconnaissance teams that will provide the eyes for division and regimental commanders; and the fixed bridges crossing STRANGER Creek vicinity MILLWOOD.

(d) *Brunch.* The 9 MRD could employ a forward detachment along AA2 or M3 to the division immediate objective at the KANSAS River. The detachment would likely be battalion size, but it could be as large as a regiment.

1 *Branch #1 (early commitment).* The forward detachment could be committed up to 12 hours before the Nebraskiis attack if they find a route through our sector along M2 or M3 that conceals the FD's movement.

2 *Branch #2 (commitment after attack begins).* This is the more probable branch. The 9 MRD commander would commit the forward detachment behind a successful attack in 2d Bde's sector. With the commitment of 1st Bde against the enemy's success - this would slow his tempo - and our successful defense forward, the 9 MRD commander might react by committing a forward detachment on M3 between our brigade and 2d Bde.

(4) *Conclusions.*

(a) The map analysis revealed the limited key terrain discussed earlier. There was no terrain that we could readily identify as decisive.

(6) The best defensive terrain is forward in sector. We have acceptable EAs and defensible ground near the high school on MI and near KICKAPOO on M2. An alternate area on M2 is along Highway 73 near SALT Creek.

(c) An appropriate place for locating the brigade's main effort is near the high school along AA1. The combination of the terrain and the enemy COAs point to this area as a possible decisive point in the battle.

(d) The canalized terrain and supporting attack will allow us to take some risk on M2.

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(e) So that we are able to block any attempts by the Nebraskiis to use AA3 and in order to destroy enemy platoons that might get behind our forward defenses, we should have no less than an armor-heavy company team in reserve. Possible locations for the reserve are southwest of STELLAMARX Lake, vicinity BETHEL CHURCH, and east of the lake, vicinity OPOSSUM HOLLOW. The first location enables rapid commitment of the reserve along AA1 or AA3. OPOSSUM HOLLOW provides good cover and concealment and quick response to activity along AA2, and the east-west routes to the north and south of STELLAMARIS Lake would enable us to commit the reserve in a reasonable amount of time along AA1 or AA3.

b. S3.

(1) *Current 3d Bde status.*

(a) 3d Bde is currently located with other 55th Mech Div units in AA OTTAWA (UN0376).

(b) Unit level training status is excellent.

(c) Individual-, squad-, and company-level training continues in assembly areas.

(d) There has been no reconnaissance by commanders or staff of the AO.

(e) 3d Bde and its attached and supporting units are at RES-0.

(2) *Other operational facts.*

(a) MOPP level is 0.

(b) OEG is negligible risk to exposed, unwarned personnel.

(c) Air defense warning is YELLOW; weapons control status is TIGHT.

(d) Vehicle recognition signal is an inverted V painted on both sides and the rear of a vehicle and outlined with thermal tape.

(3) *Higher HQ assumptions.*

(a) Strategic and operational intelligence assets will detect the movement of the Nebraskii 1 Army into the eastern EL DORADO panhandle.

(b) 10th Corps covering force operations will destroy the Nebraska Front reconnaissance elements, delay first-echelon divisions north of the line FOSTORIA-EDGERTON-KIDDER for 48 hours, and reduce the first-echelon regiments of those divisions to less than 75- to go-percent effectiveness.

(c) 55th Mech Div will have 45 hours after anival in sector to prepare MBA defenses.

(d) CAF can achieve air superiority over the division AO during division movement and defensive preparations.

(4) *3d Bde operational assumptions.*

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(a) 55th Mech Div will implement OPLAN WHITE only after identification of Nebraska movement into the eastern EL DORADO panhandle.

(c) Combat elements of the brigade will close in sector within 8 hours after notification to move from the assembly area.

(c) Division guard force will delay leading elements of 2 Army for 6 hours between PL RED and PL GRAY.

(d) At attachment, TF 4-77 Mech PDY strength will be approximately 78 percent. Approximately 80 percent of combat systems will be mission capable. The task force will require about 5 hours to reorganize before being recommitted to the battle.

(e) Refugees will not significantly hinder the operation

(5) Conclusions and recommendations.

(a) Initially, we have 8 infantry and armor companies available to develop a possible solution. With the attachment of TF 4-77, the total will increase to 11.

(b) Combat support and CSS assets are adequate.

(c) Our most significant shortfall appears to be in fire support. Division has tasked us to neutralize the RAGs and mortars. This task will keep our two battalions of artillery busy with counterfire and degrade their support to the maneuver units in the close fight. We should seek some relief from division and corps.

(d) Time is the driving factor in preparing our defense. We will have to carefully choose which units get primary and alternate survivability positions because we lack the time to build multiple positions for every combat and combat support system. We have sufficient personnel to dig obstacles and construct barriers, but time will force us to be prudent in the placement of those obstacles.

c. SI.

(1) *Current personnel status of 3d Bde (current Mportion of WFM)).*

(a) The total brigade PDY strength with attachments and support units is 89 percent. The overall PDY strength of maneuver units is 85 percent; the overall PDY strength of fire support, combat support, and CSS units is 93 percent.

(b) The following key personnel shortages may impact on the brigade mission and require command emphasis and assistance from higher headquarters:

1. 11M: The brigade is short 73 (using PDY strength). Internal cross leveling will ensure all vehicles have minimal manning. However, dismounted operations are affected.

2. 55B: FSB is at 50 percent strength (short 3), creating a significant impact on its ability to handle ammunition. Cross leveling and training can reduce the immediate impact. Request assistance from higher headquarters.

(2) Other personnel facts.

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(a) No significant problems exist in medical treatment or evacuation; adequate resources are available.

(b) Division priority of replacements is 55th Avn Bde, 2d Bde, 3d Bde, and 1st Bde, in order.

(3) *Projected personnel status of 3d Bde on D-day (before M portion of M4FFm).* The majority of personnel assigned, but not PDY, will return to duty to bring the overall unit strength up to 90 percent by D-day.

(4) *Other SI assumptions.*

1 TF 4-77 Mech will require personnel replacements when attached to 3d Bde. The brigade must maintain close coordination to determine TF requirements and expedite any necessary efforts to increase its combat power for use in our operation.

2 3d Bde will receive approximately 20% of the division's 92 replacements per day, even though they are initially low on the divisions priority list.

d. *SJ.*

(1) Current logistic status of 3d Bde (*current AFFMS portion of MAFFMS*),

(a) *Arm.*

1. UBLs are at 100 percent.

2. CSR for 155, mm HE will result in expenditure of brigade HE stocks on D+2. FA units will be required to substitute another round for 155-mm HE.

(b) *Fuel.*

1. Basic loads are at 100 percent.

2. Total on hand fuel in the brigade area is sufficient for 36 hours of operation

3. Time distance from DSA to the BSA is local haul. Resupply to the brigade will not be a factor unless we displace the BSA north beyond PL RED and the DSA does not move.

4. Maneuver battalions can support from the BSA out to line-haul distance.

(c) *Fix.*

1. Units assigned, attached, or OPCON to and supporting the brigade are all maintaining an OR rate above 80 percent in major combat, combat support, and combat service support systems except FISTVs (72 percent), Volcanos (50 percent), PLSs (62 percent) and M920s (75 percent).

a. The OR rate of FISTVs is the result of turret problems and will affect FA fire support if not repaired. Request MST to assist in determining the turret problem.

b. Volcanos are NMC due to NSL parts. Parts are not due-in for 15 days.

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c. PLSs are NMC due to unserviceable tires and will affect field artillery ammunition resupply if not repaired. Extensive cross-leveling of tires is required to raise OR rate.

d. The. OR rate of M920s will rise above 80 percent in the next 24 to 72 hours if parts are on hand.

2. Division ASL is short major system drive train components. DS maintenance units will have to rely on controlled substitution, cannibalization, and extensive BDAR to repair inoperable combat systems.

3. Unit PLLs average 70-percent fill; 20-percent zero balance lines impact on unit ability to perform maintenance.

4. DS stocks of class VII have not been issued to 553d FSB.

5. Maintenance time lines are 36 hours for DS and 96 hours for DS backup. Maintenance priorities are tanks, Bradleys, howitzers, recovery vehicles, forklifts, POL vehicles, and cargo vehicles.

6. Cannibalization is authorized at DS level only.

7. Corps has located two maintenance collection points in the division area along I-70. One of them is in the southeast corner of our AO, vicinity WALKER School (UP 3629).

(d) Move.

1. A brigade movement from OTTAWA to the brigade sector must be planned. The route goes from OTTAWA east along corps MSR CHRYSLER and then north along corps MSR EAGLE to the bridge at BONNER SPRINGS. Anticipate 5 hours travel time from OTTAWA to the brigade AO.

2. The division CSS overlay identifies MSR STAR for 3d Bde operations support.

3. Heavy rains will affect the MSRs that traverse secondary roads, especially at stream crossing sites. Engineer support will be required to keep secondary MSRs open.

4. Corps MSRs traversing the division sector remain under corps control throughout the operation. DTO must clear all convoy movement with the 4 104th MCC when using corps MSRs.

5. Roads are in good condition in the 3d Bde sector and division rear, East-west roads are adequate throughout the sector; however, only one class 70 road runs north and south.

(e) Sustain.

1. 3d Bde must conduct its defense with a major limitation in class IV barrier material. The brigade will be limited to 40 percent of the division stockage objective for defense pack CCLs and mine pack CCLs. Division has authorized local requisition of material for construction of barriers, bunkers, and overhead protection. Division has authorized the use of available existing structures for protection and concealment.

2. DS stocks of classes II, IV, and VI have not been issued to the FSB.

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3. 4-81 Mech has on hand only 55 percent of its authorized NVGs. A shortage of NVGs is likely to hamper battalion operations during periods of limited visibility. No other significant equipment shortages exist.

4. Air evacuation is authorized as far forward as battalion aid stations. Division has tasked 553d FSB to operate an AXP at PP 7. One ground ambulance platoon and two air ambulances will locate at the AXP. Brigade will provide area medical support to covering force and guard force units transiting the brigade area.

5. Hospital support is available from the 83d Med Gp. CSH is in LSA CHARLIE, and a MASH is in the DSA.

6. Class VIII ASL is at go-percent fill.

7. SLCR services will be available in the DSA before and after the operation. During the division MBA fight, field services (except mortuary affairs) will be suspended.

8. MA augmentation is not available until D+4. 3d Bde must establish an MA collection point per division SOP.

9. BDOs are command regulated.

10. The brigade is zero balance on fog oil, severely limiting smoke operations.

11. MEDEVAC assets are adequate to handle the initial W1A projections.

(2) Other logistic facts.

(a) TF 4-77 Mech may require reconstitution with division ORF, if available.

(b) 3d Bde must conduct a 100 kilometer road march to get from AA OTTAWA to defensive positions in sector. Units will have to conduct thorough preventive maintenance before, during, and after the march. Units must plan to rapidly recover inoperable systems to collection points in sector.

(3) Projected logistic status of 3d Bde on D-day (before AFFMS portion of MAFFMS).

(a) Arm. The brigade ATP has the capability to support the anticipated RSR for assigned units, support slice, and a portion of the DS FA battalion. The reinforcing FA battalion and a portion of the DS FA battalion will be supported by the designated corps ATP or ASP.

(b) Fuel. Corps will provide support for a ROM if required.

(c) Fix. Equipment identified with NMC deficiencies which can be corrected within 24 to 72 hours if class IX parts are available will be operational on D-day.

(d) Move. No change.

(e) Sustain. No change.

(4) Other S4 assumptions.

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(a) Division will issue class 11, IV, V, VI, and VII stocks to 553d FSB after 3d Bde moves into sector.

(b) 553d FSB will have to support TF 4-77 Mech while it is performing the division guard mission.

(c) Rear area threat will remain low prior to D-day.

(d) Division will meet the 3d Bde daily supply requirements throughout the operation except in class IV, class V controlled ammunition, and class VII replacements.

(e) 3d Bde will be able to use the major roadways through and around LEAVENWORTH before, during, and after the operation.

10. TIME ANALYSIS

11. RESTATED MISSION

On order, 3d Bde defends in sector to destroy 2 Army first-echelon MRD along a line from MILLWOOD to EIGHTMILE HOUSE to UP308578 to UP326615 to deny 2 Army the east avenues of approach and protect the 2d Bde (div main effort) right flank from envelopment.

COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 3. The Tactical Decisionmaking Process**

Enclosure A to Appendix 4 to-Advance Sheet, Lesson 3. Solution to Logistics Worksheets

1. GENERAL

a. The completed worksheets provided in this appendix are provided to see if you have properly determined the unit's consumption or requirements.

b. Now that you have determined logistical requirements for the operation, you can look at what that information tells you.

c. The first thing you did was compute personnel information. Why do you want to know projected personnel strengths and projected casualties?

1) Projected numbers of casualties affect the evacuation and medical assets and supplies required. Projected numbers of deceased personnel help to determine the mortuary affairs and transportation assets required.

2) Personnel strength figures are used as the basis to estimate requirements for several classes of supply. Class I, VI, and VIII can be most accurately estimated based on personnel strength. The other classes of supply, including water, are less accurately estimated on personnel strengths. They must be adjusted based on the type of operation and climate.

3) Logisticians are more interested in present for duty strengths than authorized strengths. Those that are authorized, but not present for duty, require very little support!

d. The next thing you did was determining ammunition requirements. What can the S4 do to alleviate any anticipated shortages?

1) Request increased CSR. You have nothing to lose by going back, with good justification, and asking for more. Your chances of success are greatest if you are the main effort.

2) Predraw/stockpile critical items. This is really just good old fashioned hoarding; get as much as you can, whenever you can, and save it until you really need it. There are several disadvantages to this: Where do you store it? How do you move it? Even if you have the ability to cache, the risk of loss must be carefully considered.

3) Substitute a different type of ammo. If sabot rounds for the main tank gun are in short supply, compensate with increased amounts of high explosive antitank rounds. Substitutes for different artillery rounds are usually fairly easy to identify. Remember that substitution doesn't necessarily solve the problem, but hopefully it can at least help minimize the negative impact of the shortage.

4) Establish restrictions to firing. You can also recommend that the commander restrict fire of a particular munition. You can instruct subordinate units to engage certain types of targets with selected munitions only, as an example: Use sabot rounds against enemy tanks only, using other ammo against softer targets live earthen bunkers and wheeled vehicles.

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5) Suballocate to subordinate units. This is probably the most common solution. Don't just take the CSR imposed by higher and pass it down to all subordinate units. Examine the projected missions of these units. If a unit will be in reserve, its CSR can be reduced to increase the CSR of other units that will be actively engaged.

6) With a little imagination, you can envision many other ways to manage and maximize the use of the ammunition that is available.

e. The next thing you did was determining fuel requirements. Factors influencing consumption include quantity and type of movement (cross-country versus road), equipment readiness rates (broken items use little fuel), type and pace of operation (static defense versus offense), and weather (cold weather increases consumption). What actions can you take when the fuel required exceeds your carrying capacity?

1) Request assistance from higher headquarters. You can always ask for help. As you have seen, the higher you go up the CSS structure ladder, the more transportation assets are found. Usually, the more assets you have, the greater your flexibility. You can request corps to throughput more fuel directly to the brigade.

2) Modify distribution method. You can have one or more of the battalions go to the DSA and pick up bulk fuel with its organic assets (HEMTT tankers).

3) Increase tanker trips per day. Another way to increase the amount delivered is simply to have the MSB's tankers make more trips per day, cut back on driver rest, or have other than assigned drivers make additional trips. The toll this can take on people and equipment may not show up immediately, but the long term implications of such an action should be carefully considered. If the tactical situation allows, you might even be able to have the DSA move closer to the BSA to cut down on required travel time.

4) Set priorities. Rob Peter to pay Paul. You decide whose requirements are the most critical overall and give that unit or units the full measure of fuel needed, then provision the remaining units as soon as you can. Setting priorities is also the usual way to address shortages in the amount of fuel that is available for issue. You give to some and have the rest share the shortage!

5) Refuel-on-the-move (ROM). This is a technique to refuel vehicles en route without using up any of your organic refueling capabilities.

f. Transportation shortfalls may exist for other than bulk fuel, but the solutions are very similar.

1) Prioritize supplies/units. You can prioritize the type of supplies to be transported first and/or you can decide who gets supplies or equipment delivered first.

2) Use supply point distribution. If you normally deliver an item to a user, inform them that if they want the item now, they'll have to come and get it.

3) Request more throughput. Another way to lessen your transportation needs is to ask corps to deliver directly to the brigade.

4) Request more transportation from higher headquarters. You can also simply ask for more assets with which to do the job yourself, but don't count on long-term loan of vehicles that belong to someone else.

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g. Closely related to, and often the cause of transportation shortfalls, is a shortfall in maintenance. Low equipment readiness rates can be caused by many different factors: everything from a shortage of trained mechanics to a lack of transportation for replacement equipment. Each problem area may require a different fix and it could take several simultaneous fixes to completely address the problem. If you focus on those problems unique to the maintenance system, some possible solutions become clearer.

1) Prioritize by unit and equipment. As in the other areas you have looked, prioritization is one method used to help lessen the impact of shortfalls in our abilities. You can designate which unit gets the most attention from the mechanics and/or you can place more effort on a particular piece of equipment or weapon system. The emphasis should result in an improved readiness rate for that item. But remember, there is only so much emphasis to go around; therefore, any improvement will come at the expense of whatever item is correspondingly receiving less emphasis.

2) Control Class VII. Class VII is usually command regulated; therefore, defacto prioritized according to the commander's guidance. You can also influence control in other ways. You can internally prioritize the use of available assets to recover and/or evacuate certain types of equipment or in support of a particular unit. The faster you get an item to the area where it can be repaired, the faster it can be returned to the battle.

3) Adjust maintenance timelines. You can adjust maintenance timelines to either keep equipment longer or evacuate it earlier, whichever will return the most vehicles to the battle the quickest. This of course, depends on several different factors. Another way to accomplish the same effect is to ask higher headquarters for help in the form of additional maintenance support teams to operate in your forward locations, lessening the requirement to evacuate items.

4) Increase availability of spare parts. You may be experiencing a shortage of repair parts. If for some reason you are unable to obtain needed parts through the supply system, you might want to look at controlled substitution and/or cannibalization.

3. Once you have identified what is needed and what is available, solving existing shortfalls is how logistics planners earn their pay. It is probably safe to assume that, in combat, shortfall situations will be more prevalent than periods of plenty. That is why innovation is a sustainment imperative-you have got to do it if you want to be successful on the battlefield!

4. **CONCLUSION.** Remember as discussed in Lesson 2 of S310A, the task of planning logistics operations is analogous to an iceberg. The great majority of that iceberg consists of computing requirements, identifying capabilities, and solving any shortfalls that might exist between the two.

3D BDE
ESTIMATE OF DAILY PERSONNEL LOSSES/STATUS

| ROW | ITEM | SOURCE/COMPUTATION | D+0 | D+1 | D+2 DEFENSE | D+ _____ | D+ _____ |
|-----|--|--|--------|--------|----------------|----------|----------|
| 1 | PARENT UNIT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH | MTOE LINE 1 PREVIOUS DAY | 3991 | 3991 | 3991 | | |
| 2 | ATTACHED UNIT(S) AUTHORIZED STRENGTH | MTOE UNIT(S) ATTACHED DURING RPT PERIOD | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 3 | DETACHED UNIT(S) AUTHORIZED STRENGTH | MTOE UNIT(S) DETACHED DURING RPT PERIOD | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 4 | TOTAL AUTHORIZED STRENGTH | SUM OF ROWS 1 AND 2 MINUS ROW 3 | 3991 | 3991 | 3991 | | |
| 5 | PARENT UNIT PRESENT FOR DUTY STRENGTH | PDS REPORT OR ROW 14 FROM PREVIOUS DAY | 3552 | 3551 | 3550 | | |
| 6 | ATTACHED UNIT (S) PRESENT FOR DUTY STRENGTH | PDS REPORT FOR UNIT(S) ATTACHED DURING RPT PERIOD | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 7 | DETACHED UNIT(S) PRESENT FOR DUTY STRENGTH | PDS REPORT FOR UNIT(S) DETACHED DURING RPT PERIOD | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 8 | TOTAL PRESENT FOR DUTY STRENGTH | SUM OF ROWS 5 AND 6 MINUS ROW 7 | 3552 | 3551 | 3550 | | |
| 9 | LOSS RATE | ST 101-6 LOSS FACTOR (PAGE 1-1) DIVIDED BY 100 | .010 | .010 | .035 | | |
| 10 | TOTAL LOSSES | ROW 8 TIMES ROW 9 | 36 | 36 | 124 | | |
| 11 | NUMBER OF REPLACEMENTS | HIGHER HEADQUARTERS S1/G1/AG/DCSPER | 18* | 18* | 18* | | |
| 12 | HOSPITAL RETURNS (RTDs) | PERSONNEL WORKSHEET 2, ROW 1 ST 101-6 FACTOR (PAGE 1-2) | 17 | 17 | 57 | | |
| 13 | NET LOSSES | ROW 10 MINUS THE SUM OF ROWS 11 AND 12 | 1 | 1 | 49 | | |
| 14 | END OF DAY PRESENT FOR DUTY STRENGTH | ROW 8 MINUS ROW 13 | 3551 | 3550 | 3501 | | |
| 15 | END OF DAY PERCENT OF AUTHORIZED STRENGTH | ROW 14 DIVIDED BY ROW 4 | 90.79% | 90.76% | 87.92% | | |

ASSUMPTION: 3D BDE WILL RECEIVE APPROX 20% OF THE DIVISION'S 92 REPLACEMENTS PER DAY EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE INITIALLY LOW ON THE DIVISION'S PRIORITY LIST.

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3D BDE
AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS

| UNIT OR WPN SYSTEM | REQUIREMENT IN SHORT TONS (ST 101-6, p. 1-6) | | | | | TOTAL RQMT |
|-----------------------|---|-------------|---------------|----------|----------|---------------|
| | D+0 | D+1 | D+2 (DEFENSE) | D+ _____ | D+ _____ | |
| TF 4-77 MECH | 25X.4=10 | 10 | 76 | | | 96 |
| 4-81 MECH | 25X.4=10 | 10 | 76 | | | 96 |
| 4-25 ARMOR | 9X.4=3.6 | 3.6 | 48 | | | 55.2 |
| 4-42 FA | 30X.4=12 | 12 | 288 | | | 312 |
| C/4-441 ADA | 4X.4=1.6 | 1.6 | 9 | | | 12.2 |
| 33D ENGR | 13X.4=5.2 | 5.2 | 39 | | | 49.4 |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| GRAND TOTAL | 42.4 | 42.4 | 536 | | | 620.8 |

COMPARE THE DAILY TOTAL AMMUNITION REQUIREMENT AGAINST THE UNIT'S AMMUNITION HANDLING CAPABILITY.

I.E. A DIVISION HAS THREE FSB's THAT CAN HANDLE 572 STONS/DAY OR A TOTAL OF 1716 STONS/DAY.

A BRIGADE WOULD HAVE ONE FSB THAT CAN HANDLE 572 STONS/DAY.

IF THE DAILY TOTAL REQUIREMENTS EXCEED THE UNIT'S CAPABILITY TO HANDLE THE AMMUNITION, REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM HIGHER OR SURGE YOUR UNIT'S CAPABILITY TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT.

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3D BDE

AMMUNITION DAILY REQUIREMENTS

| COLUMN 1 | COLUMN 2 | COLUMN 3 | COLUMN 4 | COLUMN 5 | COLUMN 6 |
|--------------------------|---|--|--|--------------------------------------|---|
| | BEGINNING BASIC LOAD (PER WEAPON) | REQUIRED SUPPLY RATE (RSR) PER WPN | CONTROLLED SUPPLY RATE (CSR) PER WPN | ENDING BASIC LOAD (PER WEAPON) | NUMBER OF AUTHORIZED WEAPON SYSTEMS |
| SOURCE OR COMPUTATION | ST 101-6, p. 1-7 APPROVED UBL/ COL 5 PREV DAY | ST 101-6, p. 1-7 HISTORICAL DATA | HIGHER HQ's CSS PLAN/ ORDER | COL 2 PLUS COL 4 MINUS COL 3 | MTOE ST 101-6, APPENDIX N |
| AMMUNITION TYPE | | | | | |
| D+0 THROUGH D+1 | | | | | |
| 155 MM HE | 18 | 0 | 0* | 18 | |
| 155MM DPICM | 135 | 0 | 0* | 135 | |
| 15MM HE-RAP | 24 | 0 | 0* | 24 | |
| ATGM, TOW | 16 | 0 | 0* | 16 | |
| D+2 (DEFENSE) | | | | | |
| 155 MM HE | 18 | 59 | 40 | -1 | |
| 155MM DPICM | 135 | 68 | 50 | 117 | |
| 15MM HE-RAP | 24 | 7 | 4 | 21 | |
| ATGM, TOW | 16 | 9 | 8 | 15 | |

* SINCE THE BRIGADE DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY AMMUNITION ON THESE DAYS, THEY WOULD NORMALLY NOT RECEIVE THEIR ALLOCATED CSR.

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3D BDE
DAILY FUEL CONSUMPTION (ST101-6 p 1-5)

| UNIT | <u>D+0</u> | | | <u>D+1</u> | | | <u>D+2 (DEFENSE)</u> | | | TOTAL FUEL REQUIREMENTS | | TOTAL |
|--------------------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|----------------------|---------------|----------------|-------------------------|---------------|----------------|
| | JP8 | MOGAS | TOTAL | JP8 | MOGAS | TOTAL | JP8 | MOGAS | TOTAL | JP8 | MOGAS | |
| TF 4-77 MECH | 19,212 | 1,979 | 21,191 | 19,212 | 1,979 | 21,191 | 19,212 | 1,979 | 21,191 | 57,636 | 5,937 | 63,573 |
| 4-81 MECH | 19,212 | 1,979 | 21,191 | 19,212 | 1,979 | 21,191 | 19,212 | 1,979 | 21,191 | 57,636 | 5,937 | 63,573 |
| 4-25 ARMOR | 39,917 | 1,885 | 41,802 | 39,917 | 1,885 | 41,802 | 39,917 | 1,885 | 41,802 | 119,751 | 5,655 | 125,406 |
| 4-42 FA | 13,525 | 1,659 | 15,184 | 13,525 | 1,659 | 15,184 | 13,525 | 1,659 | 15,184 | 40,575 | 4,977 | 45,552 |
| C/4-441 ADA | 2,579 | 355 | 2,934 | 2,579 | 355 | 2,934 | 2,579 | 355 | 2,934 | 7,737 | 1,065 | 8,802 |
| 33D ENGR | 23,941 | 3,103 | 27,044 | 23,941 | 3,103 | 27,044 | 23,941 | 3,103 | 27,044 | 71,823 | 9,309 | 81,132 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL FUEL REQUIREMENTS | 118,386 | 10,960 | 129,346 | 118,386 | 10,960 | 129,346 | 118,386 | 10,960 | 129,346 | 355,158 | 32,880 | 388,038 |

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3D BDE
MAINTENANCE STATUS
(EQUIPMENT READMESS)

| COLUMN 1 | COLUMN 2 | COLUMN 3 | COLUMN 4 |
|---------------|----------------------------------|--|---|
| WEAPON SYSTEM | NUMBER OF WEAPON SYSTEMS ON-HAND | NUMBER OF WEAPON SYSTEMS MISSION CAPABLE | ER RATE % (COL 3 DIVIDED BY COL 2 = COL 4) |
| D+0 | | | |
| M1A2 | 68 | 64 | 94% |
| M2 | 82 | 75 | 91% |
| 155 HOW | 24 | 22 | 92% |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

NOTE: COMMANDERS WILL NORMALLY DIRECT WHAT SYSTEMS THEY WANT TRACKED OR MONITORED.

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DAILY EQUIPMENT STATUS

| COLUMN 1 | COLUMN 2 | COLUMN 3 | COLUMN 4 | COLUMN 5 | COLUMN 6 | COLUMN 7 | COLUMN 8 | COLUMN 9 | COLUMN 10 |
|------------|---|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|---|---|---|---|--|---|
| ITEM | TOTAL NUMBER ON-HAND (ENSURE TO ADD REPAIRED ONSITE AND AT DS NEXT DAY) | LOSS RATE %, ST 101-6, p. 1-7 | NO. LOST (COL 2 X 3) | LOSS CATEGORY NON-REPAIR FACTOR, ST 101-6, p. 1-8 (COL 4 X 5) | LOSS CATEGORY REPAIRABLE FACTOR, ST 101-6, p. 1-8 (COL 4 X 6) | EVAC TO TA MAINT UNIT FACTOR, ST 101-6, p. 1-8 (COL 6 X 7) | REPAIR ONSITE FACTOR, ST 101-6, p. 1-8 (COL 6 X 8) | REPAIR AT DS FACTOR, ST 101-6, p. 1-8 (COL 6 X 9) | REPAIR AT B/U DS FACTOR, ST 101-6, p. 1-8 (COL 6 X 10) |
| D+0 | | | | | | | | | |
| M1A2(TANK) | 68 | .05 | 3 | 3X.10=0* | 3X.90=3 | 3X.20=1 | 3X.30=1 | 3X.30=1 | 3X.20=0* |
| M2 (BFV) | 82 | .05 | 4 | 4X.10=0* | 4X.90=4 | 4X.20=1 | 4X.30=1 | 4X.30=1 | 4X.20=1 |
| 155 HOW | 24 | .05 | 1 | 1X.10=0* | 1X.90=1 | 1X.20=0 | 1X.30=1* | 1X.30=0 | 1X.30=0 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| D+1 | | | | | | | | | |
| M1A2(TANK) | 68-3+2=67 | .05 | 3 | 3X.10=0* | 3X.90=3 | 3X.20=1 | 3X.30=1 | 3X.30=1 | 3X.20=0* |
| M2 (BFV) | 82-4+2=80 | .05 | 4 | 4X.10=0* | 4X.90=4 | 4X.20=1 | 4X.30=1 | 4X.30=1 | 4X.20=1 |
| 155 HOW | 24-1=1=24 | .05 | 1 | 1X.10=0* | 1X.90=1 | 1X.20=0 | 1X.30=1* | 1X.30=0 | 1X.30=0 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| D+2 | | | | | | | | | |
| M1A2(TANK) | DEFENSE 67-3+2=66 | .20 | 13 | 13X.15=2 | 13X.85=11 | 11X.35=4 | 11X.20=2 | 11X.25=3 | 11X.20=2 |
| M2 (BFV) | 80-4+2=78 | .20 | 16 | 16X.15=2 | 16X.85=14 | 14X.35=5 | 14X.20=3 | 14X.25=4 | 14X.20=2 |
| 155 HOW | 24-1+1=24 | .10 | 2 | 2X.15=0* | 2X.85=2 | 2X.35=1 | 2X.20=0 | 2X.25=1 | 2X.20=0 |

* NUMBERS WERE ROUNDED TO THIS NUMBER TO ENSURE TOTALS ADDED UP

NOTE: THESE FIGURES ARE BASED ON EQUIPMENT BEING FIXED ON SITE OR AT DS BEING RETURNED TO THE OWNING UNIT WITHIN 24 HOURS, EVEN THOUGH DS CAN KEEP THE REPAIR JOB LONGER.

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3D BDE
SUPPLY WORKSHEET

| COLUMN 1 | | COLUMN 2 | COLUMN 3 | | COLUMN 4 | | COLUMN 5 | |
|----------|--------------------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|---|--|
| | | CONSUMPTION RATE LBS/MAN | D+0 COL 3A PERSONNEL STRENGTH | COL 3P STONS REQUIRED | D+1 COL 4A PERSONNEL STRENGTH | COL 4B STONS REQUIRED | D+2 (DEFENSE) COL 5A PERSONNEL STRENGTH | COL 5B STONS REQUIRED |
| ROW | CLASS OF SUPPLY | ST 101-6, PAGE 1-4 TO 1-5 OR HISTORIC DATA | PDS RPT PERSONNEL PROJECTIONS | COL 2 TIMES COL 3A DIVIDED BY 2000 | PDS RPT PERSONNEL PROJECTIONS | COL 2 TIMES COL 3A DIVIDED BY 2000 | PDS RPT PERSONNEL PROJECTIONS | COL 2 TIMES COL 3A DIVIDED BY 2000 |
| AA | I | 5.535 | 3552 | 9.8 | 3551 | 9.8 | 3550 | 9.8 |
| BB | II | 6.129 | 3552 | 10.9 | 3551 | 10.9 | 3550 | 10.9 |
| CC | III (PKG) | 0.51 | 3552 | 0.9 | 3551 | 0.9 | 3550 | 0.9 |
| DD | IV | 8.5 | 3552 | 15.1 | 3551 | 15.1 | 3550 | 15.1 |
| EE | VI | 0 | 3552 | 0 | 3551 | 0 | 3550 | 0 |
| FF | VIII | 1.03 | 3552 | 1.8 | 3551 | 1.8 | 3550 | 1.8 |
| GG | IX | 2.5 | 3552 | 4.4 | 3551 | 4.4 | 3550 | 4.4 |
| HH | WATER | 7 | 3552 | 12.4 | 3551 | 12.4 | 3550 | 12.4 |
| JJ | TOTAL STONS ALL CLASSE S | SUM OF ROWS AA THRU HH | | 55.3 | | 55.3 | | 55.3 |

CLASS I FIGURE = 3 MREs + HCP1 + HCP2 = 5.535 PMD

CLASS II FIGURE = SWA FACTOR + 4.038 PMD CDE FACTOR = 6.129 PMD

CLASS VIII FIGURE = MCR-E FACTOR = 1.03 PMD

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COMBAT OPERATIONS**Lesson 4. Subcourse Examination****SCOPE**

This examination covers the material included in TLO C and presented during the subcourse. The examination will measure how well you understand the material. It consists of multiplechoice, multiple-response, and matching items. Exam items focus on your comprehension of tactical concepts and principles rather than on your ability to memorize definitions or look up answers. The examples you have thought about and the practical exercises you have completed are similar to what you will see on the exam. It should take you approximately two hours to complete the exam.

ADVANCE PREPARATION

1. Review your notes and the material presented in the Advance Book for S310B. Pay particular attention to any notes you made and your practical exercise solutions.
2. Review study assignments and requirements as necessary. Don't review to memorize. The exam focuses on your comprehension of principles and concepts. Remember, the exam is open book.

RESTRICTIONS

1. Possession or use of old or new CGSOC examinations and old or new CGSOC solution-discussion booklets is prohibited.
2. Discussion of examination questions between students before or during the completion of this examination is considered collaboration and is not authorized.
3. Unauthorized assistance in conjunction with this examination is not permitted.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

Appendix 1 to Advance Book, S310B. General Situation

1. BACKGROUND

a. *General.* Centralia is a nation whose continuing independence and friendship are of vital interest to the United States. Both countries entered into a bilateral defense agreement in the late 1950s when the socialist coalition north of Centralia attempted to rekindle an ancient feud over navigation rights along the Missouri River. Accordingly, the President of the United States directed the establishment of a unified command, United States Forces, Centralia (USFORCENT), with responsibility for the Plains Theater of Operations (PTO).


The terms of the bilateral agreement limited the numbers of US forces stationed in Centralia and the amount of positioned material configured to unit sets (POMCUS) on Centralian soil. Therefore, because Centralia is located on a continent where the United States maintains forward-deployed forces, US forces needed for a conflict would initially come from elsewhere in the region. Follow-on forces would deploy from CONUS.

The regional military balance changed significantly after the dissolution of the northern socialist coalition in 1988 and the Iowa-Nebraska War (1989-90). First, Nebraska, Illinois, and Iowa, seceded from the coalition in 1988, thus fracturing the Central Theater of Military Operations (TVD). Then, in December 1989, Illinois demobilized its armed forces after Greens and Social Democrats swept the first free election held there in 40 years. Also that year, Nebraska isolated itself from the world community and ignited a 2-year war with Iowa by seizing the eastern panhandle of the Free State of El Dorado (sketch map B).

The Iowa-Nebraska War ended in the fall of 1990 with Nebraska still in possession of the El Dorado panhandle and with enough offensive military power to constitute a regional threat. Under the terms of the 3+1 Treaty negotiated between Nebraska, Iowa, Centralia, and the United States, Nebraska agreed to position only security forces in the portion of the El Dorado panhandle east of the Missouri River, and the United States agreed to limit US forces deployed north of the east-west line formed by the Kansas and Missouri Rivers in Centralia to only security forces.

Although Nebraska has honored the troop-stationing limitations of the 3+1 Treaty to date, it has also constructed several class 60 and 100 bridges across the Missouri River within the El Dorado panhandle. Constructed on the pretense of improving the transportation infrastructure and economy, these bridges nonetheless provide Nebraska with the capability to rapidly shift an entire army into the eastern panhandle.

Since the armistice, Nebraska has fully regenerated two of the four Nebraska *Front* armies-the 1 Army and the 2 Army. Iowa, however, has little offensive capability. Nebraska destroyed three of the four Iowa *Front* armies during the war. The remaining Iowa army is capable only of territorial defense and internal security operations.



Sketch Map B. Centralia and its northern neighbors.

These changes in the regional power balance helped cause the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to amend the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) in early 1991. The Commander in Chief, United States Forces, Centralia (CINCFORCENT) (dual-hatted as commanding general, 15th Army) will continue to prepare plans for the unilateral support of Centralia in the event of future aggression and for the support of US interests therein (OPLAN 1647). He also is charged with developing the capabilities of the Centarlian Territorial Forces (CTF). Initially, US Army Forces Centralia (ARFORCENT) would be augmented with one heavy corps from the forward-deployed forces in the region. At maturity, ARFORCENT could receive one additional corps from CONUS. US forward presence consists of limited, deployed special operating forces (SOF) working with Centralian defense forces under security assistance programs and combined exercises (fig 1).




Figure 1. US Forces, Centralia.

In the CINC's estimate, the two goals of the defensive campaign would be to destroy the invading force and to retain Kansas City, the Centralian capital. Eliminating enemy forces on Centralian soil would be necessary to restore the original borders and regain control over Centralian territory. Since the Centralian capital is the cultural, economic, and spiritual focal point of the nation, the coalition would also have to deny the invader any control over this center of gravity.

USFORCENT would conduct the defensive campaign in three phases. Phase I would prevent attacking forces from reaching the east-west line formed by the Kansas and Missouri Rivers while isolating these forces from their support bases. This would cause an attack to reach its culminating point before it threatens Kansas City. Phase II would methodically destroy enemy forces remaining on Centralian soil and restore the prewar international borders. Phase III would restore the Centralian infrastructure to prewar conditions. X (US) Corps would be the heavy corps initially deployed to the

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PTO under OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR. If deterrence failed, the corps would bear the major responsibility for achieving the CINC's campaign objectives.

Within the foreseeable future, Nebraska poses the only credible land threat to Centralia. If Nebraska invades Centralia, the X Corps would oppose the two armies of the Nebraska Front and its independent combined arms and frontal aviation units. All of the Nebraska units would possess export versions of heavy OPFOR weapon systems. However, the heavy OPFOR country cut off all assistance to Nebraska to halt the Iowa-Nebraska War, and intelligence analysis indicates that the Nebraska units would have difficulty sustaining a major land offensive longer than a week. Neither the heavy OPFOR country nor its successor states have resumed aid. Stockage levels of tank and artillery ammunition are limited, and repair parts for sophisticated systems are in short supply.

The terrain favors mobile warfare by heavy forces. Lacking any decisive terrain, the region between the international border and Kansas City is a heavily cross-compartmented area of low hills having an eastern and southeastern drainage pattern. The Missouri River flows south along the Nebraska border with Iowa and Centralia. At Kansas City it is joined by the eastward flowing Kansas River. From there, the Missouri flows eastward. Both rivers are major obstacles to maneuver, as are Perry Lake, Tuttle Creek Lake, and Smithville Lake (sketch map C).

Sketch Map C. Northern Centralia.

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b. Possible enemy courses of action.

(1) These terrain features combine to create three avenues of approach to Kansas City from the international border:

- (a) *Avenue of approach 1:* Pawnee City (QV4242)-Holton (TP6572)-Topeka (TF'6725)
- (b) *Avenue of approach 2:* Falls City (TQ7837)-Horton (TP8394)-Lawrence (UP05 15)
- (c) *Avenue of approach 3:* Maryville (UQ4167)-St. Joseph (UQ4203)-Platte City (UP4759)

Each can support the maneuver of a Nebraskii Army, although using of avenue of approach 3 would require pre-hostility violation of the 3+1 Treaty because offensive forces would be shifted into the portion of the El Dorado panhandle east of the Missouri River.

(2) *General Courses of action.* These avenues let the Nebraska *Front* develop four general courses of action.

(a.) *The front* could attempt a double envelopment of Kansas City with one army advancing on the capital from the east (avenue Maryville-St. Joseph-Platte City) and the other army encircling Kansas City from the west (avenue Pawnee City-Holton -Topeka) (fig. 2)




Figure 2. Course of action 1.

(b) The *front* could also attack with one army enveloping the city from either the west or east, while the other army advanced directly on the capital along the avenue Falls City-Horton-Lawrence (fig 3 and 4)




Figure 3. Course of action 2.




Figure 4. Course of action 3.

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The Nebraska *Front* could also descend on Kansas City with forces on all three avenues (fig 5)




Figure 5. Course of action 4.

When deployed, the X Corps would consist of two armored divisions, one mechanized division, a separate mechanized brigade, two ACRs, two aviation brigades, four FA brigades, and the doctrinal contingent of nondivisional combat support (CS) and CSS units.

Time would be the critical resource. Although the corps would deploy to Centralia as a deterrent measure based on strategic indicators, under the 3+1 Treaty terms the corps can deploy only its security forces north of the east-west line formed by the Kansas and Missouri Rivers until a neighbor of Centmlia commences hostilities. Assuming no operational surprise, the corps could establish a cover near the international border and prevent penetration of the line Fostoria (QU1468)-Edgerton (UP6074)-Kidder (VQ0704) for up to 48 hours after hostilities commence. Subsequent air-ground action by the corps could complete the defeat of the Nebraska *Front* north of the line Manhattan (QU1140)-Leavenworth (UP3555)-Polo (VP1178).

Given these factors, LTG Brennan, the X Corps commander, concluded that he would use the broad area north of Kansas City and the relatively equal force ratios to his advantage. He reasoned that if the enemy were to attack on a broad front using all three avenues of approach, it might penetrate the corps covering operation in one or more locations, but would not possess the operational reserves to exploit that success. On the other hand, if the enemy were to concentrate forces along only one or two avenues of approach, the corps could mass forces north of the Kansas-Missouri River and prevent the enemy from penetrating the line Manhattan-Leavenworth-Polo.

As analyzed by LTG Brennan from the enemy perspective, COAs 2 and 3 (which use the direct approach on Kansas City in conjunction with an envelopment) offer several advantages. Specifically,

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these COAs allow the two armies of the Nebraska Front to mass on adjacent avenues while the short attack distance minimizes the impact of limited Nebraskii resources. COA 1 offers the enemy the opportunity to force United States and Centralian forces to defend across a broad front, creating possible gaps or weaknesses in the defense, but also disperses the two Nebraskii armies beyond any mutual support and creates lengthy attack distances. COA 4 is unlikely, given Nebraskii doctrine and organization.

As a result of his analysis, LTG Brennan concluded that the corps deception plan should build on the force deployment limitations contained in the 3+1 Treaty, reinforcing the tendency of the Nebraska Front commander to attack Kansas City by the most direct approaches (COA 2 or COA 3) thus allowing the corps to economize on the flanks. The corps would then be able to mass in the center of its sector, contain both Nebraskii armies, and retain forces for immediate transition to the offense.

X Corps OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR (app 2 to adv book) has been designed primarily to counter enemy COAs 2 and 3, the enemy's most likely and most dangerous COAs. By shaping the battlefield and employing its deception plan, the OPLAN encourages the Nebraska Front commander to adopt COA 3. CONPLANS have been built into the plan in case the enemy adopts a different COA, but you will not focus on these CONPLANS during S310B.

2. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND CURRENT SITUATION

Recent regional and worldwide political developments have heightened tensions in the region. The Centralian Government has never officially recognized the Nebraskii occupation of the El Dorado panhandle and views the occupation as a direct threat to regional stability and to Centralian independence. The collapse of the OPFOR has had a serious effect on Nebraskii morale, as well as on the health of the Nebraska economy. The termination of OPFOR military aid has made it increasingly difficult for the Nebraskiis to maintain the readiness of their forces. These factors have contributed to a siege mentality within the Nebraskii Government and military. Over a year ago, Nebraskii leaders adopted a theme that all their problems originated as the direct result of the policies of the "illegitimate" Centralian Government and its "American protectors." Recently, Nebraskii officials began publicizing centuries-old claims to Centralian territory north of the Kansas-Missouri River system, including much of the Kansas City metropolitan area. This rhetoric has been accompanied by a significant increase in "accidental" border crossings and military overflights. Terrorist activity traceable to Nebraskii sympathizers has increased.

On 8 March 199_, responding to an urgent request by the Centralian Government pursuant to the bilateral defense agreement, the United States dispatched elements of X Corps, as well as Air Force and SOF units, to Centralia to conduct joint exercises with Centralian forces. An armored division, a separate mechanized brigade, and an ACR were among the X Corps units deployed. Nebraska responded with increased provocations and announced that the "liberation" of disputed Centralian territory was imminent. Consequently, on 17 May 199_ the US and Centralian Governments agreed to complete the deployment of the initial contingent allocated to CINCFORCENT under OPLAN 1647. This deployment, it was felt, would be sufficient to deter Nebraskii attack and, should deterrence fail, defend Centralia. A decision to deploy the follow-on US corps was deferred indefinitely.

It is now 14 August 199_. One week ago, the 55th Mech Div, the last combat unit on the X Corps deployment list, closed in its assembly area. Tensions between Centralia and Nebraska continue, but thus far no attacks on US forces have occurred. Immediate attack by the Nebraska Front does not appear likely. X Corps units continue planning, base construction, training, and assistance activities in support of OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR.

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Appendix 2 to Advance Book, S310B. Operation Plan BRIDAL SPUR

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OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

- Maps: -Series Western United States NJ 14-3, Kansas, sheet 1 (Manhattan),
edition 1969, 1:250,000
- Series Western United States NJ 14-6, Kansas, sheet 1 (Hutchinson),
edition 1969, 1:250,000
- Series Western United States NJ 15-1, Missouri-Kansas, sheet 1
(Kansas City), edition 1974, 1:250,000
- Series Western United States NJ 15-4, Kansas-Missouri, sheet 1
(Lawrence), edition 1974, 1:250,000
- Series Western United States NK 14-12, Nebraska-Kansas, sheet
1 (Lincoln), edition 1981, 1:250,000
- Series Western United States NK 15-10, Nebraska-Missouri-Iowa-
Kansas, sheet 1 (Nebraska City), edition 1974, 1:250,000

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: SIERRA.

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization).

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces. Adjacent and supporting units:

(1) Centralian Territorial Forces (CTF) defend on the corps right and left flanks. These forces comprise battalion- and regimental-sized units called to active duty and defending areas near their home communities. In addition, the CTF will defend river-crossing sites and perform refugee control within the 10th Corps sector.

(2) CCC comprises the majority of the professional Centralian Army. Its major combat forces are organized into two mechanized infantry regiments, four infantry regiments, and six independent tank battalions. It includes the capital city's gendarme and other security forces. The CCC mission is to establish a fortified zone within KANSAS CITY and, on order, defend the capital.

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(3) The Leavenworth Militia is an infantry regiment based at FORT LEAVENWORTH. Its mission is to secure the fort with its airfield and ammunition depot, to defend the western approaches to the Centennial Bridge across the MISSOURI River, and to defend its assigned sector.

(4) The commander of the CAF is the Commanding General, US 52d Air Force (dual hatted as the US Forces, Centralia Air Component Commander). The CAF comprise the 52d Air Force and the Centralia Air Division (CAD). The CAD consists of a mix of F-16A, F-5, and A-7 jets and AH-1 helicopters provided over the years under the US military assistance program.

c. Attachments and Detachments. See Task Organization. All attachments effective OO.

d. Assumptions.

(1) Strategic and operational intelligence assets will detect the movement of the Nebraskii 1 Army into the eastern EL DORADO panhandle.

(2) X US Corps covering force operations will destroy the Nebraska Front reconnaissance elements, delay first-echelon divisions north of the line FOSTORIA(QU1468)-EDGERTON(UP6074)-KIDDER(VQ0704) for 48 hours, and reduce the first-echelon regiments of those divisions to less than 75- to 80-percent effectiveness.

(3) Combined Air Forces can achieve air superiority over the division AO during division movement and defensive preparations.

2. MISSION.

X (US) Corps defends in sector to defeat the Nebraska Front forward of PL BLUE in order to protect the integrity of CENTRALIA.

3. EXECUTION.

INTENT:

Purpose: The purpose of this operation is to protect the integrity of CENTRALIA in the event of a Nebraskii invasion.

End state: The desired end state is the defeat of the Nebraska Front well north of KANSAS CITY, with X (US) Corps units securing objectives on the CENTRALIA-NEBRASKA border.

Method: Before the Nebraskii attack, the corps conducts a ruse in accordance with the deception plan to portray a defense in sector south of the KANSAS- MISSOURI Rivers to convince the front commander that X (US) Corps will not seek a decisive engagement north of the rivers. This should encourage him to attack on the most direct approaches to KANSAS CITY. On the first hostile act, both ACRs delay the Nebraska Front for 48 hours to allow 55th Mech Div and 313th Sep Mech Bde time to deploy and prepare defensive positions north of the KANSAS-MISSOURI Rivers. 14th Avn Bde in the east and 10th Avn Bde in the west interdict the enemy's flanking first-echelon divisions to encourage the enemy to concentrate his attack in the center into the defenses of 55th Mech Div and 313th Sep Mech Bde. East of the MISSOURI River, 313th Sep Mech Bde fixes the first-echelon divisions of 1 Army,

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while 23d Armd Div conducts a flank attack from the east to defeat the secondechelon divisions canalized by 14th Avn Bde. The purpose of this action is to isolate 1 Army on the east side of the MISSOURI River. The decisive action takes place to the west of the MISSOURI River, where 55th Mech Div contains the lead divisions of 2 Army, while 10th Avn Bde, main effort, causes the culmination of the Nebraska Front by the attrition of 2 Army's secondechelon divisions. 25th Armd Div, initially the corps reserve for this action, is to be prepared to assume the main effort and attack from the western flank to destroy the rear and LOCs of 2 Army if 10th Avn Bde is unable to cause the culmination of the Nebraska Front unaided. When the Nebraska Front attack has culminated, 25th Armd Div, now the main effort, and 23d Armd Div attack north to seize objectives on the CENTRALIA-NEBRASKA border. 55th Mech Div follows 25th Mech Div to clear bypassed enemy and restore the integrity of CENTRALIA. The operation will be phased as follows:

Phase I - Deception and Security Operations Prior to the Nebraskii Attack.

Phase II - Decisive Combat Operations.

Phase III - Exploitation to Restore the Centralian Border.

a. Concept of Operation. Annex C (Operation Overlay) Control measures. Basic control measures are as shown on the 10th Corps operation overlay sketch (Annex C).

b. Tasks to Maneuver Units.

(1) Phase I. Deception and Security Operations.

(a) 208th and 209th ACRs, supported by 10th Corps Artillery, are the corps covering force and will identify the enemy first hostile act and delay the Nebraskii Front lead elements for 48 hours forward of PL GREEN.

(b) 313th Sep Mech Bde, located vic LEES SUMMIT (UP8008), initially conducts a ruse by portraying defense in sector as 23d Armd Div between INDEPENDENCE and LITTLE BLUE RIVER. OO, moves into its sector vic PLATTE CITY (UP4759).

(c) 23d Armd Div, located vic OAK GROVE (VP0218) will support the 313th Sep Mech Bde deception.

(d) 25th Armd Div, the corps phase I main effort, portrays a defense between TOPEKA and LAWRENCE to cause the Nebraska Front commander to attack on the direct approach to KANSAS CITY between PERRY Lake and the MISSOURI River.

(e) 10th Avn Bde is corps reserve.

(f) 14th Avn Bde is corps reserve.

(2) Phase II. Decisive Combat Operations.

(a) 208th ACR, after battle handover at PL RED, screens between TUTTLE Creek and Delaware River/Perry Lake to prevent an envelopment of X (US) Corps from the west.

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(b) 209th ACR, tier battle handover at PL RED, guards between SMITHVILLE and POLO to protect the east and north flanks of the 23d Armd Div counterattack.

(c) 313th Sep Mech Bde, after battle handover from 209th ACR at PL RED, defends in sector to fix the first-echelon divisions of 1 Army between PLATTE CITY and SMITHVILLE.

(d) 23d Armd Div, OO, attacks to defeat the second-echelon division of 1 Army vic obj CHIEF.

(e) 25th Armd Div, as corps reserve, it will be prepared to block 2 Army along the KANSAS River west of PERRY Lake to prevent envelopment of 10th Corps from the west. It will also be prepared to become the main effort and attack to destroy 2 Army rear and LOC units along a line from HOLTON - HORTON - DENTON - ST JOSEPH to cause the culmination of the Nebraska Front.

(f) 10th Avn Bde is the corps phase II main effort and interdicts the western firstechelon division of 2 Army forward of PL GREEN (H hour through H+48) in order to encourage 2 Army to commit its main attack between PERRY Lake and the MISSOURI River. It then attrits the second-echelon divisions of 2 Army by 25 percent forward of PL GREEN (H+48 through H+64) to cause the culmination of 2 Army.

(g) 14th Avn Bde interdicts the eastern firstechelon division of 1 Army forward of PL GREEN (I-I hour through H+48) in order to encourage 1 Army to commit its main attack into 313th Sep Bde AO. It then canalizes secondechelon divisions of 1 Army (H+48 through H+64) into obj CHIEF in order to prevent the enemy from escaping defeat by 23d Armd Div

(3) Phase III. Exploitation to restore the Centralia Border.

(a) 208th ACR covers west of a line of route 63 to protect the west flank of 25th Armd Div.

(b) 209th ACR covers east of the line of route 33 to protect the east flank of 23 Armd Div.

(c) 313th Sep Mech Bde is corps reserve.

(d) 23d Armd Div attacks to secure obj BLADE.

(e) 25th Armd Div is the corps main effort and attacks to secure objective ROYAL in order to restore the CENTRALIA-NEBRASKA border.

(f) 10th Avn Bde is corps reserve.

(g) 14th Avn Bde is corps reserve.

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c. Tasks to Combat Support Units

(1) Fire support.

(a) Phase I-Deception and Security Operations Prior to Nebraskii Attack. This phase will focus on the movement and positioning of 64th FA Bde and 63d FA Bde in their direct support roles for the 208th ACR and 209th ACR respectively. They will provide close fires in support of the corps covering force mission. The 66th and 62d FA Bdes will support the corps deception plan by being positioned south of the KANSAS and MISSOURI Rivers. The 66th FA Bde will be positioned initially with 25th Armd Div to make it *appear* that 25th Armd Div has been weighted with field artillery assets. This positioning will also facilitate execution of the tactical mission of the 66th FA Bde during phase II of the operation. Deep fire planning will focus on enemy reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA), ADA, and FS assets to be executed during phase II. 10th corps artillery HQ will co-locate with 62d FA Bde. Priority of fires to 208th and 209th ACRs. Rear fires will be provided by organic artillery assets within assigned assembly areas and/or sectors.

(b) Phase II-Decisive Combat Operations, 10th (US) Corps deep fires and CF focus on RISTA, SSMs, ADA (supporting FS), FS, maneuver forces, LOCs, then C³. 10th corps artillery provides SEAD in support of tactical air (TACAIR) and 10th Avn Bde cross-FLOT operations. Initial close fires will be provided by 64th and 63d FA Bdes in support of the mission of 208th and 209th ACRs to delay the Nebraskii *Front* for 48 hours. 55th Mech DIVARTY, reinforced by 66th FA Bde, is responsible for FS battle handover from 208th ACR. 62d FA Bde is responsible for FS battle handover from 209th ACR while 63d FA Bde moves and positions itself to assume a DS tactical mission in support of 313th Sep Mech Bde. 55th Division and 313th Sep Mech Bde MBA forces with organic artillery assets reinforced by corps artillery assets support defensive operations. Rear fires are provided by the organic mortars of the TCF battalion with on-call support of an attack helicopter company from 14th Avn Bde. Initial priority of fires to 208th ACR, 209th ACR, 55th Mech Div, 313th Sep Mech Bde, 10th Avn Bde, 14th Avn Bde, 25th Armd Div, and 23d Armd Div. On completion of battle handover, priority of fires is to 55th Mech Div, 313th Sep Mech Bde, 208th ACR, 209th ACR, 25th Armd Div, and 23d Armd Div. Priority of fires shifts to 10th Avn Bde and 14th Avn Bde, in that order, for deep aviation operations. 64th FA Bde will provide SEAD fires for 10th Avn Bde and 62d FA Bde will provide SEAD fires for 14th Avn Bde.

(c) Phase III-Exploitation to Restore the Centralian Border. Deep fires focus on second-echelon divisions and the independent motorized rifle brigades (IMRBs). Corps CF initially focuses on remaining artillery between PL YELLOW and PL RED, then shifts to north of PL GREEN. Close fires support 25th Armd Div (main effort) and 23d Armd Div counterattacks. Rear fires are same as in phase II. Corps continues deep operations north of PL GREEN. Priority of fires is to 25th Armd Div, 23d Armd Div, 55th Mech Div, 313th Sep Mech Bde, 208th ACR 209th ACR, 10th Avn Bde, and 14th Avn Bde.

(d) FA Organization for Combat: See Annex F.

(2) Air defense. See task organization. Provide point coverage on bridges crossing KANSAS River. Provide area coverage for movement in sector.

(3) Chemical (NBC defense).

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(4) Combat engineer.

(5) Intelligence and electronic warfare. Annex I (Electronic Warfare)

(6) Military police. Priority to BCC at river-crossing sites when moving into sector. Second priority at battle handover at PL RED and PL YELLOW. Upon completion of battle handover, provide area security mission vicinity DSA. Establish one POW collection point in division rear.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) This plan is effective for planning on receipt and implementation OO.

(2) D-day is the day Nebraskii forces cross the CENTRALIA-NEBRASKA border and commence hostilities.

(3) All units implement appropriate security measures to counter threat of terrorism

(4) PL RED is corps BHL.

(5) MOPP level 0.

(6) OEG: Negligible risk to exposed, unwarned personnel.

(7) Air defense warning status YELLOW; air defense weapons control status WEAPONS TIGHT.

(8) Vehicle recognition signal consists of inverted V painted on both sides and rear of vehicle and outlined with thermal tape.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Concept of Support. The theater personnel command (PERSCOM), medical command (MEDCOM), finance command, transportation command (TRANSCOM), and the 15th Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) provide support to X Corps. 10th COSCOM, 644th Personnel (Pers) Group (Gp), and 2d Finance (Fin) Gp provide support to 10th Corps from LSAs ALPHA, BRAVO, BRAVO (FWD), BRAVO Alternate (ALTN) (FWD), CHARLIE, CHARLIE (FWD), DELTA, and DELTA (FWD). Initial priority of support is to 208th ACR, 209th ACR, 10th Corps Arty, 10th Avn Bde, 55th Mech Div, 14th Avn Bde, 313th Sep Mech Bde, 25th Armd Div, and 23d Armd Div, in order. 20th CSG (Rear) will provide mortuary affairs augmentation teams to major subordinate commands (MSCs) on D+4. Replacement class VII will not be available until D+10.

(1) Support before operations. (Phase I: Deception and Security Operations) 13th CSG (Fwd) establishes LSA CHARLIE and LSA CHARLIE (FWD). 13th CSG (Fwd) and 83d Med Gp provide support to 55th Mech Div, 66th FA Bde, and corps units operating in the 55th Mech Div area. 14th CSG (Fwd) establishes LSAs BRAVO, BRAVO (FWD), and BRAVO (ALTN) (FWD). 14th CSG (Fwd) and 84th Med Gp provide support to 208th ACR, 64th FA Bde, 10th Avn Bde, 25th Armd Div, and corps units operating in 25th Armd Div area. 19th CSG (Fwd) establishes LSAs DELTA and DELTA (FWD). 19th CSG (Fwd) and 82d Med Gp

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provide support to 209th ACR, 63d FA Bde, 14th Avn Bde, 313th Sep Mech Bde, 23d Armd Div, and corps units operating in 313th Sep Mech Bde or 23d Armd Div areas. 20th CSG (Rear), 80th Med Bde, 644th Pers Gp, and 2d Fin Gp establish LSA ALPHA and provide DS and general support (GS) to the corps sector. 825th Med Bn Evac will provide a ground ambulance company in DS of 208th ACR, 209th ACR, and 55th Mech Div and a ground ambulance platoon in DS of 313th Sep Mech Bde on D-2. Additional elements of 10th COSCOM, 644th Pers Gp, and 2d Fin Gp will locate in MSC areas on request or coordination with affected unit. CSGs will throughput barrier material and mines to designated engineer supply points (ESPs) along PL BLUE. 13th, 14th, and 19th CSGs (Fwd) establish corps maintenance collection points (MCPs) along highway I-70. 20th CSG (Rear) provides heavy equipment transfer (HET) support to corps MCPs. Priority of maintenance and evacuation is to tanks, BFVs, recovery vehicles, MLRS, howitzers, and fuel vehicles. Aviation maintenance priorities are AH-64s CH-47s and UH-60s. Movement on MSR CCC is restricted to CCC forces only.

(2) Support during operations. (Phases II and III) Aeromedical evacuation authorized as far forward as battalion aid stations. Priority of movement to corps covering force elements and classes III and V forward. Priority of rearward movement is to medical, EPWs, corps covering force elements, and human remains, in order.

(a) Phase II: Decisive Combat Operations.

1. Covering force operations. CSBs from the 10th COSCOM provide DS to corps troops and reinforcing DS and GS to divisional troops from the four forward LSAs. 825th Med Bn Evac provides two air ambulance detachments in DS of 208th and 209th ACRs. 55th Mech Div and 313th Sep Mech Bde provide emergency medical treatment, POL, and class V supply point support to corps covering force units on an area basis as required.

2. Main battle area operations. OO, CSBs displace from forward LSAs to LSAs BRAVO, CHARLIE, and DELTA. 825th Med Bn Evac provides one air ambulance company in DS of 55th Mech Div and one air ambulance detachment in DS of the 313th Sep Mech Bde. Priority of support shifts to 10th Avn Bde, 55th Mech Div, 313th Sep Mech Bde, 14th Avn Bde, 208th ACR, 209th ACR, 10th Corps Arty, 25th Armd Div, and 23d Armd Div, in order.

(b) Phase III: Exploitation to Restore Centralian Border. CSGs prepare to displace and reestablish forward LSAs north of PL BLUE. Priority of support shifts to 25th Armd and 23d Armd Divs.

(3) Support after operations. OO, CSGs reestablish the four forward LSAs. Priority of support is to 25th Armd Div, 23d Armd Div, 10th Avn Bde, 14th Avn Bde, 208th ACR, 209th ACR, 10th Corps Arty, 55th Mech Div, and 313th Sep Mech Bde, in order. OO, CSGs displace and establish additional LSAs north of PL BROWN to support northward offensive operations. Priority of movement forward to classes V, III and IX.

b. Annex Q (Service Support) and Appendix 1 (Service Support Overlay) to Annex Q (Service Support).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command. TBP.

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- b. Signal. Annex J (Signal).

ACKNOWLEDGE.

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LTG

OFFICIAL

/s/Delaney
DELANEY
G3

ANNEXES: A-Task Organization
B-Intelligence
C-Operation Overlay
D-Engineer (TBP)
E-Army Aviation (TBP)
F-Fire Support
G-Air Defense (TBP)
H-Army Airspace Command and Control (TBP)
I-Electronic Warfare (TBP)
J-Signal Operations (TBP)
K-Operations Security (TBP)
L-Deception (TBP)
M-Psychological Operations (TBP)
N-Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Operations (TBP)
O-Provost Marshal (TBP)
P-Rear Operations (TBP)
Q-Service Support
R-Highway Regulation (TBP)
S-Civil Affairs (TBP)
T-Contingency Plans (TBP)

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ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps

55TH Mech Div

1st Bde

4-80 Mech (M2A1)

4-2 Armor (M1A2)

4-3 Armor (M1A2)

2d Bde

4-78 Mech (M2A1)

4-79 Mech (M2A1)

4-4 Armor (M1A2)

4-5 Armor (M1A2)

3d Bde

4-77 Mech (M2A1)

4-81 Mech (M2A1)

4-25 Armor (M1A2)

55th Avn Bde

4-23 Cav

Trps A, B, & C (M1A2/M3A2)

Trps D & E (OH-58D)

1-55 Avn (Atk)

2-55 Avn (Atk)

3-55 Avn (GS)

55th Mech DIVARTY

4-40 FA (155, SP)

4-41 FA (155, SP)

4-42 FA (155, SP)

D/43 FA (MLRS)

E120 FA (Tgt Ace)

Div Troops

4-441 ADA

HHD

Btrys A-C (BSFV/MNPADS)

Btry D (Avenger/MANPADS)

55th Cml Co

1st-5th Plts (Decon)

6th Plt (Smoke)

7th Plt (Recon)

55th DIVEN Bde

HHD

31st Engr Bn

32d Engr Bn

33d Engr Bn

55th MI Bn

HHC

Co A (DS)

Co B (DS)

Co C (DS)

Co D (GS)

AQF Plt (OPCON)

55th MP Co

1st Plt (DS)

2d Plt (DS)

3d Plt (DS)

4th-6th Plts (GS)

55th Sig Bn

Co A (Area Sig)

Co B (Area Sig)

Co C (Area Sig)

Co D (Sig Spt)

55th Mech DISCOM

HHC/MMC

551st FSB

552d FSB

553d FSB

554th DASB

555th MSB

A-1

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ANX A (TASKORG) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - - X (US) Corps

23d Armd Div

1st Bde

1-91 Mech (M2A1)

1-10 Armor (M1A2)

1-11 Armor (M1A2)

2d Bde

1-92 Mech (M2A1)

1-12 Armor (M1A2)

1-13 Armor (M1A2)

1-14 Armor (M1A2)

3d Bde

1-93 Mech (M2A1)

1-94 Mech (M2A1)

1-15 Armor (M1A2)

23d Avn Bde

1-22 Cav

Trps A, B, & C (M1A2/M3A2)

Trps D & E (OH-58D)

1-23 Avn (Atk)

2-23 Avn (Atk)

3-23 Avn (GS)

23d Armd DIVARTY

1-50 FA (155, SP)

1-51 FA (155, SP)

1-52 FA (155, SP)

A/53 FA (MLRS)

D/20 FA (Tgt Acq)

Div Trp

1-440 ADA

HHD

Btrys A-C (BSFV/MANPADS)

Btry D (Avenger/MANPADS)

23d Cm1 Co

1st-5th Plts (Decon)

6th Plt (Smoke)

7th Plt (Recon)

23d DIVEN Bde

HHD

41st Engr Bn

42d Engr Bn

43d Engr Bn

23d MI Bn

HHOC

Co A (DS)

Co B (DS)

Co C (DS)

Co D (GS)

AQF Plt (OPCON)

23d MP Co

1st Plt (DS)

2d Plt (DS)

3d Plt (DS)

4th-6th Plts (GS)

23d Sig

Co A (Area Sig)

Co B (Area Sig)

Co C (Area Sig)

Co D (Sig Spt)

23d Armd DISCOM

HHC/MMC

151st FSB

152d FSB

153d FSB

154th DASB

155th MSB

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

ANX A (TASKORG) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - - X (US) Corps

25th Armd Div

1st Bde

- 2-91 Mech (M2A1)
- 2-10 Armor (M1A2)
- 2-11 Armor (M1A2)

2d Bde

- 2-92 Mech (M2A1)
- 2-12 Armor (M1A2)
- 2-13 Armor (M1A2)
- 2-14 Armor (M1A2)

3d Bde

- 2-93 Mech (M2A1)
- 2-94 Mech (M2A1)
- 2-15 Armor (M1A2)

25th Avn Bde

- 2-22 Cav
- Trps A, B, & C (M1A2/M3A2)
- Trps D & E (OH-58D)

- 1-25 Avn (Atk)
- 2-25 Avn (Atk)
- 3-25 Avn (GS)

25th Armd DIVARTY

- 2-50 FA (155, SP)
- 2-51 FA (155, SP)
- 2-52 FA (155, SP)
- C/53 FA (MLRS)
- G/20 FA (Tgt Acq)

Div Trp

2-440 ADA

HHB

- Btrys A-C (BSFV/MANPADS)
- Btry D (Avenger/MANPADS)

25th Cm1 Co

- 1st-5th Plts (Decon)
- 6th Plt (Smoke)
- 7th Plt (Recon)

25th DIVEN Bde

HHB

- 51st Engr Bn
- 52d Engr Bn
- 53d Engr Bn

25th MI

- HHOC
- Co A (DS)
- Co B (DS)
- Co C (DS)
- Co D (GS)
- AQF Plt (OPCON)

25th MP Co

- 1st Plt (DS)
- 2d Plt (DS)
- 3d Plt (DS)
- 4th-6th Plts (GS)

25th Sig

- Co A (Area Sig)
- Co B (Area Sig)
- Co C (Area Sig)
- Co D (Sig Spt)

25th Armd DISCOM

- HHC/MMC
- 251st FSB
- 252d FSB
- 253d FSB
- 254th DASB
- 255th MSB

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

ANX A (TASKORG) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - - X (US) Corps

313th Sep Mech Bde

5-80 Mech (M2A1)
 5-81 Mech (M2A1)
 5-2 Armor (M1A2)
 5-3 Armor (M1A2)
 A/5-23 Cav (M1A2/M3A2)
 5-40 FA (155, SP)
 313th ADA Plt (BSFV/MANPADS)
 313th Cml Plt (Decon)
 313th Engr Co
 313th MI Co
 313th MP Plt
 313th Sig Plt
 313th Spt Bn
 313th MMC

208th ACR

1/208th ACR
 Trps A-C (M1A2/M3A2)
 Co D (M1A2)
 1st How Btry
 2/208th ACR
 Trps E-G (M1A2/M3A2)
 Co H (M1A2)
 2d How Btry
 3/208th ACR
 Trps I-L (M1A2/M3A2)
 Co M (M1A2)
 3d How Btry
 4/208th ACR
 Trps N-P (OH-58D/AH1)
 Trp S (UH-60)
 AVUM Trp
 208th ADA Btry (Stinger)
 208th Cml Co
 1st Plt (Smoke-Decon)
 2d Plt (Recon)
 208th Engr Co
 208th MI Co
 Spt Sqdn
 S&T Trp
 Maint Trp
 Med Trp

209th ACR

1/209th ACR
 Trps A-C (M1A2/M3A2)
 Co D (M1A2)
 1st How Btry
 2/209th ACR
 Trps E-G (M1A2/M3A2)
 Co H (M1A2)
 2d How Btry
 3/209th ACR
 Trps I-L (M1A2/M3A2)
 Co M (M1A2)
 3d How Btry
 4/209th ACR
 Trps N-P (OH-58D/AH1)
 Trp S (UH-60)
 AVUM Trp
 209th ADA Btry (Stinger)
 209th Cml Co
 1st Plt (Smoke/Decon)
 2d Plt (Recon)
 209th Engr Co
 209th MI Co
 Spt Sqdn
 S&T Trp
 Maint Trp
 Med Trp

10th Avn Bde

403d Atk Hel Regt
 1-403 Avn (AH-64)
 2-403 Avn (AH-64)
 3-403 Avn (AH-64)
 400th Avn Group
 1-400 Avn (CAB)
 2-400 Avn (Aslt) (UH-60)
 3-400 Avn (MHB) (CH-47)
 4-400 Avn (CSAB) (UH-60)
 6-457 ATS

A-4

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

USACGSC-FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

ANX A (TASKORG) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - - X (US) Corps

14th Avn Bde

503d Atk Hel Regt
 1-503 Avn (AH-64)
 2-503 Avn (AH-64)
 3-503 Avn (AH-64)
 500th Avn Group
 1-500 Avn (CAB)
 2-500 Avn (Aslt) (UH-60)
 3-500 Avn (MHB) (CH-47)
 4-500 Avn (CSAB) (UH-60)
 6-557 Avn (ATS)

10th Corps Arty

62d FA Bde HQ
 1-651 FA (MLRS)
 2-661 FA (MLRS)
 63d FA Bde HQ
 2-628 FA (155, SP)
 2-631 FA (155, SP)
 2-634 FA (155, SP)
 2-662 FA (MLRS)
 64th FA Bde HQ
 2-611 FA (155, SP)
 2-616 FA (155, SP)
 2-635 FA (155, SP)
 2-644 FA (MLRS)
 2-645 FA (MLRS)
 66th FA Bde HQ
 2-641 FA (155, SP)
 2-642 FA (155, SP)
 2-643 FA (155, SP)
 2-665 FA (MLRS)
 2-667 FA (MLRS)

10th ADA Bde

1-432 ADA (Avenger)
 1-433 ADA (Avenger)
 1-434 ADA (Patriot)
 1-454 ADA (Hawk)

42d Cml Bde

401st Cml Bn
 411th Cml Co (Decon)
 415th Cml Co (Recon)
 423d Cml Co (Smoke) (Mech)
 402d Cml Bn
 412th Cml Co (Decon)
 416th Cml Co (Recon)
 424th Cml Co (Smoke) (Mech)
 431st Cml Co (Smoke/Decon)
 444th Cml Co (Smoke) (Mtz)
 403d Cml Bn
 413th Cml Co (Decon)
 421st Cml Co (Recon)
 425th Cml Co (Smoke) (Mech)
 404th Cml Bn
 414th Cml Co (Decon)
 422d Cml Co (Recon)
 441st Cml Co (Smoke) (Mech)
 445th Cml Co (Smoke) (Mtz)
 451st Cml Co (Smoke/Decon)

63d Engr Bde (Corps)

61st Engr Gp
 500th Cbt Engr Bn (Corps)
 (Whl)
 501st Cbt Engr Bn (Corps)
 (Mech)
 570th Cbt Engr Bn (Hvy)
 571st Cbt Engr Bn (Hvy)
 5047th Ash Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)
 5048th Ash Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)
 5080th Engr Cbt Spt Equip Co
 62d Engr Gp
 502d Cbt Engr Bn (Corps)
 (Mech)
 503d Cbt Engr Bn (Corps)
 (Mech)
 572d Cbt Engr Bn (Hvy)
 573d Cbt Engr Bn (Hvy)
 5049th Aslt Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)
 5050th Aslt Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)
 5081st Engr Cbt Spt Equip Co

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

ANX A (TASKORG) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - - X (US) Corps**22d MI Bde**

200th MI Bn (AE)
210th MI Bn (TE)
220th MI Bn (HQ/Ops)

22d MP Bde

231st MP Bn
270th MP Co
271st MP Co
272d MP Co
232d MP Bn
370th MP Co
371st MP Co
372d MP Co
233d MP Bn
470th MP Co
471st MP Co
472d MP Co
234th MP Bn
570th MP co
571st MP co
572d MP Co

72d Sig Bde

700th Sig Spt Bn (MSE)
Cos A & B (Area Sig)
Co C (Sig Spt)
704th Area Sig Bn (MSE)
Cos A-C (Area Sig)
Co D (Sig Spt)
705th Area Sig Bn (MSE)
Cos A-C (Area Sig)
Co D (Sig Spt)
706th Area Sig Bn (MSE)
Cos A-C (Am Sig)
Co D (Sig Spt)

200th PSYOP Bn

Co A (TAC)
Cos B-E (TAC)

2d Fin Gp

10th Fin Bn
23d Fin Bn
25th Fin Bn
55th Fin Bn
208th Fin Bn
209th Fin Bn

502d CA Bde

663Sth CA Bn (GP)
6636th CA Bn (DS)
6637th CA Bn (DS)

644th Pers Gp
169th Pers Svc Bn
142d Postal Co
183d Pers Svc Bn
143d Postal Co
184th Pen Svc Bn
144th Postal co
185th Pers Svc Bn
145th Postal co
186th Pen Svc Bn
146th Postal Co
187th Pen Svc Bn
159th Postal co
1493d Repl Co (DS)
140th Army Band
141st Postal co

110th Press Camp HQ**12th PA Tm**

116th Mobile PA Det
117th Mobile PA Det

1800th RAOC**1801st RAOC****1802d RAOC****1803d RAOC**

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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

ANX A (TASK ORG) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - - X (US) Corps

10th COSCOM

2d Spt Tm (TACSATCOM)

2005th MMC

4104th MCC

788th MCT

789th MCT

790th MCT

791st MCT

797th ATMCT

798th ATMCT

7071st MRT

7072d MRT

7073d MRT

7074th MRT

7075th MRT

80th Med Bde

82d Med Gp

84th MASH

8300th Med Det Surg

809th CSH

Med Tm Head & Neck Surg

Med Tm Eye Surg

810th CSH

Med Tm Neurosurg

8221st Med Det CSC

8222d Med Det CSC

8420th Med Det PM (Sani)

8421st Med Det PM (Sani)

8467th Med Det PM (Entom)

83d Med Gp

85th MASH

8302d Med Det Surg

811th CSH

812th CSH

Med Tm Head & Neck Surg

Med Tm Eye Surg

814th CSH

Med Tm Neurosurg

8223d Med Det CSC

8224th Med Det CSC

8422d Med Det PM (Sani)

8423d Med Det PM (Sani)

8270th Med Det PM (Entom)

84th Med Gp

817th CSH

Med Tm Head & Neck Surg

Med Tm Neurosurg

Med Tm Eye Surg

818th CSH

Med Tm Head & Neck Surg

Med Tm Neurosurg

Med Tm Eye Surg

819th CSH

Med Tm Infect Disease

802d ASMB

8424th Med Det PM (Sani)

8425th Med Det PM (Sani)

8468th Med Det PM (Entom)

8403d Med Co Holding

833d Med Bn Dent Svc

8259th Med Co Dent Svc

8250th Med Tm Prostho

8260th Med Co Dent Svc

8251st Med Tm Prostho

8261st Med Co Dent Svc

8240th Med Det Dent Svc

8241st Med Det Dent Svc

8242d Med Det Dent Svc

8243d Med Det Dent Svc

825th Med Bn Evac

855th Med Co Gnd Amb

856th Med Co Gnd Amb

857th Med Co Gnd Amb

860th Med Co Gnd Amb

861st Med Co Air Amb

862d Med Co Air Amb

863d Med Co Air Amb

864th Med Co Air Amb

865th Med Co Air Amb

820th Med Co CSC

826th Med Det Vet Svc (HQ)

8265th Med Det Vet Svc

8266th Med Det Vet Svc

8163d Med Det Vet Med

827th Med Bn Log (Fwd)

8208th Med Det Log Spt

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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

USACGSC-FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

ANX A (TASK ORG) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - - X (US) Corps

13th CSG (Fwd)

13th CSB

220th QM Co (POL Sup)
 721st Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)
 293d QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
 273d QM Co (Sup) (GS)
 QM Plt (Perish Subsist)
 9017th Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Track Veh)
 Maint Det (SP Arty Trt/FC)
 Maint Det (Whl Veh)
 Maint Det (NIC Btry Chg)
 Maint Det (TACFIRE)
 711th Trans Co (Mdm Trk
 Cntnr/Cgo)
 7400th Trans Det (TTP)

90th CSB

9012th Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Engr Equip)
 Maint Det (Crypto Equip)
 Maint Det (Bot Ch-Chg Sta)
 Maint Det (Fabric)
 Maint Det (TACFIRE)
 9013th Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Track Veh)
 Maint Det (SP Arty Trt/FC)
 Maint Det (Radar)
 Maint Det (Sig)
 Maint Det (TACFIRE)

199th CSB

9011th Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Engr Equip)
 Maint Det (Track Veh)
 Maint Det (Tk Trt)
 Maint Det (SP Arty Trt/FC)
 Maint Det (TACFIRE)
 271st QM Co (Sup) (DS)
 291st QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
 580th Ord Co (DS) (MOADS)
 759th Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)

14th CSG (Fwd)

14th CSB

221st QM Co (POL Sup)
 722d Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)
 292d QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
 239th QM Co (Sup) (GS)
 QM Plt (Perish Subsist)
 9018th Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Track Veh)
 Maint Det (SP Arty Trt/FC)
 Maint Det (Whl Veh)
 Maint Det (NIC Btry Chg)
 Maint Det (TACFIRE)
 707th Trans Co (Mdm Trk
 Cntnr/Cgo)

91st CSB

9015th Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Engr Equip)
 Maint Det (Crypto Equip)
 Maint Det (Bot Ch-Chg Sta)
 Maint Det (Fabric)
 Maint Det (TACFIRE)
 9016th Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Track Veh)
 Maint Det (SP Arty Trt/FC)
 Maint Det (Radar)
 Maint Det (Sig)
 Maint Det (TACFIRE)

198th CSB

9014th Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Engr Equip)
 Maint Det (Track Veh)
 Maint Det (Tk Trt)
 Maint Det (SP Arty Trt/FC)
 Maint Det (TACFIRE)
 208th QM Co (Sup) (DS)
 294th QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
 581st Ord Co (DS) (MOADS)
 735th Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

ANX A (TASKORG) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - - X (US) Corps

19th CSG (Fwd)

19th CSB

228th QM Co (POL Sup)
 723d Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)
 253d QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
 250th QM Co (Sup) (GS)
 QM Plt (Perish Subsist)
 9024th Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Track Veh)
 Maint Det (SP Arty Trt/FC)
 Maint Det (Whl Veh)
 Maint Det (MC Btry Chg)
 Maint Det (TACFIRE)
 Maint Det (Crypto Equip)
 745th Trans Co (Cntnr/Cgo)
 7403d Trans Det (TTP)

127th CSB

9023d Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Engr Equip)
 Maint Det (SP Arty Trt/FC)
 Maint Det (Bot Ch-Chg Sta)
 Maint Det (Fabric)
 Maint Det (TACFIRE)
 Maint Det (Track Veh)
 Maint Det (Radar)
 9026th Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Track Veh)
 Maint Det (Whl Veh)
 Maint Det (Sig)
 Maint Det (Crypto Equip)
 Maint Det (TACFIRE)
 Maint Det (Mobile Maint)
 592d Ord Co (GS MOADS)
 747th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)

197th CSB

9022d Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Engr Equip)
 Maint Det (Track Veh)
 Maint Det (Tk Trt)
 Maint Det (SP Arty Trt/FC)
 Maint Det (TACFIRE)
 248th QM Co (Sup) (DS)
 295th QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
 582d Ord Co (DS) (MOADS)
 753d Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)

20th CSG (Rear)

129th CSB

237th Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Track Veh)
 Maint Det (SP Arty Trt/FC)
 Maint Det (Tk Trt)
 Maint Det (TACFIRE)
 9025th Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Turbo Genr)
 Maint Det (Whl Veh)
 Maint Det (Sig)
 Maint Det (ORF Maint)
 Maint Det (Mobile Maint)
 9027th Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Turbo Genr)
 Maint Det (Radar)
 Maint Det (Bot Ch-Chg Sta)
 Maint Det (Crypto Equip)
 9028th Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Turbo Genr)
 Maint Det (Radar)
 Maint Det (Whl Veh)
 Maint Det (NIC Btry Chg)
 Maint Det (Fabric)
 2029th Maint Co (DS)
 Maint Det (Engr Equip)
 Maint Det (Track Veh)
 Maint Det (SP Arty Trt/FC)
 Maint Det (UAV)
 Maint Det (TACFIRE)
 932d Avn Bn (AVIM)
 700th Avn Co (AVIM)
 701st Avn Co (AVIM)
 702d Avn Co (AVIM)
 703d Avn Co (AVIM)
 33d QM Bn (POL Sup)
 229th QM Co (POL Sup)
 260th QM Co (POL Sup)
 725th Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)
 724th Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)
 55th Ord Bn Ammo (DS/GS)
 590th Ord Co (Conv) (GS MOADS)
 591st Ord Co (Conv) (GS MOADS PLS)

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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

ANX A (TASKORG) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - - X (US) Corps

138th CSB

- 251st QM Co (Sup) (DS)
- 238th QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
- 249th Ord Co (DS) (Msl Spt)
 - MLRS Bn Aug Tm
 - MLRS Bn Aug Tm
 - MLRS Bn Aug Tm
 - MLRS Bn Aug Tm
 - MLRS Bn Aug Tm
 - Chap Bn Aug Tm
 - LCSS Aug Tm
- 260th Maint Co (DS) (Hawk)
 - Ord Tm (DS) (Hawk)
- 261st Maint Co (DS) (Patriot)
- 734th Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)

20th S&S Bn

- 257th QM Hvy Mat Sup Co (GS)
- 290th QM Co (Sup) (GS)
 - QM Plt (Perish Subsist)
- 298th QM Co (Rep Pxts, GS)
 - QM Acft Rep Parts Sup Plt
 - QM Rep Parts Tm (HNS)
- 258th QM Co (Adrp Sup)
- 259th QM Co (Adp Eq Rep/Sup)
- 20th Coll Co (MA)
- 260th QM Co (Adrp Sup) (Hvy)

180th TMT Bn

- 709th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
- 710th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
- 746th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
- 789th Trans Co (Cgo Trf)

182d TMT Bn

- 733d Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)
- 729th Trans Co (Hvy Trk)
- 779th Trans Co (Hvy Trk)
 - 7401st Trans Det (TTP)
 - 7402d Trans Det (TTP)
- 799th Trans Co (Cgo Trf)
- 712th Trans Co (Cntnr/Cgo)

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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

APPENDIX 1 (X (US) CORPS AUTHORIZED STRENGTH) to ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION)
to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

| <i>Unit</i> | <i>Authorized</i> |
|--------------------|-------------------|
| 23d Armd Div | 18,044 |
| 25th Armd Div | 18,044 |
| 55th Mech Div | 18,046 |
| 313th Sep Mech Bde | 5,382 |
| 208th ACR | 4,588 |
| 209th ACR | 4,588 |
| 10th Avn Bde | 3,293 |
| 14th Avn Bde | 3,293 |
| 10th Corps Arty | 10,328 |

| <i>Unit</i> | <i>Authorized</i> |
|--------------------|-------------------|
| 10th Corps Arty HQ | 193 |
| 62d FA Bde | 961 |
| 63d FA Bde | 2,776 |
| 64th FA Bde | 3,199 |
| 66th FA Bde | 3,199 |
| Subtotal | 10,328 |

| | |
|--|--------|
| 12th ADA Bde | 1,989 |
| 42d Cml Bde | 2,145 |
| 63d Engr Bde | 5,925 |
| 22d MI Bde | 1,286 |
| 22d MP Bde | 2,178 |
| 72d Sig Bde | 2,775 |
| 200th PSYOP Bn | 530 |
| 2d Fin Gp | 540 |
| 502d CA Bde | 702 |
| 644th Pers Gp | 1,849 |
| 110th Press camp | 69 |
| 1800th, 1801st, 1802d, and 1803d RAOCs | 96 |
| 10th COSCOM | 28,050 |

| <i>Unit</i> | <i>Authorized</i> |
|------------------|-------------------|
| 10th COSCOM (HQ) | 1,197 |
| 80th Med Bde | 9,500 |
| 13th CSG (Fwd) | 2,860 |
| 14th CSG (Fwd) | 3,292 |
| 19th CSG (Fwd) | 3,074 |
| 20th CSG (Fwd) | <u>8,127</u> |
| Subtotal | 28,050 |

| | |
|------------------------|---------|
| 10th Corps grand total | 133,740 |
|------------------------|---------|

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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

APPENDIX 2 (COMMANDER, AIR FORCE FORCES, CENTRALIA, TROOP LIST) to ANNEX A
(TASK ORGANIZATION) to OPERATIONS PLAN BRIDAL SPURCOMAFFORCENT Troop List

| | |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|
| 509th Bomb Wing | |
| 393d Bomb Sqdn | 8 B-2 |
| 713th Bomb Sqdn | 8 B-2 |
| 28th Bomb Wing | |
| 37th Bomb Sqdn | 12 B-1 |
| 337th Bomb Sqdn | 12 B-1 |
| 2d Bomb Wing | |
| 62d Bomb Sqdn | 12 B-52H |
| 596th Bomb Sqdn | 12 B-52H |
| 23d Fighter Wing | |
| 74th Fighter Sqdn | 18 A-10 |
| 76th Fighter Sqdn | 18 A-10 |
| 303d Fighter Sqdn | 18 A-10 |
| 388th Fighter Wing | |
| 4th Fighter Sqdn (HARM) | 18 F-16C |
| 421st Fighter Sqdn (HARM) | 18 F-16C |
| 20th Fighter Wing | |
| 17th Fighter Sqdn | 18 F-16C |
| 33d Fighter Sqdn (HARM) | 18 F-16C |
| 192d Fighter Wing | |
| 192d Fighter Squadron | 18 F-16D (RECCE) |
| 1st Fighter Wing | |
| 27th Fighter Sqdn | 18 F-15C |
| 71st Fighter Sqdn | 18 F-15C |
| 94th Fighter Sqdn | 18 F-15C |
| 4th Fighter Wing | |
| 334th Fighter Sqdn | 18 F-15E |
| 335th Fighter Sqdn | 18 F-15E |
| 336th Fighter Sqdn | 18 F-15E |
| 49th Fighter Wing | |
| 415th Fighter Sqdn | 15 F-117A |
| 963d Airborne Warning/Control Sqdn | 9 E-3C |
| 964th Airborne Warning/Control Sqdn | 9 E-3C |
| 411st JSTARS | 7 E-8C |
| 4412th JSTARS | 7 E-8C |
| 41st Electronic Combat Sqdn | 5 EC-130H (CC) |
| 7th Airborne Command and Control Sqdn | 5 EC-130H (ABCCC) |
| 314th Airlift Wing | |
| 16th Airlift Sqdn | 12 C-130H |
| 48th Airlift Sqdn | 12 C-130H |
| 61st Airlift Sqdn | 12 C-130H |
| 135th Airlift Group (ANG) | 12 C-130H |
| 305th Rescue Sqdn | 12 HH-60G (SAR) |
| 19th Air Refueling Wing | |
| 19th Air Refueling Sqdn | 12 KC-135 |
| 912th Air Refueling Sqdn | 12 KC-135 |
| 22d Air Refueling Wing | |
| 6th Air Refueling Sqdn | 12 KC-135 |
| 9th Air Refueling Sqdn | 12 KC-135 |
| 92d Air Refueling Wing | |
| 43d Air Refueling Sqdn | 12 KC-135 |
| 92d Air Refueling Sqdn | 12 KC-135 |

A-2-1

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: SIERRA

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

App 1 (Intel Est) and ST100-7.

2. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (PIR) / INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS (IR).

- a. Location and formation of AAGs and AGRA.
- b. Locations of artillery and rocket units supporting 3 and 9 MRDs of 2 Army DAGs.
- c. Commitment of 2 TD of 2 Army.
- d. Commitment of 42 IMRB.
- e. Location and commitment of 2 Army attack aviation regiment.
- f. Location and direction of attack of enemy air force CAS committed in 55th Mech sector,
- g. Location and commitment of army and front-level engineer mobility assets.

3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS.

- a. Orders to Subordinate and Attached units.

(1) 208 ACR is requested to provide, as obtained, indications or enemy attempts to cross Perry Lake at TP880447 & TP884573.

(2) 313th SEP Mech Bde is requested to provide, as obtained, indications or enemy attempts to cross the MISSOURI River between UP332646 and UP357549.

- b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Coordinating Units.

(1) Leavenworth Militia is requested to provide, as obtained-

(a) Enemy reconnaissance and patrol activity in the vicinity of LEAVENWORTH.

(b) Enemy attempts to seize the bridge across the MISSOURI River in the vicinity of UP357549.

(2) CCC is requested to provide, as obtained, commitment of battalion-sized enemy airborne or AASLT operations forces in the vicinity of KANSAS CITY.

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ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL.

- a. EPWs, deserters, repatriates, inhabitants, and other persons will be reported to the corps G2 IAW SOP.
- b. Report type of material captured with priority to improved T-80s and AT-6 systems.

5. DOCUMENTS OR EQUIPMENT REQUIRED.

- a. Maps. All X Corps graphics will be issued at the 1:250,000 scale.
- b. R & S Plans. Subordinate units R & S plans submitted IAW SOP.

6. MULTIDISCIPLINED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

Not used.

7. REPORTS and DISTRIBUTION.

IAW SOP.

BRENNAN
LTG

OFFICIAL:
DAVIDSON, G2

APPENDIX 1 - Intelligence Estimate

B-2

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APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Estimate: SIERRA.

1. MISSION

See base Plan.

2. AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. Weather.

(1) Existing situation.

(a) General. August and September temperatures can be extremely warm and then gradually decrease with the onset of fall. Daily temperatures average 85°F in August and decrease to 76 °F in September. Extreme temperature ranges for August are high-110 °F; low-45 °F. Extreme temperature ranges for September are high-97 °F; low-24 °F. Weather-front activity generally declines and the decreasing precipitation results in an overall increase in trafficability of soils in the area. Because of decreased precipitation, rivers and streams in the area are generally below normal river stages, and some streams may dry out completely during this time of the year.

(b) Precipitation. The average precipitation for August is 4.1 inches, with a record high of 14.6 inches. The average precipitation for September is 3.4 inches, with a record high of 6.5 inches.

(c) Wind. Wind direction remains generally from the south and southwest, averaging 6 knots per hour with gusts up to 40 knots per hour. An advancing cold front will bring winds from the north and northwest.

(d) Visibility. Ceilings of less than 3,000 feet with visibility less than 3 miles occur, on the average, for about 50 percent of the days during the period. Visibility is restricted to less than 7 miles for an average of an additional 10 days each month. Ground fog, generally in low-lying areas and around rivers and lakes, will occur between 0630 hours and 0900 hours on approximately 6 mornings in August and 10 mornings in September.

(e) Light data. Tab A (Light Data).

(f) Summary of weather to date.

1. Kansas has received nearly double the average rainfall during July and August. As a result, small streams are swollen, major rivers are just below flood stage, and soils in agricultural areas are saturated.

2. Agricultural fields are passable, but marginally trafficable. They will break down rapidly after one or two vehicles traverse the area. During periods of precipitation, local low-lying

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APP 1 (INTEL EST) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN Bridal Spur - X (US) Corps

areas will collect water and then will also be untrafficable.

3. If no rain falls for at least 3 days, soils dry almost as quickly as they absorb water during periods of precipitation. The prevailing winds from the south and southwest will combine with the average high temperatures during this period to produce rapid drying.

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action

(a) Impaired trafficability will reduce the ability of the Nebraskii forces to effectively move large formations cross country at doctrinal speeds during the conduct of the offense. Off-road movement, particularly through low-lying areas, will require extensive employment of engineers. Additionally, this reduction in the trafficability of soils will likely diminish the effectiveness of their artillery support as it attempts to keep pace with the maneuver forces at doctrinal distances. Artillery will either be forced to mass near roads and risk blocking follow-on forces, or will require additional time and engineer resources to set up in off-road open areas.

(b) Periods of low moon illumination and early morning fog will favor the reconnaissance elements of Nebraskii forces as they attempt infiltration to gain knowledge of our defensive disposition. These periods of reduced visibility will also favor, in a limited sense, tactical surprise in the offense at the small-unit level.

(c) High temperatures will make day fighting difficult in the offense by reducing any prolonged soldier combat effectiveness, particularly if a soldier has to weather these conditions in various levels of MOPP for a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environment. Unless enemy maintenance discipline is high, the precipitation and elevated humidity will degrade the effectiveness of small-arms weapons and weapon systems.

(d) Wind conditions do not favor enemy use of NBC munitions, particularly along our forward line of own troops (FLOT). Conditions also are not generally favorable for the enemy to use smoke munitions to conceal his attack unless winds are from the southwest or northeast (parallel to our defensive positions).

(3) Effect on own courses of action.

(a) The reduced trafficability as a result of the recent precipitation should not adversely affect defensive operations. However, cross-country axes supporting counterattacks and retrograde missions at all levels may suffer, particularly in low-lying areas. Some engineer preparation of counterattack routes may be required, but saturated soils will reinforce the natural obstacle value of the terrain to enhance counter-mobility efforts.

(b) The generally clear conditions during the daytime and at night will favor our defense by permitting long-range surveillance using standard optics. Only the infrequent periods of limited visibility when fog conditions, heavy precipitation, and low moon illumination exist will degrade that effectiveness. The forecast weather conditions will not adversely affect thermal systems.

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APP 1 (INTEL EST) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN Bridal Spur -- X (US) Corps

(c) The high temperatures mixed with extreme humidity may affect soldier performance during the labor-intensive periods of building fortifications, constructing vehicle-defilade and individual fighting positions, and emplacing manmade obstacle networks, particularly if an NBC battlefield environment requires the soldiers to be in elevated MOPP. Once the defense has been constructed, the high temperatures should be of minimal impact in the defense. Nonetheless, soldiers need to be well hydrated and regularly fed to maintain a ready state; this condition will require constant emphasis by the entire chain of command, but especially by first-line leaders. The recent and projected rainfall, in combination with elevated humidity, will demand constant preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) of vehicles, weapons, weapon systems, and ammunition.

(d) Prevailing winds favor employing chemical munitions should we opt for their use. Using smoke during counterattack or during retrograde missions will have a positive effect, especially if the wind is blowing perpendicular to our lines of operations. Only the occasional gusts ranging to a maximum of 40 knots will significantly degrade the effectiveness of smoke munitions.

b. Terrain. TBP

c. Other characteristics. TBP

3. ENEMY SITUATION

a. Disposition. See Tab B (Enemy Disposition).

b. Composition. See Tab C (Enemy Composition).

c. Strength. See Tab D to (Enemy Strenght).

d. Recent and present significant activities. intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) will provide updates, as they become available, regarding any out-of-the-ordinary, large-scale military movements, mobilizations, massing of troops and combat systems near the border areas, and increased levels of Nebraskii surveillance and reconnaissance using airborne platforms and human intelligence (HUMINT). The Nebraskiis have conducted large-scale, joint, field-training exercises during the last 6 months and have established a bona fide front HQ (in the past existing only during wartime). Significant activity has been the systematic rotation of 1 Army divisional regiments to relieve the 15 IMRB in its security force mission under the guise of providing troop rest and maintenance. However, these rotations also provide all elements of 1 Army with detailed knowledge of the terrain and potential attack avenues in the eastern sector of the EL DORADO panhandle.

e. Peculiarities and Weaknesses:

Tactics: Tab E (Enemy Tactics).

Training: Tab F (Enemy Training).

Logistics: Tab G (Enemy Logistics).

Combat Effectiveness: Tab H (Enemy Combat Effectiveness).

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APP 1 (INTEL EST) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN Bridal Spur - X (US) Corps

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. Enumeration. The probable final objective of a Nebraskii offensive is KANSAS CITY. KANSAS CITY, if seized, would be a major stepping stone toward revitalizing the NEBRASKA economy, which is currently on the brink of ruin. In addition, only KANSAS CITY, as an economic hub, lies marginally within the objective-depth parameters prescribed by the Nebraskii offensive doctrine and barely within the limited depth of military resources.

b. Analysis and Discussion. Seizing KANSAS CITY would be a very optimistic undertaking, but given NEBRASKA's desperate economic state and its apparent nothing-to-lose political bent of recent months, the capability to attack lies well within the realm of the probable. Since NEBRASKA has limited ability to sustain combat operations, the offensive would likely be direct (limited operational maneuver) and well focused on KANSAS CITY.

5. CONCLUSIONS

a. Effects of intelligence considerations on operations. The mission is supportable from the standpoint of military intelligence operations.

d. Enemy vulnerabilities.

(1) The Nebraska Front, while at a high level of preparedness, lacks the resources to wage protracted offensive action to an objective depth that would include KANSAS CITY.

(2) The Nebraskii forces are not well equipped for night fighting; they must rely on massive battlefield illumination to sustain 24-hour operations.

/s/

DAVIDSON

G2

TABS: A - Light Data
B - Enemy Disposition
C -- Enemy Composition
D - Enemy Tactics
E - Enemy Training
F -- Enemy Logistics
G -- Enemy Strength
H -- Enemy Combat Effectiveness

B-1-4

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TAB A (light data) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to
OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

SOLAR DATA

Nautical Twilight, Civil Twilight, and Sunrise/Sunset

For: FORT LEAVENWORTH

Latitude: 39 deg 22 min N, Longitude: 94 deg 55 min W

Flying Altitude: 0

AUGUST

ALL TIMES ARE LOCAL TIME (GMT minus 6 hrs 0 Mins)

| DAY | BMNT | BMCT | SUN RISE | SUN SET | EECT | EENT |
|-----|------|------|-------------|------------|------|------|
| 1 | 0413 | 0449 | 0519 | 1932 | 2001 | 2039 |
| 2 | 0414 | 0450 | 0520 | 1931 | 2000 | 2037 |
| 3 | 0415 | 0451 | 0521 | 1930 | 1959 | 2036 |
| 4 | 0416 | 0452 | 0522 | 1929 | 1958 | 2035 |
| 5 | 0417 | 0454 | 0523 | 1928 | 1957 | 2033 |
| 6 | 0418 | 0455 | 0524 | 1926 | 1955 | 2032 |
| 7 | 0419 | 0456 | 0525 | 1925 | 1954 | 2031 |
| 8 | 0420 | 0457 | 0526 | 1924 | 1953 | 2029 |
| 9 | 0422 | 0458 | 0527 | 1923 | 1952 | 2028 |
| 10 | 0423 | 0459 | 0528 | 1922 | 1950 | 2026 |
| 11 | 0424 | 0500 | 0529 | 1920 | 1949 | 2025 |
| 12 | 0425 | 0501 | 0529 | 1919 | 1948 | 2023 |
| 13 | 0426 | 0502 | 0530 | 1918 | 1946 | 2022 |
| 14 | 0427 | 0503 | 0531 | 1916 | 1945 | 2020 |
| 15 | 0428 | 0504 | 0532 | 1915 | 1944 | 2018 |
| 16 | 0430 | 0505 | 0533 | 1914 | 1942 | 2017 |
| 17 | 0431 | 0506 | 0534 | 1912 | 1941 | 2015 |
| 18 | 0432 | 0507 | 0535 | 1911 | 1939 | 2014 |
| 19 | 0433 | 0508 | 0536 | 1909 | 1938 | 2012 |
| 20 | 0434 | 0509 | 0537 | 1908 | 1936 | 2010 |
| 21 | 0435 | 0510 | 0538 | 1906 | 1935 | 2009 |
| 22 | 0437 | 0511 | 0539 | 1905 | 1933 | 2007 |
| 23 | 0438 | 0512 | 0540 | 1903 | 1932 | 2005 |
| 24 | 0439 | 0513 | 0541 | 1902 | 1930 | 2003 |
| 25 | 0440 | 0514 | 0542 | 1900 | 1929 | 2002 |
| 26 | 0441 | 0515 | 0543 | 1859 | 1927 | 2000 |
| 27 | 0442 | 0516 | 0543 | 1857 | 1926 | 1958 |
| 28 | 0443 | 0517 | 0544 | 1856 | 1924 | 1957 |
| 29 | 0444 | 0518 | 0545 | 1854 | 1922 | 1955 |
| 30 | 0445 | 0519 | 0546 | 1853 | 1921 | 1953 |
| 31 | 0447 | 0520 | 0547 | 1851 | 1919 | 1952 |

BMNT-Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight EENT-Ending Evening Nautical Twilight
BMCT-Beginning Morning Civil Twilight EECT-Ending Evening Civil Twilight

B-1-A-1

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TAB A (light data) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to
OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

LUNAR DATA

Moonrise/Moonset, Night Vision Goggle Periods, and Percent Illumination

For: FORT LEAVENWORTH

Latitude: 39 deg 22 min N, Longitude: 94 deg 55 min W

Flying Altitude: 0

AUGUST

ALL TIMES ARE LOCAL TIME (GMT minus 6 hrs 0 Mins)

| DAY | MOON RISE | START NVG | STOP NVG | MOON SET | % ILLUM |
|-----|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|------------|
| 1 | 0702 | **** | **** | 2100 | 2 |
| 2 | 0813 | **** | **** | 2136 | 7 |
| 3 | 0923 | **** | **** | 2207 | 14 |
| 4 | 1029 | **** | **** | 2238 | 23 |
| 5 | 1133 | 1951 | 2011 | 2307 | 32 |
| 6 | 1235 | 1950 | 2027 | 2338 | 42 |
| 7 | 1336 | 1949 | 2042 | **** | 52 |
| 8 | 1434 | 1947 | 2054 | 0011 | 62 |
| 9 | 1531 | **** | **** | 0047 | 71 |
| 10 | 1525 | **** | **** | 0126 | 79 |
| 11 | 1715 | **** | **** | 0210 | 86 |
| 12 | 1800 | **** | **** | 0259 | 92 |
| 13 | 1842 | 2248 | **** | 0352 | 96 |
| 14 | 1919 | 2254 | 0040 | 0448 | 99 |
| 15 | 1952 | 2306 | 0211 | 0546 | 100 |
| 16 | 2023 | 2324 | 0328 | 0645 | 99 |
| 17 | 2052 | 2342 | 0443 | 0745 | 96 |
| 18 | 2120 | **** | 0512 | 0846 | 91 |
| 19 | 2149 | 0003 | 0513 | 0948 | 85 |
| 20 | 2220 | 0030 | 0514 | 1051 | 77 |
| 21 | 2254 | 0059 | 0515 | 1156 | 67 |
| 22 | 2333 | 0135 | 0516 | 1303 | 56 |
| 23 | **** | 0216 | 0517 | 1411 | 45 |
| 24 | 0018 | 0305 | 0518 | 1518 | 34 |
| 25 | 0112 | **** | **** | 1622 | 23 |
| 26 | 0214 | **** | **** | 1719 | 14 |
| 27 | 0323 | **** | **** | 1809 | 6 |
| 28 | 0435 | **** | **** | 1852 | 2 |
| 29 | 0548 | **** | **** | 1930 | 0 |
| 30 | 0701 | **** | **** | 2003 | 1 |
| 31 | 0810 | **** | **** | 2035 | 5 |

NVG - Night Vision Goggle

For NVG Lunar Illum > 23%

B-1-A-2

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TAB A (light data) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to
OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

DARKNESS DATA

Hours of Solar Darkness, Moonlight and Total Darkness
Percent Lunar Illumination (at Moonrise/Moonset during Solar Darkness)

For: FORT LEAVESWORTH

Latitude: 39 deg 22 min N, Longitude: 94 deg 55 min W

Flying Altitude: 0

ALL TIMES ARE LOCAL TIME (GMT minus 6 hrs O Mins)

| DAY | EENT | FHT | FMI | LMI | LMT | BMNT | DAY | DD | HM | HNH |
|-----|------|------|-----|-----|------|------|-----|------|------|------|
| 1 | 2039 | 2039 | 6 | 6 | 2100 | 0414 | 2 | 0735 | 0021 | 0714 |
| 2 | 2037 | 2037 | 13 | 13 | 2136 | 0415 | 3 | 0738 | 0059 | 0639 |
| 3 | 2036 | 2036 | 21 | 22 | 2207 | 0416 | 4 | 0740 | 0131 | 0609 |
| 4 | 2035 | 2035 | 30 | 32 | 2238 | 0417 | 5 | 0742 | 0203 | 0539 |
| 5 | 2033 | 2033 | 40 | 42 | 2307 | 0418 | 6 | 0745 | 0234 | 0511 |
| 6 | 2032 | 2032 | 50 | 52 | 2338 | 0419 | 7 | 0747 | 0306 | 0441 |
| 7 | 2031 | 2031 | 60 | 62 | 0011 | 0420 | 8 | 0749 | 0340 | 0409 |
| 8 | 2029 | 2029 | 69 | 71 | 0047 | 0422 | 9 | 0753 | 0418 | 0335 |
| 9 | 2028 | 2028 | 78 | 80 | 0126 | 0423 | 10 | 0758 | 0458 | 0257 |
| 10 | 2026 | 2026 | 85 | 87 | 0210 | 0424 | 11 | 0758 | 0544 | 0214 |
| 11 | 2025 | 2025 | 91 | 93 | 0259 | 0425 | 12 | 0800 | 0634 | 0126 |
| 12 | 2023 | 2023 | 96 | 97 | 0352 | 0426 | 13 | 0803 | 0729 | 0334 |
| 13 | 2022 | 2022 | 99 | 99 | 0427 | 0427 | 14 | 0805 | 0805 | 0000 |
| 14 | 2020 | 2020 | 100 | 100 | 0428 | 0428 | 15 | 0808 | 0808 | 0000 |
| 15 | 2018 | 2018 | 99 | 99 | 0430 | 0430 | 16 | 0812 | 0812 | 0000 |
| 16 | 2017 | 2023 | 97 | 95 | 0431 | 0431 | 17 | 0814 | 0808 | 0006 |
| 17 | 2015 | 2052 | 92 | 90 | 0432 | 0432 | 18 | 0817 | 0740 | 0037 |
| 18 | 2014 | 2120 | 85 | 84 | 0433 | 0433 | 19 | 0819 | 0713 | 0106 |
| 19 | 2012 | 2149 | 77 | 75 | 0434 | 0434 | 20 | 0822 | 0645 | 0137 |
| 20 | 2010 | 2220 | 67 | 65 | 0435 | 0435 | 21 | 0825 | 0615 | 0210 |
| 21 | 2009 | 2254 | 57 | 55 | 0437 | 0437 | 22 | 0828 | 0543 | 0245 |
| 22 | 2001 | 2333 | 45 | 43 | 0438 | 0438 | 23 | 0831 | 0505 | 0326 |
| 23 | 2005 | 0018 | 34 | 32 | 0439 | 0439 | 24 | 0834 | 0421 | 0413 |
| 24 | 2003 | 0112 | 23 | 22 | 0440 | 0440 | 25 | 0837 | 0328 | 0509 |
| 25 | 2002 | 0214 | 13 | 13 | 0441 | 0441 | 26 | 0839 | 0227 | 0612 |
| 26 | 2000 | 0323 | 6 | 6 | 0442 | 0442 | 27 | 0842 | 0119 | 0723 |
| 27 | 1958 | 0435 | 1 | 1 | 0443 | 0443 | 28 | 0845 | 0008 | 0837 |
| 28 | 1957 | **** | * | * | *** | 0444 | 29 | 0847 | 0000 | 0847 |
| 29 | 1955 | **** | * | * | *** | 0445 | 30 | 0850 | 0000 | 0850 |
| 30 | 1953 | 1953 | 4 | 4 | 2003 | 0447 | 31 | 0854 | 0010 | 0844 |
| 31 | 1952 | 1952 | 9 | 10 | 2035 | 0448 | 1 | 0856 | 0043 | 0813 |

EENT-Ending Evening Nautical Twilight BMNT-Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight

FMT-First Moonlight at or after EENT LMT-Last Moonlight at or before BMNT

FMI-Percent Illumination at FMT, LMI-Percent illumination at LMT

DD-Duration of Solar Darkness HM-Hours of Moonlight

HNH-Hours with No Moon (Total Darkness)

B-1-A-3


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TAB B (ENEMY DISPOSITION) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

The following series of sketches displays the peacetime locations of the Nebraskii forces. In accordance with the 3+1 Treaty, only the 15 IMRB (acting as a security force) is garrisoned in the EL DORADO panhandle east of the MISSOURI River. However, extensive bridge construction across the MISSOURI River in the panhandle region provides the capability for the rapid movement of Nebraskii forces eastward.



Area of Interest. Nebraska Front


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TAB B (ENEMY DISPOSITION) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR



Disposition. Nebraska Front


B-1-B-2

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TAB B (ENEMY DISPOSITION) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR



Disposition. 1 Amy


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TAB B (ENEMY DISPOSITION) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B
 (-INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR



Disposition. 2 Army

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TAB C (-ENEMY COMPOSITION) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

NEBRASKA FRONT**1 ARMY**

8 MRD
5 MRD
9 TD
15 IMR BDE
110 ARTY BDE
30 RKT LCHR REGT
4 INDEP CBT HEL RGT
15 AT RGT
15 SPF BN
2 SAM BDE (SA-4)
19 SAM BDE (SA-4)
9 SSM BDE (SS21)
1 CBT ENGR BDE

7 INDEP AIRBORNE BDE

1 PARACHUTE BN
2 PARACHUTE BN
3 PARACHUTE BN
7 HOW BN (D30)
7 RECON Co
7 ENGR Co
7 AIR DEF BTRY
7 MAT SPT Co
7 CHEM PROTECTION PLT
7 SIG CO

FRONT HEADQUARTERS**26 MATERIAL SPT BDE**

11 MOTOR TRANS BN
13 MOTOR TRANS BN
17 MOTOR TRANS BN (GS)
12 POL TRANS BN (GS)

4 MAINT RGT**9 SERVICE & SECURITY DETACHMENT****2 ARMY**

3 MRD
9 MRD
2 TD
42 IMR BDE
64 ARTY BDE
78 RKT LCHR REG
6 INDEP CBT HEL RGT
14 ATRGT
2 SPF BN
41 SAM BDE (SA-4)
5 SAM BDE (SA-4)
8 SSM BDE (SS21)
2 CBT ENGR BDE
145 PORT BRGE RGT
183 ASSLT CROSS BN
44 SIGNAL RGT
24 MAT SPT BDE

27 HIGH POWER ARTY BDE
(24X2S7)

1 GUN BN (12x2S7)
2 GUN BN (12x2S7)
1 HVY MORT BN (12x2S4)
2 HVY MORT BN (12x2S4)
27 ARTY RECON BTRY

19 RADIO JAMMING RGT (GS)**3 ASSAULT CROSSING BN**

21 SIGNAL BDE (GS)
1 RADIO RELAY BN
2 RADIO RELAY BN
21 WIRE RCT

13 RADIO RECON BDE

B-1-C-1

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TAB C (ENEMY DISPOSITION) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B
(INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

NEBRASKA FRONT (cont)**14 ARTILLERY DIVISION**

| | |
|----------------------------|--|
| 13 HOW BDE (72 x D30) | 2 GUN-HOW BDE (72 x 2A65) |
| 1 HOW BN | 1 GUN-HOW BN |
| 2 HOW BN | 2 GUN-HOW BN |
| 3 HOW BN | 3 GUN-HOW BN |
| 4 HOW BN | 4 GUN-HOW BN |
| 50 GUN HOW BDE (72 x 2A65) | 69 GUN BDE (72 x 2A36) |
| 1 GUN-HOW BN | 1 GUN BN |
| 2 GUN-HOW BN | 2 GUN BN |
| 3 GUN-HOW BN | 3 GUN BN |
| 4 GUN-HOW BN | 4 GUN BN |
| 22 MRL BDE (72 x 9P140) | 97 AT BDE (72 x MT-12, 36xBRDM2 w/AT6) |
| 1 MRLBN | 1 ATBN |
| 2 MRLBN | 2 ATBN |
| 3 MRLBN | 3 ATBN |
| 4 MRLBN | 4 ATBN |
| 14 MAT SPT BN | 14 MAINT BN |
| 10 ARTY RECON BN | |
| 10 ENGR Co | |
| 10 CHEM PROTECTION Co | |
| 19 SSM BDE (18 x SS-1C) | 31 ENGINEER BDE |
| 1 BN 19 SSM | 1 CBT ENGR (SAPPER) BN |
| 2 BN 19 SSM | 2 OBSTACLE BN |
| 3 BN 19 SSM | 3 OBSTACLE CLEARING BN |
| | 4 ROAD & BRIDGE BN |
| | 5 PONTOON BRIDGE BN |
| 60 SAM BDE (27 x SA-12) | 84 PONTOON BRIDGE RGT |
| 1 BN 60 SAM | 1 PTN BGE BN |
| 2 BN 60 SAM | 2 PTN BGE BN |
| 3 BN 60 SAM | 3 PTN BGE BN |
| 20 CHEMICAL PROTECTION BDE | |
| 1 CML PROT BN | |
| 2 CML PROT BN | |
| 3 CML PROT BN | |

B-1-C-2

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TAB C (ENEMY DISPOSITION) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

NEBRASKA FRONT (Cont)

AIR FORCES OF THE FRONT

8 FIGHTER DIVISION

108 FIGHTER RGT (45xMIG-21)

118 FIGHTER RGT (45xMIG-23)

128 FIGHTER RGT (45xMIG-29)

6 FIGHTER-BOMBER DIVISION

206 FTR-BMBR RGT (45xSU-27)

216 FTR-SIMBR RGT (45xMIG-27)

226 FTR-BMBR RGT (45xMIG-27)

10 RECON RGT (45xMIG-25)

15 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER RGT (24xMI-6A, 24xMI-8)

B-1-C-3

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TAB C (ENEMY DISPOSITION) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

2 ARMY**3 MRD**

DN HQ
 11 MRR (BMP-2)
 20 MRR (BMP-2)
 22 MRR (BTR-70)
 24 TR (T-80)
 13 ITB (31xT-80)
 61 ARTY RGT
 3 AT BN (MT-12 /AT- S)
 28 SAM RGT (SA-6)

2 TD

DN HQ
 3 TR (T-80)
 5 TR (T-80)
 16 TR (T-80)
 15 MRR (BMP-2)
 54 ARTY RGT
 22 SAM GRT (SA-8)

9 MRD

DN HQ
 28 MRR (BMP-2)
 120 MRR (BMP-2)
 26 MRR (BMP-2)
 27 TR (T-80)
 211 ITB (31xT-80)
 43 ARTY RGT
 9 AT BN (MT-12/AT-S)
 29 SAM RGT (SA-6)

42 IMR BDE

BDE HQ
 182 MRB (BMP-2)
 183 MRB (BMP-2)
 184 MRB (BMP-2)
 185 MRB (BMP-2)
 186 TB (51xT-80)
 42 SP HOW BN
 42 AD BN (
 42 AT BN
 42 RECON & REC BN
 42 ENGR CO
 42 SIG BN
 42 CML PROT CO
 42 MAINT SPT BN
 42 MAINT BN
 42 MED CO

NOTE: The following units are common to all division size units and will bear the identifier of their parent division:

RECON BN
 ENGINEER BN
 CHEMICAL PROTECTION BN
 SIGNAL BN
 MAINT BN
 MEDICAL BN
 MAT SPT BN
 CMTA BTRY

B-1-C-4

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TAB C (ENEMY DISPOSITION) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

2 ARMY UNITS (cont)

| | |
|---|---|
| 64 ARTILLERY BDE (90x2A36) HQ BTRY 1 HOW BN (2A36) 2 HOW BN (2A36) 3 HOW BN (2A36) 4 GUN-HOW BN (2A65) 5 GUN-HOW BN (2A65) 64 ARTY RECON BTRY | 4 ATTACK HELO RGT HQ CO 1 HELO SQDN (20xMI-24) 2 HELO SQDN (20xMI-24) 3 HELO SQDN (MI-8THIPC) |
| 78 MRL RGT (54 x BM-21) 1 MRLBN 2 MRLBN 3 MRLBN 78 ARTY RECON BTRY | 14 ANTI-TAN RGT (54xMT-12/27xAT-6) 1 ATBN 2 ATBN 3 ATBN |
| 8 SSM BDE (18 x SS-21) 1 BN SSM 2 BN SSM 3 BN SSM | 2 ENGR BDE 1 CBT ENGR (SAPPER) BN 2 OBSTACLE BN 3 OBSTACLE CLEM ING BN 4 RQAD & BRIDGE BN 5 PONTOON BGE BN |
| 41 SAM BDE (27 x SA-4) 1 BN SAM 2 BN SAM 3 BN SAM | 139 PONTOON BDG RGT 1 BN 139 PIN 2 BN 139 PSN 3 BN 139 PTN |
| 24 MATERIAL SUPPORT BDE 1 MOTOR TRANS BN 2 MOTOR TRANS BN 3 MOTOR TRANS BN 17 POL TRANS BN | 183 ASSAULT CROSSING BN |
| 43 INDEP RADIO RELAY BN 2 SPECIAL PURPOSE BN 95 CHEMICAL PROTECTION BN 93 SMOKE BN | 44 SIGNAL RGT 58 RADIO BN 58 WIRE BN 58 RADIO RELAY BN |

B-1-C-5

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TAB C (ENEMY DISPOSITION) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

1 ARMY

Specific information about 1 Army Units is not available at this time.

B-1-C-6

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TAB D (ENEMY TACTICS) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

1. GENERAL

The Nebraskii Armed Forces were organized, equipped, and trained by the OPFOR. You can find answers to specific doctrinal questions in ST 100-7.

This tab addresses some general, but very basic, doctrinal guidelines that apply to the Nebraskii ground forces.

2. TACTICAL EMPHASIS

The Nebraskii Armed Forces do not emphasize the operational level of war as OPFOR doctrine did because the Nebraskii Armed Forces are smaller and their projected AO is relatively small. With only two combined arms armies (CAAs) of three divisions each, the primary emphasis is at the division, or tactical, level. As a result, the operational maneuver group (OMG) concept does not normally fit into Nebraskii doctrine. The Nebraskiis will deploy FDs at regimental or divisional level if enemy defenses are perceived as unprepared.

Despite the fact that the Nebraskii forces do not emphasize the operational level, they still recognize the two broad categories of operational maneuver: the broad front multiple axis attack and the encirclement (fig B-1). The Nebraskiis can employ either method, although the broad front multiple axis attack would require significant surprise, as the number of Nebraskii forces is generally insufficient to overwhelm Centralia forces.

The encirclement operation is by far the preferred method of offensive maneuver. Considerably fewer forces can accomplish it, and surprise only enhances its effectiveness. Since the Centralia capital, KANSAS CITY, is a logical center of gravity from the Nebraskii point of view, either a single penetration (using the MISSOURI River) or a double penetration (one pincer on either side of the river) is the most likely scenario to be employed against the capital (fig B-2). The Nebraskii forces would prefer to employ the latter form against Centralian forces and especially against the capital city.

With a substantial air capability, the Nebraskiis would probably initiate hostilities with an air operation. They would design this operation primarily to destroy or neutralize our air defenses and air forces on the ground and to gain at least local air superiority. This air operation would use practically all Nebraskii fixed-wing assets for the first 2 to 3 days of the offensive. The ground offensive would probably follow within hours of the initiation of the air operation. After they had obtained the operational goals of the air operation, the Nebraskiis would then allocate considerable fixed-wing assets to the two armies to support the continuing ground operation.

B-1-D-1

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TAB D (EN TAC) to APP 1 (INTEL EST) to ANB (INTEL) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR -- X (US) Corps





Figure B-1. Forms of operational maneuver.

B-1-D-2

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TAB D (EN TAC) to APP 1 (INTEL EST) to ANB (INTEL) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps




Figure B-2. Operational forms of encirclement.

B-1-D-3

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TAB D (EN TAC) to APP 1 (INTEL EST) 10 ANB (INTEL) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps

3. OFFENSIVE CONCEPTS

The Nebraskii doctrine recognizes three offensive concepts: echelonment, hierarchy of mission depths, and main and supporting attack axes.

a. Echelonment. Echelonment is nothing more than how a force is organized in depth for combat. Doctrinally, the Nebraskiis never use more than two echelons at any level and prefer to use only one if they can achieve a degree of surprise. Echelonment is determined largely by factors of METT-T and preparedness of the enemy defense. Figures B-3 and B-4 are doctrinal templates of a Nebraskii Army against fully prepared and less than fully prepared defenses.

Reserves, when formed, are contingency forces and are given no initial mission. The Nebraskiis seek to form reserves at all levels from regiment to front when the assets are available. A reserve is doctrinally about one-ninth of the parent force, or the size of the basic unit two levels down. Thus, a division reserve would typically be a battalion.

See ST 100-7 for doctrinal echelonment of a MRD against enemy defenses.

b. Hierarchy of mission depths. ST 100-7

B-1-D-4

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TAB D (EN TAC) to APP 1 (INTEL EST) to ANB (INTEL) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR -- X (US) Corps

NOTE: Against a fully prepared defense, a Nebraskii army would probably echelon with two MRDs in the first echelon and the TD in the second echelon. In this case, a brigade would be the typical army reserve. We would not expect to see FDs used at the division level against a fully prepared defense.




Figure B-3. Army operational formation against a fully prepared defense.

B-1-D-5

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TAB D (EN TAC) to APP 1 (INTEL EST) to ANB (INTEL) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR -- X (US) Corps




Figure B-4. Army operational formation against a less than fully prepared defense.

c. Main and supporting attack axes. At division level and above, at least one main attack axis and one supporting attack axis are designated for every offensive operation. The main attack axis is normally narrower than the supporting attack axis. Assets, especially artillery, are directed to support the main attack axis to raise the correlation of forces on that axis. A correlation of forces of 5:1 is not uncommon on a main attack axis at the army level. The supporting attack axis is normally wider, receives considerably fewer assets from higher HQ, and may constitute nothing more than a fixing attack. A correlation of forces of 1.5:1 or less is possible on an army supporting attack axis. Follow-on forces,

B-1-D-6

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TAB D (EN TAC) to APP 1 (INTEL EST) to ANB (INTEL) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps

especially tank forces, often follow the main attack, exploiting the success of the first echelon. Nebraskii command posts normally follow the main attack.

4. OFFENSIVE MANEUVER

The Nebraskii forces recognize and practice three types of tactical offensive action: the meeting battle, the attack against a defending enemy, and the pursuit. These actions are described in detail in ST 100-7.

a. Meeting battle. As Nebraskii forces move from initial staging areas in NEBRASKA, they would use the meeting battle as the primary form of maneuver in an attack against CENTRALIA. Advance guards at all levels from regiment to army would do most of the fighting. In the covering force area we would fight against reinforced, battalion-sized advance guards (of first-echelon regiments).

As the division moves in march column, the advance award battalion functions as a forward security force for first-echelon regiments. This advance guard is usually based on an MRB with additional reinforcements of up to a battalion of SP artillery; a company of tanks; and antitank, air defense, engineer, and chemical units. The advance guard equals about one-third of the combat power of a first-echelon regiment. Forward detachments of a division could also be used in the meeting battle to secure crossing sites on the MISSOURI and KANSAS Rivers within our AO.

b. Attack against a defending enemy. If the enemy force is defending and not moving to contact, the Nebraskiis would conduct an attack against a defending enemy. They do this either from positions in direct contact or out of direct contact with the enemy. The Nebraskiis prefer to attack from positions out of direct contact, also called an attack from the march. If not forced to deploy into attack formation, the Nebraskiis would prefer to remain in column formation to maintain their momentum. This would allow them to conduct the equivalent of an extended meeting engagement across the entire zone of attack.

Since the Nebraskiis would initiate their attack from staging areas in NEBRASKA, they would most likely move from the depths using advance guards (meeting engagement) until they reach their assembly areas. First-echelon regiments of the attacking divisions could form up for the attack as close as 20 to 30 kilometers from our forward defensive positions, as long as they were out of range of our artillery. The rest of the division would go into assembly areas about 60 to 75 kilometers from our forward defenses. From these forward assembly areas (or forming up areas), the first-echelon regiments would conduct the attack. Division and regiment reconnaissance elements would conduct their detailed reconnaissance up to 24 hours ahead of the lead regiments. The lead regiments would probably not leave their final assembly areas using advance guards, but would move in march (column) formation, one regiment per route. As they reached predetermined deployment lines, they would deploy into prebattle formation (first, battalion columns on separate routes, then company columns, etc). About 1 kilometer from the enemy forward defenses, the lead battalions would go into battle formation with maximum firepower forward. The final assault would then take place, and fighting would continue to the immediate and subsequent mission lines of the respective units.

B-1-D-7

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TAB D (EN TAC) to APP 1 (INTEL EST) to ANB (INTEL) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps

This attack would not take place in isolation. For it to succeed, the Nebraskiis would have to mass considerable fire assets against our defenses; in particular, artillery, air, and SSMs. To do this, they would send artillery battalions down from front and army to the first-echelon units conducting the main attacks. These would form AAGs, DAGs, and RAGs to ensure the success of the attack. The Nebraskiis plan four phases of offensive fire support (FS) to accomplish this. Phase I is FS of the forward movement of a force. Phase II is fire preparation, the preparation phase that covers the maneuver forces as they deploy through prebattle formations. Phase II isolates and totally destroys forward defenses at the points of penetration on main attack axes. For this, the Nebraskiis require a massive amount of artillery to support each main attack axis. Artillery densities of 100 tubes per kilometer of breakthrough frontage are common. The preparation may last from 15 minutes to over 1 hour, although an average preparation lasts about 30 minutes. Phase III, FS of the attack, starts immediately after the preparation and seeks to destroy troops and weapon systems directly in front of attacking forces. Phase IV Fire accompaniment support, supports advance of attacking forces into the depth of enemy defenses.

The Nebraskiis plan to commit second-echelon forces once the first-echelon forces have penetrated forward defenses. Generally, they commit the follow-on forces to reinforce the success of the lead forces. The Nebraskiis are flexible in their use of second-echelon forces, at least at the division and army levels. They rely extensively on objective data. They plan variants to the original plan in detail as time permits. Battalions in the attack use simple but rigid tactics, relying extensively on battle drill.

A regimental commander has two basic options for attack: two battalions forward or three battalions forward. Figure B-5 is a doctrinal template of a Nebraskii MRR in the attack from the march. This regiment is attacking with two reinforced battalions up and one back, a typical formation against a fully prepared defense or through restrictive terrain. In the case of a supporting attack, unprepared defenses, or unrestrictive terrain, he would probably employ three battalions forward.

Note that in the offense a Nebraskii MRR normally attaches one company of tanks from its TB to each of its MRBs. The MRBs, in turn, attach one tank platoon to each MRC. In a TR a similar process places a motorized rifle platoon with each tank company. These are graphically represented using task force and team symbols. The Nebraskiis do this to ensure the presence of a combined arms force at all levels. The battalion HQ is then used to augment the C² capability of the regimental CP.

c. Pursuit. Pursuit is the third form of offensive attack that the Nebraskiis recognize. Pursuit is explained in detail in ST 100-7.

B-1-D-8

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


Figure B-5. MRR in the attack from the march (template not to scale).

B-1-D-8

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TAB D (EN TAC) to APP 1 (INTEL EST) to ANB (INTEL) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR -- X (US) Corps

5. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Nebraskii Armed Forces recognize two forms of transitioning to the defense: in or out of direct contact with the enemy. The primary difference between the two is the absence or presence of a security zone, similar to our covering force area. The Nebraskiis plan to conduct a stubborn defense throughout the depth of the security zone, fighting from well prepared company strongpoints.

Our AO has two likely scenarios that might cause the Nebraskiis to assume the defense. One would be an economy of force operation, where forces are diverted to another sector where Nebraskiis are achieving success. The other likely scenario is as a result of catastrophic losses at the hands of superior Centralian forces. A second-echelon division might be forced to assume the defense if first-echelon divisions were totally unable to achieve their assigned missions.

There are two likely variants we could expect to see at the army level. The most likely variant would have two divisions forward in the main defensive belt, with the third division spread across the army sector in the second defensive belt. The next most likely scenario would be two divisions forward in the main defensive belt, and the bulk of the third division acting as the army-level counterattack force or mobile reserve.

The static Nebraskii defense centers around company strongpoints formed into battalion defensive areas. The Nebraskiis plan fire sacks, similar to our kill zones, at all levels from company level upward. They plan to commit tank-heavy counterattack forces at all levels above company in the event that the enemy should succeed in penetrating forward defenses. They plan artillery for direct, as well as indirect, fires and integrate tanks and antitank forces into forward motorized rifle formations to strengthen the forward defenses. The Nebraskii use of key terrain and extensive engineer preparation of obstacles and positions is impressive by any standard.

See ST100-7 for division and lower doctrinal employment in the defense.

B-1-D-9

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TAB E (ENEMY TRAINING) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

1. INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

Individual training for Nebraskii soldiers has been thorough and comprehensive. Conscripted recruits have all received the 1-month requisite basic training, either in April or October of each year. Nebraskiis conduct subsequent multilevel individual training on an annual training cycle. The winter cycle begins in December, where they conduct most training in garrison. The summer cycle begins in June and involves considerable field training. Nebraskiis schedule training at least 6 hours each day, 6 days a week. Individual training emphasizes NBC protection: troops frequently wear NBC protective masks and clothing for long periods during training. They conduct chemical training with live chemical agents for realism and practice decontamination under actual conditions. Almost all NCOs and officers have attended the military schools appropriate for their rank and experience.

2. UNIT TRAINING

The Nebraskiis also conduct thorough and realistic unit training. Units at battalion level and below receive extensive training in battle drills and are very proficient in executing them. Nebraskiis conduct division-level exercises through winter and summer training cycles and include tactical live fire, supported by artillery and helicopter assets, and night training. They consider this realistic and tough training imperative for the mental conditioning necessary for soldiers to cope with battlefield conditions and to perform well in combat. Additionally, unit political officers conduct political training at least 5 hours per week to create the proper attitude in the minds of all personnel.

3. PROBLEMS

Nebraskii training also has its negative aspects, including the stifling of young leaders' initiative by overbearing, and sometimes incompetent, supervisors. Since the various tribes of native Nebraskiis speak over a dozen languages or dialects, the Army has some difficulty training the non-Nebraskii-speaking conscripts, who make up approximately 10 percent of the armed forces. An additional problem exists because the government can divert conscripts to complete economic tasks, such as construction projects, football, and the planting and harvesting of crops. This is not yet a significant weakness in producing well-trained soldiers. No one doubts that the Nebraskii Armed Forces are still among the most professional and best-trained military organizations in the world.

B-1-E-1


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TAB F (ENEMY LOGISTICS) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

The Nebraska Front materiel support system is graphically depicted below.



Principles of Nebraska logistics support stress centralized planning, tailoring of logistics facilities and/or units, delivery forward from higher to lower, continuous support, standardization of equipment, complete use of transportation assets, complete mobile support, and use of all possible resources (Nebraska troops are taught to forage for food in local areas and to use captured stocks, for example).

Priorities of supplies in an offensive operation would normally be-

- POL.
- Ammunition of all types.
- Technical supplies.
- Rations and clothing.

Nebraska provide maintenance facilities in the field for all major end items of equipment. They perform vehicle repairs at three levels:

Routine-below division level. Individual components repairable within a short time.

B-1-F-1
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TAB F (EN LOG) to APP 1 (INTEL EST) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) corps

Medium-regiment and division level. Major overhaul of at least two basic assemblies (engine/transmission).

Capital-army and front Major overhauls or complete disassemblies. Each combat battalion establishes a technical outpost to monitor the battlefield for damage, to assist crews, and to call repair and evacuation groups (REGs) forward. Battalion REGs are called forward for repairs requiring less than 5 hours. Regimental REGs are called if more than 5 hours are required for repair. Divisions and above operate damaged vehicle maintenance points.

The two principal missions of the military medical service in combat are evacuation and treatment of casualties and the prevention of disease in AOs. Organic medical support units or personnel exist from company to front level. The Nebraskiis require their medical support system to be highly mobile. Its components are capable of repeated forward deployment with a minimum loss of efficiency. Medical support displaces to areas experiencing or expecting large numbers of casualties.

B-1-F-2

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TAB G (ENEMY STRENGTH) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR

If the Nebraska Front attacks, committed forces against the 55th Mech Div would probably consist of two first-echelon MRDs (the 3 MRD and the 9 MRD of the 2 Army) with a total of 18 MRBs, 12 TBs, and 2 ITBs supported by normal regimental and divisional artillery and combat support units. All units are between 96- and 98-percent strength in personnel, weapons, and equipment.

Reinforcing forces considered capable of closing with the 55th Mech Div forces are the 2 TD in the second echelon of the 2 Army and the 42 IMRB of the 2 Army.

Another possible reinforcing force is the 1 Army, which will probably be committed east of the MISSOURI River. The 8 MRD and the 5 MRD would probably be the army first echelon; the 9 TD, the second echelon; and the 15 IMRB, the army-level reserve. All reinforcing forces are also between 96- and 98-percent strength in personnel and equipment.

B-1-G-1

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TAB H (ENEMY COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

After analyzing the following factors, we have determined that 1 Army and 2 Army of the Nebraska Front are fully combat effective.

- a. Personnel strength is currently between 96- and 98-percent authorized personnel.
- b. Weapon and equipment statuses are also between 96 and 98 percent on hand and combat ready.
- c. The status of training is discussed in Annex E (Training).
- d. The NCO and officer corps are highly efficient.
- e. Leaders from army to battalion level are highly efficient and generally combat tested
- f. The unit has not been committed to combat before.
- g. The traditions and past performance of the 1 Army and the 2 Army, since the Great Patriotic War to repel the Canadian invasion and in recent training exercises, have been of the highest standard.
- h. Present unit commanders, at least at the division level and above, are the cream of the Nebraskii command selection and training system. They all have followed the exclusive command career track with attendant experience and formal training.
- i. The geographic area of projected commitment for both armies of the Nebraska Front is quite similar to that in which they have trained and will present few unexpected problems for rapid maneuver.
- j. Morale, esprit, health, discipline, and political reliability are fairly high among the 90 percent of the Nebraskii forces who are of European descent. The native Nebraskiis, who make up the remaining 10 percent of the force structure, are interspersed among the units to the point that any reluctance on their part can be readily overcome.
- k. Technical support and logistic support throughout the front are combat ready. Support units are in place. Materiel support units contain 21 total DofS for POL, ammunition, and supplies from front to regiment.
- l. The majority of the population in NEBRASKA is descended from 19th century European immigrants, and national will among this group is solidly behind government actions. The native Nebraskiis, composing 10 percent of the population, are not as politically reliable because resentment against the majority population for the conquest of their tribes has survived and still smolders. However, the native population does not have the necessary power to adversely affect government actions.

B-1-H-1


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ANNEX C (OPERATION OVERLAY) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

X Corps Operation Overlay



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APPENDIX 1 (X CORPS COURSE OF ACTION NESTING MATRICES) to ANNEX C (OPERATION OVERLAY) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

1. PHASE 1 NESTING MATRIX: DECEPTION AND SECURITY OPERATIONS PRIOR TO THE NEBRASKII ATTACK

| | 209th ACR | 23d Armd Div | 25th Armd Div | 55th Mech Div | 313th Sep Mech Bde | 14th Avn | | 14th Avn | |
|----------|--|--|---|---|--|----------|-----|----------|-----|
| | | | | | | Purp | Res | Purp | Res |
| | Supporting | Supporting | Main Effort | Supporting | Supporting | | | | |
| | X Corps T: Portray a defense in sector south of KANSAS-MISSOURI Rivers. P: Cause the Nebraska Front commander to conduct his main attack on the direct approach to KANSAS CITY between PERRY Lake and MISSOURI River | | | | | | | | |
| Security | T: Cover NEBRASKA - CENTRALIA border west of MISSOURI River P: Identify first hostile act | T: Cover NEBRASKA border east of MISSOURI River. P: Identify first hostile act. | | | | | | | |
| MBA | | T: Support 313th Sep Bde deception. P: Deceive enemy that 23d Armd Div is defending in sector between INDEPENDENCE and LITTLE BLUE RIVER. | T: Portray a defense in sector between TOPEKA and LAWRENCE. P: Cause the Nebraska Front commander to attack on the direct approach to KANSAS CITY between PERRY Lake and MISSOURI River. | T: Portray Corps reserve at OTTAWA. P: Cause Nebraska Front commander to believe that X Corps will not seek decisive combat north of KANSAS-MISSOURI Rivers. | T: Portray a defense in sector by 23d Armd Div between INDEPENDENCE and LITTLE BLUE RIVER. P: Give the appearance that 23d Armd Div is protecting KANSAS CITY from envelopment from the east. | | | | |

NOTE: T-task
P-purpose

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APP 1 (X CORPS COA NESTING MATRICES) to ANX C (OP OVERLAY) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR--X (US) Corps
PHASE II NESTING MATRIX: DECISIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS

| | 208th ACR | 55th Mech Div | 25th Armd Div | 10th Avn Bde | Lynxth Militia |
|----------|---|---|--|--|--|
| | Supporting | Supporting | Reserve - O/O Main Effort | Main Effort | Supporting |
| Deep | <p>X Corps</p> <p>T: Defeat the Nebraska Front forward of PL BLUE.</p> <p>P: Protect the integrity of CENTRALIA.</p> | | | <p>T1: Interdict the western 1st-ech div of 2 Army forward of PL GREEN.</p> <p>P1: Encourage 2 Army to commit main attack between PERRY LAKE and MISSOURI River.</p> <p>T2: Attrit 2d-ech divs of 2 Army by 25% forward of PL GREEN.</p> <p>P2: Cause the culmination of 2 Army.</p> | |
| Security | <p>T1: Delay 2 Army for 48 hours forward of PL GREEN between BLUE RAPIDS and ST JOSEPH.</p> <p>P1: Enable 55th Mech Div to prepare defenses north of KANSAS River.</p> <p>T2: Screen between TUTTLE Creek and DELAWARE River/PERRY Lake.</p> <p>P2: Prevent possible Nebraska envelopment of X Corps from west.</p> | | | | |
| MBA | | <p>T: Contain 2 Army along a line from VALLEY FALLS-OSKALOOSA-TONGANOXIE-LEAVENWORTH.</p> <p>P: Permit 10th Avn Bde, corps ME, to cause 2 Army to culminate through attrition of 2d ech divs.</p> | | | <p>T: Secure CENTENNIAL Bridge.</p> <p>P: Prevent enemy from capturing this east-west road link across MISSOURI River.</p> |
| Reserve | | | <p>T1: Be prepared to block 2 Army along KANSAS River west of PERRY LAKE.</p> <p>P1: Prevent envelopment of X Corps from west.</p> <p>T2: Be prepared to destroy 2 Army rear and LOC units along a line from HOLTON-HORTON-DENTON-ST JOSEPH.</p> <p>P2: Cause the culmination of Nebraska Front.</p> | | |
| Rear | | | | | |

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APP 1 (X CORPS COA NESTING MATRICES) to ANX C (OP OVERLAY) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR--X (US) Corps

| | 313th Sep Mech Bde | 23d Armd Div | 209th ACR | 14th Avn Bde | Air |
|----------|---|--|---|--|---|
| | Supporting | Supporting | Supporting | Supporting - O/O Res | Supporting |
| Deep | | | | T1: Interdict the eastern 1st-ech div of 1 Army forward of PL GREEN. P1: Encourage 1 Army to commit main attack into 313 Sep Mech Bde AO. T2: Canalize 2d-ech divs of 1 Army into obj CHIEF. P2: prevent the enemy from escaping defeat by 23 Armd Div. | T1: Destroy all bridges across MISSOURI River between PL BROWN and NEBRASKA/IOWA border. P1: Isolate 1 Army and prevent its redeployment to support the decisive combat west of MISSOURI River. T2: Interdict 2 Army LOC. P2: Support 10th Avn Bde, the Corps ME, by causing the culmination of 2 Army forward of PL BLUE. |
| Security | | | T1: Delay 1 Army for 48 hours forward of PL GREEN between ST JOSEPH and Lake VIKING. P1: Enable 313 Sep Mech Bde to prepare defenses north of MISSOURI River. T2: Guard between SMITHVILLE and POLO. P2: protect the east and north flanks of 23d Armd Div from counterattack. | | |
| MBA | T: Fix 1 Army 1st-ech divs between PLATTE CITY and SMITHVILLE. P: Create an assailable flank for 23d Armd Div. | T: O/O defeat 2d-ech divs of 1 Army. P: Isolate 1 Army from the decisive combat west of MISSOURI River. | | | |
| Reserve | | | | T3: Be prepared to degrade 2 Army reserve by 40% forward of PL GREEN. P3: Prevent the commitment of 2 Army tactical reserve into decisive combat w/ 10th Avn Bde. | |
| Rear | Provide one bn TF as TCF T: Be prepared to secure crossings over MISSOURI River for 23 AD. P: Ensure 23 AD counter attack not delayed by enemy deep opns. | | | Provide avn lift for TCF. | |

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APP 1 (X CORPS COA NESTING MATRICES) to ANX C (OP OVERLAY) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR--X (US) Corps

3. PHASE III: EXPLOITATION TO RESTORE CENTRALIAN BORDER

| | 208th ACR | 209th ACR | 23 AD | 25 AD | 55th ID(M) | 313 Sep Mech Bde | 10 Avn Bde | 14 Avn Bde | Air |
|-----------------|---|---|--|---|--|--|------------|------------|------------|
| | Supporting | Supporting | Supporting | Main Effort | Reserve | Reserve | Supporting | Supporting | Supporting |
| Deep | 10th Corps T: Clear enemy between BIG BLUE River and PATTONSBURG P: Restore CENTRALIA - NEBRASKA border | | | | | | | | |
| Security | T: Cover west of line of Route 63 P: Protect west flank of 25 AD, the Corps ME | T: Cover east of line of Route 33 P: Protect east flank of 23 AD | | | | | | | |
| MBA | | | T: Secure Obj BLADE P: Protect right flank of 25 AD, the corps ME | T: Secure obj ROYAL P: Restore CENTRALIA - NEBRASKA border | | | | | |
| Reserve | | | | | T: Be prepared to clear enemy bypassed by 25 AD, the corps ME P: Restore integrity of CENTRALIA | T: Be prepared to support CCC with post conflict operations in KANSAS CITY P: Assist rapid return to normality for Centralian population center | | | |

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ANNEX F (FIRE SUPPORT) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

1. SITUATION

Base plan.

2. MISSION

Base plan.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Fires. To be published (TBP).

b. Air Support.

(1) General. COMAFFORCENT conducts air campaign beginning D-day to establish and maintain air superiority.

(2) Air interdiction (AI) operations. X (US) Corps commander's intent for AI is to initially destroy all bridges on the MISSOURI River between PL BROWN and the NEBRASKA-IOWA border in order to isolate 1 Army and prevent its redeployment to support the decisive combat west of the MISSOURI River. Secondly, AI operations will focus on interdiction of 2 Army LOC to support the defeat of 2 Army. Division nominates targets to corps with focus on delaying and destroying 2 Army secondechelon forces in sector. Emphasis is on SSMs, MRL systems, artillery groups, and attack aviation assets. AI target nominations must be submitted to X Corps deep operations control cell (DOCC) NLT 0800 hours daily for inclusion in the 72-hour targeting plan. DOCC will begin processing requests on D-3 for the D-day air tasking order (ATO).

c. Field Artillery Support. Corps has retained control of all Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS). Preplanned ATACMS requests will be submitted IAW the timelines established for AI nominations. Requests for immediate ATACMS fire missions will be submitted to corps main fire support element (FSE).

d. Coordinating Instructions. OO, PL BROWN (CENTRALIA-NEBRASKA border) is X Corps fire support coordination line (FSCL).

APPENDIX: 1 - Artillery Organization for Combat

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APPENDIX 1 (ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT) to ANNEX F (FIRE SUPPORT) to
OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

55th Mech Div

55th Mech DIVARTY

4-40 FA (155-mm, SP)

4-41 FA (155-mm, SP)

4-42 FA (155-mm, SP)

D/43 FA (MLRS)

E/20 FA (Tgt Acq)

66th FA Bde: R 55th DIVARTY

2-641 FA (155-mm, SP)

2-642 FA (155-mm, SP)

2-643 FA (155-mm, SP)

2-665 FA (MLRS)

2-667 FA (MLRS)

23d Armd Div

23d Armd DIVARTY (-)

1-50 FA (155-mm, SP)

1-51 FA (155-mm, SP)

1-52 FA (155-mm, SP)

A/53 FA (MLRS)

25th Armd Div

25th Armd DIVARTY (-)

2-50 FA (155-mm, SP)

2-51 FA (155-mm, SP)

2-52 FA (155-mm, SP)

C/53 FA (MLRS)

313th Sep Mech Bde

5-40 FA (155-mm, SP)

208th ACR

1st How Btry

2d How Btry

3d How Btry

64th FA Bde: DS 208th ACR; OO, R 25th Armd DIVARTY

2-611 FA (155-mm, SP)

2-616 FA (155-mm, SP)

2-635 FA (155-mm, SP)

2-644 FA (MLRS)

G/20 FA (Tgt Acq)

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APP 1 (ARTY ORG FOR CBT) to ANX F (FS) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps

209th ACR

1st How Btry

2d How Btry

3d How Btry

63d FA Bde: DS 209th ACR: OO, DS 313th Sep Mech Bde

2-628 FA (155-mm, SP): OO, atch 23d Armd Div

2-631 FA (155-mm, SP): OO, atch 23d Armd Div

2-634 FA (155-mm, SP)

2-662 FA (MLRS)

D/20 FA (Tgt Acq): OO, atch 23d Armd Div

62d FA Bde (GS)

1-651 FA (MLRS)

2-661 FA (MLRS)

2-645 FA (MLRS): OO, R 23d Armd Div

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ANNEX Q (SERVICE SUPPORT) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

TO BE PUBLISHED

APPENDIXES: 1 - Service Support Overlay
 2 - Logistic/Personnel Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) Extract


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APPENDIX 1 (SERVICE SUPPORT OVERLAY) to ANNEX Q (SERVICE SUPPORT) to
OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR



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APPENDIX 2 (LOGISTICS/PERSONNEL STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE EXTRACT) to ANNEX Q (SERVICE SUPPORT) to OPERATION PLAN BRIDAL SPUR

This extract provides specific information concerning the personnel and logistics policies and procedures the X (US) Corps uses and should be used as a basis for personnel and logistic planning. You may refer to this SOP extract when briefing or writing concepts of support. These policies and procedures are applicable to all corps units except when specifically superseded by OPLANs or OPORDs.

1. PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING AND STRENGTH REPORTING

The corps adjutant general (AG), in coordination with the theater PERSCOM, establishes all strength-related reporting requirements for all units assigned and attached in X (US) Corps support areas. The command and control strength reporting system (C²SRS) is the primary means of reporting strength-related information and accounting for soldiers and Army civilians. The battalion S1 using the (Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS)) will prepare C²SRS reports and transmit them through the Tactical Army Combat Service Support (CSS) Computer System (TACCS) to the personnel service battalions (PSBs) supporting the units. Units will use the manual personnel status report (PSR) transmitted by MSE as backup to the automated system.

2. PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT OPERATIONS

a. The corps adjutants allocate officer and enlisted soldiers and Army civilian replacements to MSCs based on the commander's priorities. The goal for moving replacements from the DS replacement company to corps units and from the division replacement section to the BSA is 24 hours. Replacements shipped from theater GS replacement companies will be delivered to corps DS replacement companies (or throughput to division G1/AG replacement sections) for final verification of assignment and equipping. DS replacement companies will coordinate transportation for replacements to their final destinations with supporting corps MCTs.

b. RTD soldiers will be processed through the replacement company nearest the organization maintaining control of the RTD soldier. The controlling organization will arrange delivery of RTD soldiers to the replacement company.

3. CASUALTY REPORTING

Units report all casualties killed in action (KIA), missing in action (MIA), wounded in action (WIA), captured, detained, or interned found on the battlefield, including Department of Defense (DOD) civilians; contract personnel; and military personnel from other units, other Services, and allied forces. Units record casualties on Witness Statement/Casualty Feeder Reports (DA Form 1155). This report is sent to battalion level without delay or as soon as the tactical situation permits. Battalions send this information to their supporting PSB. The time standard for casualty information processing is 24 hours from time of incident through casualty reporting channels to receipt at the United States Total Army (USTA) PERSCOM. Personnel, medical, logistics, and PM communities will operate as a team in the casualty operations management system.

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APP 2 (LOG/PER SOP EXT) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps

4. POSTAL OPERATIONS

The postal operations platoons will arrange delivery of mail to postal services platoons with the supporting MCT. Postal services platoons will deliver mail to supported units and provide services to soldiers as far forward as the tactical situation permits (stamps and money orders).

5. BAND

Corps and divisional bands will perform their primary music mission as long as the tactical situation permits. The band is under the personnel group commander's staff supervision.

6. FINANCE OPERATIONS.

The finance group (FG) commander assigns finance units to support corps units on a GS or DS basis.

a. Support to the procurement process. Each unit down to battalion or separate company will appoint primary and alternate field ordering officers and class A agents for local purchase funding and pay support.

b. Enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees. As the situation permits, captured EPWs or detained civilian internees (CIs) will be searched and any currency, precious metals, or artifacts will be accounted for. This property and a record of it will be presented to the MPs when the EPWs or detainees enter the EPW or CI camp.

Weapons for cash. Once notified by the US Department of State to institute this program, all weapons turned in will be accounted for on a DA Form 4137 IAW AR 190-45.

d. Captured cash. Currency found on the battlefield and not belonging to a specific individual will be turned in to the nearest finance element.

e. Noncombatant evacuation order payments. The FG commander will designate the finance unit responsible for making noncombatant evacuation order (NEO) payments on notification of evacuation.

f. Imprest funds. Imprest funds will be established within the limitations authorized in DOD Federal Acquisitory Regulations, and the nearest finance unit will fund and replenish the imprest fund cashier.

7. HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Patient evacuation policy. Patient evacuation policy is 72 hours for MSC level I and II medical units. The corps evacuation policy will be recommended by the corps commander (surgeon) and approved by the theater commander (surgeon) based on the tactical situation and available medical assets. Medical evacuation time lines for MSCs are as follows:

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APP 2 (LOG/PER SOP EXT) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps

| Priority | Category | Time line |
|----------|--------------------|---------------------|
| 1 | Urgent | 1 hour or less |
| 1A | Urgent surgical | 1 hour or less |
| 2 | Priority | 3 hours or less |
| 3 | Tactical immediate | ASAP due to mission |
| 4 | Routine | 24 hours or less |
| 5 | Convenience | Situational |

b. RTDs from corps medical treatment facilities. will process through the supporting replacement company. Medical treatment facilities will arrange to deliver RTDs to the replacement company.

c. Combat lifesaver program. MSC and corps surgeons are responsible for the combat lifesaver program. Units will train and certify a minimum of one combat lifesaver per squad, section, crew, team, or other independently operating element. In addition, each combat vehicle will contain a minimum of one certified combat lifesaver. Each combat lifesaver will be issued a combat lifesaver kit.

d. EPWs and CIs.

(1) EPW and CI patients will be evacuated through medical channels with the same priorities as US patients. Nonmedical units will provide guards for EPWs and CIs being evacuated. EPWs and CIs will not be evacuated in the same vehicle as US or allied patients whenever possible.

(2) EPWs and CIs will be segregated from US and allied patients whenever possible. Supporting MP units will provide guards within their areas of responsibility.

8. STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

The staffjudge advocate (SJA) will locate at the corps rear CP. SJA services will be provided as far forward as possible. The SJA will dedicate a team to support corps civil-military operations (CMO).

9. PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Only media personnel who are accredited in the theater of operations are authorized to function in the corps AO. Corps or MSC public affairs office (PAO) personnel are required to escort all members of the media.

10. CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES

Priority of chaplain coverage is to combat units, medical treatment facilities, reconstitution sites, and MA operations.

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APP 2 (LOG/PER SOP EXT) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR -- X (US) Corps

11. INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

The IG will operate from the corps rear CP. The IG will provide support as far forward as is consistent with the tactical situation.

12. EPW AND CI OPERATIONS

a. The corps G1, division G1/AGs, separate brigade S1/AGs, and brigade S1s will coordinate with the provost marshal to ensure humane treatment and accountability of EPWs and CIs at brigade and higher command echelons.

b. Each MSC will establish an EPW or CI collection point. Manning and operation of these points is an MSC responsibility. The corps PM will coordinate the establishment of corps EPW or CI holding areas with the MP brigade and the corps G1. The corps PM, with the supporting MCT, will transport EPWs or CIs from MSC collection points to corps holding areas.

c. EPWs or CIs will be evacuated from the corps area as soon as the tactical situation permits. The objective is no more than 48 hours' retention in corps holding areas after EPWs or CIs are received. Transportation to theater enclosures is a corps responsibility that will be coordinated with the supporting MCT.

13. CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

The corps GS will operate the civil-military operations center (CMOC) from the corps rear CP.

14. SUPPLY

a. Class I and water.

(1) Unit basic loads will consist of MREs only. Minimum of 2 DofS will be stocked by MSC direct support units (DSUs). Mechanized units will carry 3 DofS on unit vehicles.

(2) Corps standard feeding policy is two hot meals (T-, B-, or A-rations) and one MRE daily. Units may feed three MREs daily during close combat operations but will return to corps standard feeding policy as soon as the tactical situation permits.

(3) Basic load of water for mechanized units will be 5 gallons per soldier carried on vehicles (light units carry minimum 1 gallon with each soldier) and full 400-gal water trailers.

(4) Water distribution from corps water production sites is a corps responsibility. COSCOM will transport water as far forward as BSA locations when required. The corps materiel management center (CMMC) will contract for local bottled water to supplement water production capability. Bottled water will be delivered to class I break points.

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APP 2 (LOG/PER SOP EXT) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR -- X (US) Corps

b. Class II.

(1) MSC basic load will be 15 DofS-5 DofS carried at unit level and 10 DofS carried at DS level. Additionally, mechanized units will carry two complete individual chemical equipment (ICE) packs (battle dress overgarment (BDO), gloves, filters, boots) with each soldier. DSUs and GSUs will carry one complete ICE pack per supported soldier. DSUs supporting light units will stock two complete ICE packs per soldier.

(2) MSCs will maintain a basic load of personal effects bags and human remains pouches based on 10 percent of authorized unit strength. Corps DSUs and general support units (GSUs) will maintain a stockage of personal effects bags and human remains pouches equivalent to 10 percent of the authorized strength of units they support.

c. Class III.

(1) All corps fuel tankers will carry JP-8.

(2) Unit basic load of package products will be 5 DofS. MSC DS units will carry 3 DofS.

(3) Refuel on the move (ROM) kits. Each FSB and MSB and corps POL supply units will maintain two ROM kits. Each ROM kit provides eight fuel points. Each fuel point can dispense fuel at a rate of 35 gallons per minute (GPM) using a 5,000-gal tanker as the source of fuel.

d. Class IV.

(1) MSC DS units will carry 1 DofS of class IV. MSC basic load will consist of items needed to replace losses to unit vehicle basic loads. Unit vehicles will carry enough class IV to build fighting positions, mark target reference points (TRPs), and provide aiming stakes for weapons. UBLs may include small quantities of wire, long pickets, and lumber. Basic loads will not be designed to build bunkers or emplace significant obstacles. Basic loads enable units to construct a limited number of fighting positions with overhead cover.

(2) Class IV stocks at corps DS and GS levels will be configured in unit defense pack (UDP) CCLs. The following UDP CCLs will be used to request barrier material:

(a) Alpha pack provides 250 meters of triple-standard concertina fence. One A pack consists of 54 rolls of wire, 134 long pickets, and 4 wire reels. Total weight is approximately 2,500 pounds.

(b) Bravo pack provides a GP tape obstacle 140 meters long. It weighs 117 pounds.

(c) Charlie pack provides marking capability for a mined area. It consists of 134 pickets and 9 wire reels and has a total weight of approximately 1,300 pounds.

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APP 2 (LOG/PER SOP EXT) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps

(3) The following are corps DS/GS stockage objectives for UDP CCLs:

120 Alpha packs
800 Bravo packs
600 Charlie packs

e. Class v.

(1) Mine stocks at corps DS and GS levels will be configured in minepack CCLs. The following minepack CCLs will be used to request mine obstacle material:

(a) Delta pack provides 250 meters of row AT minefield. It consists of 148 M-21 mines. There are 4 per box; 91 pounds per box x 37 boxes = 3,367 pounds.

(b) Echo pack provides 250 meters of 0-1-0 antipersonnel (AP) minefield and consists of 248 M-16 mines. There are 4 per box; 45 pounds per box x 62 boxes = 2,790 pounds.

(c) Foxtrot pack consists of 48 M-18 Claymore mines. There are 6 per box; 53 pounds per box x 8 boxes = 424 pounds.

(d) Golf pack provides twelve 250- by 125-meter scatterable minefields using Volcano mine dispensers. Each pack consists of 12 pallets of MS7 Volcano mines. Each pallet contains 40 mine canisters (total of 480 canisters). One Volcano system can hold 160 mine canisters (960 mines). Each canister contains five AT and one APERS mine. This pack provides three Volcano dispenser loads. 40 canisters per pallet; 1,700 pounds per pallet x 12 pallets = 20,400 pounds.

(2) The following are corps DS and GS stockage objectives for minepack CCLs:

500 Delta packs
200 Echo packs
50 Foxtrot packs
45 Golf packs

(3) Class V stocks (other than mines) will be configured to support ATP operations. Ammunition managers will use the ammunition transfer point (ATP) CCLs unless the tactical situation dictates other mixes. ATPs are able to process a maximum of 30 PLS flatracks per day due to lift capability limitations. Corps ATPs can process 58 flatracks per day. DAOs will compute the mix of CCLs and coordinate with the CMMC for deliveries. Units other than DIVARTY must transload ammunition from flatracks to organic vehicles. DIVARTY units equipped with PLS vehicles will upload flatracks on organic PLS trucks for movement to respective unit locations.

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APP 2 (LOG/PER SOP EXT) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps

(4) The following ATP CCLs are designed to support a battalion-sized unit, weigh no more than 16.5 STONs, and are established by COSCOM:

| | DODIC | Ammo type | Quantity |
|--|-------|----------------------|----------|
| (a) <u>ATP Pkg 1</u> (<u>General Purpose</u>) | A059 | 5.56-mm ball | 161,280 |
| | A063 | 5.56-mm tracer | 39,360 |
| | A064 | 5.56-mm linked SAW | 19,200 |
| | A131 | 7.62-mm linked 4:1 | 48,000 |
| | A576 | .50-cal AP-T 4:1 | 28,800 |
| | B546 | 40-mm HEDP | 1,944 |
| | G881 | Gren, frag | 810 |
| | K143 | Mine M-16 | 96 |
| | G815 | Smoke RP gren | 198 |
| | G826 | IR smoke gren | 192 |
| (b) <u>ATP Pkg 2</u> (<u>M2/M3 Bradley</u>) | A131 | 7.62-mm ball/tracer | 48,000 |
| | A974 | 25-mm APDS-T | 4,800 |
| | A975 | 25-mm HETT | 1,500 |
| | G815 | Smoke RP gren | 10 |
| | G826 | IR smoke gren | 10 |
| | PE 96 | TOW 2A | 12 |
| (c) <u>ATP Pkg 3</u> (<u>M1A1</u>) | A131 | 7.62-mm ball/tracer | 16,000 |
| | A576 | .50-cal API 4: 1 | 4,800 |
| | C380 | 120-mm APFSDS-T | 210 |
| | C787 | 120-mm HEMP-T | 120 |
| | G815 | Smoke RP gren | 10 |
| | G826 | IR smoke gren | 10 |
| (d) <u>ATP Pkg 4</u> (<u>Javelin/AT-4</u>) | PA34 | Javelin | 80 |
| | C995 | 84-mm AT-4 | 20 |
| (e) <u>ATP Pkg 5</u> (<u>120-mm mortar</u>) | C379 | 120-mm, HE w/fuze | 395 |
| | C624 | 120-mm, smoke w/fuze | 60 |
| | C625 | 120 mm, illum w/fuze | 10 |
| (f) <u>A7J Ph6</u> (<u>155-mm ICM</u>) | A576 | .50-cal API 4: 1 | 4,800 |
| | D533 | 155-mm prop RB | 75 |
| | D541 | 155-mm prop WB | 100 |
| | D563 | 155-mm HE ICM | 168 |
| | N285 | Fuze MTSQ | 144 |
| | N464 | Fuze prox | 32 |
| | N523 | Primer | 250 |

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APP 2 (LOG/PER SOP EXT) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps

| | <u>DODIC</u> | <u>Ammo type</u> | <u>Quantity</u> |
|----------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------|------------------|
| (g) <u>ATP Pkg 7</u> | A576 | .50-cal API 4:1 | 4,800 |
| <u>(155-mm HE and RAP)</u> | D533 | 155-mm prop RB | 75 |
| | D541 | 155-mm prop WB | 100 |
| | D544 | 155-mm HE | 112 |
| | D579 | 155-mm RAP | 56 |
| | N285 | Fuze MTSQ | 48 |
| | N340 | Fuze PD | 136 |
| | N464 | Fuze prox | 32 |
| | N523 | Primer | 250 |
| (h) <u>ATP Pkg 8</u> | D506 | 155-mm smoke HC | 16 |
| <u>(155-mm support)</u> | D505 | 155-mm illum | 24 |
| | D528 | 155-mm smoke screen smoke | 104 |
| | D550 | 155-mm WP | 16 |
| | D540 | 155-mm prop GB | 42 |
| | D541 | 155-mm prop WB | 125 |
| | N285 | Fuze MTSQ | 132 |
| | N340 | Fuze PD | 45 |
| | N523 | Primer | 250 |
| (i) <u>ATP Pkg 9</u> | D502 | 155-mm HE ADAM | 40 |
| <u>(155-mm FASCAM shrt Cphd)</u> | D509 | 155-mm HE RAAMS | 112 |
| | D510 | 155-mm Copperhead | 12 |
| | D533 | 155-mm prop RB | 90 |
| | D540 | 155-mm prop GB | 18 |
| | D541 | 155-mm prop WB | 75 |
| | Fuze | MTSQ | 192 |
| | N523 | Primer | 250 |
| (j) <u>ATP Pkg 10</u> | D501 | 155-mm ADAM | 24 |
| <u>(155-mm FASCAM long)</u> | D503 | 155-mm RAAMS | 72 |
| | D533 | 155-mm prop RB | 45 |
| | D540 | 155-mm prop GB | 10 |
| | D541 | 155-mm prop WB | 50 |
| | N285 | Fuze MTSQ | 104 |
| | N523 | Primer | 120 |
| (k) <u>ATP Pkg 11</u> | H104 | MLRS | 4 pods (24 rkts) |
| <u>(MLRs)</u> | | | |

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APP 2 (LOG/PER SOP EXT) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps

| | <u>DODIC</u> | <u>Ammo type</u> | <u>Quantity</u> |
|---|--------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| (k) <u>ATP Pkg 12</u> (<u>Apache</u>) | A965 | Ctg 25.4-mm M839 Decoy | 50 |
| | B130 | Ctg 30-mm HEDP M789 | 3,456 |
| | L410 | Flare IR M206 | 50 |
| | MD74 | Ctg impulse M976 | 60 |
| | PD68 | Hellfire | 36 |
| (l) <u>ATP Pkg 13</u> (<u>Apache, 2.75-in</u>) | B130 | Ctg 30-mm HEDP M789 | 5,184 |
| | H116 | Rkt 2.75 WP M259 | 30 |
| | H163 | Rkt 2.75 HE M151 (10#) | 60 |
| | H464 | Rkt 2.75 MPSM M261 | 120 |
| (m) <u>ATP Pkg 14</u> (<u>Cobra, AH-1</u>) | A653 | Ctg 20-mm HEI M56A3 | 2,400 |
| | A965 | Ctg 25.4-mm M839 Decoy | 50 |
| | H116 | Rkt 2.75 WP M259 | 10 |
| | H163 | Rkt HE M151 (10#) | 30 |
| | H180 | Rkt illum M257 | 6 |
| | H464 | Rkt MPSM M261 | 60 |
| | L410 | Flare IR M206 | 50 |
| | MD74 | Ctg impulse M976 | 60 |
| | PE96 | TOW 2A | 48 |
| (n) <u>ATP Pkg 15</u> (<u>Engr-CEV/AT-4</u>) | A131 | 7.62-mm linked 4:1 | 16,000 |
| | A576 | .50-cal linked (A576) | 9,600 |
| | A589 | .50-cal linked (A589) | 680 |
| | D570 | 165-mm HEP | 100 |
| | G815 | Smoke screen, gren | 20 |
| | C995 | 84mm, AT-4 | 50 |
| (o) <u>ATP Pkg 16</u> (<u>Engr-Mobility</u>) | M913 | 5-in rkt F/MICLIC | 3 |
| | K867 | Smoke pot | 84 |
| | M023 | Charge demo 1¼ lbs | 90 |
| | M028 | Bangalore torpedo | 4 |
| | M130 | Cap blasting elec | 50 |
| | M131 | Cap blasting nonelec | 50 |
| | M421 | Charge shape 40 | 6 |
| | M456 | Cord det | 1,000 |
| | M670 | Fuze blast time | 100 |
| | M757 | Charge assy demo | 10 |
| | M766 | Igniter time blast | 50 |
| | M913 | MICLIC | 3 |

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APP 2 (LOG/PER SOP EXT) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps

| | <u>DODIC</u> | <u>Ammo type</u> | <u>Quantity</u> |
|---|--------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| (p) <u>ATP Pkg 17</u> (Engr-counter mobility/demo) | M023 | Chg, demo 1¼ lbs | 1,080 |
| | M024 | Chg, demo 2½ lbs | 480 |
| | M032 | Chg, demo 1 lb | 1,152 |
| | M039 | Chg, crater 40 | 50 |
| | M130 | Cap blasting elec | 500 |
| | M131 | Cap blasting nonelec | 500 |
| | M241 | Destructor expl | 50 |
| | M420 | Charge shape 15 | 21 |
| | M421 | Charge shape 40 | 24 |
| | M456 | Cord det | 9,000 |
| | M670 | Fuze blast time | 500 |
| | M757 | Charge assy demo | 32 |
| | M766 | Igniter time blast | 600 |
| | M965 | Demo kit crater M180 | 9 |

f. Class VI. Ration supplement sundries packs (RSSPs) and health and comfort pack (HCP) items will be issued gratuitously with rations until tactical field exchanges (TFEs) are established.

g. Class VII. Class VII is command regulated as published by the CMMC controlled item list. The primary stockage site for major end items will be in the QM heavy materiel supply company in the corps rear CSG.

h. Class VIII. Combat lifesaver bags will be carried on each combat vehicle. MSC DS units will carry aid chests and 5 DofS of class VIII. The corps medical logistics battalion will stock 5 DofS. Class VIII resupply will be by unit ambulances in MSC areas. The CMMC and CMCC will coordinate for transport of class VIII from the medical logistics battalion to MSCs.

Class LX. PLLs and ASLs will be constrained to fit in organic unit PLL and ASL vehicles. Corps stockage will be determined on a case-by-case basis by the CMMC.

15. TRANSPORTATION

a. Units will transport all MTOE items using organic assets. Once all unit organic transportation assets are fully used, units may submit requests for additional transportation support to their supporting MCTs. CONEXs, MILVANs, and similar containers not part of the unit MTOE will not accompany units from sea ports of deparkation (SPODs) or air ports of debarkation (APODs) to tactical sites unless moved by unit organic equipment. Cargo containers will be unloaded and returned to the supply system within 48 hours or as soon as practical. DISCOM elements may transport mounted MILVAN containers to forward tactical sites for storage and stockpile of supplies.

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APP 2 (LOG/PER SOP EXT) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps

b. Corps MSRs extending beyond MSC support areas (DSAs, BSAs, and LSAs) for purposes of supporting forward and displaced corps units will remain under the movements control jurisdiction of the CMCC. MSCs will coordinate their movement on these MSRs with the supporting MCT.

c. Commitment authority for HET assets will be retained at the CMCC. MCTs will forward HET requirements to the CMCC for allocation and commitment of trucks. MCTs will recommend specific loads for the deadhead segment of HET commitments.

16. SERVICES

a. Shower, laundry, and clothing repair (SLCR). COSCOM provides SLCR services on an area basis. SLCR services will be provided as far forward as BSA locations. Unit S4s are responsible for coordination of SLCR service. Priority for shower services is decontamination operations. Priority for laundry and clothing repair services is backup support to hospitals, organizational clothing and equipment, and individual clothing and salvage textiles, in order.

b. Mortuary affairs.

(1) Each MSC will establish an MA collection point.

(2) Units will initially search, recover, identify, and evacuate remains to brigade or division MA collection points. MSCs are responsible for transport of remains to corps collection points. Remains will not be retained in MSCs longer than 24 hours.

(3) MA procedures for deceased allied, civilian, and enemy personnel will be similar to those for deceased US soldiers. Allied, civilian, and enemy dead will be processed IAW FM 10-63.

(4) The CINC can authorize emergency or mass burials when the local tactical situation precludes immediate evacuation of remains to an MA collection point. Procedures contained in FM 10-63, STANAG 2070, and QSTAG 655 will be used when emergency war burials are authorized.

(5) Contaminated remains will be processed under STANAG 2070 emergency war burials procedures. Contaminated remains will not be transported to collection points.

c. Airdrop and sling-load operations.

(1) Selected items will always be prerigged to reduce response time to emergency requests for air-delivered supplies. Each OPLAN and OPORD will specify type and quantity of prerigged supplies for emergency delivery.

(2) MSCs are responsible for retrograding airdrop equipment to a location the supporting CSG designates.

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APP 2 (LOG/PER SOP EXT) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR--X (US) Corps

(3) CSGs and MSCs will tram and certify a minimum of 10 soldiers per DS unit in helicopter sling-loading procedures. Each DS unit will include 20 sling-load sets in its basic load (slings, pallets, nylon webbing, chainlink slings, and clevises). Units receiving supplies by sling-load will recover and return sling-load sets to their supporting DS unit. MSCs are responsible for retrograding sling-load equipment to a location the supporting CSG designates.

(4) The CMCC will manage the CH-47 and UH-60 aviation assets allocated to the COSCOM.

17. MAINTENANCE

a. Repair time guidelines will be based on the current tactical situation and published in orders. Corps maintenance units will provide maintenance support teams (MSTs) to reinforce DS units as directed by the CMMC based on requirements and priorities.

b. Recovery responsibilities. Units will recover equipment from breakdown sites to a unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) or designated MCP.

c. Evacuation responsibilities.

(1) DSUs will evacuate equipment from UMCPs and MCPs to DS and backup DS maintenance facilities as directed by MSC MMCs.

(2) COSCOM will provide backup evacuation support, within capabilities, upon request of a MSC DSU.

(3) Crew members will not accompany vehicles evacuated from MSC areas.

18. WEAPON SYSTEM REPLACEMENT OPERATIONS (WSRO)

The deputy COSCOM commander is the corps weapon system manager (WSM). The corps G4 provides staff supervision of WSRO. The corps will employ WSRO procedures when the commander directs. The corps WSRO site will normally be operated by the rear CSG and located in its area of support. The corps AG will provide a dedicated point of contact to coordinate personnel replacement functions.

19. REPORTS

Logistics and personnel reports will be forwarded to corps as required by annex R (published under separate Cover). Primary means of forwarding reports from MSCs to corps is maneuver control system (MCS).

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COMBAT OPERATIONS

Appendix 3 to Advance Book, S310B, OPLAN White, UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

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OPERATION PLAN WHITE

- Maps:
- Series USACGSC 50-301, KANSAS, sheet 1 (HOLTON-HORTON), edition 1977, 1:50,000 (map A (sheet 1 of 4)).
 - Series USACGSC 50-302, KANSAS-MISSOURI, sheet 1 (LEAVENWORTH-ST JOSEPH), edition 1977, 1:50,000 (map A (sheet 2 of 4)).
 - Series USACGSC 50-303, KANSAS, sheet 1 (TOPEKA-LAWRENCE), edition 1976, 1:50,000 (map A (sheet 3 of 4)).
 - Series USACGSC 50-304, KANSAS-MISSOURI, sheet 1 (LAWRENCE-OLATHE), edition 1977, 1:50,000 (map A (sheet 4 of 4)).

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: SIERRA.

Task Organization: Annex A.

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence),
- b. Friendly Forces. Annex A (Task Organization)
- c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization). All attachments effective OO.
- d. Assumptions.

(1) Strategic and operational intelligence assets will detect the movement of the Nebraskii 1 Army into the eastern EL DORADO panhandle.

(2) X Corps covering force operations will destroy the Nebraska Front reconnaissance elements, delay first-echelon divisions north of the line FOSTORIA (QU1668)-EDGERTON (UP5878)-RIDDER (VQ0604) for 48 hours, and reduce the first-echelon regiments of those divisions to less than 75- to 80-percent effectiveness.

(3) 55th Mech Div will have 45 hours after arrival in sector to prepare MBA defenses.

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OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

Avn Bde attacks into EA RON (TP935800-TP990795-TP933750-TP990750) and EA BILL (UP142725-UP128780-UP070750-UP100718) to destroy combined arms reserve units (ITBs) to prevent their being committed to breaking the containment of 2 Army. 2d Bde, main effort, contains lead divisions of 2 Army north of PL BLUE to enable 10th Avn Bde to culminate 2 Army. OO, 3d Bde destroys lead elements of lead divisions, then blocks follow-on forces along a line from MILLWOOD (UP178611)--8 MILE HOUSE (UP240599)-UP308578-UP326615 to deny the enemy the east avenues of approach and protect main effort brigade right flank from envelopment. 1st Bde, division reserve in AA LYNX, will be prepared to block penetration in the vicinity of WINCHESTER to maintain the integrity of the containment of 2 Army. 1st Bde should also be prepared to destroy second-echelon regiments vic EA MUSTANG (POTTER (UP660156)-BIG EIGHT Lake (UP228656)-UP195708-UP150700) to prevent the enemy from massing overwhelming combat power against 3d Bde. 4-23 CAV initially OPCON to 55th Avn Bde. OO, screen the division left flank to prevent enemy forces from penetrating the flank and rear of 2d Bde. The CTF infantry mechanized bn will secure KANSAS River bridges at LECOMPTON (TP9325), LAWRENCE (UP0518), EUDORA (UP1813) DE SOTO (UP2916), and BONNER SPRINGS (UP 3824) to permit the uninterrupted movement of 55th Mech Div forward of the KANSAS River.

(2) Fires. The purpose of fires is to support the 55th Mech Div containment of 2 Army. Division fire support assets must accomplish four critical tasks in order to accomplish the purpose: (a) execute fire support battle handover from 208th ACR in order to maintain continuous suppression of lead elements of 2 Army and disrupt Nebraskii phase I fires; (b) shoot suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) and counterfires for the 55th Avn Bde security mission to delay and disrupt lead elements of 2 Army in order to gain 6 hours for MBA defensive preparations; (c) destroy 50 percent of firstechelon division DAGs and AAG to prevent phases II and III fires; and (d) provide SEAD for deep operations to support the destruction of combined arms reserves. Division deep fires will focus on reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA), ADA, and FS. 66th FA Bde provides SEAD and CF in support of initial security mission and deep operations. 66th FA Bde will be the division CF HQ. Division close fires will focus on RISTA, FS, and maneuver. Brigades are responsible to neutralize RAGs and destroy mortar batteries within their sector. GS artillery will be positioned to weight 2d Bde fight. Rear fires are provided by the TCF mortars. Initial priority of fires is to 55th Avn Bde, 2d Bde, 3d Bde, 4-23 Cav, and 1st Bde; OO, shifts to 2d Bde, 3d Bde, 55th Avn Bde, 4-23 Cav, and 1st Bde. Annex F (Fire Support).

(3) Counterair operations. Priority of protection initially to divisional elements moving into sector; then to C², 55th Avn Bde, 2d Bde, 3d Bde, FA battalions, and CSS activities during the defense in sector. Initially, air defense warning status YELLOW; air defense weapons control status WEAPONS TIGHT. Annex G (Air Defense).

(4) Intelligence. Priority of collection effort initially to identify the axis of the 2 Army main effort, 2 Army AAG, DAGs, and the commitment of the secondechelon regiments and ITBs. Annex B (Intelligence).

(5) Electronic warfare. Targets, in priority, are reconnaissance nets, forward air control nets, regimental and divisional C² nodes, and division-level fire support nets. Annex I (Electronic Warfare).

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OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

(6) Engineer. Obstacle zone A is a “disrupt zone” to assist in the delay of enemy forces for 6 hours. Annex D (Engineer).

(7) Deception. Division supports the corps deception plan by minimizing activities that project defensive preparations north of the KANSAS River. Objective is to cause the 2 Army to approach KANSAS CITY by the most direct approaches (avenues B and C). Target is the Commander, Nebraska Front. Story is that the area north of the KANSAS River is lightly held; 55th Mech Div MBA is corps reserve south of the river. Annex L (Deception).

b. Tasks to Maneuver Units.

(1) 1st Bde. Division reserve; occupy AA LYNX and be prepared to execute division counterattack plans. Annex T (Contingency Plans). Planning priority: BROWN DERBY (block penetration), then TOP HAT (destruction of second-echelon regiments).

(2) 2d Bde.

(a) Responsible for division left flank security; coordinate flank security operations with 4-23 Cav.

(b) Facilitate the movement of corps covering force elements through brigade sector.

(c) Establish passage points (PPs) and develop routes for rearward passage of elements of the divisional guard force along PL GRAY; be prepared to establish PPs and develop forward passage of 1st Bde along PL YELLOW.

(d) Construct obstacles in zones B, C, and D.

(3) 3d Bde.

(a) Responsible for division right flank security.

(b) Establish PPs and develop routes for rearward passage of elements of the divisional guard force along PL GRAY.

(c) Establish liaison with Leavenworth Militia

(d) Receive attachment of TF 4-77 and 3/C/4-441 ADA when the aviation brigade completes guard mission.

(e) Construct obstacles in zones E, F, and G.

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OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

(4) 55th Avn Bde.

(a) Establish PPs and develop routes for rearward passage of elements of the 208th ACR along PL RED.

(b) Construct obstacles in zone A.

(c) On completion of the guard mission:

1. Release TF 4-77 Mech and 3/C/4-441 ADA to 3d Bde.

2. Release 4-23 Cav to division control.

2. Occupy AA WREN.

(5) 4-23 Cav. On release from 55th Avn Bde control, screen division left flank from PL BLUE to division rear boundary to prevent envelopment of division left flank.

c. Tasks to Combat Support Units

(1) Fire support. Annex F.

(a) Air support. For planning, 55th Mech Div will receive 40 CAS sorties per day; X Corps will retain all search and rescue (S&R) sorties. Plan for two sorties per mission. For planning, CAS sorties will be subdistributed as follows:

| | | | | |
|---------|--------|--------|--------------|-------------|
| 1st Bde | 2d Bde | 3d Bde | 55th Avn Bde | Div control |
| 0 | 15 | 10 | 05 | 10 |

(b) Field artillery support.

1. 66th FA Bde will be OPCON to 55th Avn Bde during its security operations. 66th FA units will be positioned by 55th DIVARTY and will not be positioned north of PL YELLOW. Do not exceed

30 percent of controlled supply rate (CSR) while supporting 55th Avn Bde. OO, R 55th DIVARTY. 55th DIVARTY has authorization to subassign tactical missions to three FA battalions (155, SP).

2. D/43 FA, 2-642 FA, and 2-643 FA missions effective on the outbreak of hostilities.

3. 4-40 FA and 2-642 FA missions effective on commitment of division reserve.

(c) Chemical support. Priority for smoke is to screen battle handover operations, MBA positions, and commitment of reserve.

(d) Naval gunfire support. None available.

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OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

(e) Fire support coordinating instructions.

1. On order. PL BROWN (CENTRALIA--NEBRASKA border) is X Corps FSCL.

2. On order, PL RED is 55th Mech Div coordinated fire line (CFL); OO, PL YELLOW is 55th Mech Div CFL.

(2) Air defense. See task organization. Provide point coverage on bridges crossing KANSAS River. Provide area coverage for movement in sector.

(3) Chemical (NBC defense). Priority of decontamination to 1st Bde, 55th Avn Bde, 2d Bde, 3d Bde, and 55th DIVARTY. Priority of recon to 55th Avn Bde, 2d Bde, and 3d Bde.

(4) Combat engineer.

(a) For planning purposes, division SOP limits quantities of mines and barrier material to the stockage objectives. 2d and 3d Bdes each plan to receive 40 percent of the stockage objective; 55th Avn Bde plans to receive 20 percent of the stockage objective.

(b) Assist maneuver units in obstacle construction in their respective zones.

(c) 5080th Engr Cbt Spt Equip Co returns to division control at H+24 to begin MSR maintenance and survivability support in the division rear.

(d) 500th Cbt Engr Bn (Corps) (Whl) returns to division control and 501st Cbt Engr Bn (Corps) (Mech) (-) returns to X Corps control on 208th ACR battle handover to 55th Avn Bde.

(5) Intelligence and electronic warfare. Annex I (Electronic Warfare).

(6) Military police. Priority to battlefield circulation control (BCC) at river-crossing sites when moving into sector. Second priority at battle handover at PL RED and PL YELLOW. After completing battle handover, provide area security mission vicinity DSA. Establish one prisoner of war (PW) collection point in division rear.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) This plan is effective for planning on receipt and implementation OO.

(2) D-day is the day Nebraskii forces cross the CENTRALIA-NEBRASKA border and commence hostilities.

(3) All units implement appropriate security measures to counter threat of terrorism.

(4) PL GREEN defines the forward division boundary. Effective on battle handover from 208th ACR.

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OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

- (5) PL RED is corps BHL.
- (6) PL GRAY is division BHL.
- (7) OO division left-flank boundary effective on battle handover from 208th ACR to 55th Avn Bde.
- (8) OO brigade boundary effective on battle handover from 55th Avn Bde to MBA brigades.
- (9) MOPP level 0.
- (10) OEG: Negligible risk to exposed, unwarned personnel.
- (11) OO, division sector becomes a high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ).
- (12) Air defense warning status YELLOW; air defense weapons control status WEAPONS TIGHT.
- (13) Vehicle recognition signal consists of inverted V painted on both sides and rear of vehicle and outlined with thermal tape.
- (14) Authority to employ artillery-delivered FASCAM retained by 55th Mech Div CG. Authority to employ engineer-emplaced short-term FASCAM (Volcano mines) delegated to brigade commanders.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Concept of Support. X Corps initial priority of support is to 208th ACR, 209th ACR, 10th Corps Artillery, 10th Avn Bde, 55th Mech Div, 14th Avn Bde, 313th Sep Mech Bde, 25th Armd Div, and 23d Armd Div, in that order. The 55th Fin Bn, 185th Pers Svc Battalion, 10th COSCOM, 13th CSG (Fwd), and the 83d Med Gp provide support to 55th Mech Div and nondivisional units in sector from LSA CHARLIE (FWD) vic CUMMINGS (UP0670) and LSA CHARLIE vic PAOLA (UN3670). 55th Mech DISCOM provides support from DSA vic LAWRENCE (UP0818). Initial priority of support and replacements is to 55th Avn Bde, 2d Bde, 3d Bde, and 1st Bde, in order. Corps mortuary affairs augmentation teams will not be available until D+4. Replacement class VII (other than ORF) not available until D+10. CSR for selected items in effect. MSR CCC is restricted to use by CCC forces.

(1) Support before operations. Priorities of support and personnel replacements remain the same. Overall logistics focus is to improving combat readiness of the division and preparing for guard force mission, 85th MASH and elements of 825th Med Bn Evac displace to DSA and collocate with 55th DISCOM. 55th DISCOM establishes ambulance exchange points (AXPs) to support the division guard force in the vicinity of contact points 3 and 7. 580th Ord Co (DS) (MOADS PLS) ammunition supply

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OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

points (ASPs) locate in the division rear area (TP9814, UP2507, UP3812) and support corps artillery. Units may stockpile ammunition in battle positions and delaying positions as required. Mines and class IV will be throughput to class IV/V supply points at UP233515 and UP093412. MSB establishes division MA point in DSA and dedicates TMT company assets to move remains from division MA collection point to corps MA point in LSA CHARLIE. Priority of ground maintenance and evacuation is to tanks, Bradleys, MLRS, SP howitzers, recovery vehicles, forklifts, fuel vehicles, and cargo vehicles in order. Priority of aviation maintenance is to AH-64, OH-58D, and UH-60, in order. Initial priority for forward movement is to units, class IV, and class V. Priority of rearward movement is to casualties, corps covering force elements, division guard force elements, and EPW, in order.

(2) Support during operations. Initial priorities of support and replacements remain unchanged. Overall logistics focus is to supporting forces in contact. Aeromedical evacuation authorized as far forward as battalion aid stations. Priority of forward movement to classes V and III. Priority of rearward movement is initially unchanged.

(a) Corps battle handover and division guard force operations. 552d FSB operates AXP in the vicinity of contact point 3 and 553d FSB operates AXP in the vicinity of contact point 7. 555th MSB provides HET evacuation support to NMC corps covering force elements along MSR JEEP and EAGLE.

(b) Division battle handover and MBA operations. AXPs in the vicinity of contact points 3 and 7 displace to the vicinity of PL BLUE. Priority of rearward movement on MSR JEEP is 55th Avn Bde. Priority of support and forward movement shifts to 2d Bde, 35th Avn Bde, 3d Bde, and 1st Bde, in order. Priority of support shifts to 1st Bde when committed.

(3) Support after operations. After enemy second-echelon division is defeated, priority of support and personnel replacements shift to main effort of future operation. Overall logistics focus is to reconstitution of maneuver forces to 70-percent combat power so they can conduct offensive operations northward to clear enemy bypassed by the 25th Armd Div. OO, DSA displaces to the vicinity of CUMMINGS (UP0670). Priority of forward movement is to class III, class V, and logistics units displacing to prepare for future operations.

b. Annex Q (Service Support) and Appendix 1 (Service Support Overlay) to Annex Q (Service Support).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command.

(1) Main CP: UP196304 (TONGANOXIE), then UP295160 (DE SOTO).

(2) TAC CP: UP097405 (MCLOUTH), then UP168243 (RENO).

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(3) Rear CP: UN030755 (OTTAWA), then UP024120 (LAWRENCE).

b. Signal. Annex J (Signal).

ACKNOWLEDGE.

GOMEZ
MG

OFFICIAL

/s/Gamer
GARNER
G3

ANNEXES: A-Task Organization
B-Intelligence
C-Operation Overlay (Map A)
D-Engineer
E-Amy Aviation (TBP)
F-Fire Support
G-Air Defense (TBP)
H-Army Airspace Command and Control (TBP)
I-Electronic Warfare (TBP)
J-Signal Operations (TBP)
L-Deception (TBP)
Q-Service Support
T-Contingency Plans

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ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) OPERATION PLAN WHITE

| | 1st Bde | 2d Bde | 3d Bde | 55th AVN Bde | Div Ttp |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|---|--|---|
| M A N E U V E R | TF 4-2 Armor 4-2 Armor (-) C/4-77 Mech TF 4-3 Armor 4-3 Armor D/4-77 Mech 4-80 Mech | 4-78 Mech 4-79 Mech 4-4 Armor 4-5 Armor | 4-81 Mech 4-25 Armor | TF 4-77 Mech: OPCON; OO, atch 3d Bde 4-77 Mech (-) D/4-2 Armor 4-23 Cav: OO, Div Ttp 1-55 Avn (Atk) 2-55 Avn (Atk) | 6635th CA Bn: DS 1/B/200th PSYOP Bn: DS SOCCE: OPCON Bn, CTF: OPCON (TCF) |
| A V N | | | | 3-55 Avn (GS) 1/A/6-457 ATS | |
| F A | 4-41 FA (155, SP): DS 2-643 FA (155, SP): R 4-41 FA 1/E/20 FA: atch | 4-41 FA (155, SP): DS 2-643 FA (155, SP): R 4-41 FA 1/E/20 FA: atch | 4-42 FA (155, SP): DS 3/E/20 FA: atch | 66th FA Bde: OPCON ; OO, R 55th Mech DIVARTY 2-641 FA (155, SP); OO, R 4-40 FA 2-642 FA (155, SP); OO, R 4-42 FA; OO, R 4-40 FA 2-665 FA (MLRS) 2-667 FA (MLRS) E/20 FA (Tgt Acq)(-): OPCON | 55th Mech DIVARTY 4-40 FA (155, SP): GS; OO, DS 1st Bde D/43 FA (MLRS): GS; OO, OPCON 2-667 FA (MLRS) |
| A D A | A/4-441 ADA: DS | B/4-441 ADA: DS | C/4-441 ADA (-): DS | 3/C/4-441 ADA: DS; OO, DS 3d Bde | 4-441 ADA (-): GS C/1-432 ADA (Avenger): GS |
| C M L | 1/55th Cml Co: DS | 2/55th Cml Co: DS | 3/55th Cml Co: DS | | 55th Cml Co (-) 414th Cml Co (Decon): DS 423d Cml Co (Smoke)(Mech): DS |

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ANX A (TASK ORG) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

| | | | | | |
|------|---|---|--|---|--------------------------------------|
| ENGR | 31st Engr Bn: DS C/501st Cbt Engr Bn (Corps) (Mech): OO, X Corps | 32d Engr Bn: DS 500th Cbt Engr Bn (Corps) (Whl)(-): DS; OO, Div Trp 5080th Engr Cbt Spt Equip Co: DS; OO, Div Trp | 33d Engr Bn: DS C/500th Cbt Engr Bn (Corps)(Whl): OO, Div Trp | 501st Cbt Engr Bn (Corps) (Mech) (-): OPCON; OO, 10th Corps | 55th DIVEN Bde (-) |
| MI | | B. 55th MI (DS) | C/55th MI (DS) | A/55th MI (DS): OO, DS 1st Bde | 55th MI (-) 2/EW/210th MI Bn (TE) |
| MP | 1/55th MP Co: DS | 2/55th MP Co: DS | 3/55th MP Co: DS | | 55th MP Co (-) 270th MP Co |
| SIG | 1/1/A/55th Sig: DS | 2/1/A/55th Sig: DS | 3/1/A/55th Sig: DS | 4/1/A/55th Sig: DS | 55th Sig (-) |
| CS | 551st FSB: DS | 552d FSB: DS | 553d FSB: DS | 554th DASB: DS | DISCOM 555th MSB |
| | | | | | |

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ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) OPERATION PLAN WHITE

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: SIERRA,

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

OPLAN WHITE, paragraph 1a. Details of enemy contained in appendix 1 to annex B and ST 100-7.

2. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (PIR).

a. PIR:

(1) Will the 2 Army commit 3 and 9 MRDs along avenue of approach A?

(2) Will the 2 Army employ a forward detachment to secure STRANGER Creek bridges and crossing sites between EASTON and JARBALO?

(3) Will 2 TD be employed along avenue of approach B or C?

b. IR:

(1) Where are the 2 Army 2S7, SS-21, and 9P140 (AAG) systems positioned as the first echelon regiments cross the line ARRINGTON (TP8271) - CUMMINGS (UP-770) - DALBEY (UP2174)?

(2) Where are the 3 & 9 MRD DAGs (2A36, 2A65, 2S4, BM-21) positioned as the first echelon regiments cross the line: ARRINGTON - CUMMINGS - DALBEY?

(3) Identify the type and location of army and front-level engineer bridging assets (PMP, GSP/PMM-2, PTS) on avenue of approach B and C between PL GREEN and PL GRAY.

(4) Is the 2 Army main attack along avenue of approach C?

(5) Where are the 2 Army 2S7, SS-21, and 9P140 (AAG) systems positioned as the first echelon regiments cross PL GRAY?

(6) Where are the 3 and 9 MRD DAGs (2A36, 2A65, 2S4, BM-21) positioned as the first echelon regiments cross PL GRAY?

(7) Will the 42 IMRB be committed to the 2 Army attack?

(8) Does the 2 TD have the combat power to establish a defense north of PL GRAY?

3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS.

a. Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units.

(1) All 55th Mech Div units report, as obtained:

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ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

- (a) Number, size, equipment, composition, route and time of enemy patrols observed in sector.
- (b) Size, location, unit identification, and type of equipment of enemy battalions in contact.
- (c) Direction, location, size and type of enemy aircraft.
- (d) Indications of possible or actual NBC weapons use.
- (e) Jamming activity.
- (f) All incoming artillery and rocket attacks.
- (g) Locations, type, and size of enemy air- or artillery-delivered minefields with priority to MSRs.
- (h) Appendixes 2 and 3 contain specific collection requirements.

(2) 55th Avn Bde.

(a) After corps battle handover at PL RED report status of CROOKED Creek bridges in the vicinity of UP077665, UP068647, and UP045624.

(b) After division battle handover at PL GRAY report movement of local civilian population and refugees.

(3) 4-23 Cav (after division battle handover) report enemy activity vicinity PERRY Lake bridges at TP885447 and TP922352.

(4) 55th MI Bn.

(a) Provide one DS company to each ground maneuver brigade IAW task organization.

(b) Coordinate IEW support with 208th ACR MI company to ensure assets are prepared to work in conjunction with 55th Mech analysis and control element (ACE).

(5) Division Rear.

(a) Report sabotage attempts against supply depots, ammunition points, communication facilities, and MSRs.

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ANX A (TASK ORG) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

(b) Report movement of civilians and refugees that impedes present or planned operations.

b. Request to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units.

(1) X (US) Corps is requested to provide, as obtained:

(a) Location and formation of AAGs and AGRA.

(b) Locations of artillery and rocket units supporting 3 and 9 MRDs of 2 Army AAGs.

(c) Commitment of 2 TD of 2 Army.

(d) Commitment of 42 IMRB.

(e) Location and commitment of 2 Army attack aviation regiment.

(f) Location and direction of attack of enemy air force CAS committed in 55th Mech sector.

(g) Location and commitment of army and front-level engineer mobility assets.

(h) Appendixes 2 and 3 contain specific requests.

(2) 208th ACR is requested to provide indications or enemy attempts to cross PERRY Lake at TP880447 and TP884573.

(3) 313th Sep Mech Bde is requested to provide indications or enemy attempts to cross the MISSOURI River between UP332646 and UP357549.

(4) Leavenworth Militia is requested to provide, as obtained:

(a) Enemy reconnaissance and patrol activity in the vicinity of LEAVENWORTH.

(b) Enemy attempts to seize the bridge across the MISSOURI River in the vicinity of UP357549.

(5) CCC is requested to provide any commitment of battalion-size enemy airborne or air assault operations forces in the vicinity of Kansas City.

a. EPWs, Deserters, Repatriates, Inhabitants, and Other Persons will be reported to the division G2 IAW the SOP.

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ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIAL.

b. Captured Documents. Turn in to division G2 by most expeditious means.

c. Captured Materiel. Report type of material captured. Priority to improved T-80s and AT-6 systems.

5. DOCUMENTS or EQUIPMENT REQUIRED.

a Maps. All 55th Mech Div graphics will be issued at the 1:50,000 scale.

b. Subordinate units R&S plans submitted IAW SOP.

6. MULTIDISCIPLINED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

* * * * *

7. REPORTS and DISTRIBUTION.
IAW SOP.

APPENDIXES: 1 - Intelligence Estimate
 2 - Event Matrix
 3 - Collection Plan
 4 - Detailed Analysis of Area of Operation

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APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPLAN WHITE.

References: Maps:

- Series USACGSC 50-301, KANSAS, sheet 1 (HOLTON-HORTON), edition 1977, 150,000 (map A (sheet 1 of 4)).
- Series USACGSC 50-302, KANSAS-MISSOURI, sheet 1 (LEAVENWORTH-ST JOSEPH), edition 1977, 150,000 (map A (sheet 2 of 4)).
- Series USACGSC 50-303, KANSAS, sheet 1 (TOPEKA-LAWRENCE), edition 1976, 1:50,000 (map A (sheet 3 of 4)).
- Series USACGSC 50-304, KANSAS-MISSOURI, sheet 1 (LAWRENCE-OLATHE), edition 1977, 1:50,000 (map A (sheet 4 of 4)).
- Series USACGSC 250-140, WESTERN UNITED STATES, sheet 1 (ST JOSEPH-TOPEKA), edition 1976, 1:250,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Estimate: SIERRA.

1. MISSION

On order, 55th Mech Div defends in sector to contain the lead divisions of 2 Army north of PL BLUE to enable 10th Avn Bde to expose the second-echelon divisions to direct fires of the 10th Avn Bde north of PL GREEN.

2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

- a. Weather. Appendix 4 to Annex B.
- b. Terrain. (Analysis of area of operations).

(1) Key terrain

- (a) Road and rail networks-SABETHA (TQ6020).
- (b) Road and rail networks-HORTON (TP8394).
- (c) Road and rail networks-ATCHISON (UP 1882).
- (d) Road and rail networks-ST JOSEPH (UQ4204).
- (e) All fixed bridging sites over the KANSAS and the MISSOURI Rivers and the dominant terrain overlooking these crossings.
- (f) The KANSAS CITY (UP6025) metroplex, particularly the outlying transportation (road, rail, and watenvay) networks.

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APP1 (INTELL EST) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

- (g) The terrain generally lying east-west between LEAVENWORTH (UP3250) and PERRY Lake (TP8844) along PL BLUE.
- (g) The terrain along the north and south sides of the KANSAS River.
- (2) Enemy avenues of approach.
 - (a) Avenue A: Axis PAWNEE CITY (QV4242)-HOLTON (TP6572)- TOPEKA (TP6725). Capable of supporting two Nebraskii divisions west of PERRY Lake.
 - (b) Avenue B: Axis HORTON (TP8394)-OSKALOOSA (UP0042)- LAWRENCE (UP0615). Capable of supporting one Nebraskii division along the terrain just to the east of PERRY Lake.
 - (c) Avenue C: Axis ATCHISON (UP1881)-EASTON (UP 1857)-BONNER SPRINGS (UP3724). Capable of supporting one Nebraskii division along the terrain just to the west of the MISSOURI River.
 - (d) Avenue D: Axis ST JOSEPH (UQ4204)-PLATTE CITY (UP4759)- KANSAS CITY (UP6038). Capable of supporting one Nebraskii division along the terrain just to the east of the MISSOURI River.

(3) The effect on enemy courses of action. The open, maneuver-accommodating nature of the terrain generally favors the offense. However, the terrain, which is compartmented northwest to southeast, and the complementary heavy-lift rail networks will both support and canalize a Nebraskii offensive operation. PERRY Lake and the MISSOURI River system will canalize one, and possibly two, Nebraskii divisions within our division AO. The MISSOURI River poses a significant obstacle to east-west movement and will, therefore, be a deterrent to reinforcing efforts once first-echelon divisions become committed. Given that the Nebraska m objective is probably the seizure of KANSAS CITY, the army opposing our division in sector will probably use avenues of approach B and C.

- (4) The effect on own courses of action.

(a) The generally open, even nature of the terrain does not favor the defense. However, the absence of significant irregular and heavily vegetated terrain in the deep operations area will greatly enhance the destructive effects of friendly fires on the Nebraskii forces. These factors also favor a deep security zone forward of the MBA.

(b) If, in fact, the opposing Nebraskii Army deploys its divisions along avenues of approach B and C, our divisional forces will be able to form lethal kill zones between the PERRY Lake system and the MISSOURI River by reinforcing the natural obstacle value of these two features to impede east-west maneuver. Additionally, the KANSAS River to the south helps contain any Nebraskii offensive while adding to our ability to successfully defend against an assault of KANSAS CITY by fire or maneuver.

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APP1 (INTELL EST) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

(c) Although the MISSOURI River and PERRY Lake offer flank protection, we must maintain close coordination with adjacent forces.

(d) Numerous built-up areas characterize our AO. While Nebraskii forces will probably choose to bypass these areas, we must nevertheless prepare our divisional forces to conduct military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT).

c. Other Characteristics. The analysis of area of operations-55th Mech Div (app 4 to Annex B) contains information regarding relief and drainage systems, vegetation, surface materials, manmade features, and certain aspects of combat service support and civil-military operations.

3. ENEMY SITUATION

a. Disposition. Tab A to appendix 1 to annex B.

b. Composition. Tab B to appendix 1 to annex B.

c. Recent and Present Significant Activities. MTSUMs will provide updates, as they become available, regarding any out-of-the-ordinary, large-scale military movements, mobilizations, massing of troops and combat systems near the border areas, and increased levels of Nebraskii surveillance and reconnaissance using airborne platforms and human intelligence (HUMINT). The Nebraskiis have conducted large-scale, joint, field-training exercises during the last 6 months and have established a bona fide front HQ (in the past existing only during wartime). Significant activity has been the systematic rotation of 1 Army divisional regiments to relieve the 15 IMRB in its security force mission under the guise of providing troop rest and maintenance. However, these rotations also provide all elements of 1 Army with detailed knowledge of the terrain and potential attack avenues in the eastern sector of the EL DORADO panhandle.

d. Peculiarities and Weaknesses. See X Corps OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. The following COAs represent the capabilities of 2 Army, which would oppose the 55th Mech Div.

(1) Tab D (COA 1). 2 Army commander perceives that 10th US Corps is defending in unprepared positions. The army attacks with three divisions in its first echelon, the IMR brigade as its combined arms reserve, and the antitank brigade protecting the army's western flank. An MRD on avenue of approach A and an MRD on avenue of approach C conduct supporting attacks to fix the 55th Mech Div and 10th Corps reinforcing forces. The TD, as the army main effort, conducts an attack against a defending enemy along avenue of approach B to take advantage of the most trafficable terrain. An army regimental-sized FD would lead the formation to secure crossing sites across the KANSAS River. The immediate mission would be the far side of the KANSAS River; the subsequent mission, linkup south of KANSAS CITY with elements from the other army operating east of the MISSOURI River.

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APP1 (INTELL EST) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

(2) Tab D. Same capability as subparagraph (1) except that the TD, while still the army main effort, conducts its attack along avenue of approach A or C.

(3) Tab D (COA 2). 2 Army commander perceives that 10th US Corps is defending from partially prepared positions. The army, in an attempt to maximize its forces to achieve depth at the operational level, attacks with two MRDs in its first echelon followed by the army second-echelon TD arrayed with a TR as the first echelon and three regiments abreast as the second echelon. The antitank brigade protects the west flank of the army. The IMR brigade serves as the army combined arms reserve. Avenue of approach B supports the main attack with one first-echelon MRD, followed by the first-echelon TR of the second-echelon TD to employ the more open, trafficable, and maneuver-oriented terrain on that avenue. Avenue of approach C would accommodate the other MRD conducting the supporting attack. Lead MRD regiments will use advance guards to gain contact with the enemy and develop the situation. Depending on where he perceives the greatest chance of success, the army commander could commit up to three regiments from the second-echelon division on avenue B; he could commit up to two regiments on avenue C. The army combined arms reserve is centrally positioned to exploit success on either axis, but is anticipated to move on the axis of the main effort. The immediate mission would orient to a depth generally defined by the KANSAS River, at which point the I'D would be committed to achieving the subsequent mission south of KANSAS CITY. The first-echelon TR of the second-echelon TD would cross the KANSAS River and prepare to fight a meeting engagement with the division or corps counterattack force while the second-echelon regiments of the TD crossed the river.

(4) Tab D (COA 3). Same capability as subparagraph (3) above except that avenue of approach C supports the main effort and avenue of approach B, the supporting attack.

(5) Tab D (COA 4). Same capability as subparagraph (3) above except that avenues of approach A and B would accommodate either the main or supporting attacks in combination.

(6) The army can conduct defensive operations, in or out of contact with the 55th Mech Div, at any time.

(7) The army can conduct retrograde operations at any time.

(8) At any time, the army could be reinforced by the front airborne forces and fixed-wing air support.

(9) The army could employ chemical weapons in one of three ways:

(a) Using nonpersistent agents mixed with smoke to break through the covering force and establish artillery positions to support the main attack.

(b) Using persistent agents to block X Corps counterattacks if the CAA fails to achieve mission depths-immediate or subsequent.

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APP1 (INTELL EST) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

- (c) Using nonpersistent and persistent agents in combination with smoke to further protect exposed flanks during its offensive operations.

b. Analysis and Discussion.

(1) The 2 Army must fight through a corps covering force area and be subject to deep attacks from 10th Corps while advancing to the MBA. Lead-echelon regiments should be reduced before they reach the MBA. We can anticipate fighting the first-echelon regiments of the lead divisions at 60-percent strength and the second-echelon regiments at 80- to 85-percent strength when they come in contact with our MBA forces.

(2) The army could halt for up to 24 hours after the covering force fight to regroup for the continued attack by the second-echelon regiments. However, as indicated in subparagraph (1) above, the army will likely attack rapidly without stopping so it can retain offensive tempo and maintain attack momentum and pressure on the 55th Mech Div as the army attempts a battle handover. The Nebraska forces realize that any time invested for their regrouping will permit our reorganization as well, a contradiction to their offensive doctrine.

(3) Seizing KANSAS CITY would be a very optimistic undertaking, but given NEBRASKA's desperate economic state and its apparent nothing-to-lose political bent of recent months, the capability to attack lies well within the realm of the probable. Since NEBRASKA has limited ability to sustain combat operations, the offensive would likely be direct (limited operational maneuver) and well focused on KANSAS CITY. As such, the following avenue-of-approach analysis serves the army opposing the 55th Mech Div.

(a) A three-division army first echelon would not be likely, as the army has only three divisions and an IMRB. The army would not have enough depth to successfully attack along avenues of approach A, B, and C through a defense; cross the KANSAS River; and achieve a subsequent mission south of KANSAS CITY.

(b) The army commander will probably prefer to attack with his two MRDs in the first echelon and his exploiting force, the TD, in the second echelon. This battlefield structure provides the depth necessary to retain offensive tempo and momentum; it serves the required objective focus on KANSAS CITY; and it permits retaining the IMR brigade as a valid combined arms reserve.

(c) The army would not prefer an attack using a combination of avenues of approach A and B. The PERRY Lake system would disrupt coordination in the attack by the first-echelon divisions and would inhibit reinforcing efforts. Additionally, the second echelon, once committed, would have much less flexibility to exploit the greater success of the other first-echelon division sector, should that degree of success unexpectedly occur. Avenue of approach A requires traversing a much greater distance and, therefore, diffuses the focus on the operational objective, KANSAS CITY. The army commander would also deem too much terrain uncovered (i.e., avenue of approach C) and the force more vulnerable to turning movements and enveloping maneuvers by the 55th Mech Div and the X Corps.

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APP1 (INTELL EST) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

(d) Avenues of approach B and C seem to serve 2 Army interests very well. They accommodate the operational focus on KANSAS CITY, allow greater coordination in the attack between the two first-echelon divisions, accommodate the successful commitment of the second echelon, and permit greater protection of the forces overall. Either avenue could support the army main effort and the commitment of the second echelon.

5. CONCLUSIONS

a. Effects of Intelligence Considerations on Operations. The mission is supportable from the standpoint of mill- intelligence operations.

b. Effects of the Area of Operations on Own Courses of Action. The most defensible terrain lies along the ground defined by LEAVENWORTH/WAGNER Point (UP3257)-EASTON (UPI756)-WINCHESTER (UP0454)-LAKE PERRY/North (TP9053), and, alternately, LEAVENWORTH WAGNER Point (UP3257)-SW LEAVENWORTH (UP2849)-MCLOUTH (UP0940)-LAKE PERRY/South (TP9040). The best and most dangerous enemy avenues of approach into the division defensive AO are B and C, either of which could support the army main effort. Avenue of approach B is the better high-speed approach.

c. Probable Enemy Courses of Action.

(1) Tab D (COA 2). The most probable army COA is to attack at any time with the two MRDs in the first echelon along avenues of approach B and C, with the main attack along B and the supporting attack along C. The first-echelon TR of the second-echelon TD follows in avenue of approach B while the second-echelon regiments of the second-echelon TD move with two regiments (one tank and one motorized rifle) along avenue of approach B and one TR along avenue of approach C. The IMR brigade would serve as the combined arms army reserve and exploit success. The immediate mission for the first-echelon divisions would be approximately the KANSAS River; their subsequent, the establishment of a bridgehead. The immediate mission for the Army second-echelon division would be the bridgehead; the subsequent mission would be the linkup with 1 Army forces south of KANSAS CITY.

(2) Tab D (COA 1). An alternate army COA would be to attack at any time with all three divisions in the first echelon and the IMR brigade as the army combined arms reserve and only depth. The attack would likely include the three division-sized avenues of approach A, B, and C. As avenue B is the more high speed, it would likely support the tank division in a three-up scenario. In such an offensive, the far side of the KANSAS River would likely be their subsequent mission.

(3) Each COA would be supported with fixed-wing air and NBC and potentially reinforced with front-level assets in the form of artillery, air defense, and airborne forces.

(4) Tab E (2 Army High-Value Target List (HVTL)).

d. Enemy Vulnerabilities.

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APP1 (INTELL EST) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

(1) The Nebraska Front, while at a high level of preparedness, lacks the resources to wage protracted offensive action to an objective depth that would include KANSAS CITY.

(2) The Nebraskii forces are not well equipped for night fighting; they must rely on massive battlefield illumination to sustain 24-hour operations.

TABS: A - 2 Army Disposition
 B - 2 Army Composition
 C - 2 Army High Value Target List
 D -- Enemy Courses of Action


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TAB A (2 ARMY DISPOSITION) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B
(INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN WHITE



Disposition, 2 Army

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TAB B (2 ARMY COMPOSITION) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN WHITE

2 ARMY**3MRD**

DLV HQ
 11 MRR (BMP-2)
 20 MRR (BMP-2)
 22 MRR (BTR-70)
 24 TR (T-80)
 13 ITB (31 x T-80)
 61 ARTY RGT
 3 AT BN (MT-12/AT-S)
 28 SAM RGT (SA-6)

2 TD

DIV HQ
 3 TR (T-80)
 5 TR (T-80)
 16 TR (T-80)
 15 MRR (BMP-2)
 54 ARTY RGT
 22 SAM GRT (SA-8)

9 MRD

DIV HQ
 28 MRR (BMP-2)
 120 MRR (BMP-2)
 26 MRR (BMP-2)
 27 TR (T-80)
 21 ITB (31 x T-80)
 43 ARTY RGT
 9 AT BN (MT-12/AT-S)
 29 SAM RGT (SA-6)

42 IMR BDE

BDE HQ
 182 MRB (BMP-2)
 183 MRB (BMP-2)
 184 MRB (BMP-2)
 185 MRB (BMP-2)
 186 TB (51xT-80)
 42 SP HOW BN
 42 AD BN (
 42 AT BN
 42 RECON & REC BN
 42 ENGR CO
 42 SIG BN
 42 CML PROT CO
 42 MAINT SPT BN
 42 MAMT BN
 42 MED CO

NOTE: The following units are common to all division size units and will bear the identifier of their parent division:

RECON BN
 ENGINEER BN
 CHEMICAL PROTECTION BN
 SIGNAL BN
 MAINT BN
 MEDICAL BN
 MAT SPT BN
 CMTA BTRY

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TAB B(2 ARMY COMPO) to APP 1 (INTEL EST) to ANX B(INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th
Mech Div

2 ARMY UNITS (cont)

| | |
|---|--|
| 64 ARTILLERY BDE (90x2A36) HQ BTRY 1 HOW BN (2A36) 2 HOW BN (2A36) 3 HOW BN (2A36) 4 GUN-HOW BN (2A65) 5 GUN-HOW BN (2A65) 64 ARTY RECON BTRY | 4A1TACKHELORGT HQ CO 1 HELO SQDN (20xMI-24) 2 HELO SQDN (20xMI-24) 3 HELO SQDN (MI-8THIPC) |
| 78 MU RGT (54 x BM-21) 1 MRL BN 2 MRL BN 3 MRL BN 78 ARTY RECON BTRY | 14 ANTI-TAN RGT (54xMT-12/27xAT-6) 1 AT BN 2 ATBN 3 ATBN |
| 8 SSM BDE (18xSS-21) 1 BN SSM 2 BN SSM 3 BN SSM | 2 ENGR BDE 1 CBT ENGR (SAPPER) BN 20 BSTACLE BN 30 OBSTACLE CLEM ING BN 4 RQAD & BRIDGE BN 5 PONTOON BGE BN |
| 41 SAM BDE (27xSA-4) 1 BN SAM 2 BN SAM 3 BN SAM | 139 PONTOON BDG RGT 1 BN 139 PIN 2 BN 139 PSN 3 BN 139 PTN |
| 24 MATERIAL SUPPORT BDE 1 MOTOR TRANS BN 2 MOTOR TRANS BN 3 MOTOR TRANS BN 17 POL TRANS BN | 183 ASSAULT CROSSING BN |
| 43 INDEP RADIO RELAY BN | 44 SIGNAL RGT 58 RADIO BN 58 WIRE BN 58 RADIO RELAY BN |
| 2 SPECIAL PURPOSE BN | |
| 95 CHEMICAL PROTECTION BN | |
| 93 SMOKE BN | |

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TAB C (2 ARMY HIGH-VALUE TARGET LIST) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN WHITE

| <i>Category</i> | <i>Target</i> |
|-----------------|--|
| C ³ | 2 (Nebmskii) Army main CP 2 (Nebraskii) Army forward CP 3 Motorized Rifle Div main and forward CPs 9 Motorized Rifle Div main and forward CPs 2 Tank Div main and forward CPs 42 Independent Motorized Rifle Bde main and forward CPs Mercury Grass VHF radio relay Arty ACRV (BTR-60P) |
| FS | 64 Arty Bde HQ/COP 78 Rocket Launcher Regt HQ 61 Arty Regt HQ (3 MRD) 43 Arty Regt HQ (9 MRD) 54 Arty Regt HQ (2 TD) 2A36 (152-mm, T, 28-33 km) BM-21 (MRL, 20 km) 2S3 (152-mm, SP, 17 km) 2S1 (122-mm, SP, 15 km) 8 SSM Bde HQ SS-21 (70 km) HIND-D (Mi-24) Atk helicopter forward operating base (FOB) (6 Ind Cbt Hel Regt) END TRAY meteorological radar 2A65 (152-mm, T, 24-30 km) (<u>Front</u>) 2S4 (240-mm Hvy Mortar, 10-20 km) (<u>Front</u>) 2S7 (203-mm, SP, 37-50 km) (<u>Front</u>) |
| Maneuver | Regt FD Motorized rifle regts (MRR) in column Tank regts (TR) in column MRRs in assembly area TRs in assembly area Abn bde (<u>Front</u>) AT bde (<u>Front</u>) 2 SOF Bn AT regt (army) |

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TAB C (2 ARMY HVT LIST) to APP 1 (INTEL EST) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div


| | |
|----------|---|
| AD | 41 SAM Bde HQ 5 SAM Bde HQ SA-4 (70 km) PAT HAND radar fire control for SA-4 28 SAM Regt HQ (3 MRD) 29 SAM Regt HQ (9 MRD) 22 SAM Regt HQ (2 TD) SA-6 (24 km) STRAIGHT FLUSH radar fire control for SA-6 SA-8 (12 km) LAND ROLL radar fire control for SA-8 |
| RSTA | 2 Recon & REC Bn Div Recon Bns LONG TRACK radar (ADA 150+ km) FLAT FACE radar (ADA 240 km) TALL MIKE (10 km) BIG FRED (20 km) SMALL FRED (20 km) ARK 1 |
| Nuc/Chem | 152-mm arty and larger END TRAY meteorological radar SS-21 2S7 2A65 2S4 |
| Engr | Div engr bn HQ PMP (119m, Cl 60) TMM (82m, Cl 60) |
| REC | R33OP jammer Div DF site |
| Ammo | Army ASP Division ASPs |
| POL | Army POL site Division POL sites |
| Maint | N/A |
| Lift | HETs, Rail cars, barges |
| LOC | Bridges - Fortescue, St Joseph, Atchison, Leavenworth, Missouri river RRs - Missouri Pacific, Union Pacific, Atchison Topeka Santa Fe, Chicago Rock Island Pacific Highways - SH 7, SH 9, US 36, US 73 |

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TAB D to (ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION) to APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN WHITE




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TAB D to (ENEMY COA) to APP 1 (INTEL EST) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div




Course of Action 2

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
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TAB D to (ENEMY COA) to APP 1 (INTEL EST) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div



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TAB D to (ENEMY COA) to APP 1 (INTEL EST) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div



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APPENDIX 2 (EVENT MATRIX) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPERATION PLAN WHITE

| <u>NAI</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EVENT</u> | <u>NET</u> | <u>NLT</u> |
|------------|-----------------|---|--------------|----------------|
| 1 | UP077667 | LEAD MRB CONTINUES SOUTH (COA1) OR TURNS EAST ON MC2 (COA2) | H+50 | H+51 |
| 2 | UP142726 | - LEAD MRB ADV SOUTH ON AA A (COA1) OR TURNS WEST INTO 2D BDE SECTOR - FORMATIONS OF ARTILLERY MOVING SOUTH (COA 1 OR 2) | H+49 H+51 | H+50 H+52 |
| 3 | UP168730 | LEAD MRB ADV SOUTH ON AA C OR TURNS WEST ON AA B. | H+50 | H+50.5 |
| 4 | UP132638 | LEAD MRB CONTINUES SOUTH INTO 2 BDE (COA 1&2) OR TURNS EAST TO MILLWOOD ON MC3 (COA1&2) | H+51 | H+52.5 |
| 5 | UP196708 | LEAD MRB CONTINUE SOUTH (COA 1 & 2) OR TURNS WEST (POTENTIAL BRANCH) | H+50 | H+51 |
| 6 | UP180675 | - LEAD MRB CONTINUE TO ATTACK SOUTH (COA 1&2) - LARGE FORMATIONS OF ARTILLERY POSITIONING (COA 1 OR 2) | H+51 H+52 | H+51.5 H+53 |
| 7 | UP205660 | LEAD MRB CONTINUES SOUTH (COA 1 & 2) | H+52 | H+53 |
| 8 | UP220643 | LEAD MRB TURNS EAST TOWARDS KICKAPOO MC1 (COA 1&2) OR CONTINUES SOUTH ON MC2 (COA1&2) | H+52 | H+53 |
| 9 | UP131615 | LEAD MRB TURNS EAST TO MILLWOOD ON MC2 (COA 1&2) OR CONTINUES SOUTH ON AA B (COA 1&2) | H+53 | H+54 |
| 10 | UP130590 | LEAD MRB CONTINUES SOUTH (COA 1 OR 2) OR TURNS EAST TO EASTON (BRANCH) | H+54 | H+56 |
| 11 | UP350595 | AASLT TO SEIZE SHERMAN AIRFIELD WITH SUBSEQUENT MISSION TO SEIZE CENTENNIAL BRIDGE (BRANCH) | H+56 | H+58 |
| 12 | UP138538 | MRB CONTINUES SOUTH (COA 1 OR 2) OR TURNS EAST ON BN MC (BRANCH) | H+58 | H+59 |
| 13 | UP136510 | MRB CONTINUES SOUTH (COA 1&2) OR TURNS EAST ON BN MC (BRANCH) | H+60 | H+61 |
| 14 | UP225515 | ASSLT TO SEIZE KEY TERRAIN TO SUPPORT ATTACK ALONG AA C (BRANCH) | H+56 | H+58 |
| 15 | UP355550 | SPF SEIZE BRIDGE AND LINKUP WITH 1ST ARMY ELEMENTS (BRANCH) | H+58 | H+60 |
| 16 | TP970920 | LEAD MRB CONTINUES SOUTH (COA 1 & 2) OR SOUTHWEST (COA3) | H+43 | H+44 |
| 17 | UP025757 | SPF SEIZE BRIDGES OVER STRANGER CREEK (COA 1&2) | H+48 | H+50 |

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APP 2 (EVENT MATRIX) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE --55th Mech Div

| <u>NAI</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EVENT</u> | <u>NET</u> | <u>NLT</u> |
|------------|-----------------|---|--------------|--------------|
| 18 | UP024819 | - LEAD MRB CONTINUES SOUTHEAST ON AA B OR SOUTH ON AA C (COA 1&2) - FORMATIONS OF ARTILLERY MOVING SOUTH (COA 1&2) | H+45 H+47 | H+46 H+48 |
| 19 | TP935772 | LARGE FORMATIONS OF ARTILLERY (2S7, 9P140) | H+50 | H+52 |
| 20 | TP997706 | MRB MOVING SOUTHEAST ON MC1 (COA1) OR SOUTH ON MC2 (COA2) | H+50 | H+51 |
| 21 | TP815708 | - SPF SEIZE BRIDGE - MRR MOVING EAST (COA 3) | H+46 H+48 | H+48 H+50 |
| 22 | TP890574 | - SPF SEIZE BRIDGE DELAWARE RIVER - MRC MOVES EAST | H+51 H+53 | H+52 H+54 |
| 23 | UP045628 | SPF/FD SEIZE BRIDGES CROOKED CREEK OR MRR MOVE EAST (COA1) OR SOUTH (COA2) | H+53 | H+54 |
| 24 | UP103478 | MRB MOVES EAST (BRANCH) OR SOUTH (COA 1) | H+60 | H+62 |
| 25 | TP885446 | SPF SEIZE BRIDGE OVER PERRY LAKE (BRANCH) | H+60 | H+62 |
| 26 | TP930280 | MRR MOVES EAST (COA 3) | H+68 | H+70 |
| 27 | TP934247 | SPF SEIZE LECOMPTON BRIDGE OVER KANSAS RIVER | H+65 | H+68 |
| 28 | UP090410 | MRB MOVING SOUTH / SOUTHEAST (COA1) | H+64 | H+66 |
| 29 | UP062182 | SPF SEIZE LAWRENCE BRIDGE OVER KANSAS RIVER | H+65 | H+68 |
| 30 | UP184138 | SPF SEIZE EUDORA BRIDGE OVER KANSAS RIVER | H+65 | H+68 |
| 31 | UP380250 | SPF SEIZE BONNER SPRINGS BRIDGE OVER KANSAS RIVER | H+65 | H+78 |

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APPENDIX 3 (COLLECTION PLAN) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION PLAN WHITE

| | PIR / IR | TIME FRAME | INDICATORS | 1ST BDE | 2ND BDE | 3RD BDE | AVN BDE | DIV ARTY | CTF | MI BN | DREAR | CORPS |
|-------------------------------|---|----------------|---|---------|--|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------|-----|---|-------|-------|
| DP ☆ Re-posn 3rd Bde | Will the 2d Army commit 3d & 9th MRDs along AA A? | H+40 - H+48 | -increased Div recon on AA A -massing of maneuver units, arty, log. support -Phase I arty fires on friendly units in AA A | | | | | | | X | | X |
| IR | Where are the 3 & 9 MRD DAGs (2A36, 2A65, 2S4, BM-21) as the 1st echelon regiments cross the line: Arlington-Cummings-Darby? | H+48 - H+52 | 9th MRD DAG: 36 x BM-21 18 x 2A65 18 x 2A36 3d MRD DAG: 54 x BM-21 54 x 2A65 12 x 2S4 | | | | X NAIs: 2,3,5,20 | X | | X NAIs: 2,3,5,17,20 | | X |
| IR | Where are the 2d Army 2S7, SS-21, 9P140 (AAG) systems positioned as the 1st Ech Rgts cross the line: Arlington-Cummings-Darby? | H+44 - H+50 | 18 x 9P140 12 x 2S7 90 x 2A36 | | | | | X | | X NAIs: 17-19 | | X |
| IR | Identify the type and location of Army & Front-level engineer bridging assets (PMP, GSP/PMM-2, PTS) on AA B & C between PL Green & PL Yellow? | H+44 - H+58 | 32-128 x PMP (center) 24-64 x GSP/PMM 28-64 x PTS | | X NAIs; 9, 10, 12,132 2-24 | X NAIs: 8, 14 | X NAIs: 1,2,3,5,20, 25 | | | X NAIs: 1-3, 5, 8,20,22, 23 | | X |

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| | PIR / IR | TIME FRAME | INDICATORS | 1ST BDE | 2ND BDE | 3RD BDE | AVN BDE | DIV ARTY | CTF | MI BN | DREAR | CORPS |
|--------------|--|----------------|--|---------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|---------|----------|-----|--------------------------------------|-------|-------|
| ☆ 1st Bde | Will 2nd Tank Division be employed along AA B or AA C? | H+65 - H+80 | - 90 or more T-80s - artillery prep (50-60 minutes) | | | | | | | X | | |
| ☆ 1st Bde | Will the 2d Army employ FD to secure Stranger Creek bridges between Easton and Jarbalo? | H+40 - H+54 | - reinforced TR or MRR - IMRB - assault bridging assets forward (PMP, GSP) | | X NAIs: 10,121 3, 24 | X NAIs: 14 | | | | X NAIs: 10,12,13 ,14,24 | | X |
| IR | Where are the 3 & 9 MRD DAGs (2A36, 2A65, 2S4, BM-21) as the 1st Ech Rgts cross PL Gray? | H+50 - H+55 | 9th MRD DAG: 36 x BM-21 18 x 2A65 18 x 2A36 3d MRD DAG: 54 x BM-21 54 x 2A65 12 x 2S4 | | | X NAIs: 6,7,8 | | | X | X NAIs: 6,7,8 | | X |
| IR | Where are the 2d Army 2S7, SS-21, 9P140 (AAG) systems as 1st Ech Rgts cross PL Gray? | H+48 - H+56 | 18 x 9P140 12 x 2S7 90 x 2A36 | | | | | | X | X | | X |
| IR | Is the 2d Army main effort along AA C? | H+42 - H+48 | -massing maneuver units, arty, log. support - AAG systems: 2S7, SS-21, 9P140 | | | | | | | X | | X |
| IR | Does 2d Tank Div have combat power to establish a defense north of PL Gray? | H+70 - H+80 | 40-60% combat strength: - 150-170 x T-80 - 40-50 x 2A36 - 8-10 x 9P140 - 4-6 x 2S7 | | 6-8 | 4,9,23 | | | X | | X | X |

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APP 3 (COLLECTION PLAN) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

NAI RESPONSIBILITIES

| UNIT NAI RESPONSIBILITY | 1ST BDE | 2ND BDE | 3RD BDE | AVN BDE | 4-23 Cav | MI BN | TCF | DREAR | CORPS |
|----------------------------|------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|-------------|----------|-----|-------|-----------------------|
| | 28 | 4, 6-10, 12, 13, 22, 24, 28 | 4, 6- 9, 14, 23 | 1, 4-7, 21, 22, 29, 31 | 25-27 | 1-28 | 30 | 26-31 | 1-6, 11, 15-22, 25 |

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APPENDIX 4 (ANALYSIS OF AREA OF OPERATION) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to
OPERATION PLAN WHITE

References: See Base Plan

1. PURPOSE AND LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS

a. Purpose. To analyze terrain and weather conditions in the area of HOLTON (TP6572)--CARBONDALE (TP6600)-ST JOSEPH (UQ4102)-KANSAS CITY (UP6231).

b. On order, 55th Mech Div defends in sector to contain the lead divisions of 2 Army north of PL BLUE to expose the second echelon divisions to the direct fires of the 10th Avn Bde north of PL GREEN.

2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA

a. Climate or Weather Conditions.

(1) Climate. ***.

(2) Weather. Weather for August and September.

(a) Precipitation. Average precipitation decreases from August to September, resulting in improved off-road trafficability. Rivers and streams in the area flow below normal river stages. Some small and intern&tent streams may dry completely during this time of year.

1. Average precipitation.

August: 4.1 inches

September: 3.4 inches

2. Record high precipitation.

August: 14.6 inches

September: 6.5 inches

(b) Fog. Ground fog will be present between 0630 and 0900 during an average of 6 mornings in August and IO mornings in September, especially in low-lying areas and around rivers and lakes.

(c) Temperature. Temperatures in August are extreme; temperatures in September are more moderate.

1. Average daily temperatures.

August: 85°F

September: 76°F

2. Temperature extremes.

August: high-110°F, low-45°F

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APP 4 (ANAL OF AO) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

September high-97°F, low-24°F

(d) Wind. Wind direction remains generally from the south and southwest, averaging 6 knots per hour with gusts up to 40 knots per hour. An advancing cold front will bring winds from the north and northwest.

(e) Cloudiness. Ceilings of less than 3,000 feet with visibility of less than 3 miles on average occur about 50 percent of the days during this period. Visibility of less than 7 miles occurs an average of an additional 10 days a month.

(f) Atmospheric pressure. ***.

(g) Moon. OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps

(h) Light data OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR - X (US) Corps.

b. Terrain.

(1) Relief and drainage systems. The AO consists of a portion of the high central plains plateau region of the North American continent. It is traversed north to south by the MISSOURI River and from west to east by the KANSAS River, a major tributary of the MISSOURI River. KANSAS CITY, a large urbanized area encompassing nearly 120 square kilometers, is located at the junction of these two rivers (UP6131). PERRY Lake (TP9032) and CLINTON Lake (TP9810) are major water obstacles within the AO. These reservoirs generally canalize the terrain in a north to south direction. The area is dotted with numerous farm ponds and small streams and stream beds. STRANGER Creek is fordable in some locations after extensive bank preparation. STRANGER Creek may also be crossed with organic bridging equipment in some areas during this time of year. The PLATTE River may be crossed by fording or with bridging equipment in some locations. Both STRANGER Creek and the PLATTE River have very steep, high banks within the AO.

(a) The area consists of a plateau having a flat to gently rolling terrain that drains generally in a northwest to southeast direction on the west side of the MISSOURI River and northeast to southwest direction on the east side of the MISSOURI River.

(b) PERRY Lake is a large manmade lake that is a significant obstacle to east-west movement on the western boundary of the AO. Generally, there is negligible current flow in PERRY Lake, even with high winds and water drawdown. PERRY Lake has an average depth of 15 to 20 feet and a maximum depth of 55 feet. The lake is too wide at most locations to be bridged efficiently. While vehicles may swim or be ferried across, these operations can take place only where ramps have been prepared. Although crossing operations on PERRY Lake are highly unlikely, such operations are possible.

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APP 4 (ANAL OF AO) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

The area east of PERRY Lakk consists of a plateau that varies in elevation from 300 to 366 meters. A low ridge runs generally northwest to southeast midway between STRANGER Creek and the MISSOURI River. Changes in relief are gradual except along streambeds and along the MISSOURI and KANSAS Rivers.

(c) The MISSOURI River valley runs through the eastern half of the division sector. The river is the single most significant terrain feature in the AO. It meanders through a 3- to 4-km-wide floodplain with heavily wooded bluffs. The eastern side of the river has elevations that are 80 to 100 meters higher than the river valley floor. Intermittent bluffs along the western side of the river are of equivalent height in the vicinity of LEAVENWORTH (UP3359) and KICKAPOO (UP3 163); however, the western bluffs are generally lower than the eastern bluffs and offer less cover. The river averages 175 to 225 meters wide and is too fast for swimming operations (current of 1.6 meters per second at normal stage). The river averages 2 to 4 meters deep; however, certain parts of the river have a deeper channel. The river valley has numerous lakes and small ponds formed from oxbows of the river that serve as secondary obstacles to movement. Also, after a rain the river valley plain can impede movement because the alluvial soil is supersaturated. The most significant terrain features along the MISSOURI River are the heavily forested hill mass surrounding the town of LEAVENWORTH (UP3554) and the undulating plateau that stretches westward. These forested hill masses and the urban area of LEAVENWORTH-LANSING (UP3646) dominate the terrain and represent a significant obstacle for north-south movement. They are the central features of a long ridgeline that generally parallels the MISSOURI River valley on the west and extends from ATCHISON (UP1882) to KANSAS CITY (UP5535).

(d) The western part of this ridgeline is drained by the STRANGER Creek system. The headwaters of this system are in the vicinity of EFFINGHAM (TP9582), and the creek drains southward, reaching the KANSAS River at LINWOOD (UP2418). STRANGER Creek presents a significant obstacle to east-west movement, having a severely eroded bed with soft alluvial banks 1 to 2 meters high. After periods of heavy rainfall (greater than 1 inch in 24 hours), the creek may overflow its banks and make the surrounding plain impassable.

STRANGER Creek flows north to south in zone. During this time of year, the water depth is less than 2 feet in many parts of the creek. Also, the flow of water is usually less than 0.5 meters per second. The creek can be divided into three distinct sections for crossing.

1. Between points A (UP167657) and B (UP177603). The northern part of STRANGER Creek is extremely narrow, averaging less than 10 meters in width. In this section, it is possible to ford the creek after extensive bank preparation for both entry and exit. It would take approximately 1 hour to prepare each bank for fording. Recent heavy rains might make fording impossible for a short period of time after the rainfall. No bank preparation would be required to emplace AVLBs quickly in this section.

2. Between points B and C (UP184535). The average width in this section is 10 to 15 meters. Because of the nature of the terrain and saturation characteristics of the soil, fording would be extremely difficult. After several vehicles passed, muddy conditions would make the crossing site impassable to wheeled and tracked vehicles. A large engineer effort would be required to make a fording

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APP 4 (ANAL OF AO) to ANX B (INTEL) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

site stable and durable. AVLBs can be emplaced throughout this section; however, because of the instability of the steep banks, each AVLB site would require 1 hour of bank preparation.

3. South of point C. The creek widens considerably beyond this point to greater than 16 meters and AVLBs can not be used in most areas. The nature of the soil in the creek bed and the surrounding floodplain makes fording nearly impossible. The creek is neither wide enough nor deep enough to allow the use of float bridging. The only expedient way to cross STRANGER Creek south of point C would be by medium girder bridge (MGB), Bailey bridge, or some other form of fixed bridging.

Six permanent bridges span STRANGER Creek in sector. Two-lane bridges near EASTON (UP1857) and on Highway 92 (UP1850) are rated class 70 and are two way. The remaining four bridges are all class 15. At the time of this writing, all bridges were intact.

Farther to the west, a second ridgeline traverses the division AO from HIAWATHA (TQ83 15) to HORTON (TP8494). This ridge is generally wider, lower, and more rolling than the ridge paralleling the MISSOURI River. It is predominantly dry grassland and offers very little cover and concealment. South of this ridge lies PERRY Lake (para 2b(1)(b) above).

(e) The KANSAS River runs from west to east in the south of the division AO. It is another major obstacle, although not as formidable as the MISSOURI River. At normal stage, the KANSAS River averages 100 to 160 meters wide and 2 to 3 meters deep and has a velocity of 0.5 to 1.0 meters per second. The silty, sandy river bed, with numerous sandbars in the river and along its banks, impedes bridging and rafting operations. The banks slope gently to the river from north and south, offering little cover and concealment. The wide flat valley of the KANSAS River may be impassable after a heavy rain.

(f) Flood control in the MISSOURI and KANSAS River valleys is critical. As much as 350-million acre feet of water are stored behind dams along the MISSOURI River north and west of the AO. Destruction of these dams will cause downstream flooding and swift currents. PERRY Lake and CLINTON Lake each have earthfill and concrete dams that control flooding in their areas. If these dams are destroyed, a flood surge will saturate many downstream areas and increase the depth, width, and current velocity of the KANSAS River.

(g) South of the KANSAS River, relief and the drainage pattern are considerably less pronounced but generally adhere to the northwest to southeast flow. CLINTON Lake is a major water obstacle in this area.

(2) Vegetation. Vegetation in the area includes row crops (corn, soybeans, and milo), grazing land, orchards, and wooded areas. Farmers have not harvested the principal warm-weather crops in August, but normally start in September. After a rainfall, plowed fields will not support cross-country movement of tracked or heavy, wheeled vehicles. Deciduous trees grow along water courses, in windbreaks around field perimeters, and on the slopes of ridgelines. The tops of ridges are generally clear of heavy vegetation.

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The most significant vegetation is on the ridges east and west of the MISSOURI River and along the banks of major tributaries that run generally in a northwest to southeast trace. In these areas, deciduous trees with trunk diameters averaging 6 to 8 inches are mixed with thick underbrush that impedes cross-country movement. Wet farmland is present along principal tributary creeks as well as the MISSOURI River valley.

There is also heavy deciduous growth along the banks of PERRY Lake and in the tributary bottom lands feeding into the KANSAS River. The KANSAS River valley is a 3- to 5-km-wide floodplain of cultivated wet cropland. On the ridges north of the KANSAS River, vegetation is essentially limited to dry grassland prairie with intermittent cultivation of dryland crops.

Vegetation south of the KANSAS River valley is principally high prairie used for rangeland grazing and production of dry grass fodder, such as hay and alfalfa. The area surrounding CLINTON Lake is covered by heavy deciduous growth.

(3) Surface materials. Generally, the beds and banks of streams and the MISSOURI and KANSAS Rivers comprise fine-textured, limestone-type soils and frequently have exposed limestone bedrock shelf outcroppings. Cultivated areas are characterized by loose topsoil that is marginally trafficable after rain. Frequent moderate to high winds dry the soil; blowing dust is common in and around plowed fields during dry weather.

(4) Artificial features.

(a) Roads. Road networks run both north-south and east-west. Most of the roads are compacted gravel farm roads with good year-round trafficability.

The major north-south roads are Highway 73 from NEBRASKA CITY (TR5907) to HORTON (TP8294) and Highway 75 from NEBRASKA CITY to HOLTON (TP6571). These road networks are paved, two-way roads with intermittent four-lane segments. I-29 from the IOWA border (TQ7696) to ST JOSEPH (UQ4203) is a dual 4-lane highway. The gently rolling nature of the terrain will not generally restrict movement to roads in this area. Farther south, the north-south roads include I-29 from ST JOSEPH to KANSAS CITY; Highway 73 from ATCHISON to LEAVENWORTH to KANSAS CITY; Highway 159 from EFFINGHAM (TP9477) to NORTONVILLE (TP9965) where it joins Highway 59 from ATCHISON to OSKALOOSA (UPO043); and Highway 75 from HOLTON to TOPEKA.

The three primary east-west roads in the area are Highway 4-116 from ATCHISON southwest to STRANGER Creek and then west to HOLTON; Highway 92 from SMITHVILLE MO (UP6561) through LEAVENWORTH to the vicinity of ROCK CREEK (TP8147); and Highway 2440 from KANSAS CITY through TONGANOXIE (UP2031) to LAWRENCE (UP06 19) where the road divides, with Highway 24 continuing north of the KANSAS River and Highway 40 south of the river, both to TOPEKA.

The Kansas Turnpike-I-70 extends from KANSAS CITY to TOPEKA where I-70 goes west to MANHATTAN (QU1040) and the turnpike turns southwest to EMPORIA (QT4555). I-435 forms a

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beltway around KANSAS CITY and is not depicted on most military maps. It is a four-lane highway with some six-lane segments.

Other loose-surfaced secondary roads and some paved state and county roads cross the entire area generally in a north-to-south and east-to-west grid system.

(b) Railroads. Numerous railways generally extending from KANSAS CITY in a northwesterly direction toward OMAHA (off maps) and LINCOLN (PA9516) would facilitate the forward movement of heavy logistic tonnage and second-echelon forces. Two major rail lines service the TOPEKA (TP6825) to KANSAS CITY LOCs, offering an east-west rail network. A small village or town is usually located at each railroad junction. These junctions offer offloading and transloading facilities for heavy equipment.

Major rail lines parallel both the KANSAS and MISSOURI Rivers. KANSAS CITY serves as the hub for nearly all rail lines in the area. The major rail lines in the area are the ATCHISON-LEAVENWORTH-KANSAS CITY; LAWRENCE-BONNER SPRINGS-KANSAS CITY; and ST JOSEPH-KANSAS CITY. Heavy rail nets also extend south from KANSAS CITY.

(c) Bridges. Major fixed bridges of class 100 or greater cross the MISSOURI River at ATCHISON and LEAVENWORTH and on I-435 (UP4047). The I-435 bridge is a six-lane interstate bridge that is not depicted on many maps. Major fixed bridges of class 100 or greater cross the KANSAS River on 1435 (UP4423) and at BONNER SPRINGS (UP3824) and EUDORA (UP1813), as well as in the built-up areas of LAWRENCE and TOPEKA. Numerous smaller farm bridges crisscross small streams in the area. These bridges are generally class 15 or less.

(d) Other. The LEAVENWORTH area contains several heavily constructed prisons, including the Federal Penitentiary, the US Disciplinary Barracks, and the Kansas State Prison. Major built-up areas include KANSAS CITY, TOPEKA, LAWRENCE, LEAVENWORTH-LANSING, ATCHISON, and ST JOSEPH.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AREA

a. Tactical Aspects

(1) Observation and Fire.

(a) Weather conditions. Weather normally permits good air and ground observation. Weather is good to excellent for flying; low ceilings and visibilities associated with frontal systems and/or local thunderstorms may limit flight operations. Fog tends to be localized and exist for only a short time; it is generally not a problem.

(b) Relief. Because there are few major terrain features in the area, long-range observation is generally good. The areas east of STRANGER Creek, west of the MISSOURI River, and south of the

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KANSAS River afford excellent observation over adjacent lowlands. Heavy cross-compartmentalization in and around PERRY Lake and CLINTON Lake restrict observation and fire.

(c) Vegetation. During August and September, observation is generally reduced because trees and bushes are in full foliage. Also, row crops are not generally harvested until the end of September. High corn and milo fields will restrict observation.

(d) Manmade features. Water towers, grain elevators, and *other* tall buildings in urban areas provide excellent observation.

(2) Cover and Concealment.

(a) Relief. Ridges and folds in the ground provide fair concealment and some cover from direct-fire weapons. In general, creek and stream valleys provide excellent cover throughout the area. Row crops will provide concealment from direct fire; however, these areas offer limited concealment from the air. The reverse slopes of the bluffs overlooking the MISSOURI River, KANSAS River, and STRANGER Creek offer excellent concealment and cover.

(b) Vegetation. The tops of the principal ridges are generally bare and provide only limited concealment. On the other hand, the slopes of many ridges are heavily wooded and provide excellent concealment. The bluffs overlooking the MISSOURI River, KANSAS River, and STRANGER Creek are also heavily wooded and offer excellent concealment and cover. The vegetation will tend to hold fog, smoke, and chemicals in the area. Smoke will enhance the *natural* concealment available in the valley and along ridges.

(3) Obstacles.

(a) Relief. The rivers, streams, and lakes in the area constitute the major obstacles. The KANSAS and MISSOURI Rivers are especially formidable obstacles that will require planning and bridging assets for crossing. Many bluffs along the MISSOURI and KANSAS Rivers are too steep for tracked- or wheeled-vehicle mobility. Also, most of the farmland is marked by barbed wire, which could impede vehicular movement.

(b) Vegetation. Wooded areas on the slopes of ridges and bluffs overlooking water courses will generally impede movement. Row crops could impede lighter wheeled-vehicle traffic.

(4) Key terrain features.

- (a) Road and rail networks-SABETHA (TQ6020).
- (b) Road and rail networks-HORTON (TP8394).
- (c) Road and rail networks-ATCHISON (UP1882).
- (d) Road and rail networks-ST JOSEPH (UQ4204).
- (e) All fixed bridging over the KANSAS and MISSOURI Rivers and the high ground overlooking these crossings.
- (f) The KANSAS CITY (UP6025) metroplex.

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(5) Avenues of approach.

- (a) Avenue A: Axis PAWNEE CITY (QV4242-HOLTON (TP6572)-TOPEKA (TP6725). Capable of supporting two enemy divisions west of PERRY Lake.
- (b) Avenue B: Axis HORTON (TP8394)-OSKALOOSA (UP0042)-LAWRENCE (UP0615). Capable of supporting one enemy division.
- (c) Avenue C: Axis ATCHISON (UP1881)-EASTON (UP1857)-BONNER SPRINGS (UP3724). Capable of supporting one enemy division.
- (d) Avenue D: Axis ST JOSEPH (UQ4204)-PLATTE CITY (UP4759)-KANSAS CITY (UP6038). Capable of supporting one enemy division.

b. Combat Service Support Aspects.

- (1) Personnel. Severe heat and high humidity are common during August and September. Heat injuries will occur with prolonged wear of protective suits during extremely hot days.
- (2) Logistics. LOCs and MSRs are subject to interdiction and disruption through selective destruction of bridges over the KANSAS and MISSOURI Rivers.
- (3) Civil-military operations.
 - (a) Refugee movement will present control problems on all highways in the area. These problems will severely affect traffic flow across the KANSAS River.
 - (b) Inmates of the State and Federal prisons and patients at all hospitals will be evacuated from the area by host nation agencies at the onset of hostilities.
 - (c) Civil government is responsible for maintaining and overseeing the distribution of all civilian supplies, including food and medical supplies. The location and capacity of hospitals within the AO are listed below:

| Name | Location | Bed capacity |
|------------------|----------|--------------|
| Cushing Memorial | UP347526 | 94 |
| Munson Army | UP342577 | 55 |
| St John | UP354498 | 76 |
| Veterans Affairs | UP364497 | 118 |

- (d) State and local law enforcement personnel will remain in the corps rear area and will assist the corps MP brigade as required.

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4. EFFECTS OF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA

a. Effect on Enemy Courses of Action. The northwest to southeast compartmentalization of the terrain and complementary heavy-lift rail networks will both support and canalize an enemy army attack. PERRY Lake and the MISSOURI River will canalize one or two enemy divisions within the division AO. The MISSOURI River poses a significant obstacle to east-west movement. The army commander will probably direct his attack along either avenue B or C or both to reach his objective of KANSAS CITY. If the enemy employs chemical munitions, he will probably use nonpersistent agents in advance of a cold front, when the wind direction changes from a southeast to northwest direction.

b. Effect on Own Courses of Action.

(1) The openness of the terrain and vegetation will increase the effects of friendly fires on the enemy. The nature of the terrain and lack of cover favor a deep security zone forward of the MBA.

(2) If the enemy forces deploy between PERRY Lake and the MISSOURI River, friendly forces will be able to form a kill zone using these natural obstacles to impede the enemy east-west maneuver. The KANSAS River in the south also serves to contain the enemy attack.

(3) There are numerous built-up areas in the AO. Listed below are the location and type of major built-up areas with populations of 6,000 people or more within the AO.

| <u>Area</u> | <u>Cen mass</u> | <u>Type area</u> | <u>Type construction</u> |
|----------------|-----------------|--|--------------------------|
| LEAVENWORTH | UP3453 | Close, orderly block w/ residential | Wood/timber w/ masonry |
| LANSING | UP3648 | Close, orderly block w/ residential | Wood/timber w/ masonry |
| LAWRENCE | UP0514 | Close, orderly block w/ residential and industrial | Wood/timber w/ masonry |
| OSKALOOSA | UP0043 | Residential | Wood/timber w/masonry |
| ATCHISON | UP1781 | Close, orderly block w/ residential and industrial | Wood/timber w/ masonry |
| TONGANOXIE | UP1930 | Residential | Wood/timber w/masonry |
| BONNER SPRINGS | UP3725 | Close, orderly block w/ residential and industrial | Wood/timber w/ masonry |

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ANNEX D (ENGINEER) to OPERATION PLAN WHITE

Reference: OPLAN WHITE

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: SIERRA.

ENGINEER TASK ORGANIZATION

| <i>1st Bde</i> | <i>2nd Bde</i> | <i>3d Bde</i> | <i>Avn Bde</i> | <i>Div Trp</i> |
|---|--|--|--|--------------------|
| 31st Engr Bn: DS | 32d Engr Bn: DS | 33d Engr Bn: DS | 501st Cbt Engr Bn: Corps,(Mech)(-) OPCON; OO, X Corps | 55th DIVEN Bde (-) |
| C/501st Cbt Engr Bn (Corps, Mech) OO, X Corps | 500th EN Bn (-) (Corps,WHL) D; OO, DIV Trp | c/500th Cbt Engr Bn (Corps, Whl) OO, Div Trp | | |
| | 5080th Engr Cbt Spt Equip Co: DS OO, Div Trp | | | |

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy.

(1) Effects of terrain on engineers.

(a) Divisional crossing sites on the KANSAS River include fixed bridge locations (LAWRENCE (UP0518, UP0616) EUDORA (UP 1813), DESOTO (UP2916) LECOMPTON (TP9324), and BONNER SPRINGS (UP3824)) and the following assault locations:

1 UP0915 to UP1316 along avenue of approach "B"

2 UP2518 to UP2917 and UP 3116 to UP 3416 along avenue of approach "C".

(b) Crossing sites on STRANGER Creek north of MILLWOOD are good for regimental engineer capabilities. Division engineers will be needed to support a flank attack south of MILLWOOD. Standing bridges will speed the enemy attack.

(c) Good cover and concealment afforded by vegetation should be cleared as required so attacking forces cannot approach our defenses undetected.

(d) Conditions for digging in farm fields and low lands will be favorable and become more difficult on hilltops or near limestone outcroppings.

(e) Mines can be surface laid in uncultivated crop fields and in high grass and should only be required to be buried in cut hay fields and in roadways.

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(f) Rolling terrain creates considerable intervisibility and will require careful placement of obstacles to ensure they are tied in with terrain to prevent bypass.

(g) Levees in sector may require mining to prevent use as firing positions by enemy.

(h) Potential requirement exists for removal of power lines when establishing engagement areas.

(2) Effects of weather on engineers.

(a) CENTRALIA has received twice the average rainfall for July and August. Small streams are swollen, and major rivers are just below flood stage. This will limit enemy ability to conduct assault river crossings, fording operations and bridge bypasses.

(b) Debris in water and increased water velocity will hamper float bridging operations.

(c) Cross-country trafficability will be severely degraded in low lying areas. Combat trails and secondary roads may require crushed rock stabilization for extensive use.

(d) Due to wet conditions any removal of vegetation will severely reduce trafficability

(e) Wet conditions may prevent use of low lying areas as assembly and logistic areas.

(f) High illumination and long periods of available moon will enhance countermobility and survivability operations but will also favor enemy reconnaissance.

(3) Enemy engineer capability and/or activity.

(a) We expect to face the Nebraskii 2 Army conducting the main attack for the Nebraskii Front 2 Army engineer units include 2 Cbt Engr Bde, 145 Pont Brg Regt, and the 183 Aslt Crossing Bn. These units are currently located in assembly areas NW of LINCOLN. Divisional engineer battalions and regimental engineer companies are currently located with their respective maneuver units in the vicinity of the Nebraskii - Centralia border. The 42 IMRB, the 2 Army combined arms reserve, also has an organic engineer company.

(b) Enemy engineer capabilities.

1. Mobility:

(a) Water crossing capabilities for army level engineers units:

- Support for three crossing sites along KANSAS River with three pontoon bridges (PMP) 227m long x 6.5m wide, 60 metric ton.

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- assault 1 MRB or TB in one crossing with heavy amphibious Ferries (GSP).

• Movement support detachments (MSD) groupings give the enemy commander a potent obstacle-breaching capability. MSDs are ad hoc groupings formed from army, division, and regimental engineer units. Missions include route reconnaissance, mine clearing, repair/reinforcement of bridges, creation of tracked vehicle routes, and construction of bypasses. Composition is a factor of METT-T. Division units can form up to three MSDs. Each may have one or two of the following types of equipment: mine detectors (DIM), armored engineer tractors (IMR), truck-mounted bridges (TMM), tank-launched bridges (MTU-20), and mineclearers (MTK-2). Regiments can form one MSD. Divisions can be augmented with army engineer units to form more MSDs. Divisional MSDs operate on main routes while regimental MSDs operate on secondary routes. MSDs are normally employed behind combat reconnaissance patrols (CRPs).

2. Countermobility. MODs are ad hoc groupings formed from army, division, and regimental engineer units. The MOD mission is to deny key terrain to the enemy, particularly those avenues of approach that are suited for tanks. Army, division, and regimental MODs consist normally of three armored tracked minelayers (GMZ). MODs normally operate with antitank reserves to provide flank protection and repel counterattacks. Regimental MODs can also be found between an advance guard and a main body.

Mines the Nebraskiis are most likely to use include --

- AT mines: TMN-46, TM-62B, TM-62P, and TMK-2 mines.
- AP mines: OZM-3, POMZ- 2M, MON 50/100/200, PFM, and PMN mines.

Scatterable mine capabilities include -

| <i>Delivery system</i> | <i>Unit</i> | <i>Minefield size (m)</i> |
|------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|
| BM-21 | Btry | 1,000 x 300 |
| | Bn | 3,000 x 300 |
| 9P140 | Plt | 1,500 x 600 |
| | Btry | 3,000 x 600 |
| Mi-8 HIP | 1 hel. | 300 x 25 |
| | Flight | 1,200 x 25 |
| | Sqdn | 4,800 x 25 |
| Mi-24 HIND | 1 hel. | 150 x 25 |
| | Flight | 600 x 25 |
| | Sqdh | 2,400 x 25 |

(c) Employment of engineers based on enemy course of action (ECO A).

1. Lead MRDs will have to be reinforced with army engineer units to conduct hasty

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and/or deliberate crossings across the KANSAS River to reach their subsequent objective line. The 3 MRD will be reinforced with the 145 Pont Regt and 183 Aslt Crossing Bn to conduct the primary river crossing along avenue of approach B while 9 MRD will be reinforced with a pontoon bridge Bn and 24 GSPs out of the 2 Cbt Engr Bde to conduct a supporting assault along avenue of approach C. The river width at the assault crossing sites averages between 120 meters to 175 meters; therefore, the lead divisions are incapable of supporting a mech or tank heavy assault based on the organic assets found in the division engineer BN. SA-6 batteries will be positioned by lead divisions to support river crossing operations.

2. 2 Cbt Engr Bde will form four MODS with their organic GMZs. One of these MODS will augment 3 MRD while the remaining three MODS will reinforce 14 AT Regt, 2 Army.

2. 2 Cbt Engr Bde will reinforce 3 MRD with one combat engineer (sapper) company and one obstacle clearing company to augment 3 MRD movement support capabilities. The remaining movement assets in 2 Cbt Engr Bde will be used to reinforce 2 TD and 42 IMRB.

(d) Enemy engineer vulnerabilities.

1. The limited number of MTK-2s (projected line charge systems) available makes the enemy vulnerable to complex obstacles covered by direct and indirect fires. This lack of rapid minefield breaching will force the enemy to employ blades, plows, and rollers well forward to breach the minefields.

2. Because the IMR (tracked crane/dozer) and the IMR 1986 have unique capabilities and are scarce, finding their locations could possibly indicate the main effort of the division.

3. Enemy forces rely heavily on tank-mounted rollers and plows for minefield breaching. These plows and rollers are heavy and cumbersome, slowing a formation to 10 kmph. They must be mounted from trailers in assembly areas; this, increases vulnerability and slows operations. Plows and rollers will probably be mounted prior to an enemy assault on the covering force area.

4. Critical engineer assets are best destroyed with direct fires when on the march and indirect fires while in chokepoints, such as bridges, rivers, etc.

5. Presence of both regimental and divisional MSDs are indicators of main attack.

6. Employment of AT mines by GMZs is an indicator of the enemy establishing hasty defense and the presence of an AT reserve.

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b. Friendly.

(1) X Corps engineer organization for combat.

| <i>55th Mech</i> | <i>23d Armd Div</i> | <i>25th Armd Div</i> | <i>313 Sep Mech Bde</i> | <i>208th ACR</i> | <i>Corps Troops</i> |
|--|---------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------|
| 55th DIVEN Bde | 23d DIVEN Bde | 25th DIVEN Bde | 313th Engr Co | 208th Engr Co | 63d Engr Bde |
| HHd | HHd | HHd | | 540th Cbt Engr (Hvy) | 61st Engr Gp |
| 31st Engr Bn | 41st Engr Bn | 51st Engr Bn | | 541st Cbt Engr (Hvy) | |
| 32nd Engr Bn | 42d Engr Bn | 52nd Engr Bn | | 5047th Aslt Flt Brg Co(ribbon) | |
| 33rd Engr Bn | 43d Engr Bn | 53d Engr Bn | | OO, 501st Engr (Corps, Mech) | |
| | | 502d CBT Engr Bn | | | |
| 500th Engr Bn (Corps, Mech) OO 61st Engr Gp | | | | | |
| 508th Engr CSE Co | | | | | |

(2) Units capable of assisting in engineer operations include --

(a) 55th DIVARTY and 66th FA Bde for emplacement of situational obstacles (FASCAM) and smoke to protect obstacles from observation.

(b) 55th Avn Bde to provide sorties for Volcano minefield emplacement.

(c) 1/55th Cml Co. to provide smoke to deny enemy reconnaissance on obstacles.

(d) COMAFFORCENT fixed wing assets to provide situational obstacles support.

(3) Availability of host nation support. TBD

c. Attachments/detachments. See above and Annex A (Task Organization.) All attachments effective 00, Commander, X (US) Corps.

2. MISSION

On order, 55th Mech Div defends in sector to contain the lead divisions of 2 Army north of PL BLUE to expose the second echelon divisions to the direct fires of the 10th Avn Bde north of PL GREEN.

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3. EXECUTION

a. Scheme of Engineer Operations. Initially, engineers support the 55th Mech Div portrayal of a defense south of the KANSAS River by constructing survivability positions in AA OTTAWA and simultaneously improving routes of movement. Deception countermobility operations will be conducted forward of fighting positions and will enhance the deception story. Engineers conduct other deception tasks such as simulating bridge and road demolition preparation.

As they depart from A4 OTTAWA, engineers will support the division move north by positioning mobility assets well forward in march units that are prepared to breach and clear obstacles. Survivability and countermobility assets, along with classes TV and V, must also be forward to facilitate the rapid transition to defensive preparations. Engineer commanders conduct leader reconnaissance with supported maneuver commanders in order to identify system and obstacle locations.

At closure in assigned sectors, engineers quickly transition into defensive operations by falling in on predetermined vehicle fighting positions and obstacle locations. Class IV and V supply points will be established and operated by the maneuver commander within each task force sector. Mobility operations will continue on all supply routes. At the conclusion of the security zone fight and rearward passage of friendly forces, engineers will execute obstacles in zone A to close lanes through passage points.

During the MBA fight Volcano and FASCAM will provide situational obstacle support while mobility assets refit and rearm to provide mobility support to follow-on operations.

b. Priority of effort.

(1) In AA OTTAWA:

- Survivability-Deception positions
- Mobility-Departure supply routes and alternate routes.
Preparations for movement northward.
- Countermobility-Deception obstacles and bridge demolition.
Upload of classes IV and V basic loads for movement.

(2) During movement:

- Mobility-Breach and clear forward during movement. Route maintenance.
- Countermobility-MODS and UBLs move with maneuver units.
- Survivability-Assets forward in march units.

(3) Defensive preparation and execution:

- Countermobility-MBA.
- Survivability-MBA.
- Mobility-MSD support to reserves.

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c. Priority of support: 2 Bde, 3d Bde, 55th Avn Bde, then 1st Bde throughout.

d. Situation obstacles

(1) The commander's intent is to optimize the use of available FASCAM minefields to reinforce obstacles (existing and/or man-made) and/or assist in shaping the battlefield. Initially, 55th Avn Bde will have priority of support during their deep operations and in obstacle zone A. Priority will shift at battle handover to 2d Bde, 3d Bde, then 1st Bde.

(2) Emplacement authority matrix.

| System | Duration | Authority | Restriction |
|------------|----------------------------|-----------|---------------------------|
| GATOR | 15 days (long) | Corps | No use in zone G. |
| GATOR | 4 days (long) | Div | No use in zone G. |
| ADAM/RAAMS | 48 hours(long) | Corps | No use in zone G. |
| ADAM/RAAMS | 4 hours(short) | Div/ACR | |
| Volcano | 48 hours 15 day (short) | Corps | No 48-hour use in zone G. |
| Volcano | 4 hours | Div/ACR | |
| GEMSS | 15 days(long) | Corps | No use in zone G. |
| MOPMS | 4 hours | Div/ACR | |

(3) Tactical obstacles. Emplacement authority is delegated to brigade commanders, who may delegate the authority to TF commanders through obstacle belts. All obstacle belts must be reported to 55th Mech Div, ATTN: ADE, and in the Brigade OPOD by grids and/or overlay formats. There will be no use of hand-emplaced antihandling devices in any X Corps zones.

(4) Protective obstacles. Emplacement authority is delegated to brigade commanders, who may delegate to TF commanders, who may delegate to company/team commanders. Brigades are required to report to division as requested.

(5) Obstacle zones. Listed units are responsible for emplacement, overwatch, and reporting. Zones are effective on division main body departure from AA OTTAWA. The use of hand-emplaced antihandling devices is prohibited in all obstacle zones. All mine obstacles will be marked per division SOP and observed at all times.

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ANX D (ENG) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

| <u>Unit</u> | <u>Zone</u> | <u>Grids</u> |
|--------------|-------------|--|
| 55th Avn Bde | A | Area within division boundaries north of PL GRAY to PL RED INTENT: Disrupt enemy ability to seek cover/concealment off road network. PURPOSE: Improve effectiveness of air attacks by restricting enemy movement to roads. |
| 2d Bde | B | TP887447, TP884584, TP962615, UP000614, UP004425 INTENT: Turn enemy forces east of VALLEY FALLS into disruptive zone C. PURPOSE: Flow enemy into open terrain north of WINCHESTER in order to maximize use of direct fire systems. |
| | C | UPO04425, UP0006 14, UP086622, UP090470 INTENT.: Fix enemy forces in open terrain north of WINCHESTER. PURPOSE: Obstacle complex must fix the enemy in the engagement areas north of WINCHESTER to enable ME to complete its defenses to contain lead divisions of 2 Army. |
| | D | UP090470, UP086622, UP166630, UP171611, UP176499 INTENT: Turn enemy forces west of EASTON into disruptive zone C. RESTRICTIONS: No buried mines on roads in zone D. PURPOSE: Maintain mobility of 1st Bde during counterattack. |
| 3d Bde | E | UP176499, UP175569, UP17161 1, UP166630, UP187635, UP212640, UP227604, UP228591, UP225518 INTENT: Turn enemy forces east of MILLWOOD into blocking zone F. PURPOSE: Cause enemy to move east into engagement areas. |
| | F | UP225518, UP228591, UP227604, UP212640, UP221642, UP251656, UP253524, UP262516 INTENT: Block. PURPOSE: Enable the containment of enemy forces. |
| | G | UP262516, UP262519, UP253524, UP25 1656, UP266661, UP289677, UP297659, UP327615, UP342593, UP325566, UP318542, UP316528, UP319515, UP315507, UP316500 INTENT: Turn enemy forces west of KICKAPOO into blocking zone F. PURPOSE: Cause enemy to move west. RESTRICTIONS: No buried mines across route 73 within zone G. PURPOSE: Maintain mobility for 1st Bde counterattack. |

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ANX D (ENG) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

e. Subunit instructions.

(1) 55th DIVEN Bde.

(a) Responsible for tracking and coordination of all engineer operations in 55th Mech Div sector.

(6) Attach and detach units LAW task organization

(c) Regain control of C/500 Cbt Engr Bn at H+48.

f. Coordinating instructions.

(1) This annex is effective for planning on receipt, execution on order.

(2) Minimum destruction of civilian private and public property consistent with the mission.

(3) Ensure distribution of obstacle and mobility plans to prevent fratricide.

(4) Brigade engineers develop obstacle belts within assigned zones and submit to ADE, with individual obstacle reports to follow within 12 hours of completion.

(5) Lane markings for passage of friendly units through obstacles is the standard corps breach lane marking system.

(6) Obstacle material will be throughput by corps and prestocked at class IV and V points.

(7) Report available information on the following to the ADE:

(a) Location of bridges in sector that are less than MLC 60, due to design, damage, or sabotage.

(b) Location of host nation engineer material stockpiles and host nation engineer equipment in sector.

(c) Submit cl IV barrier material requests through supported unit S4.

(8) Armored units will utilize blade tanks to begin survivability positions prior to arrival of engineer equipment teams.

(9) Brigade engineer will ensure survivability positions for artillery radars operating within their sectors are prepared utilizing organic engineer units. Priorities will be coordinated between DIVARTY S3 and Bde engineer.

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ANX D (ENG) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

(10) Brigade engineers have the authority to plan for and execute bridge demolitions on any bridge of MLC 60 or less not on MSR or supply route if the demolition supports the brigade commander's defensive plan. Any bridge over MLC 60 that the brigade wants to destroy must be cleared by division.

(11) Each brigade has the responsibility to close all passage points, lanes, and routes through their sector on receipt of authority from division. Brigades can plan and prep the points, lanes, and routes, but cannot execute without authority from division.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

Class IV (barrier construction materials) are limited throughout division. C1 IV and engineer-related class V packages will be planned in preconfigured packages and pushed forward to the FSBs in bulk. Bulk shipments will be broken into preconfigured packages and pushed forward to class IV and V points in brigade AOs.

- a. MICLIC/Volcano CSR. Reloads per system per day.

| | Volcano | MICLIC |
|---------|---------|--------|
| Offense | 1 | 2 |
| Defense | 2 | 1 |

- b. Initial allocation of CCL packages is as follows:

| Unit/Pack | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
|--------------|----|-----|----|----|----|---|---|
| 55th Avn Bde | 10 | 64 | 48 | 40 | 16 | 4 | 4 |
| 2d Bde | 19 | 128 | 96 | 80 | 32 | 8 | 7 |
| 3d Bde | 19 | 128 | 96 | 80 | 32 | 8 | 7 |

- c. Location of class IV and V points are for planning and may be altered to fit brigade maneuver and obstacle plans with coordination through the ADE.

| CI IV/V points | Grid |
|----------------|----------|
| 1 | UP233515 |
| 2 | UP093412 |

- d. Initial allocation for modular pack mine systems (MOPMS) is 10 minefield units (suitcases) per engineer battalion and aviation brigade. CSR is three per engineer battalion per day and one per maneuver battalion.

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ANX D (ENG) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

e. Supplies.

- (1) Rock for supply routes and combat trails can be located at the following operational quarries.

| <u>Coordinate</u> | <u>Vicinity</u> |
|-------------------|------------------|
| UP386262 | SUNFLOWER |
| UP266442 | LEAVENWORTH |
| UP039247 | LAWRENCE |
| UP989268 | WILLIAMSTOWN |
| UP189567 | EASTON |
| UP244511 | HIGH PRAIRIE |
| UP299529 | MEMORIAL GARDENS |
| UP907528 | PERRY LAKE |

f. Transportation.

- (1) Class IV will be supported by the 273d QM Co (Sup) (GS), 19th CSB.
- (2) Support distribution from 580th Ord Co (DS).
- (3) Priority for air transport of classes IV and V is 55th Avn Bde, 2d Bde, then 3d Bde.
- (4) Brigades are responsible for transport of classes IV and V from class IV and V point forward.

g. Health services support.

- (1) DISCOM AXPs at contact points 3 and 7 support guard force.
- (2) Location of corps hospitals supporting 55th Mech Div.
- (a) 85th MASH collocated with 55th DISCOM in the DSA in the vicinity of LAWRENCE (UPO316).
- (b) 81 1th, 812th, and 814th CSHs located in LSA CHARLIE in the vicinity of PAOLA (UN3670).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command.

- (1) DIVEN CP will be located with 55th Mech TACCP.

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ANX D (ENG) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

- (2) ADE is located with 55th Mech Div main CP.
- (3) TAC engineer will be collocated with 2d Bde main CP.
- (4) Engineer succession of command is brigade XO; Cdr, 33d Engr Bn, brigade S3.

b. Signal.

DIVEN will monitor corps engineer net, division command, and others, per DIVEN tactical SOP.

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ANNEX F (FIRE SUPPORT) to OPERATION PLAN WHITE

References: OPLAN WHITE

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: SIERRA.

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence).

(1) Artillery.

(a) 2 Army artillery support consists of the 64 Arty Bde (five 2A36 cannon battalions, 152-mm, towed, 28- to 33-km range), the 78 Rkt Lchr Bde (three BM-21 battalions (122-mm MRL, whl, 20-km range), and the 8 SSM Bde (three SS-21 battalions, 70-km range). The Nebraska Front commander will augment 2 Army with additional artillery assets from the 14 Arty Div and the 27 high powered (HP) Arty Bde. The assets could include the following types of battalions: 152-mm guns (2A36, 2A65), 220-mm MRLs (9P140), 122-mm cannons (D-30), 203-mm guns (2S7), and a 240-mm heavy mortars (2S4). The 2 Army commander will organize his artillery for combat with emphasis on weighting the AAG with long-range shooters to form the basis of his phase I fires. He will augment the committed divisions with additional assets from both army and front to form the basis of the phase II and III fires. The 2 Army commander will retain control of the 8 SSM Bde.

(b) The MRD artillery support consists of a regiment of artillery that includes three 2S3 battalions and one BM-21 battalion. All maneuver regiments within the MRD have an organic 2S1 battalion. The TD artillery support is the same as the MRD, except that it has one less 2S3 battalion in its artillery regiment. The committed division commanders organize their artillery for combat with the artillery assets augmented from the army to form the division and regimental artillery groups. CMKB radars are organic only to the divisions and must be tasked organized to support the DAG(s) and AAG.

(c) Enemy artillery organization for combat based on ECOA:

| 2 Army (bns) | 9 MRD (bns) | 3 MRD (bns) | 2 TD (bns) | 42 IMRB (bns) |
|--|--|--|--|---------------|
| AAG 1 x 9P140 =18 1 x 2S7 =12 5 x 2A36 =90 ARK 1 radar | DAG 2 x BM-21 =36 1 x 2A65 =18 1 x 2A36 =18 ARK 1 rada.r | DAG 3 x BM-21 =54 3 x 2A65 =54 1 x 2S4 =12 ARK 1 radar | Retains all organic artillery 1 x BM-21=18 2 x 233=36 4 x 2S1=72 | 1 x 2S3=18 |
| 3xSS21=18 (2 launchers per b w) | RAG 1 2 x 2S3=36 1 x 2S1=18 1 x D30=18 | RAG 1 2 x 233=36 1 x 2S1=18 1 x D30=18 | | |
| | RAG 2 1 x 2S1=18 1 x 2S3=18 | RAG 2 1 x 2S1=18 1 x 2S3=18 | | |

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ANX F (FS) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

(d) Tube and rocket/missile comparison.

2 Amry/SSth Mech Div

| | Tube | Rocket/missile |
|---------------------------------------|---------|----------------|
| First echelon (AAG, DAGs, RAGs) | 4261144 | 126163 |
| Commitment of second echelon and IMRB | 5441144 | 144/63 |

(2) Air. Enemy forces have a substantial air force that is capable of establishing local air superiority. The Nebraska Front and 2 Army will use a combination of fixed-wing and helicopter assets for CAS. Enemy attack helicopter assets include two Mi-24 HIND D squadrons. The attack helicopters have no nighttime capabilities. Most likely employment of attack helicopters will be in a CAS role. They will be used to support the main effort and as a counterattack force.

(3) NBC. Nebraskii forces have no nuclear capabilities. Capability exists for biological weapons, but it is a largely ineffective and very limited capability that the enemy will not use. Nebraskii forces will use chemical weapons (GB, VX, and HD) under favorable weather conditions. All systems 152-mm and above (including 250-kg and 500-kg bombs) are chemical capable. The most likely enemy employment of chemical weapons will be to employ persistent agents during phase I fires to protect enemy flanks and target reserve and aviation units to fix these units in place. The enemy will be likely to use nonpersistent agents during phases II and III fires to disrupt and neutralize MBA forces along high-mobility corridors. The Nebraskii will use smoke extensively to screen their movement.

(4) Air defense. The enemy force has an extensive and modern air defense system employed throughout the depth of its offensive operations. 2 Army has SA-4, SA-6, SA-8, SA-13, and ZSU-23-4 systems supported by LONG TRACK (tgt acq), THIN SKIN (tgt acq), PAT HAND (fire control for SA-4), LAND ROLL (fire control for SA-8), STRAIGHT FLUSH (fire control for SA-6) and GUN DISH (fire control for ZSU-23-4) radars. Hand-held systems include SA-16 and SA-18 missiles. 2 Army will organize its AD to provide overlapping and point coverage with SA-4 for LOC, CPs, ASPs, fuel storage areas, and other key assets. Divisions can be expected to organize their AD assets to protect artillery groupings, CPs, logistics sites, and LOC.

(5) Up to 50 SPF teams will be operating in the X Corps rear. They are highly trained. These teams will interdict supply lines or disrupt or destroy MLRS systems, target acquisition radars, logistic sites, and C³ sites.

b. Friendly Forces.

X Corps concept of fires. OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR.

c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization).

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ANX F (FS) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

2. MISSION

On order, 55th Mech Div defends in sector to contain the lead divisions of 2 Army north of PL BLUE to expose the second echelon divisions to the direct fires of the 10th Avn Bde north of PL GREEN.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Fires. The purpose of fires is to support the division containment of 2 Army. Division FS assets must accomplish four critical tasks in order to accomplish this purpose: (1) execute fire support battle handover from 208th ACR in order to maintain continuous suppression of lead elements of 2 Army and disrupt Nebraskii phase I fires; (2) shoot SEAD and counterfires for 55th Avn Bde security mission to delay and disrupt lead elements of 2 Army in order to gain 6 hours for MBA defensive preparations; (3) destroy 50 percent of DAGs of first-echelon divisions and AAG to prevent phase II and III fires; and (4) provide SEAD for deep operations to support the destruction of combined arms reserves. Division deep fires will focus on RISTA, ADA, and FS. 66th FA Bde provides SEAD and counterfire in support of initial security mission and deep operations. 66th FA Bde will be the division counterfire HQ. Division close fires will focus on RISTA, FS, and maneuver. Brigades are responsible to neutralize RAGS and destroy mortar batteries within their sector. GS artillery will be positioned to weight 2d Bde fight. Rear fires are provided by the TCF mortars. Initially priority of fires is 55th Avn Bde, 2d Bde, 3d Bde, 4-23 Cav, and 1st Bde.

b. Air Support,

(1) General COMAFFORCENT conducts air campaign beginning D-day to establish and maintain air superiority and destroy enemy forces.

(2) Air interdiction (AI) operations. Division nominates targets to corps with focus on delaying and destroying 2 Army second-echelon forces in sector. Emphasis is on SSMs, MRL systems, artillery groups, and helicopter attack aviation assets. AI target nominations must be submitted to X Corps DOCC NLT 0800 hours daily for inclusion in the 72-hour targeting plan. DOCC will begin processing requests on D-3 for the D-day ATO.

(3) Close air support (CAS) operations. 55th Mech Div will receive 40 CAS sorties per day. For planning, CAS sorties will be subdistributed as follows:

| 1st Bde | 2d Bde | 3d Bde | 55th Avn Bde | Division |
|---------|--------|--------|--------------|----------|
| 0 | 15 | 10 | 05 | 10 |

A minimum of two sorties per mission will be flown.

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ANX F (FS) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

(4) Electronic combat (EC) operations. Annex I (Electronic Warfare).

(a) Priority of electronic support (ES) is to identify and locate enemy SAMs, antiaircraft artillery (AAA), SSMs, artillery groups, helicopter attack aviation assets, and maneuver battalions.

(b) Priority of electronic attack (EA) is to suppress reconnaissance nets, forward air control nets, regimental and divisional C² nodes, and division-level fire supports nets.

(5) Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations. X Corps will retain all R&S sorties.

c. Field Artillery Support.

(I) General

(a) Deep fires. 55th Mech DIVARTY initially positions 66th FA Bde assets forward to first support the FS battle handover with 208th ACR and then to support security operations with 55th Avn Bde. 66th FA Bde assets will not be positioned forward of PL YELLOW. Prior to battle handover at PL GRAY, 66th FA Bde assets will be repositioned to support deep operations into EAs ALVIN, RON, and BILL. Remaining GS units will be positioned forward to support security operations and deep fires.

(b) Close fires. Brigades are responsible for close fires. Fires are provided by the DS FA bns and reinforcing FA bns augmented with a Q-36 fire finder radar. Brigades transmit requests for additional FS on DIVARTY fire net.

(c) Rear fires. Provided by TCF organic mortars. Observed fires only in the rear area.

(d) Counter-fire. 66th FA Bde is the counterfire HQ. 66th FA Bde concentrates on the AAG and DAGs in that order. Brigade DS battalions and their reinforcing FA bns concentrate on the RAGs. Establish initial call-for-fire-zones (CFFZs) on templated locations of enemy artillery groups. Counter-fire priorities in order are rocket, cannon, and mortar systems.

(e) SEAD. 66th FA Bde is responsible for firing SEAD in support of both security and deep operations.

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ANX F (FS) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

(2) Organization for combat.

| 1st Bde | 2d Bde | 3d Bde | 55th Avn Bde | DIVARTY |
|---------|---|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| | 4-41 FA(155-SP): DS 2-643 FA(155 SP): R 4-41 FA 1/E/20 FA atch | 4-42 FA(155 SP): DS 3/E/20 FA atch | 66 FA Bde: OPCON; OO, R 55 DIVARTY 2-641 FA(155 SP): OO R 4-40FA 2-642 FA(155 SP): OO,R 4-42FA; OO, R 4-40FA 2-665 FA(MLRS) 2-667 FA(MLRS) E/20 FA(TgtAcq)(-):OPCON | 4-40 FA(155-mm SP): GS; OO, DS 1st Bde D/43 FA (MLRS): GS; OO, OPCON 2-667 FA (MLRS) |

(3) Miscellaneous.

(a) Targeting numbering system:

| | |
|-------------------|-------------|
| 55th Mech Div FSE | AA0001-1999 |
| DIVARTY | AB0001-1999 |
| 1st Bde | AC0001-1999 |
| 2d Bde | AD0001-1999 |
| 3d Bde | AE0001-1999 |
| 55th Avn Bde | AF0001-1999 |
| 4-23 Cav | AG0001-0999 |
| TCF | AH0001-0999 |

(b) Positioning restriction. Do not position firing units or fire-finder radars north of PL YELLOW,

(c) Authority to employ artillery-delivered FASCAM retained by division commander. Each brigade should plan for use of three medium-density minefields.

(d) Corps has retained control of all ATACMS. Preplanned ATACMS requests will be submitted IAW the timelines established for AI nominations. Requests for immediate ATACMS fire missions will be submitted to corps main FSE.

d. Chemical Support. Annex N (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Weapons).

e. Offensive EW support. Annex I (Electronic Warfare).

h. Target Acquisition. E/20 FA Bn (Tgt Acq) is positioned by and reports to 66 FA Bde. Initial priority of CFZ coverage are to 55th Avn Bde battle handover ground operations, division guard force ground units, MLRS units, and division TAC. Priority shifts to coverage of MBA battle handover

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ANX F (FS) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

operations, forward MBA units, MLRS battalions, cannon battalions, and division TAC and main CPs. See appendix 3 (FA Spt Plan) for specific target acquisition tasks.

i. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Division operations area. Initial deep area is defined as the area between PL GREEN and PL RED after battle handover with 208th ACR. Deep area is extended south to east-west 68 gridline after battle handover to the MBA units.

(2) FSCM. On order, coordinated fire lines (CFLs) are PL RED and PL YELLOW.

(3) Targeting Products. See Appendix 1 (Targeting Products) for high payoff target list (HPTL), attack guidance matrix (AGM), and target selection standards (TSS).

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

Annex Q (Service Support).

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL

a. Command.

(1) See base order for division TAC, main, and rear CP locations.

(2) DIVARTY CP collocated with main.

(3) DIVARTY succession of command: deputy Division fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), DIVARTY XO, and DIVARTY S3.

b. Signal. Annex J (Signal).

Appendices: 1 - Targeting Products (HPTL, AGM, TSS)
 2 - Target List
 3 - FA Support Plan (TBP)
 4 - Position Areas

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

APPENDIX 1 (TARGETING PRODUCTS) to ANNEX F (FIRE SUPPORT) to OPERATION PLAN WHITE

HIGH PAYOFF TARGET LIST

| Priority | Category | Target (range) | Purpose |
|--|----------|-----------------------------------|---|
| 1 | RISTA | FLAT FACE Tgt acq radar (240 km) | Deny early warning of deep attack. |
| 2 | RISTA | LONG TRACK tgt acq radar (150+km) | Deny early warning of deep attack. |
| 3 | ADA | STRAIGHT FLUSH radar (60-90 km) | Find & destroy SA-6 btry. Open Air corridor. |
| 4 | FS | END TRAY radar. SS-21 met station | Find & destroy SS-21 bn. Prevent phase I fires. |
| 5 | RISTA | Div recon teams | Deny disposition of MBA. |
| 6 | RISTA | ARK 1 CM/CB radar | Disrupt CF and locate AAG and DAG. |
| 7 | FS | 9P140 (40 km) | Destroy enemy AAG. Prevent phase I fires. |
| 8 | FS | 2S7(37 to 50 km) | Destroy enemy AAG. Prevent phase I fires. |
| 9 | FS | BM-21(20 km) | Destroy DAGs. Prevent phase II and III fires. |
| 10 | FS | Hind-D FOB | Destroy deep assets/catk force. |
| 11 | Maneuver | ITB in column | Destroy reserve. |
| 12 | Maneuver | TR in column | Support containment. |
| 13 | Maneuver | MRR in column | Support containment. |
| 14 | LOC | Highways 7,4, and 9 | Disrupt n-s movement. |
| 15 | LOC | ATCHISON Bridge | Isolate 2 Army. |
| Purpose: Enable 10th Avn to defeat 2 Army. Task: Contain 2 Army north of PL BLUE. | | | |

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APP 1 (TGT PROD) to ANX F (FS) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

ATTACK GUIDANCE MATRIX

| HPTL | When | How | Effect | Remarks |
|----------------------|------|-----------------|---------|--|
| FLAT FACE radar | P | AI/CAS | D | Plan in J-SEAD |
| LONG TRACK radar | P | AI/CAS | D | Plan in J-SEAD |
| STRAIGHT FLUSH | P | MLRS | D | Plan in J-SEAD |
| END TRAY radar | I | Atk hel | D | |
| Div recon teams | I | C-recon force | D | BDA |
| Ark 1 | I | MLRS/cannon | D | |
| 9P140 | I | Atk hel/MLRS/cn | D | BDA |
| 2S7 | I | Atk hel/MLRS/cn | D | |
| BM-21 | I | MLRS/cannon | D | BDA |
| HIND-D FOB | I | MLRS | D | |
| ITB in column | A | Atk hel | D | BDA |
| TR in column | A | Atk hel/AI | D | BDA |
| MRR in column | A | Atk hel/AI | D | BDA |
| Highways 4, 7, and 9 | P | TACAIR | Disrupt | Plan TOTs on choke points & intersections |
| ATCHISON bridge | P | " | | |

When: A - As acquired
I - Immediate
P - Planned

Effect: S - Suppress
N - Neutralize
D - Destroy

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APP 1 (TGT PROD) to ANX F (FS) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

TARGET SELECTION STANDARDS

| HPTL | How | TLE(m) | DT (min) | Remarks |
|----------------------|-----------------|------------|----------|------------|
| Flatface radar | AI/CAS | 500 m | 60 | |
| Long track radar | AI/CAS | 500 m | 60 | |
| Straight flush | MLRS | 150 m | 60 | |
| End tray radar | Atk hel | 1 km | 60 | |
| Div recon teams | C-recon force | 50 m | 30 | |
| Ark 1 | MLRS/cannon | 150 m | 30 | |
| 9P140 | Atk hel/MLRS/cn | 3 km/150 m | 30 | |
| 2S7 | Atk hel/MLRS/cn | 3 km/150 m | 30 | |
| BM-21 | MLRS/cannon | 150 m | 30 | |
| Hind-D FOB | MLRS | 150 m | 120 | |
| ITB in column | Atk hel | 1 km | N/A | Moving tgt |
| TR in column | Atk hel/AI | 1 km | N/A | Moving tgt |
| MRR in column | Atk hel/AI | 1 km | N/A | Moving tgt |
| Highways 7, 4, and 9 | TACAIR | | N/A | Preplanned |
| ATCHISON bridge | " | | N/A | Preplanned |

TLE-target location error

DT- dwell time

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APPENDIX 2 (TARGET LIST) to ANNEX F (FIRE SUPPORT) to OPERATION PLAN WHITE

| Line | Target | Description | Location | Remarks | Groups | | | | |
|------|--------|---------------------------|----------|---------------|--------|---|---|--|--|
| 1 | AB0001 | RI Hwy 159 | TP831888 | | A | A | A | | |
| 2 | AB0002 | RI Hwy 159 | TP830848 | | 1 | 2 | 3 | | |
| 3 | AB0003 | RI | TP960869 | | B | B | B | | |
| 4 | AB0004 | RI | TP991863 | Series GOLD | | | | | |
| 5 | AB0005 | RI Hwy 73 | UP014835 | Series GOLD | | | | | |
| 6 | AB0006 | RI Hwy 73 vic LANCASTER | UP024819 | Series GOLD | | | | | |
| 7 | AB0007 | Checkpoint hwy 7 | UP168857 | | | | | | |
| 8 | AB0008 | RI vic MUSCOTAH | TP839807 | | | | | | |
| 9 | AB0009 | RI Hwy 159 | TP887807 | | | | | | |
| 10 | AB0010 | RI (EA RON) | TP936796 | Series SILVER | X | | | | |
| 11 | AB0011 | RI (EA RON) | TP952796 | Series SILVER | X | | | | |
| 12 | AB0012 | RI (EA RON) | TP969796 | Series SILVER | X | | | | |
| 13 | AB0013 | RI (EA RON) | TP991795 | Series SILVER | X | | | | |
| 14 | AB0014 | RI vic EFFINGHAM (EA RON) | TP935772 | Series SILVER | | X | | | |
| 15 | AB0015 | RI Hwy159 (EA RON) | TP951771 | Series SILVER | | X | | | |
| 16 | AB0016 | RI Hwy159 (EA RON) | TP968774 | Series SILVER | | X | | | |
| 17 | AB0017 | RI vic MONROVIA (EA RON) | TP990778 | Series SILVER | | X | | | |
| 18 | AB0018 | RI vic SHANNON | UP080818 | | | | | | |
| 19 | AB0019 | ATCHISON Airfield | UP128820 | | | | | | |
| 20 | AB0020 | ATCHISON Bridge | UP184809 | | | | | | |
| 21 | AB0021 | Hwy 116 vic ARRINGTON | TP836710 | | | | | | |

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APP 2 (TGT LIST) to ANX F (FS) to OPLAN WHITE-55th Mech Div

| Line # | Target # | Description | Location | Remarks | G r o u p | | | | | |
|--------|----------|--|----------|---------------|-----------|--|---|--|--|--|
| 22 | AB0022 | RI Hwy 116 | TP932708 | | | | | | | |
| 23 | AB0023 | RI Hwy 159 and hwy 116 | TP981706 | | | | | | | |
| 24 | AB0024 | RI (EA BILL) | UP079751 | | | | X | | | |
| 25 | AB0025 | RI (EA BILL) | UP094751 | | | | X | | | |
| 26 | AB0026 | Hwy 4 vic PARNELL (EA BILL) | UP103750 | | | | X | | | |
| 27 | AB0027 | RI (EA BILL) | UP127750 | | | | X | | | |
| 28 | AB0028 | RI Hwy 4 | UP133792 | | | | | | | |
| 29 | AB0029 | Checkpoint Hwy 7 | UP167740 | | | | | | | |
| 30 | AB0030 | RI Hwy 7 | UP197709 | | | | | | | |
| 31 | AB0031 | RI Hwy 4 vic HAWTHORNE | UP093720 | | | | | | | |
| 32 | AB0032 | RI Hwy 4 (EA ALVIN) | UP011680 | Series BRONZE | | | | | | |
| 33 | AB0033 | RI Hwy 4 (EA ALVIN) | UP029689 | Series BRONZE | | | | | | |
| 34 | AB0034 | RI Hwy 4 (EA ALVIN) | UP044693 | Series BRONZE | | | | | | |
| 35 | AB0035 | RI Hwy 4 Vic CUMMINGS (EA ALVIN) | UP061704 | Series BRONZE | | | | | | |

RI-Road intersection

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APPENDIX 4 (POSITION AREAS) to ANNEX F (FIRE SUPPORT) to OPERATION PLAN WHITE

| Unit | Guard operations | MBA and deep operations |
|----------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| 4-40 FA(155) | PA 3-UP040585 AOF-6400 | PA 8-UP050515 AOF-6400 |
| 4-41 FA(155) | Positioned by 2 Bde | Positioned by 2 Bde |
| 4-42 FA(155) | Positioned by 3 Bde | Positioned by 3 Bde |
| D/43(MLRS) | PA 9-UP095510 AOF-6400 | PA 10-UP135510 AOF-6400 |
| 2-641 FA(155) | PA 2-TP995590 AOF-6400 | PA 7-UP015515 AOF-6400 |
| 2-642 FA(155) | PA 5-UP210580 AOF-6000 | Positioned by 3 Bde |
| 2-643 FA (155) | Positioned by 2 Bde | Positioned by 2 Bde |
| 2-665 FA(MLRS) | PA 1-TP935575 AOF-6400 | PA 6-TP960520 AOF-6400 |
| 2-667 FA(MLRS) | PA 4-140590 AOF-6400 | PA 10-UP135510 AOF-6400 |

PA-Position area

AOF-Azimuth of fire

PA radius for MLRS bn is 2 kilometers.

PA radius for MLRS brty is 1 kilometer.

PA radius for cannon bn is 1 kilometer.

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ANNEX Q (SERVICE SUPPORT) to OPERATION PLAN WHITE

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: SIERRA.

1. SITUATION

OPLAN WHITE, paragraph 1.

2. MISSION

OPLAN WHITE, paragraph 2.

3. EXECUTION

55th Mech Div is supported by 55th Fin Bn, 185th PSB, and the 10th COSCOM. CSS operations will be conducted IAW X Corps SOP and 55th Mech Div Logistics SOP Extract (appendix 2) except as specified in this annex. Appendix 1 (Service Support Overlay).

4. SERVICE SUPPORT (MATERIEL AND SERVICES)

a. Supply. Division receives supply support from 13th CSG (Fwd), 13th CSB; and 199th CSB located in LSA CHARLIE in the vicinity of PAOLA (UN3670). DISCOM will provide unit distribution of all supplies (less class V) to BSAs and operate supply points in the DSA for 55th Avn Bde and division troops.

(1) Class I. Division supported by 273d QM Co (Sup) (GS), 13th CSB

(a) Before and after operations ration cycle will be B/C/B. During operations ration cycle will be C/C/C. Issue cycle will be 2/2/2 on even-numbered days.

(b) Sundry packs, ration supplements, and bottled water will be issued at ration break points.

(2) Class II. Division supported by 273d QM Co (Sup) (GS), 13th CSB. BDOs are command regulated.

(3) Class III

(a) Division receives bulk POL support from the 220th QM Co (POL Sup) and 721st Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL), 13th CSB. The MSB will use TIP operations to deliver fuel to the BSAs.

(b) Division receives package POL support from 273d QM Co (Sup) (GS), 13th CSB.

(c) MSB and FSBs will provide limited emergency area support of bulk POL to corps units operating in the division sector.

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ANX Q (SVC SUP) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

(4) Class IV. Division supported by 273d QM Co (Sup) (GS), 13th CSB.

(a) All construction and barrier materials are command regulated.

(b) COSCOM will throughput class IV and mines to CL IV/V supply point (SUPPT) (ESP) in the vicinity of UP233515 and UP093412 in support of division barrier plan. Classes IV and V packs will be limited to the division CCL stockage objective. 2d Bde and 3d Bde will each receive 40 percent of the division classes IV and V CCL minepacks. 55th Avn Bde will receive 20 percent of the division classes IV and V CCL minepacks.

(5) Class V.

(a) SUPPT distribution from 580th Ord Co (DS) (MOADS)(PLS) ASPs and ATP in sector. Initial locations of ASPs are TP9814, UP2507, and UP3811. Initial location of 580th ATP is 55th Div DSA. ASPs support corps artillery and backup ATPs.

(b) 580th ATP will support 55th Avn Bde guard mission from DSA. Initial configuration will be ATP Pkgs 6, 11, 12, and 13.

(c) 551st, 552d. and 553d FSB ATPs will be configured with ATP Pkgs 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7.

(d) CSR for 55th Mech Div and corps artillery units in sector in effect D-day through D+3.

D-day

| DODIC | Type | 1st Bde | 2d Bde | 3d Bde | Div Trp | DIVARTY |
|-------|----------------|---------|--------|--------|---------|---------|
| D544 | 155-mm HE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 |
| D563 | 155-mm DPICM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 65 |
| H104 | MLRS, LP/C | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| PB93 | ATGM, TOW | 0 | 8 | 8 | 12 | 0 |
| D579 | 155-mm, HE-RAP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| PV29 | Hellfire | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 0 |

D+1 through D+3

| DODIC | Type | 1st Bde | 2d Bde | 3d Bde | Div Trp | DIVARTY |
|-------|----------------|---------|--------|--------|---------|---------|
| D544 | 155-mm HE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 |
| D563 | 155-mm DPICM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 |
| H104 | MLRS, LP/C | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| PB93 | ATGM, TOW | 12 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 0 |
| D579 | 155-mm, HE-RIP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| PV29 | Hellfire | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 |

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ANX Q (SVC SUP) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

(6) Class VI. Division supported by 273d QM Co (Sup) (GS), 13th CSB. Sundry packs issued with class I.

(7) Class VII. Division supported by 257th QM Hvy Mat Sup Co (GS), 20th S&S Bn, 20th CSG (Rear), located in LSA ALPHA.

(a) All tracked vehicles, wheeled vehicles, and aircraft are command regulated.

(b) Class VII replacement items will not be available from X Corps until D+10.

(c) The 555th MSB deployed with the division ORF stockage. The following class VII replacement items are available at the DSA. ORF stockage is authorized for issue as replacement class VII on D-day. ORF issue is command regulated. Listed below are ORF stocks currently fully mission capable (FMC).

M1A2 (tank): 7
M2A1 (BFV): 6
M3A2 (CFV): 4
M121 (120-mm mortar, tracked): 2
M109A6 (155-mm howitzer, SP): 2
M577 (CP, tracked): 2
M88 (recovery vehicle, tracked): 2
M977 (HEMTT, cgo): 4
M978 (HEM-IT, POL): 4
M998 (HMMWV): 4

(8) Class VIII. Distribution of medical supplies is from 827th Med Bn Log (Fwd) and 80th Med Bde, located in LSA ALPHA (TN8229).

(9) Class IX.

(a) Critical shortages exist in the following repair parts:

1. Tank engines, M1A2 series.
2. Transmissions, 5-ton truck.
3. Transmissions, M2/M3 series.
4. Final drive, M109A6 howitzer.
5. Engine, M88A1.

(b) Cannibalization (except of stockage items) is authorized at DS level only.

(c) Unserviceable end items and major assemblies must be recovered to collection points and evacuated to appropriate maintenance without delay.

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ANX Q (SVC SUP) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

(10) Class X. No stocks currently on hand.

(11) Water.

(a) The 555th MSB will locate reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs) in each BSA and will locate one unit in the DSA.

(b) Purification tablets and bottled water will be issued through class I point.

b. Transportation.

(1) Division Transportation Officer (DTO) located at division main CP. Movement Control Officer (MCO) located at DISCOM HQ.

(2) Ten or more vehicles on MSRs constitute a convoy and require movement clearance

(3) Bridges on all primary and secondary highways can be considered class 70 or higher

(4) Corps MSRs traversing the division sector remain under corps control throughout the operation. DTO will clear all convoy movement with 4104th MCC.

c. Services.

(1) Mortuary augmentation teams from the 20th Coll Co (MA) will not be available until D+4. Units will establish MA collection points to recover and evacuate remains IAW the division SOP.

(2) Shower, laundry, and clothing repair (SLCR) will be provided by 291st QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS), 199th CSB, IAW the division SOP.

d. Labor. None provided.

e Maintenance.

(1) Repair time limits.

(a) DS: 36 hrs.

(b) DS backup: 96 hrs.

(2) Ground maintenance priorities.

(a) Tanks.

(b) Bradleys.

(c) MLRS.

(d) Howitzers.

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ANX Q (SVC SUP) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

- (e) Recovery vehicles.
- (f) Forklifts.
- (g) Fuel vehicles.
- (h) Cargo vehicles.

(3) Aviation maintenance priorities.

- (a) AH-64.
- (b) OH-58D.
- (c) UH-60.

(4) Division maintenance collection point is located in the DSA (UP0914). Corps maintenance collection points are located along I-70. Corps maintenance collection points in the division sector are located at WALKER School (UP3629) and LAWRENCE (UP0718) interchange. Appendix 1 (Service Support Overlay).

5. MEDICAL EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

a. Evacuation.

- (1) Corps evacuation policy is 7 days
- (2) Preferred means of patient evacuation is air ambulance

(3) 55th Mech Div supported by 825th Med Bn Evac. The 861st and 862d Med Co Air Amb are DS to 55th Mech Div on D-day. The 855th Med Co Gnd Amb is DS to 55th Mech Div on D-2.

(4) DISCOM will establish AXPs at contact points 3 and 7 to support the division guard force. 552d FSB operates the AXP at contact point 3 and 553d FSB operates the AXP at contact point 7. One ambulance platoon from 855th Med Co Gnd Amb will be located at each AXP. A minimum of two air ambulances from 861st Med Co Air Amb will be located at each AXP. AXPs will displace to PL BLUE at completion of division battle handover.

b. Hospitalization.

(1) 55th Mech Div is supported by 83d Med Gp located in LSA CHARLIE in the vicinity of OSAWATOMIE (UN3065). Locations of corps hospitals supporting 55th Mech Div:

- (a) 85th MASH collocated with 55th DISCOM in the DSA in the vicinity of LAWRENCE (UP0316).
- (b) 811th, 812th and 814th CSHs located in LSA CHARLIE in the vicinity of PAOLA (UN3670).

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ANX Q (SVC SUP) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

(2) Division medical treatment facilities located in the BSAs and the DSA. Appendix 1 (Service Support Overlay).

(3) Medical units will camouflage and not display distinctive markings unless under direct attack.

6. PERSONNEL

a. Maintenance of Unit Strength.

(1) The division expects 92 replacements per day

(2) Initial priority of replacements is 55th Avn Bde, 2d Bde, 3d Bde, and 1st Bde, in order.

b. Personnel Management.

(1) Personnel management will be IAW division and corps SOP. 185th Pers Svc Bn is DS to the division and will collocate with the division G1.

(2) 55th Mech Div EPW collection points will be established IAW the division SOP. Corps EPW collection point is located in LSA ALPHA, in the vicinity of COLONY (TN9218). Appendix 1 (Service Support Overlay).

c. Development/Maintenance of Morale. IAW SOP.

(1) Postal support provided by 145th Postal Co collocated with 13th CSG in LSA CHARLIE, (UN3670).

(2) Finance support available from 55th Fin Bn, collocated with 13th CSG in LSA CHARLIE,

d. Discipline, Law, and Order

(1) Civilian establishments are off limits.

(2) Civilian curfew 2000 to 0600 daily.

7. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

a. Refugee control handled by local civil authorities,

b. Incidents involving civilian death or injury or civilian property damage caused by military personnel will be reported to G5 by quickest means.

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ANX Q (SVC SUP) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

8. MISCELLANEOUS

a. 55th Mech Div rear boundary is corps light line in 55th Mech Div sector.

b. Emergency destruction of supplies and equipment (except medical items) is authorized to prevent capture by enemy.

Appendices 1 -- Service Support Overlay (TBP)
 2 -- Logistic/Personnel Standing Operating Procedures(SOP) Extract - 55th Mech Div.
 3 -- Standard Requirement Code

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APPENDIX 2 (STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES) to ANNEX Q (SERVICE SUPPORT) to OPERATION PLAN WHITE

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE-55th Mech Div

1. GENERAL

The following logistics/personnel SOP extract provides specific information concerning the logistics and personnel procedures the 55th Mech Div uses. This SOP should be used as a basis for logistic and personnel planning. You may refer to this SOP extract when briefing or writing concepts of support.

2. PERSONNEL

a. Personnel accounting and strength reporting (PASR) system. Brigade HQs provide all strength-related reports for all units task-organized under them (attached). The C²SRS is the primary means of reporting personnel strengths. Units will use the manual PSR as backup.

b. Personnel replacement operations. Assignment of enlisted soldiers is made to battalion, separate company, or detachment level. Officer and warrant officer assignments are made to brigade level. The G1 coordinates movement of replacements to the gaining unit. Primary transportation means is 5-ton trucks from the MSB TMT company. Replacements will be held in the division rear during offensive operations.

c. Casualty reporting. DA Form 1155 (Witness Statement) and DA Form 1156 (Casualty Feeder Report) will be used to report casualties. Unit personnel and administration centers (PACs) initiate casualty reports using the TACCS program.

d. Postal. The G1 will notify units when mail is ready for pickup. Units will pick up mail from the postal services unit providing support to the division. Transporting mail is a unit responsibility.

e. Finance. The G1 coordinates soldier finance support. Finance support teams will operate as far forward as possible. Each battalion or separate company will appoint primary and alternate field ordering officers and class A agents for local purchase funding and pay support.

f. Combat Health Support. The patient holding policy for the division is 72 hours at the FSB or MSB. The parent unit transports RTD patients from the FSB or MSB. RTD patients outside the division area process through the AG replacement system. Units will train and certify a minimum of one combat lifesaver per squad, section, crew, team, or other independently operating element. In addition, each combat vehicle will contain a minimum of one certified combat lifesaver. The division surgeon is responsible for the combat lifesaver program.

g. Staff judge advocate. The SJA dedicates a judge advocate (JA) to each maneuver brigade, the aviation brigade, and the DISCOM.

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APP 2 (SOP) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

h. Public affairs. Only media personnel who are accredited in the theater of operations are authorized to function in the division AO. PAO personnel must escort all members of the media.

i. Chaplain activities. Priority of chaplain coverage is to combat units, medical facilities, and MA collection points.

j. Inspector general activities. The IG will operate from the division rear CP. The IG will provide support as far forward as unit areas.

k. Enemy prisoner of war operations. Each brigade-sized element will establish an EPW collection point. Units must man and operate brigade EPW points. Brigade must transport EPWs from brigade to division collection points. The provost marshal will establish a division EPW point in the DSA. The fourth and fifth platoons normally establish the division central EPW collection point. The division will transport EPWs from the division collection point to the corps collection point. If transportation assets are not available, the DTO will coordinate with the CMCC for transportation assets.

l. Civil-military operations center (CMOC). The G5 will operate the CMOC from the division rear command post. Each brigade-sized element will be augmented with a designated S5 officer during combat operations.

3. SERVICES

a. Shower, laundry, and clothing repair (SLCR). COSCOM provides SLCR services on an area support basis. SLCR services will be provided as far forward as BSA locations when the tactical situation allows. Unit S4s will coordinate SLCR services. These services will normally be suspended during combat operations.

b. Mortuary affairs

(1) Each brigade-sized element will establish a MA point. Brigades will train and identify soldiers to man the MA point until COSCOM provides the required augmentation. The MSB will establish the division MA collection point in the DSA and will dedicate TMT company trucks to transport remains to the corps collection point. The division band will provide soldiers to man the division MA point located in the DSA.

(2) Units will initially search, recover, identify, and transport remains to brigade or division MA collection points. Brigades will transport remains to the division collection point, Division will transport remains to corps collection points.

(3) MA procedures for deceased allied, civilian, and enemy personnel will be similar to those for deceased US soldiers. Allied, civilian, and enemy dead will be processed IAW FM 10-63.

(4) Units will process contaminated remains under STANAG 2070 emergency war burial

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APP 2 (SOP) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

procedures. Do not transport contaminated remains to MA points.

c. Airdrop and sling-load operations

(1) Units receiving resupply by airdrop will recover airdrop equipment to the DISCOM (FSB or MSB). The DISCOM will transport and/or return airdrop equipment to corps.

(2) The DISCOM will train and certify a minimum of 10 soldiers per MSB and FSB in helicopter sling-loading procedures. Each MSB and/or FSB will include 20 sling-load sets in its basic load (slings, pallets, nylon webbing, chain-link slings, and clevises). Units receiving supplies by sling-load will recover and return sling-load sets to the DISCOM.

(3) The aviation brigade will provide a minimum of two UH-60s to the DISCOM daily for logistics operations. The DISCOM may coordinate for additional assets as required.

4. CLASS I

The division basic load consists of MREs only. The DISCOM carries 2 DofS. Unit vehicles will carry 3 DofS. Sundry packs (male and female) are carried with the class I basic load. Units carry 7 DofS and the DISCOM carries 1 DofS of sundry pack items. The basic load of water is 5 gallons per soldier, carried on soldier vehicles. Units also carry full 400-gallon water trailers. The DISCOM carries four full 3,000-gallon bags of water, one per FSB and MSB. DISCOM stake and platform (S&P) trailers from the TMT company must carry the semitrailer mounted fabric tanks (SMFTs).

5. CLASS II

The division basic load is 15 DofS. Five DofS is carried at unit level, and the DISCOM carries 10 DofS. In addition, each soldier must carry two complete sets of BDOs (suit, gloves, filters boots). The DISCOM will carry one complete BDO per soldier in the division. Each battalion-sized element and separate company will maintain a basic load of personal effects bags and human remains pouches; the size of this basic load will be 10 percent of the authorized unit strength. The DISCOM will maintain a basic load of personal effects bags and human remains pouches equivalent to 10 percent of the division authorized strength.

6. CLASS III

The seventy 5,000-gallon tankers in the division will all be filled with JP-8. Each FSB and MSB will carry 1,500 gallons of MOGAS in 500-gallon collapsible drums. The division fuel system support point (FSSP) will contain JP-8. The DISCOM will carry 15 DofS of package products. Units will carry 5 DofS of package products.

7. CLASS IV

The DISCOM will carry 1 DofS of class IV. The DISCOM class IV basic load will consist of items

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APP 2 (SOP) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

needed to replace losses to unit vehicle basic loads. Unit vehicles will contain enough class IV to build fighting positions, mark TRPs, and provide aiming stakes for weapons. Class IV packages may include small quantities of wire, long pickets, and some lumber. They are not designed to build bunkers, but do enable units to construct a limited number of fighting positions with overhead cover. The following unit defensive pack CCLs are established:

- a. Alpha pack provides 250 meters of triple-standard concertina fence. One A pack consists of 54 rolls of wire, 134 long pickets, and 4 wire reels. Total weight is approximately 2,500 pounds.
- b. Bravo pack contains GP tape, obstacle, 140 meters long, weighing 117 pounds. This item is like a giant razor blade. It is packed in a Styrofoam box and springs out like a slinky toy.
- c. Charlie pack is a package of minefield wire that provides marking capability for a mined area. It consists of 134 pickets and 9 wire reels. Total weight is approximately 1,500 pounds.
- d. The following are division stockage objectives for unit defensive pack CCLs:
 - 48 Alpha packs
 - 320 Bravo packs
 - 240 Charlie packs

8. CLASS V. Units have been issued a full ammunition basic load. The following minepack CCLs are established:

- a. Delta pack provides 250 meters of row AT minefield. It consists of 148 M-21 mines. There are 4 per box; 91 pounds a box x 37 boxes = 3,367 pounds.
- b. Echo pack provides 250 meters of 0-1-0 armor-piercing (AP) minefield. It consists of 248 M-16 mines. There are 4 per box; 45 pounds a box x 62 boxes = 2,790 pounds.
- c. Foxtrot pack provides 48 M-18 Claymore mines. There are 6 per box; 53 pounds a box x 8 boxes = 424 pounds.
- d. Golf pack provides twelve 250- by 125-meter scatterable minefields for Volcano mine dispensers. Each pack consists of 12 pallets of M-87 Volcano mines. Each pallet contains 40 mine canisters; total 480 canisters. One Volcano system can hold 160 mine canisters (960 mines). Each canister contains five AT mines and one antipersonnel (APERS) mine. This package provides three Volcano dispenser loads; 40 per pallet; 1,700 pounds x 12 pallets = 20,400 pounds.
- e. The following are division stockage objectives for CCL minepacks:
 - 200 Delta packs
 - 80 Echo packs
 - 20 Foxtrot packs
 - 18 Golf packs

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APP 2 (SOP) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

- f. For COSCOM established ATP CCLs see X Corps OPLAN BRIDAL SPUR.
- g. Division Material Management Center (DMMC) ammunition managers will compute mix of flatracks and coordinate with CMMC for deliveries.
- h. Units other than DIVARTY must transload ammunition from flatracks to organic vehicles. DIVARTY units equipped with PLS vehicles will upload flatracks for movement to respective unit locations.

9. CLASS VI
NA.

10. CLASS VII.
None carried.

11. CLASS VIII

Units carry aid chests and bags with medics and at the battalion aid stations. Combat lifesaver bags are carried on each combat lifesaver. The DISCOM carries aid chests with FSB and MSB medical companies and 5 DofS of class VIII with the division medical supply office (DMSO).

12. CLASS IX

PLLs and the ASL will be constrained to fit in the division organic PLL and ASL vehicles. The DISCOM will carry a maximum of eight S&P trailer loads of major assemblies. The DMMC will determine the quantity and type of major assemblies.

13. TRANSPORTATION

Units will transport all MTOE items using organic assets. Vehicles assigned to the MSB TMT company will not be used to transport MTOE items or to augment MSC HQ. SeaLand containers, CONEXs, or similar containers not on the unit MTOE will not accompany units from SPODs and APODs to tactical sites. Organic unit vehicles will not be diverted from their intended MTOE mission to carry SeaLand and CONEX or other containers.

14. MAINTENANCE

- a. The G4 will determine repair time guidelines in coordination with the DISCOM commander.
- b. Recovery and evacuation responsibility:
 - (1) Unit-recovery from breakdown site to either UMCP or MCP
 - (2) DISCOM-evacuation from UMCP or MCP to division or corps MCP

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APP 2 (SOP) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

(3) COSCOM-backup recovery and evacuation as coordinated by DISCOM.

c. Vehicles in UMCPs and at BSA or DSA MCPs will be accompanied by crewmembers. The minimum number of soldiers that will stay with NMC vehicles is two per tracked vehicle and one per wheeled vehicle. Crewmembers will not accompany vehicles evacuated from the division area.

15. REFUEL-ON-THE-MOVE KITS

Each FSB and the MSB will maintain two ROM kits. Each ROM kit provides eight fuel points. Each fuel point can dispense fuel at a rate of 35 GPM.

16. WEAPON SYSTEM REPLACEMENT OPERATIONS (WSRO)

The division G4 will coordinate weapon system replacement operations. The division will employ WSRO procedures when the corps directs. The division WSRO site will be located in the DSA and operated by the MSB. The DISCOM XO is the division weapon system manager (WSM).

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APPENDIX 3 (STANDARD REQUIREMENT CODE) to ANNEX Q (SERVICE SUPPORT) to
OPERATION PLAN WHITE

| <i>Heavy division, mech inf (5x5x2)</i> | | | <i>Qty</i> | <i>Unit str</i> |
|---|-----------|---------------------------|------------|-----------------|
| | 87004L200 | HHC, INF DIV, (MECH) | 1 | 279 |
| AVN BDE ¹ | 01300L200 | DIVISION AVN BDE (HVY) | 1 | 1660 |
| | 01032L000 | HHC, DIV AVN BDE (HVY) | 1 | 81 |
| DIV CAV | 17285L400 | DIV CAV SQDN | 1 | 649 |
| | 17286L100 | HHT, DIV CAV | 1 | 202 |
| | 17287L100 | CAV TRP, CAV SQDN | 3 | 131 |
| | 01267L300 | AIR RECON TRP (OH-58D) | 2 | 27 |
| GSAB | 01305A000 | GENERAL SPT AVN BN | 1 | 332 |
| | 01306A000 | HHC, SPT AVN BN | 1 | 112 |
| | 01304L000 | COMMAND AVN CO | 1 | 72 |
| | 01307A000 | SUPPORT AVN CO | 2 | 35 |
| | 01309A000 | AVIATION UNIT MAINT | 1 | 78 |
| ATK HEL | 013851200 | ATTACK HEL BN (AH-64) | 2 | 299 |
| | 01386L200 | HHC, ATK HEL BN (AH-64) | 2 | 118 |
| | 01387L200 | ATTACK HEL CO (AH-64) | 6 | 33 |
| | 01389L200 | AVN UNIT MAINT (AH-54) | 2 | 82 |
| ENGR BDE | 05330L000 | ENGINEER BDE | 1 | 1371 |
| | 05332L000 | HHD, ENGINEER BDE | 1 | 57 |
| ENGR BN | 05335L000 | ENGR BN, HVY DIV | 3 | 438 |
| | 05336L000 | HHC ENGR BN, HVY DIV | 3 | 74 |
| | 05337L000 | ENGR CO, ENGR BN, HVY | 9 | 102 |
| | 05536L000 | SPT PLT, ENGR BN, HVY | 3 | 58 |
| DIVARTY ² | 06300L200 | MECH DIVARTY | 1 | 2570 |
| | 063021000 | HHB, DIV ARTY, HVY DIV | 1 | 193 |
| | 06303L000 | TGT ACQ BTRY HVY DIV | 1 | 77 |
| | 06398L000 | FA BTRY MLRS | 1 | 125 |
| FA BN | 06365L500 | FA BN 155SP HVY DIV (3x8) | 3 | 725 |
| | 06366L500 | HHB FA BN, 155SP (3x8) | 3 | 241 |
| | 06367L200 | FA BTRY 155SP (3x8) | 9 | 111 |
| | 06369L200 | SVC BTRY 155SP (3x8) | 3 | 151 |
| INF BDE | | | | 4030 |
| | 87042L200 | HHC INF DIV MECH BDE | 2 | 80 |

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APP 3 (SRC) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

| | | | <i>QTY</i> | <i>Unit str</i> |
|---------------------|-----------|----------------------------|------------|-----------------|
| INF BN ³ | 07245L500 | INF BN MECH | 5 | 774 |
| | 07246L200 | HHC INF BN MECH | 5 | 342 |
| | 07247L000 | RIFLE CO INF BN MECH | 20 | 108 |
| SIGNAL BN | 11065L100 | DIV SIG BN (MSE) | 1 | 397 |
| | 11066L100 | HHC DIV SIG BN MSE | 1 | 127 |
| | 11067L100 | AREA SIG CO MSE | 3 | 139 |
| | 11068L100 | SIG SPT CO MSE | 1 | 131 |
| ARMOR BDE | | | | 3105 |
| | 87042L100 | HHC ARMOR DIV (ARMOR) BDE | 1 | 80 |
| TANK BN | 17375L000 | ARMOR BN | 5 | 605 |
| | 17376L000 | HHC TK BN | 5 | 353 |
| | 17377L000 | TANK COMPANY, TK BN | 20 | 63 |
| MI BN | 34395A000 | MI BN HVY DIV | 1 | 375 |
| | 34396A000 | HHOC, MI BN (HVY) | 1 | 192 |
| | 34397A000 | MI CO (DIR SPT) MI BN | 3 | 27 |
| | 34398A000 | MI CO (GEN SPT) MI BN | 1 | 102 |
| ADA BN | 44175L300 | ADA BN, HVY DIV | 1 | 637 |
| | 44176L200 | HHB ADA BN HVY (MSCS) | 1 | 148 |
| | 44177L200 | ADA BTRY (SFV-8/STGR) | 3 | 118 |
| | 44178L200 | ADA BTRY (AVENGER) | 1 | 135 |
| MP CO | 19333L000 | MP CO, HVY DIV | 1 | 153 |
| CML CO | 03157L000 | CHEMICAL CO, HVY DIV | 1 | 177 |
| DIV BAND | 12113L000 | DIVISION & ARMY BAND (DS) | 1 | 41 |
| DISCOM ⁴ | 63004L000 | SPT CMD HVY DIV 5x5x2 | 1 | 3251 |
| | 63002L000 | HHC/MMC, SPT CMD, HVY DIV | 1 | 214 |
| MSB | 63135L000 | MAIN SUPPORT BN, HVY DIV | 1 | 1070 |
| | 63136L000 | HHD, MAIN SPT BN, HVY DIV | 1 | 79 |
| | 08057L000 | MEDICAL CO (MSB) HVY DIV | 1 | 131 |
| | 42007L100 | S&S CO MAIN SPT BN HVY DIV | 1 | 144 |
| | 42507LA00 | AUG-GRREG PLT | 1 | 36 |
| | 42507LC00 | AUG-ARID ENV WATER SECTION | 1 | 25 |
| | 55188L000 | TMT CO MAIN SPT BN HVY DIV | 1 | 178 |
| | 43007L000 | LIGHT ORDNANCE (MAINT) CO | 1 | 212 |
| | 43008L000 | HEAVY ORDNANCE (MAINT) CO | 1 | 171 |
| | 09008L100 | ORD MSL SPT CO HVY DIV | 1 | 94 |

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APP 3 (SRC) to ANX Q (SVC SPT) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

| | | | <i>Qty</i> | <i>Unit str</i> |
|----------------|-----------|-------------------------------|------------|-----------------|
| FSB | 63005L100 | FWD SPT BN (2x1) HVY DIV | 1 | 450 |
| | 63006L000 | HHD, FWD SPT BN HVY DIV | 1 | 49 |
| | 43009L000 | MAINT CO, FWD SPT BN, HVY DIV | 1 | 171 |
| | 08058L100 | MEDICAL CO (FSB) HVY DIV | 1 | 77 |
| | 42008L000 | SUP CO FWD SPT BN HVY DIV | 1 | 56 |
| | 43510LA00 | TANK SYSTEM SPT TM | 2 | 37 |
| | 43510LB00 | MF (MECH) SYS SPT TM | 1 | 23 |
| FSB | 63005L200 | FWD SPT BN (2x2) HVY DIV | 1 | 479 |
| | 63006L000 | HHD, FWD SPT BN HVY DIV | 1 | 49 |
| | 43009L000 | MAINT CO, FWD SPT BN, HVY DIV | 1 | 171 |
| | 08058L100 | MEDICAL CO (FSB) HVY DIV | 1 | 77 |
| | 420081000 | SUP CO FWD SPT BN HVY DIV | 1 | 56 |
| | 43510LA00 | TANK SYSTEM SPT TM | 2 | 37 |
| | 43510LB00 | INF (MECH) SYS SPT TM | 2 | 23 |
| | 43510LC00 | MISSILE SYS SPT TM | 1 | 6 |
| FSB | 63005L300 | FWD SPT BN (1x2) HVY DIV | 1 | 442 |
| | 63006L000 | HHD, FWD SPT BN HVY DIV | 1 | 49 |
| | 43009L000 | MAINT CO, FWD SPT BN, HVY DIV | 1 | 171 |
| | 08058L100 | MEDICAL CO (FSB) HVY DIV | 1 | 77 |
| | 42008L000 | SUP CO FWD SPT BN HVY DIV | 1 | 56 |
| | 43510LA00 | TANK SYSTEM SPT TM | 1 | 37 |
| | 43510LB00 | INF (MECH) SYS SPT TM | 2 | 23 |
| | 43510LC00 | MISSILE SYS SPT TM | 1 | 6 |
| DASB | 63885A200 | DIV AVN SPT BN, HVY DIV | 1 | 596 |
| | 63886A000 | HSC, SPT BN (AV) HVY DIV | 1 | 122 |
| | 01933A200 | AMC DASB (AH-64/OH58D) | 1 | 232 |
| | 01533AA00 | AMC REPAIR TM (AH-64/24) | 1 | 61 |
| | 43888A000 | GROUND MAINT CO DASB | 1 | 181 |
| DIVISION TOTAL | | | | 18046 |

¹DIVISION AVN BDE MODIFIED TO REFLECT GSAB; ATTACK BATTALIONS WITH OH-58 AND UH-60 REMOVED.

²DIVARTY MODIFIED TO REFLECT 3-L500 FA BNS VERSUS 1-L400, 1-L500, and 1-L600.

³MECH INF BNS MODIFIED TO REFLECT REMOVAL OF ANTIARMOR COMPANIES.

⁴DISCOM MODIFIED TO REFLECT DASB; AVIM REMOVED FROM SPT CMD.

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ANNEX T (DIVISION CONTINGENCY PLANS) to OPERATION PLAN WHITE

Appendixes: 1 - Contingency Plan BROWN DERBY (TBP)
 2 - Contingency Plan TOP HAT

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APPENDIX 2 (CONTINGENCY PLAN TOP HAT) to ANNEX T (DIVISION CONTINGENCY PLANS) to OPERATION PLAN WHITE

References: OPLAN WHITE.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: SIERRA.

Task Organization: No change to basic plan.

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.

(1) 2 Army has attacked 55th Mech Div with two MRDs in the first echelon. The army main attack axis was in the west. First-echelon regiments were not able to create a penetration for the second-echelon regiments and have established a hasty defense (defense in contact). The second-echelon regiments continued the attack but were not able to create a penetration for the second-echelon division; however, but have achieved a measure of success against 55th Mech Div defenses.

(2) The army commander now perceives a greater likelihood of success in creating a penetration in the east and has therefore shifted his main effort to commit the preponderance of the second-echelon division and the combined arms reserve along avenue of approach C. The 42 IMRB follows the second-echelon TD and, on commitment, is capable of continuing the attack on either avenue of approach B or C.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) X Corps continues to defend in sector.

(2) 10th Avn Bde (main effort) continues to conduct deep attacks against the second-echelon division and the IMRB.

(3) 208th ACR to the west continues to screen between TUTTLE Creek Lake and PERRY Lake.

(4) 313th Sep Mech Bde to the east continues to defend to fix 1 Army between PLATTE CITY (UP4658) and SMITHVILLE (UP6561).

(5) 25th Armd Div is still corps reserve and uncommitted at this time.

(6) CCC continues to defend the KANSAS CITY metropolitan area.

(7) Leavenworth Militia continues to defend in sector and maintain a coordinated defense with 55th Mech Div.

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APP 2 (CONPLAN TOP HAT) to ANX T (CONPLANS) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

(8) The Combined' Air Forces continue to provide combat air power support to 10th Corps and establish air superiority over the division sector during the counterattack.

c. Attachments and Detachments.

(1) Except as noted, OPLAN WHITE task organization in effect.

(2) 1-55 Avn (Atk) OO OPCON 1st Bde.

d. Assumptions.

(1) 2d Bde continues to contain 2 Army elements north of PL BLUE.

(2) 3d Bde can defeat two regiments; commitment of a third regiment against the brigade could result in 2d Bde (division main effort) being flanked by elements of 2 Army.

(3) Division deep operations can delay the arrival of follow-on units of 2 Army up to 2 hours and division deep operations can defeat the combined arms reserves (ITBs) of the first-echelon divisions prior to their commitment to the MBA.

(4) 3d Bde is capable of securing an LD/LC for the counterattack in the vicinity of PL YELLOW, assisting in the passage of lines, and blocking committed enemy forces.

(5) 2d Bde is capable of securing an LD/LC for the counterattack in the vicinity of PL YELLOW, assisting in the passage of lines, and blocking committed enemy forces,

(6) 1st Bde is available in AA LYNX and prepared to execute CONPLAN TOP HAT.

2. MISSION

OO, 55th Mech Div counterattacks to destroy follow-on regiments of the 2 Army in the vicinity of objective MUSTANG to prevent enemy from massing overwhelming combat power against 3d Bde in order to maintain the integrity of the containment of 2 Army.

3. EXECUTION

INTENT: Purpose: Prevent enemy forces from massing overwhelming combat power against 3d Bde in order to maintain the integrity of the containment of 2 Army.

End state: Enemy forces will be destroyed in obj MUSTANG. 1st Bde will be defending along a line from POTTER (UP155660) to MISSOURI River (vic UP220750) 2d Bde will still be containing elements of 2 Army along a line from VALLEY FALLS (UP8857) -- BRUSH Creek (TP9258) - HW16-HW92 (UP0156) -- EASTON (UP1757), and 3d Bde

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APP 2 (CONPLAN TOP HAT) to ANX T (CONPLANS) to OPLAN WHITE -- 55th Mech Div

blocking along a line from MILLWOOD (UP179612) -- 8 MILE HOUSE (UP240588) -- UP308578-UP326615. All units will be prepared to conduct offensive operations to clear enemy in zone to obj ROYAL.

Method: We will conduct this operation with a brigade-sized counterattack. This attack is the main effort for the division. The decisive action will take place in objective MUSTANG where a follow-on enemy regiment will be destroyed to maintain the integrity of the containment of 2 Army. A critical supporting effort will be the focus of the division deep fight to delay follow on units. I assume risk in this operation with no reserve during the counterattack.

a. Concept of Operation.

(1) Maneuver. 2d Bde is the main effort initially. 2d and 3d Bdes defend in sector in the west and east, respectively. 2d Bde continues to contain 2 Army to support 10th Avn Bde deep operations. 3d Bde blocks enemy forces to deny eastern avenue of approach and protect 2d Bde eastern flank from envelopment. OO, 1st Bde, division reserve in AA LYNX, becomes the main effort, counterattacks to destroy the first-echelon regiment of the second-echelon division in objective MUSTANG prior to its commitment against 3d Bde to maintain the integrity of the containment of 2 Army; then defend in sector along PL BLACK to block follow-on units to support the containment of 2 Army. 3d Bde reestablishes its defense along MILLWOOD -- 8 MILE HOUSE -- UP308578 -- UP326615 to block enemy forces in support of 1st Bde counterattack. 55th Avn Bde conducts deep operations to delay and disrupt commitment of the second-echelon regiments of the division. 4-23 Cav continues to screen division left flank to prevent enemy forces from penetrating 2d Bde flank and rear. CTF mechanized battalion continues as TCF and be prepared to recapture KANSAS River bridges at LECOMPTON (TP9324), LAWRENCE (UP0518, UP0616), DE SOTO (UP2916), and BONNER SPRINGS (UP3824) to secure LOC against Level III threat.

b. Tasks to Maneuver Units.

- (1) 1st Bde. Be prepared to continue the attack north toward objective ROYAL.
- (2) 2d Bde.
 - (a) Continue to contain 2 Army.
 - (b) Maintain contact with 1st and 3d Bde forces on right flank.
 - (c) Be prepared to attack north toward objective ROYAL.
 - (d) Secure an LD/LC for the counterattack in the vicinity of PL YELLOW, assist in the passage of lines, and block committed enemy forces.

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APP 2 (CONPLAN TOP HAT) to ANX T (CONPLANS) to OPLAN WHITE - 55th Mech Div

(3) 3d Bde.

(a) Secure an LD/LC for the counterattack in the vicinity of PL YELLOW, assist in the passage of lines, and block committed enemy forces.

(b) Be prepared to attack north toward objective ROYAL.

(4) 55th Avn Bde.

(a) OO, release 1-55 Avn (Atk) OPGON to 1st Bde during the counterattack.

(b) Be prepared to attack north toward objective ROYAL.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

No change to basic OPLAN.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command.

b. Signal. No change to basic OPLAN.

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COMBAT OPERATIONS

GLOSSARY

| | |
|-----------|---|
| AA | assembly area |
| AAA | antiaircraft artillery |
| AAG | army artillery group |
| AASLT | air assault |
| ABCCC | airborne battlefield command and control center |
| abn | airborne |
| ACE | analysis and control element; armored combat earthmover |
| acft | aircraft |
| acq | acquisition |
| ACR | armored cavalry regiment |
| ACRV | armored command and reconnaissance vehicle |
| AD | air defense |
| ADA | air defense artillery |
| ADAM | area denial artillery munition |
| ADE | assistant division engineer |
| adrp | airdrop |
| AE | aerial exploitation |
| AG | adjutant general |
| AGRA | army group rocket artillery |
| AI | air interdiction; area of interest |
| AIS | Accountable Instructional System |
| al | airlift |
| altn | alternate |
| amb | ambulance |
| AMC | aircraft maintenance company |
| ammo | ammunition |
| ANG | Army National Guard |
| anx | annex |
| AO | area of operations |
| AOF | azimuth of fire |
| AP | antipersonnel; armor piercing |
| APDS | armor-piercing, discarding sabot |
| APFSDS | armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot |
| API | armor piercing, incendiary |
| APOD | aerial port of debarkation |
| app | appendix |
| AQF | Advance QUICKFIX |
| ARFORCENT | United States Army Forces, Centralia |
| arm | armored |
| arty | artillery |
| ASAP | as soon as possible |
| asgd | assigned |
| ASL | authorized stockage list |
| aslt | assault |
| ASMB | area support medical battalion |
| ASP | ammunition supply point |
| assy | assembly |
| AT | antitank |

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| | |
|--------------------|---|
| ATACMS | Army Tactical Missile System |
| ATGM | antitank guided missile |
| atk | attack |
| ATMCT | air traffic movement control team |
| ATO | air tasking order |
| ATP | ammunition transfer point |
| ATS | air traffic services |
| aug | augmentation |
| auth | authorized |
| AVIM | aviation intermediate maintenance |
| AVLB | armored-vehicle-launched bridge |
| avn | aviation |
| AVUM | aviation unit maintenance |
| AXP | ambulance exchange point |
| BCC | battlefield circulation control |
| BDA | battle damage assessment |
| bde | brigade |
| BDO | battle dress overgarment |
| BFV | Bradley fighting vehicle |
| BHL | battle handover line |
| BMCT | beginning morning civil twilight |
| BMNT | beginning morning nautical twilight |
| bmr | bomber |
| bn | battalion |
| BOS | battlefield operating system |
| bot | bottle |
| BP | battle position |
| brg | bridge |
| BSA | brigade support area |
| BSFV | Bradley Stinger fighting vehicle |
| btry | battery |
| C ² | command and control |
| C ² SRS | command and control strength reporting system |
| C ² W | command and control warfare |
| C ³ | command, control, and communications |
| CA | civil affairs |
| CAA | combined arms army |
| CAB | command aviation battalion |
| CAC | command aviation company |
| cal | caliber |
| carr | carrier |
| CAS | close air support |
| catk | counterattack |
| cav | cavalry |
| cbt | combat |
| CCC | Centralia Capital Command |
| CCIR | commander's critical information requirements |
| CCL | combat-configured load |
| CDMP | combat decisionmaking process |

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| | |
|------------------|---|
| cen | center |
| CFFZ | call-for-fire zone |
| CFL | coordinated fire line |
| CFV | cavalry fighting vehicle |
| CG | commanding general |
| cgo | cargo |
| CGSOC | Command and General Staff Officer Course |
| ch | changing |
| chg | charge; charging |
| CI | civilian internee |
| CINCFORCENT | Commander in Chief, United States Forces, Centralia |
| CMCC | corps movement control center |
| cml | chemical |
| CMMC | corps materiel management center |
| CMO | civil-military operations |
| CMOC | civil-military operations center |
| cntnr | container |
| co | company |
| COA | course of action |
| CofS | chief of staff |
| coll | collection |
| COMAFFORCENT | Commander, United States Air Force Forces, Centralia |
| COMARFORCENT | Commander, United States Army Forces, Centralia |
| comp | composition |
| COMSOFCENT | Commander, United States Special Operations Forces, Centralia |
| con | control |
| CONEX | container express |
| CONUS | continental United States |
| conv | conventional |
| COP | command observation post |
| COSCOM | corps support command |
| CP | command post |
| Cphd | Copperhead |
| CRECON | counterreconnaissance |
| cross | crossing |
| CRP | combat reconnaissance patrol |
| crypto | cryptographic |
| CS | combat support |
| CSAB | combat support aviation battalion |
| CSB | corps support battalion |
| CSC | combat stress control |
| CSE | combat support equipment |
| CSG | corps support group |
| CSH | combat support hospital |
| CSR | controlled supply rate |
| CSS | combat service support |
| CTC | combat training center |
| CTF | Centralian Territorial Forces |
| ctg | cartridge |
| CVC | combat vehicle crewman |
| D ³ A | decide-detect-deliver-assess |

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| | |
|---------|---|
| DAG | division artillery group |
| DAO | division ammunition officer |
| DASB | division aviation support battalion |
| DD | duration of solar darkness |
| DDMP | deliberate decisionmaking process |
| decon | decontamination |
| demo | demolition |
| dent | dental |
| det | detachment; detonator |
| DF | direction finding |
| DISCOM | division support command |
| dispo | disposition |
| div | division |
| DIVARTY | division artillery |
| DIVEN | division engineer |
| DMMC | division materiel management center |
| DMSO | division medical supply office |
| DOCC | deep operations coordination cell |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| DODIC | Department of Defense identification code |
| DofS | days of supply |
| DP | decision point |
| DPICM | dual purpose, improved, conventional munition |
| DS | direct support |
| DSA | division support area |
| DSETS | Direct Support Enhanced Test Set |
| dsl | diesel |
| DST | decision support template |
| DSU | direct support unit |
| DT | dwelt time |
| DTO | division transportation officer |
| EA | electronic attack; engagement area |
| EOA | enemy course of action |
| EECT | ending evening civil twilight |
| EEFI | essential elements of friendly information |
| EENT | ending evening nautical twilight |
| eff | effectiveness |
| elec | electric |
| ELO | enabling learning objective |
| en | enemy |
| enr | engineer |
| entom | entomology |
| environ | environment |
| EPW | enemy prisoner of war |
| equip | equipment |
| ES | electronic support |
| ESD | estimated shipment date |
| ESP | engineer supply point |
| evac | evacuation |
| excv | excavator |
| ext | extract |

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| | |
|--------------|--|
| FA | field artillery |
| FASCAM | family of scatterable mines |
| FC | fire control |
| FD | forward detachment |
| FEBA | forward edge of the battle area |
| FFIR | friendly forces information requirements |
| FG | finance group |
| fin | finance |
| FISTV | fire support team vehicle |
| fld | field |
| FLOT | forward line of own troops |
| fltbrg | floatbridge |
| FMC | fully mission capable |
| FMI | percent of illumination at first moonlight at or after ending evening twilight |
| nautical FMI | twilight |
| FMT | first moonlight at or after ending evening nautical twilight |
| FOB | forward operating base |
| frag | fragmentary |
| FS | fire support |
| FSB | forward support battalion |
| FSCL | fire support coordination line |
| FSCM | fire support coordinating measure |
| FSCOOD | fire support coordinator |
| FSE | fire support element |
| FSSP | fuel system supply point |
| ftt | fighter |
| fwd | forward |
| gal | gallon |
| GB | green bag |
| GEMSS | ground-emplaced, mine-scattering system |
| genr | generator |
| GMT | Greenwich Mean Time |
| gnd | ground |
| gp | group |
| Gp | general purpose |
| GPM | gallons per minute |
| gren | grenade |
| GRREG | graves registration |
| GS | general support |
| GSAB | general support aviation battalion |
| GSU | general support unit |
| HC | hexachloroethane (smoke) |
| HCP | health and comfort pack |
| HE-MP-T | high explosive, antitank, multipurpose-tracer |
| HEDP | high explosive, dual purpose |
| HEI | high explosive, incendiary |
| hel | helicopter |
| HEMTT | heavy, expanded mobility, tactical truck |
| HEP | high-explosive, plastic |
| HET | heavy-equipment transporter |

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| | |
|---------|---|
| HHB | headquarters and headquarters battery |
| HHC | headquarters and headquarters company |
| HHB | headquarters and headquarters detachment |
| HHOC | headquarters, headquarters and operations company |
| HIDACZ | high-density airspace control zone |
| HM | hours of moonlight |
| HMMWV | high-mobility |
| HNH | hours with no moon |
| HNS | host nation support |
| how | howitzer |
| HPTL | high-payoff target list |
| HUMINT | human intelligence |
| HVT | high-value target |
| HVTL | high-value target list |
| hvy | heavy |
| hyd | hydraulic |
| IAW | in accordance with |
| ICE | individual chemical equipment |
| ICM | improved conventional munition |
| IEW | intelligence and electronic warfare |
| IG | inspector general |
| illum | illumination |
| IMRB | independent motorized rifle brigade |
| indep | independent |
| infect | infectious |
| Intel | intelligence |
| INTSUM | intelligence summary |
| IPB | intelligence preparation of the battlefield |
| IR | information requirements; infrared |
| ITB | independent tank battalion |
| J-SEAD | joint suppression of enemy air defenses |
| J-STARS | Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System |
| JA | judge advocate |
| JCS | Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| JSCP | Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan |
| kg | kilogram |
| KIA | killed in action |
| km | kilometer |
| kmph | kilometers per hour |
| lchr | launcher |
| LCSS | land combat support system |
| LD/LC | line of departure is line of contact |
| ldr | loader |
| LIF | logistics intelligence file |
| LIN | line item number |
| LMI | percent illumination at last moonlight at or before beginning morning nautical LMI1 twilight |
| LMT | last moonlight at or before beginning morning nautical twilight |

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| | |
|---------|---|
| LOC | lines of communication |
| log | logistic |
| LP/C | launch pod/container |
| LSA | logistics support area |
| lt | light |
| MA | mortuary affairs |
| maint | maintenance |
| MANPADS | man-portable air defense system |
| MASH | mobile Army surgical hospital |
| mat | material |
| MBA | main battle area |
| MC | maneuver corridor; mission capable |
| MCC | movement control center |
| MCO | movement control officer |
| MCOO | modified combined obstacle overlay |
| MCP | maintenance collection point |
| MCT | movement control team |
| mdm | medium |
| ME | main effort |
| mech | mechanized |
| med | medical |
| MEDCOM | medical command |
| met | meteorological |
| METT-T | mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and time available |
| MGB | medium girder bridge |
| MHB | medium helicopter battalion |
| MI | military intelligence |
| MIA | missing in action |
| MICLIC | mine-clearing line charge |
| MILVAN | military-owned demountable container |
| MLC | military load classification |
| MLRS | multiple launch rocket system |
| MMC | materiel management center |
| MOADS | maneuver-oriented ammunition system |
| MOD | mobile obstacle detachment |
| MOGAS | motor gasoline |
| MOPMS | modular pack mine system |
| MOPP | mission-oriented protective posture |
| mort | mortar |
| MOUT | military operations on urbanized terrain |
| MP | military police |
| MPSM | multipurpose submunition |
| MRB | motorized rifle battalion |
| MRC | motorized rifle company |
| MRD | motorized rifle division |
| MRE | meal, ready-to-eat |
| MRL | multiple rocket launcher |
| MRR | motorized rifle regiment |
| MRT | movement regulating team |
| MSB | main support battalion |
| MSC | major subordinate command |

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| | |
|------------|--|
| MSD | movement support detachment |
| MSE | mobile subscriber equipment |
| msl | missile |
| MSR | main supply route |
| MST | maintenance support team |
| MT | motor transport |
| mtd | mounted |
| MTOE | modified table of organization and equipment |
| MTSQ | mechanical time, superquick |
| NA | not applicable |
| NBC | nuclear, biological, and chemical |
| NEO | noncombatant evacuation order |
| NET | not earlier than |
| neurosurg | neurosurgeon |
| NICAD | nickel-cadmium |
| NLT | not later than |
| NMC | not mission capable |
| no | number |
| NRS | Nonresident Studies |
| NSL | nonstockage list |
| nuc | nuclear |
| NVG | night-vision goggles |
| obs | obstacle |
| OEG | operational exposure guidance |
| CH | on hand |
| OMG | operational maneuver group |
| OO | on order |
| op | operation |
| OPCON (to) | (under the) operational control (of) |
| OPLAN | operation plan |
| OPORD | operation order |
| ord | ordnance |
| ORF | operational readiness float |
| org | organization |
| PA | position area |
| PAC | personnel and administration center |
| PAO | public affairs office |
| para | parachute |
| PASR | personnel accounting and strength reporting |
| PD | point detonating |
| PDY | present for duty |
| PE | practical exercise |
| pers | personnel |
| PERSCOM | personnel command |
| pkg | package |
| PL | phase line |
| PLL | prescribed load list |
| PLS | palletized loading system |
| plt | platoon |

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| | |
|--------|--|
| PM | preventive medicine; provost marshal |
| PMCS | preventive maintenance checks and services |
| POL | petroleum, oil and lubricants |
| POMCUS | pre-positioned material configured to unit sets |
| pon | pontoon |
| pos | position |
| PP | passage point |
| prod | product |
| prop | propelling (charge) |
| prosth | prosthodontics |
| prot | protection |
| PSB | personnel service battalion |
| PSR | personnel status report |
| PSYOP | psychological operations |
| PTO | Plains Theater of Operations |
| PW | prisoner of war |
| QDMP | quick decisionmaking process |
| QM | quartermaster |
| R | reinforcing |
| R&S | reconnaissance and surveillance |
| RAAMS | remote antiarmor mine system |
| RADREL | radio relay |
| RAG | regimental artillery group |
| RAOC | rear area operations center |
| RAP | rocket-assisted projectile |
| RB | red bag |
| rcvry | recovery |
| rdo | radio |
| REC | radioelectronic combat |
| RECCE | reconnaissance (Air Force term) |
| recon | reconnaissance |
| REG | repair and evacuation group |
| regt | regiment |
| rep | repair |
| repl | replacement |
| RES | radiation exposure status |
| RISTA | reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition |
| rkt | rocket |
| ROM | refuel on the move |
| ROWPU | reverse osmosis water purification unit |
| RP | red phosphorus |
| RSSP | ration supplement sundries pack |
| RTD | return to duty |
| S&P | stake and platform |
| S&R | search and rescue |
| S&S | supply and services |
| S&T | supply and transport |
| SAM | surface-to-air missile |
| sani | sanitation |

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| | |
|-----------|--|
| SAR | search and rescue |
| SAW | squad automatic weapon |
| scty | security |
| SEAD | suppression of enemy air defenses |
| sec | section |
| SEE | small emplacement excavator |
| sep | separate |
| SFV | Stinger fighting vehicle |
| SIDPERS | Standard Installation/Division Personnel System |
| sig | signal |
| SITEMP | situation template |
| SJA | staff judge advocate |
| SLCR | shower, laundry, and clothing repair |
| SMFT | semitrailer-mounted fabric tank |
| SOCCE | special operations command and control element |
| SOF | special operations forces |
| SOP | standing operating procedure |
| SP | self-propelled |
| spd | speed |
| SPF | special purpose forces |
| SPOD | sea port of debarkation |
| spt | support |
| sqdn | squadron |
| SSM | surface-to-surface missile |
| sta | station |
| STON | short ton |
| str | strength |
| subsist | subsistence |
| sup | supply |
| SUPPT | supply point |
| surg | surgery |
| svc | service |
| sys | system |
| | |
| T | towed; tracer |
| TAACOM | theater army area command |
| tac | tactics |
| TACCS | Tactical Army Combat Service Support (CSS) Computer System |
| TACFIRE | Tactical Fire Direction System |
| TACSATCOM | tactical satellite communications |
| TAI | target area of interest |
| TASS | Total Army School System |
| TB | tank battalion |
| TBP | to be published |
| TCF | tactical combat forces |
| TD | tank division |
| TDMP | tactical decisionmaking process |
| TE | tactical exploitation |
| TF | task force |
| TFE | tactical field exchange |
| tgt | target |
| tk | tank |

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